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Abstract	  (English)	  This	  PhD	  Thesis	  wants	  to	  contribute	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  why	  people	  vote	  the	  way	  we	  do.	  Adhering	   the	   critique	  by	   John	  Goldthorpe	   (2000),	   advocating	   for	   the	  reintegration	  of	  research	  and	  theory	  in	  sociology,	  this	  work	  follows	  a	  methodology	  based	   on	   (1)	   the	   description	   of	   the	   studied	   phenomenon	   and	   the	   detection	   of	  empirical	  trends	  and,	  (2)	  the	  explanation	  of	  these	  trends	  through	  theory.	  Thus,	  the	  first	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   describes	   spatial	   trends	   of	   electoral	   behavior	   taking	   into	  account	   data	   from	   the	   Spanish	   general	   elections	   (1977-­‐2011);	   we	   have	   chosen	  Spain	   as	   a	   case	   study	  because	   there	   is	   no	   international	   comparative	  dataset	   and	  because	   Spain	   presents	   enough	   internal	   variation	   in	   order	   to	   detect	   empirical	  trends	   affecting	   relevant	   variables,	   like	   class	   and	   national	   identity.	   We	   develop	  methodological	   critiques	   regarding	   the	  measurement	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   these	   two	  relevant	   variables	   on	   electoral	   behavior.	   In	   the	   second	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   we	  proceed	   to	   explain	   the	   detected	   trends.	   Thus,	   after	   a	   review	   of	   the	   currently	  dominant	  theoretical	  frameworks,	  we	  observe	  that	  their	  predictions	  do	  not	  always	  fit	  the	  described	  empirical	  trends,	  so	  we	  propose	  a	  new	  theoretical	  approach	  that	  fits	  the	  empirical	  trends	  detected	  in	  our	  data.	  Consequently,	  we	  have	  developed	  a	  new	  model	  of	  practice,	  departing	  from	  Bourdieu’s	  initial	  schema	  (Bourdieu,	  1987).	  This	  new	  model,	  we	  argue,	   can	  help	   to	  solve	  some	  of	   the	  problems	  posed	  by	   the	  schemes	  that	  today	  dominate	  the	  field	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  theory,	  i.e.,	  the	  models	  of	  Columbia,	  Michigan,	  and	  Rochester.	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Abstract	  (Galician)	  Esta	  Tese	  de	  Doutoramento	  quere	  contribuir	  para	  a	  nosa	  comprensión	  de	  por	  que	  a	   xente	   votamos	   da	   forma	   en	   que	   o	   facemos.	   Adherindo	   a	   crítica	   de	   John	  Goldthorpe	   (2000),	   que	   propón	   a	   reintegración	   de	   investigación	   e	   teoría	   na	  socioloxía,	   este	   traballo	   segue	   unha	  metodoloxía	   baseada	   en	   (1)	   a	   descrición	   do	  fenómeno	  estudado	  e	  a	  detección	  de	  regularidades	  empíricas	  e,	   (2)	  a	  explicación	  destas	   tendencias	   a	   través	   da	   teoría.	   Así,	   a	   primeira	   parte	   desta	   tese	   describe	  tendencias	   espaciais	   do	   comportamento	   electoral	   con	   datos	   das	   eleccións	   xerais	  españolas	   (1977-­‐2011);	   escollemos	   España	   como	   estudo	   de	   caso	   porque	   non	  dispomos	   dun	   conxunto	   de	   datos	   comparativo	   internacional	   e	   porque	   España	  presenta	   suficiente	   variación	   interna	   para	   poder	   detectar	   tendencias	   empíricas	  que	   afectan	   variábeis	   de	   relevancia,	   como	   a	   clase	   e	   a	   identidade	   nacional.	  Desenvolvemos	   críticas	   metodolóxicas	   atinxentes	   á	   medición	   do	   impacto	   destas	  dúas	   variábeis	   sobre	   o	   comportamento	   electoral.	   Na	   segunda	   parte	   desta	   tese	  explicamos	   as	   tendencias	   detectadas.	   Así,	   após	   unha	   revisión	   dos	   actuais	   cadros	  teóricos	  dominantes,	  observamos	  que	  as	  súas	  predicións	  non	  sempre	  se	  axustan	  ás	  tendencias	  empíricas	  descritas,	  polo	  que	  propomos	  un	  novo	  enfoque	  teórico	  que	  si	  o	   faga.	  En	  consecuencia,	  desenvolvimos	  un	  novo	  modelo	  da	  práctica,	  partindo	  do	  esquema	   inicial	  de	  Bourdieu	   (1987).	  Dito	  modelo,	  argumentamos,	  pode	  axudar	  a	  solventar	  algúns	  dos	  problemas	  presentados	  polos	  esquemas,	  hoxe	  dominantes	  na	  teoría	  do	  comportamento	  electoral,	  de	  Columbia,	  Michigan	  e	  Rochester.	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Abstract	  (Spanish)	  Esta	  Tesis	  Doctoral	  quiere	  contribuir	  a	  nuestra	  comprensión	  de	  por	  qué	   la	  gente	  votamos	  de	  la	   forma	  en	  que	  lo	  hacemos.	  Abrazando	  la	  crítica	  de	  John	  Goldthorpe	  (2000),	  que	  propone	  la	  reintegración	  de	   investigación	  y	  teoría	  en	  sociología,	  este	  trabajo	   sigue	   una	   metodología	   basada	   en	   (1)	   la	   descripción	   del	   fenómeno	  estudiado	  y	   la	  detección	  de	  regularidades	  empíricas	  y,	   (2)	   la	  explicación	  de	  estas	  tendencias	   con	   la	   teoría.	   Así,	   la	   primera	   parte	   de	   esta	   tesis	   describe	   tendencias	  espaciales	   del	   comportamiento	   electoral	   con	   datos	   de	   las	   elecciones	   generales	  españolas	  (1977-­‐2011);	  hemos	  escogido	  España	  como	  estudio	  de	  caso	  porque	  no	  disponemos	  de	  un	  conjunto	  de	  datos	  comparativo	  internacional	  y	  porque	  España	  presenta	   suficiente	   variación	   interna	   para	   poder	   detectar	   tendencias	   empíricas	  que	   afectan	   variables	   de	   relevancia,	   como	   la	   clase	   y	   la	   identidad	   nacional.	  Desarrollamos	  críticas	  metodológicas	  concernientes	  a	   la	  medición	  del	   impacto	  de	  estas	  dos	  variables	  sobre	  el	  comportamiento	  electoral.	  En	  la	  segunda	  parte	  de	  esta	  tesis	   explicamos	   las	   tendencias	   detectadas.	   Así,	   tras	   una	   revisión	   de	   los	   actuales	  cuadros	   teóricos	   dominantes,	   observamos	   que	   sus	   predicciones	   no	   siempre	   se	  ajustan	   a	   las	   tendencias	   empíricas	   descritas,	   por	   lo	   que	   proponemos	   un	   nuevo	  enfoque	   teórico	   que	   sí	   lo	   haga.	   En	   consecuencia,	   hemos	   desarrollado	   un	   nuevo	  modelo	   de	   la	   práctica,	   partiendo	   del	   esquema	   inicial	   de	   Bourdieu	   (1987).	   Dicho	  modelo,	   argumentamos,	   puede	   ayudar	   a	   solventar	   algunos	   de	   los	   problemas	  presentados	  por	   los	   esquemas,	   hoy	  dominantes	   en	   la	   teoría	  del	   comportamiento	  electoral,	  de	  Columbia,	  Michigan	  y	  Rochester.	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Resumen	  extenso	  en	  español	  	  
(En	  cumplimiento	  del	  Art.	  33	  del	  REDUDC)	  
La	  investigación	  sociológica	  atraviesa	  una	  fase	  de	  crisis	  prolongada	  cuyas	  raíces	  se	  remontan,	  si	  no	  antes,	  a	   los	  años	  60	  del	  siglo	  XX.	  Por	  aquel	  entonces	  se	  abrió	  un	  debate	   entre	   la	   intelectualidad	   alemana	   que	   acabó	   por	   ser	   conocido	   como	  
Positivismusstreit,	  la	  disputa	  sobre	  el	  positivismo	  (Adorno	  et	  al.	  1976[1969]).	  En	  él	  participaron,	  por	  un	  lado,	  los	  partidarios	  del	  Kritischer	  Rationalismus	  liderados	  por	  Karl	   Popper	   y,	   por	   el	   otro,	   personalidades	   cercanas	   al	   círculo	   de	   la	   Escuela	   de	  Frankfurt,	   defensores	   de	   la	   Kritischer	   Theorie.	   Mientras	   que	   los	   seguidores	   de	  Popper	  (1959[1934])	  argumentaban	  que	  la	  sociología	  podría	  mantener	  un	  modelo	  de	   investigación	   análogo	   al	   del	   resto	   de	   las	   ciencias,	   los	   partidarios	   del	  racionalismo	   crítico	   entendían	   que	   el	   estudio	   de	   la	   sociedad	   estaba	  intrínsecamente	   unido	   a	   cuestiones	   filosóficas	   profundas,	   que	   inhibían	   la	  posibilidad	   de	   emplear	   un	   esquema	   basado	   en	   (1)	   la	   observación	   y	   (2)	   la	  explicación.	   La	   crítica	   a	   una	   sociología	   científica	   no	   hizo	   sino	   acentuarse	   tras	   el	  impacto	  que	  supuso	  el	  postmodernismo	  en	   la	  escena	   intelectual	  mundial	  a	  partir	  de	   los	  años	  70	  del	   s.	  XX	  y	  hasta	  comienzos	  del	  nuevo	  siglo.	  Esto	  es	  así	  porque	  el	  influjo	   del	   postmodernismo	   no	   sólo	   negaba	   la	   posibilidad	   de	   una	   sociología	  científica,	  sino	  la	  idea	  misma	  de	  producir	  conocimiento	  científico	  sobre	  la	  realidad,	  no	   sólo	   social.	   Esta	   crítica	   general	   al	   conocimiento	   científico	   tomó	   tres	   formas	  distintas:	   	   relativismo	   cognitivo,	   relativismo	  perceptivo	  y	   relativismo	  epistémico.	  La	  primera	  de	  estas	   formas	  de	  relativismo	  se	  basa	  en	   la	   idea	  de	  que	   la	  ciencia	  es	  una	  empresa	  necesariamente	  dependiente	  del	  contexto	  histórico	  y	  social	  en	  que	  se	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lleva	  a	  cabo;	  de	  este	  modo,	  cabría	  esperar	  que	  desarrollos	  científicos	  en	  contextos	  diferentes	  produjesen	  conclusiones	  divergentes.	  En	   segundo	   lugar,	   el	   relativismo	  perceptivo	  parte	  de	  una	  concepción	  contextual	  de	  la	  propia	  realidad;	  así	  pues,	  sus	  proponentes	  consideran	  que	   la	  realidad	  es	  un	  constructo	  social,	  producto	  de	  una	  particular	   red	  de	   relaciones	   y	   determinado,	   o	  muy	   influenciado	   al	  menos,	   por	   el	  lenguaje,	   recordando	   la	   vieja	   proposición	   de	   Wittgenstein:	   ‘Los	   límites	   de	   mi	  lenguaje	  son	  los	   límites	  de	  mi	  mundo’	  (Wittgenstein,	  2004[1921]).	  Finalmente,	  el	  relativismo	  epistemológico	  niega	   la	  existencia	  de	  una	  verdad	  objetiva,	  que	  pueda	  ser	   iluminada	   haciendo	   uso	   de	   la	   razón.	   Estas	   tres	   formas	   de	   relativismo,	   que	  cuestionan	  la	  validez	  del	  método	  científico,	  afectaron	  de	  forma	  muy	  acusada	  a	  las	  ciencias	   sociales	   y,	   en	   particular,	   a	   la	   sociología	   y	   antropología	   modernas.	   Sin	  embargo,	  la	  reacción	  a	  dichas	  críticas	  no	  se	  hizo	  esperar	  y,	  durante	  la	  década	  de	  los	  90	   del	   s.	   XX,	   tuvieron	   lugar	   las	   conocidas	   como	   ‘guerras	   de	   la	   ciencia’	   (Parsons,	  2003).	  Los	  contendientes	   fueron,	  por	  un	   lado,	  autores	  postmodernos	  y,	  por	  otro,	  científicos	  activos	  en	  disciplinas	   tan	  dispares	  como	   la	   física	  o	   la	  biología.	  Muchos	  autores	   señalan	   que	   la	   contra-­‐crítica	   a	   favor	   de	   la	   ciencia	   superó	   con	   creces	   los	  argumentos	  esgrimidos	  por	  los	  postmodernos	  y,	  así,	  entramos	  en	  el	  siglo	  XXI	  con	  una	   fe	   renovada	   en	   la	   posibilidad	   de	   generar	   conocimiento	   científico	   sobre	   la	  realidad	   social.	   Tal	   vez	   la	   obra	   de	   John	  Goldthorpe,	  On	  Sociology	   (2000)	   se	   haya	  convertido	   en	   la	   defensa	   más	   emblemática	   de	   dicha	   renovación	   en	   aras	   de	   una	  sociología	  científica.	  Nuestro	  trabajo	  parte	  de	  la	  que	  quizás	  sea	  la	  proposición	  más	  representativa	  de	  la	  crítica	  elaborada	  por	  el	  sociólogo	  británico,	   la	  integración	  de	  investigación	  y	  teoría.	  Así	  pues,	  para	  Goldthorpe,	  el	  ‘escándalo	  de	  la	  sociología’,	  se	  refiere	   a	   la	  disociación	  entre	   teoría	   e	   investigación	  que	  afecta	   a	   la	  disciplina	  por	  partida	   doble.	   Por	   un	   lado,	   hay	   una	   tendencia	   hacia	   la	   reificación	   de	   la	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metodología,	   que	   a	   veces	   parece	   olvidarse	   de	   su	   cometido	   práctico	   y	   su	   papel	  habilitador	  de	   construcción	   teórica.	   Por	  otro,	   si	   cabe	  más	   grave,	   es	   evidente	  que	  muchos	   sociólogos/as	   han	   optado	   por	   elaborar	   teoría	   sin	   atender	   a	   la	  investigación	   empírica,	   en	   un	   ejercicio	   que	   no	   va	   mucho	   más	   allá	   del	   diálogo	  erudito.	  Como	  consecuencia,	  Goldthorpe	  reclama	  que	  la	  sociología	  debe	  recuperar	  la	   integración	  de	   investigación	   y	   teoría	   para	   retomar	  plenamente	   su	  posición	  de	  igual	  entre	  el	  resto	  de	  las	  disciplinas	  científicas.	  Esta	  integración	  debe	  obedecer,	  de	  forma	  primaria	   y	   fundamental,	   a	   un	   esquema	  por	   el	   cual,	   primero,	   se	   realice	   un	  trabajo	   de	   investigación	   empírica	   capaz	   de	   identificar	   tendencias	   empíricas	  regulares	   en	   conjuntos	   de	   datos	   agregados,	   indicativas,	   pues,	   de	   la	   existencia	   de	  fenómenos	   sociales	   para,	   en	   segundo	   lugar,	   proporcionar	   una	   explicación	  adecuada	  de	  dichas	  tendencias	  a	  través	  de	  la	  teoría.	  
De	  este	  modo,	  tras	  asumir	  el	  enfoque	  propuesto	  por	  Goldthorpe,	  hemos	  procedido	  a	  organizar	  la	  investigación	  del	  siguiente	  modo.	  En	  primer	  lugar	  analizando	  datos	  agregados	  del	  comportamiento	  electoral	  para,	  en	  segundo	  lugar,	  poder	  explicar	  las	  tendencias	  empíricas	  detectadas	  a	  través	  de	  la	  teoría.	  Dado	  que	  no	  disponemos	  de	  una	   base	   de	   datos	   internacional	   con	   información	   del	   comportamiento	   electoral	  implementado	   por	   la	   ciudadanía	   con	   derecho	   a	   voto,	   optamos	   por	   tomar	   en	  consideración	   datos	   de	   dicho	   comportamiento	   para	   las	   elecciones	   generales	   de	  España	   (período	   1977-­‐2011).	   Nuestra	   elección	   de	   España	   como	   estudio	   de	   caso	  obedece	  a	  dos	  motivos	  que	  consideramos	  bien	  fundamentados	  a	  nivel	  científico.	  El	  primero	   de	   ellos	   tiene	   que	   ver	   con	   la	   labor	   que	   el	   Centro	   de	   Investigaciones	  Sociológicas	   ha	   venido	   desarrollando	   desde	   su	   fundación	   en	   1963,	   si	   bien	  inicialmente	   se	   conocía	   como	   Instituto	   de	   la	   Opinión	   Pública.	   Dicha	   labor	   ha	  proporcionado	   a	   la	   comunidad	   científica	   un	   gran	   conjunto	  de	  datos	   que	  permite	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muchas	   veces	   la	   comparación	   de	   variables	   análogas	   a	   lo	   largo	   de	   los	   años.	   Esta	  información	   es,	   además,	   totalmente	   accesible	   y	   pública,	   permitiendo	   la	  contrastación	  de	  hipótesis	   empíricas.	   La	   investigación	  de	   variables	   sociopolíticas	  ha	  sido,	  por	  añadidura,	  prioritaria	  a	   lo	   largo	  de	   la	  historia	  del	  CIS,	   lo	  que	  resulta	  particularmente	  beneficioso	  para	  nuestro	  trabajo.	   	  En	  segundo	  lugar,	  siguiendo	  la	  propuesta	   desarrollada	   por	   Linz	   y	  Montero	   (2001),	   la	   realidad	   española	   invita	   a	  considerar	   la	   existencia	   de	   no	   uno,	   sino	   varios	   sistemas	   políticos	   en	   su	   interior.	  Esto	  es	  así	  debido	  a	  la	  impronta	  diferencial	  de	  dos	  variables	  cuya	  relevancia	  en	  la	  teoría	  del	  comportamiento	  electoral	  es	  muy	  elevada:	  la	  clase	  social	  y	  la	  identidad	  nacional.	   Además,	   el	   caso	   español	   permite	   la	   consideración	   de	   otras	   variables	  igualmente	   relevantes	   en	   el	   estudio	   del	   comportamiento	   electoral,	   como	   los	  liderazgos,	  la	  religión,	  la	  ideología,	  etc.	  
De	  este	  modo,	  hemos	  comenzado	  nuestra	   investigación	  con	   la	  realización	  de	  una	  serie	   de	   análisis	   de	   estadística	   espacial	   que	   permitiesen	   la	   identificación	   de	  tendencias	   empíricas	   reseñables	   en	   el	   comportamiento	   electoral	   de	   la	   población	  española	   con	   derecho	   a	   voto	   durante	   las	   elecciones	   generales	   para	   el	   período	  1977-­‐2011.	   Dichos	   análisis	   han	   desmentido	   intuitivas	   asociaciones	   simples	  concernientes	   a	   la	   relación	   entre	   tipo	   de	   hábitat	   y	   comportamiento	   electoral.	  Mientras	  que	   los	   análisis	   iniciales	  de	   las	   agrupaciones	   espaciales	  mostraban	  una	  tendencia	  consistente	  con	  la	  teoría	  generada	  por	  los	  estudios	  de	  voto	  de	  clase,	  en	  el	  sentido	   de	   una	   correlación	   positiva	   entre	   las	   clases	   sociales	   agrarias	   y	   el	   voto	  conservador	  (Nieuwbeerta	  y	  de	  Graaf,	  1999),	  mayores	  esfuerzos	  descriptivos	  han	  demostrado	  que	  dicha	  asociación	  no	  se	  sostiene.	  Así	  pues,	  es	  precisamente	  en	  los	  hábitats	  rurales	  donde	  encontramos	  una	  mayor	  predisposición	  al	  voto	  de	  opciones	  situadas	  en	   la	   izquierda	  del	  arco	  político	   teniendo	  en	  cuenta	  aquellos	  municipios	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incluidos	  en	  agrupaciones	  espaciales	  definidas	  por	  un	  voto	  elevado	  a	  opciones	  de	  izquierda.	  De	  modo	  análogo,	   y	  pese	  a	  que	  puede	  parecer	  paradójico,	   los	  hábitats	  rurales	   son	   también	   los	   más	   propicios	   a	   votar	   por	   opciones	   políticas	  conservadoras	   de	   entre	   los	   municipios	   incluidos	   en	   agrupaciones	   espaciales	  definidas	   por	   un	   voto	   elevado	   a	   la	   derecha.	   En	   consecuencia,	   una	   de	   las	  conclusiones	   de	   nuestro	   trabajo	   es	   que	   los	   hábitats	   rurales	   son	   siempre	   lugares	  con	  unos	  porcentajes	  elevados	  de	  voto	  hacia	  las	  opciones	  políticas	  hegemónicas	  en	  el	  ámbito	  territorial	  del	  que	  forman	  parte,	  dado	  que	  una	  tendencia	  idéntica	  ha	  sido	  también	   registrada	   en	   lo	   que	   atañe	   al	   apoyo	   de	   candidaturas	   nacionalistas	  periféricas;	   a	   tendencia,	   sin	   embargo,	   resulta	   menos	   clara	   para	   el	   caso	   más	  complejo	  de	  la	  abstención.	  En	  nuestra	  opinión,	  esta	  tendencia	  empírica	  registrada	  necesita	   de	   mayores	   esfuerzos	   de	   investigación	   para	   recibir	   una	   explicación	  satisfactoria,	  tarea	  que	  desarrollamos	  en	  los	  siguientes	  capítulos.	  Nuestros	  análisis	  de	   estadística	   espacial,	   además,	   ofrecen	   una	   contribución	   significativa	   al	   debate	  académico	  sobre	  la	  relación	  entre	  tipo	  de	  hábitat	  y	  comportamiento	  electoral.	  Así	  pues,	  en	  un	  estudio	  que	  tomaba	  en	  consideración	  datos	  propios	  de	  la	  Comunidad	  Autónoma	  de	  Andalucía	   (Ortega	  et	  al.,	   2011),	   se	  demostraba	   la	  presencia	  de	  una	  relación	   causal	   significativa,	   por	   la	   cual	   los	   hábitats	   más	   pequeños	   resultarían	  generalmente	   más	   proclives	   a	   la	   participación	   electoral.	   Mientras	   que	   esta	  tendencia	   parece	   clara	   para	   el	   caso	   andaluz,	   nuestros	   análisis	   revelan	   que	   la	  asociación	  entre	  variables	  anunciada	  por	  dicho	  estudio	  no	  es	  generalizable,	  pues	  las	  desviaciones	  típicas	  de	  los	  hábitats	  rurales	  son	  mayores	  que	  las	  de	  los	  urbanos	  para	   cada	  uno	  de	   los	   casos	   tenidos	   en	   cuenta	   (agrupaciones	   espaciales	   con	   voto	  elevado	  a	  la	  derecha,	  a	  la	  izquierda,	  al	  nacionalismo	  periférico,	  y	  a	  la	  abstención).	  Este	   es	   un	   hallazgo	   significativo,	   pues	   aquella	   relación	   tan	   sólo	   se	   había	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cuestionado	   parcialmente	   (Anckar,	   1999).	   Podemos	   decir	   que	   nuestro	   análisis	  también	  cuestiona	  algunas	   ideas	  sobre	  el	  papel	  de	   la	  abstención;	  en	  este	  sentido,	  Justel	   (1995)	   había	   argumentado	   una	   relación	   entre	   actividad	   económica	   y	   los	  diferentes	  tipos	  de	  abstención:	   ‘Hay	  un	  cierto	  indicio	  de	  que	  la	  actividad	  terciaria	  se	  asocia	  con	  niveles	  más	  altos	  de	  abstención’	  (Justel,	  1995:	  113).	  Esta	  afirmación	  no	  parece	  encontrar	  soporte	  empírico	  en	  nuestro	  análisis,	  ya	  que	  los	  hábitats	  más	  terciarizados,	   ciudades	   y	   periferias,	   se	   encuentran	   debajo	   de	   la	   media	  abstencionista,	   invirtiendo	   la	   tendencia	   calculada	  para	   porcentajes	   sobre	   el	   total	  español.	  Estos	  hallazgos	  muestran	  la	  importancia	  de	  establecer	  una	  segmentación	  de	   los	   análisis	   entre	   agrupaciones	   espaciales,	   pues	   a	   menudo	   invierten	   la	  información	  ofrecida	  para	  la	  tendencia	  nacional	  agregada.	  Finalmente,	  de	  nuestros	  análisis	  se	  desprende	  que	  no	  resulta	  adecuado	  desde	  un	  punto	  de	  vista	  sociológico	  hablar	   de	  un	   tipo	   de	   hábitats	   españoles,	   ya	   que	   los	   datos	  muestran	   una	   elevada	  variación	   intergrupal	   para	   cada	   uno	   de	   esos	   hábitats.	   Resulta,	   pues,	   hasta	   cierto	  punto	   fútil	  hablar	  de	  el	   rural	  o	  el	  urbano	  español,	   como	  si	   se	   tratase	  de	  hábitats	  homogéneos.	  De	  forma	  demasiado	  frecuente,	  los	  estudios	  sociológicos	  basados	  en	  datos	   agregados	   se	   critican	   aludiendo	   al	   problema	   postulado	   por	   la	   falacia	  ecológica	  –asociar	  de	  forma	  errónea	  la	  tendencia	  detectada	  para	  un	  grupo	  a	  cada	  uno	   de	   los	   miembros	   de	   dicho	   grupo–	   y	   no	   obstante,	   el	   análisis	   presentado	   en	  nuestra	   investigación	  muestra	  que	  si	  hacemos	  un	  uso	  apropiado	  de	   la	  estadística	  espacial	   es	  posible	  minimizar	   los	   riesgos	  de	   la	   falacia	   ecológica.	  Así	  pues,	  hemos	  visto	  que	  el	   cálculo	  agregado	  de	   las	  diferentes	  categorías	  de	  hábitat	  para	  el	   total	  español	  puede	  hacer	  caer	  en	  la	  paradoja	  de	  Simpson	  (Blyth,	  1972),	  por	  la	  cual	  una	  tendencia	   bien	   definida	   para	   un	   grupo	   determinado	   tiende	   a	   desaparecer	   o,	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incluso,	   a	   invertirse	   si	   agregamos	   tales	   grupos	   en	   una	   categoría	   superior	   que	  carezca	  de	  fundamentación	  empírica	  apropiada.	  	  
Una	  vez	  identificadas	  las	  regularidades	  empíricas	  que	  deberán	  ser	  explicadas	  por	  la	  teoría	  pasamos,	  al	  inicio	  de	  la	  segunda	  parte	  de	  la	  tesis,	  a	  exponer	  una	  revisión	  de	   la	   teoría	   del	   comportamiento	   electoral.	   La	   finalidad	   de	   esta	   revisión	   no	   es	   la	  disertación	  erudita,	  sino	  más	  bien	  comprobar	  si	  las	  tendencias	  detectadas	  durante	  la	   primera	   parte	   de	   nuestra	   investigación	   pueden	   ser	   explicadas	   por	   la	   teoría	  existente.	  Así	  pues,	  agrupamos	  la	  muy	  extensa	  teoría	  del	  comportamiento	  electoral	  en	   tres	   grupos	   o	   tipos,	   de	   acuerdo	   con	   las	   escuelas	   de	   las	   que	   surgieron	   dichos	  enfoques.	  Estos	  tres	  bloques	  teóricos	  pueden	  ser	  resumidos	  como:	  
• La	  escuela	  de	  Columbia,	  centrada	  en	  las	  bases	  sociales	  del	  voto.	  
• La	  escuela	  de	  Michigan,	  que	  parte	  de	  los	  procesos	  de	  socialización	  política,	  a	  menudo	  fundamentados	  en	  la	  psicología	  social.	  
• La	  escuela	  de	  Rochester,	  basada	  en	  la	  Teoría	  de	  la	  Elección	  Racional	  (TAR),	  que	  entiende	  el	  comportamiento	  electoral	  como	  el	  resultado	  de	  ecuaciones	  de	  maximización	  de	  la	  utilidad.	  
Partiendo	  de	  estos	  tres	  enfoques,	  hemos	  desarrollado	  una	  crítica	  metodológica	  en	  dos	  variables	  fundamentales	  para	  explicar	  el	  comportamiento	  electoral	  en	  España:	  la	  clase	  social	  y	  la	  identidad	  nacional	  (González,	  2004:	  119).	  En	  lo	  que	  concierne	  a	  la	  primera,	  partiendo	  del	  enfoque	  de	  Meillasoux	  (1972)	  hemos	  definido	  un	  sector	  de	   la	  población	  agraria	  como	  pre-­‐capitalista,	   compuesta	  por	   trabajadores	  que	  no	  están	  integrados	  en	  las	  esferas	  de	  producción	  o	  consumo	  del	  mercado	  o,	  si	  lo	  están,	  es	  de	   forma	  marginal.	  Este	   fragmento	  del	  electorado	   tiene	  una	  presencia	  notable	  en	   la	   Comunidad	  Autónoma	   de	   Galicia,	   si	   bien	   su	   peso	   relativo	   se	   reduce	   con	   el	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paso	   del	   tiempo.	   El	   análisis	   del	   comportamiento	   electoral	   de	   estas	   fracciones	   de	  clase	  demuestra	  que	  no	  presentan	  ningún	  tipo	  de	  comportamiento	  homologable	  a	  lo	  que	  puede	  ser	  el	  voto	  de	  la	  clase	  trabajadora,	  de	  acuerdo	  con	  lo	  postulado	  por	  el	  índice	   de	   Alford,	   sino	   que	   más	   bien	   se	   trata	   de	   un	   voto	   con	   tendencia	  conservadora.	  Una	  posible	  explicación	  de	  esta	  tendencia	  es	  que	  estos	  sectores	  pre-­‐capitalistas	   son	   propietarios	   de	   tierras,	   si	   bien	   se	   encuentran	   lejos	   del	  mercado	  capitalista,	   pues	   esta	   propiedad	   no	   se	   articula	   como	   capital	   dentro	   del	  mercado.	  Una	   posibilidad	   sería	   que,	   de	   modo	   semejante	   a	   la	   vieja	   teorización	   de	   Wright	  sobre	   las	   nuevas	   clases	  medias	   como	   posiciones	   contradictorias	   (Wright,	   1985),	  podríamos	   pensar	   que	   la	   propiedad	   de	   la	   tierra	   actúa	   como	   un	   elemento	   de	  capitalismo	   dentro	   de	   un	   esquema	   no	   capitalista.	   Esto	   produciría	   un	   efecto	  semejante	  al	  atribuido	  a	  las	  	  nuevas	  clases	  medias	  por	  Callinicos	  y	  Harman	  (1987),	  es	  decir,	  estas	  fracciones	  de	  clase	  estarían	  más	  próximas	  a	  los	  comportamientos	  de	  la	  clase	  trabajadora	  o	  de	  la	  burguesía	  de	  manera	  contextual	  al	  contexto	  electoral.	  Sin	   embargo,	   esta	   hipótesis	   no	   se	   acomoda	   a	   nuestros	  datos,	   que	   apuntan	   a	   una	  fuerte	   tendencia	   de	   continuidad	   conservadora	   muy	   estable	   en	   el	   tiempo.	   En	  consecuencia,	  esta	  regularidad	  pone	  en	  cuestión	  el	  alineamiento	  entre	  clase	  y	  voto	  postulado	   por	   el	   enfoque	   de	   Columbia.	   Alternativamente,	   planteamos	   una	  hipótesis	  de	  trabajo	  a	  partir	  de	  estos	  datos,	  que	  se	  resume	  como	  un	  alineamiento	  de	  clase	  con	  el	  partido	  político	  identificado	  con	  la	  élite	  económico-­‐política	  local,	  sin	  importar	   su	   ubicación	   ideológica.	   Si	   esta	   hipótesis	   es	   correcta,	   debería	   haber	  importantes	   variaciones	   ecológicas	   tanto	   en	   los	   valores	   políticos	   como	   en	   el	  comportamiento	   electoral.	   Esta	   hipótesis	   está	   directamente	   relacionada	   con	   las	  dinámicas	  de	  clientelismo	  político,	  ampliamente	  descritas	  desde	  la	  etnografía	  –vid.	  Jablonski	  (2009)	  para	  el	  caso	  gallego	  y	  Silva	  (1998)	  para	  el	  noroeste	  portugués–.	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Esta	   versión	   del	   voto	   de	   clase,	   sin	   embargo,	   no	   encaja	   con	   los	   presupuestos	   del	  modelo	  de	  Columbia,	  basado	  en	  alineamientos	  de	  clase	  entre	   las	  clases	  bajas	  y	   la	  izquierda	  política	  y	  las	  clases	  altas	  y	  la	  derecha.	  Nuestra	  hipótesis	  de	  trabajo	  encaja	  con	   los	   datos	   analizados	   durante	   la	   primera	   sección	   de	   la	   tesis,	   en	   la	   que	  postulábamos	   un	   alineamiento	   entre	   las	   clases	   más	   bajas	   y	   opciones	   políticas	  asociadas	   a	   las	   élites	   político-­‐económicas	   locales.	   Esta	   versión	   del	   voto	   de	   clase	  explicaría,	  además,	   las	  diferencias	  entre	   los	  hábitats	  rurales	  gallegos	  y	  andaluces.	  Estas	  diferencias	  no	  se	  explican	  con	  la	  hipótesis,	  ya	  comentada,	  de	  las	  diferencias	  en	  la	  propiedad	  de	  la	  tierra,	  debido	  a	  que	  incluso	  dentro	  de	  Galicia	  encontramos	  un	  número	   significativo	   de	   municipios	   categorizados	   como	   rural	   desactivado	   que	  apoyan	   fuertemente	   opciones	   políticas	   de	   izquierdas.	   Este	   hecho	   empírico	   nos	  obliga	   a	   reconsiderar	   los	   postulados	   tradicionales	   del	   voto	   de	   clase,	   cosa	   que	  hacemos	  en	  la	  parte	  final	  de	  la	  tesis.	  
Además	   de	   esta	   crítica	   metodológica	   a	   la	   medición	   del	   voto	   de	   clase,	   hemos	  realizado,	   como	   apuntábamos	   anteriormente,	   una	   crítica	   a	   la	   medición	   de	   la	  relación	  entre	  identidad	  nacional	  y	  voto,	  sin	  duda	  el	  clivaje	  de	  mayor	  relevancia	  en	  la	   escena	  política	   española,	   junto	   con	   la	   clase.	  A	   través	  de	   técnicas	   cualitativas	   –análisis	   del	   contenido	   de	   la	   prensa–	   y	   cuantitativas	   –regresión	   logística–	   hemos	  concluido	   que	   la	  medida	   generalmente	   utilizada	   para	   dar	   cuenta	   de	   la	   identidad	  nacional	   a	   través	   de	   encuestas,	   la	   pregunta	   Moreno,	   debe	   ser	   puntualizada.	  Nuestro	  argumento	  principal	  es	  que	  la	  pregunta	  Moreno	  ofrece	  una	  medida	  que	  es	  dependiente	   del	   contexto.	   Tras	   clasificar	   las	   Comunidades	   Autónomas	   españolas	  en	   cuatro	   categorías	   de	   acuerdo	   con	   los	   sentimientos	   identitarios	   de	   sus	  habitantes,	   comprobamos	   que	   la	   pregunta	   Moreno	   refleja	   correctamente	   los	  sentimientos	  de	  identidad	  nacional	  tan	  sólo	  en	  uno	  de	  estos	  cuatro	  grupos,	  que	  es	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el	  de	  aquellas	  Comunidades	  Autónomas	  en	  las	  que	  se	  da	  una	  competición	  entre	  dos	  proyectos	  nacionales	  altamente	  desarrollados,	  como	  es	  el	  caso	  de	  las	  Comunidades	  Autónomas	   de	   Cataluña	   o	   del	   País	   Vasco.	   Sin	   embargo,	   no	   es	   un	   indicador	  adecuado	  de	  la	  identidad	  nacional	  para	  aquellos	  otros	  casos	  en	  los	  que	  se	  trata	  de	  evaluar	   sociedades	   con	   un	   único	   proyecto	   nacional	   en	   marcha	   o	   en	   las	   que,	  habiendo	   más	   de	   un	   proyecto	   nacional,	   uno	   de	   ellos	   es	   claramente	   dominante.	  Hemos	  desarrollado	  una	  crítica	  a	  la	  teoría	  de	  la	  identidad	  dual,	  que	  constituye	  las	  bases	  epistemológicas	  de	  la	  pregunta	  Moreno.	  Nuestra	  crítica	  se	  basa	  en	  el	  hecho	  de	   que	   en	   aquellas	   sociedades	   en	   las	   que	   hay	   una	   clara	   primacía	   del	   proyecto	  nacional	   estatal,	   la	   identidad	   o	   identidades	   sub-­‐estatales	   se	   encuentran	   total	   o	  parcialmente	  –si	  se	  diera	  el	  caso	  de	  contar	  con	  un	  proyecto	  nacional	  alternativo–	  subsumidas	   dentro	   del	   proyecto	   estatal	   dominante,	   en	   la	   forma	   de	   expresiones	  regionales	  de	  dicho	  proyecto.	  Esta	  dinámica	  produce	  lo	  que	  podríamos	  llamar	  una	  
dialectalización	   de	   la	   identidad,	   a	   través	   de	   su	   regionalización.	   Este	   proceso	   de	  regionalización,	  basado	  en	  la	  creación	  de	  dependencias	  simbólicas	  que	  afectan	  los	  diacríticos	  étnicos	  (Barth,	  1969)	  a	  través	  de	   los	  que	   las	   identidades	  sub-­‐estatales	  nacionales	   o	   pre-­‐nacionales	   son	   socialmente	   construidas,	   origina	   un	   proceso	  dialéctico.	  En	  tal	  proceso	  la	  regionalización	  sería	  la	  tesis,	  mientras	  que	  la	  antítesis	  toma	  cuerpo	  en	  los	  diversos	  movimientos	  sociales	  que	  pueden,	  hasta	  cierto	  punto,	  identificarse	   bajo	   la	   etiqueta	   de	   independentistas.	   De	   hecho	   podríamos	   citar	  muchos	  ejemplos	  de	  este	   tipo	  de	  movimientos	  en	  aquellos	   lugares	  en	  donde	  hay	  suficiente	  diversidad	  cultural	  como	  para	  generar	  una	  situación	  demasiado	  cargada	  de	   violencia	   simbólica	   como	   para	   que	   el	   antedicho	   proceso	   dialéctico	   no	   dé	  comienzo.	   Estos	   incluirían	   la	   defensa	   y	   promoción	   de	   la	   lengua	   no	   estatal,	   del	  patrimonio	   natural	   e	   histórico,	   de	   la	  música,	   de	   la	   literatura,	   etc.	   Si,	   como	   Billig	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propone	   insistentemente,	   debemos	   tratar	   el	   nacionalismo	   como	   una	   ideología	  (Billig,	  1993),	  entonces	  tal	  vez	  debiésemos	  comenzar	  a	  medirlo	  como	  tal,	  haciendo	  uso	  de	  una	  escala	  similar	  a	  la	  que	  habitualmente	  se	  emplea	  para	  medir	  la	  ideología	  izquierda-­‐derecha,	   representando	   en	   uno	   de	   los	   extremos	   la	   completa	  identificación	   con	   el	   proyecto	   nacional	   estatal	   y	   en	   el	   otro	   la	   completa	  identificación	   con	   el	   proyecto	   nacional	   sub-­‐estatal.	   De	   forma	   alternativa,	   los	  investigadores	   podríamos	   desarrollar	   indicadores	   que	   combinen	   al	   menos	   dos	  variables	  de	  cara	  a	  medir	  realmente	  la	  identidad	  nacional	  en	  aquellos	  contextos	  en	  los	  que	  la	  eficacia	  de	  la	  pregunta	  Moreno	  ha	  demostrado	  ser	  limitada.	  
Tras	   haber	   analizado	   los	   tres	   grandes	   grupos	   de	   teorías	   existentes	   sobre	   el	  comportamiento	   electoral	   y	   haber	   introducido	   mejoras	   en	   uno	   de	   ellos	   –la	  medición	   de	   la	   relación	   entre	   los	   dos	   grandes	   clivajes	   de	   España	   y	   el	   voto–	  llegamos	  a	  la	  conclusión	  de	  que	  mayores	  esfuerzos	  teóricos	  son	  necesarios.	  Esto	  es	  así	   debido	   a	   la	   no	   adecuación	   de	   las	   predicciones	   teóricas	   con	   las	   realidades	  empíricas	   demostradas.	   El	   enfoque	   de	   Columbia	   se	   demuestra	   demasiado	   rígido	  para	  explicar	  el	  cambio	  electoral,	  mientras	  que	  el	  de	  Michigan	  resulta	  demasiado	  flexible	   para	   explicar	   ciertas	   constantes	   sobradamente	   registradas	   en	   los	   datos.	  Finalmente,	  el	  enfoque	  de	  la	  elección	  racional	  ha	  encontrado	  en	  la	  explicación	  del	  comportamiento	  electoral	  uno	  de	  sus	  principales	  talones	  de	  Aquiles,	  al	  no	  hallar	  un	  modo	   convincente	   de	   explicar	   la	   participación	   electoral,	   dada	   la	   desdeñable	  probabilidad	  de	  que	  un	  único	  voto	  sea	  capaz	  de	  alterar	  los	  resultados	  electorales.	  Así	   pues,	   hemos	   concentrado	   nuestros	   esfuerzos	   en	   diseñar	   un	   nuevo	   enfoque	  teórico	  coherente	  con	  las	  regularidades	  empíricas	  detectadas	  y	  que,	  además,	  puede	  entenderse	  como	  una	  combinación	  de	  las	  fortalezas	  de	  los	  enfoques	  de	  Columbia	  y	  Michigan.	   Postulamos,	   por	   último,	   que	   una	   versión	   definitiva	   de	   las	   prácticas	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humanas	  podría	   integrar	  cálculos	  de	  maximización	  de	   la	  utilidad	  para	  explicar	   la	  variación	   residual.	  Nuestro	   enfoque,	   pues,	   se	   basa	   en	   la	   superación	   teórica	  de	   la	  oposición	  falaz	  entre	  objetivismo	  (Columbia)	  y	  subjetivismo	  (Michigan).	  Sin	  duda,	  la	   teoría	   de	   la	   práctica	   de	   Pierre	   Bourdieu	   (1987)	   es	   la	   propuesta	   que	   hasta	   la	  fecha	   mejor	   ha	   sabido	   argumentar	   esta	   superación	   de	   estructuralismo	   y	  fenomenología.	  Se	  podría	  decir	  que	  el	  enfoque	  bourdieuano	  sitúa	  estructuralmente	  los	  enfoques	  centrados	  en	   la	   socialización	  a	   la	  vez	  que	  subjetiviza	  aquellos	  otros	  centrados	  en	  la	  posición	  estructural.	  Esto	  es	  posible	  a	  través	  de	  la	  idea	  de	  habitus,	  como	   estructura	   social	   interiorizada	   y	   encarnada	   que	   es	   capaz	   de	   orientar	   las	  prácticas,	   si	   bien	   no	   las	   determina.	   El	   habitus	   dispone	   a	   los	   individuos	   hacia	   un	  conjunto	  de	  prácticas	  determinado,	  si	  bien	  no	  compele	  a	   la	  realización	  de	  una	  de	  ellas.	  Se	  podría	  comparar	  a	  una	  baliza	  orientadora	  de	  la	  conducta	  humana.	  El	  papel	  de	   dicha	   baliza	   es,	   además,	   contextual	   a	   cada	   uno	   de	   los	   campos	   en	   los	   que	   se	  desarrolla	  la	  acción	  social,	  tomando	  como	  unidad	  base	  o	  de	  referencia	  la	  estructura	  y	  el	  volumen	  de	  capital	  disputado	  en	  cada	  uno	  de	  estos	  campos.	  Así	  pues,	  hemos	  ampliado	  el	  esquema	  inicial	  bourdieuano	  a	  través	  de	  la	  inclusión	  en	  la	  teoría	  de	  la	  idea	  de	  sub-­‐campos,	  así	  como	  también	  hemos	  formalizado	  el	  esquema	  general.	  El	  marco	   teórico	  de	   la	   teoría	  de	   la	  práctica	  postula	   la	  existencia	  de	  campos	  sociales	  compuestos	  de	  objetos	  sociales	  que	  se	  atraen	  entre	  sí;	  en	  consecuencia,	  podemos	  formalizar	  el	  modelo	  de	  acuerdo	  con	  la	  teoría	  general	  de	  campos,	  basándonos	  en	  el	  teorema	  de	  Gauss	   y	   en	   la	   gravitación	   universal.	   El	   hecho	   de	   que	   el	   resultado	   de	  ambas	   teorizaciones	   sea	   idéntico	   para	   explicar	   las	   dinámicas	   de	   atracción	   entre	  cuerpos	  dentro	  de	  campos	  determinados,	  apunta	  al	  hecho	  de	  que	  en	  realidad	  son	  modelos	  matemáticos	   de	   la	   atracción	   entre	   objetos	   dentro	   de	   campos	   de	   fuerza	  determinados.	   Hemos	   argumentado	   que	   la	   teoría	   de	   la	   práctica	   se	   desarrolla	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plenamente	   al	   colocarla	   bajo	   estos	   supuestos	   técnicos,	   lo	   que	   nos	   ha	   llevado	   a	  generar	   una	   ecuación	   elaborada	   a	   partir	   de	   las	   particularidades	   de	   los	   campos	  sociales,	  que	  es	  el	  resultado	  de	  dicha	  expansión:	  
𝐴(𝐴𝐿) = 𝑆12 + 𝑆22 + 𝑆32(𝐴𝐿)! 	  
Donde	  A	  es	  la	  fuerza	  de	  atracción	  entre	  dos	  objetos	  sociales	  A	  y	  L	  y	  es	  igual	  a	  la	  raíz	  cuadrada	   de	   la	   suma	   de	   las	   tres	   formas	   genéricas	   adoptadas	   por	   el	   capital	  simbólico	   de	   A	   y	   L	   elevadas	   al	   cuadrado,	   dividida	   entre	   la	   distancia	   euclidiana	  entre	  A	   y	  L.	   De	   este	  modo,	   el	   comportamiento	   electoral	   sería	   la	   expresión	   de	   la	  atracción	  entre	  objetos	  sociales	  –en	  este	  caso	  entre	  agentes	  y	  opciones	  políticas–	  dentro	  de	  un	  determinado	  campo	  o	  sub-­‐campo,	  gracias	  al	  poder	  del	  habitus	  como	  dispositivo	  orientador	  de	  la	  práctica.	  
El	   resultado	  de	   la	   tesis	  es	  una	  nueva	   teoría	  para	  comprender	  el	   comportamiento	  electoral	   que	   se	   adecúa	   a	   las	   regularidades	   empíricas	   registradas.	   Las	   líneas	   de	  investigación	   abiertas	   son	   fundamentalmente	   tres:	   en	   primer	   lugar	   se	   abre	   la	  posibilidad	  de	  comprender	   la	  parte	  subjetiva	  del	  habitus.	  Nuestro	  trabajo	  abre	   la	  caja	  negra	  de	  la	  parte	  objetiva	  o	  estructural	  del	  habitus;	  sin	  embargo,	  la	  explicación	  de	   la	   parte	   subjetiva,	   es	   decir,	   de	   cómo	   el	   habitus	   se	   integra	   en	   las	   redes	  neuronales	   de	   los	   agentes,	   es	   tarea	   pendiente.	   Investigaciones	   recientes	   en	  neurociencia	  invitan	  a	  pensar	  que	  el	  camino	  está	  abierto	  para	  estos	  desarrollos	  en	  un	   futuro	  próximo	  y	  hemos	  planteado	  algunas	  bases	   a	  partir	  de	   las	   cuales	  dicho	  trabajo	  se	  podría	  realizar.	  En	  segundo	  lugar	  se	  postula	  una	  teoría	  integrada	  de	  la	  acción	  social,	  que	  sería	  el	  producto	  de	   la	   integración	  de	   la	  ecuación	  general	  de	   la	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atracción	  entre	  cuerpos	  sociales	  con	  las	  ecuaciones	  de	  maximización	  de	  la	  utilidad	  propias	  de	  la	  teoría	  de	  la	  elección	  racional.	  Esta	  integración	  solucionaría	  lo	  que	  se	  ha	  dado	  en	  llamar	  la	  paradoja	  de	  la	  abstención	  (Feddersen,	  2004),	  al	  subordinar	  la	  maximización	  de	  la	  utilidad	  al	  poder	  orientador	  general	  del	  habitus,	  a	  través	  de	  lo	  que	  se	  podría	  denominar	  racionalidad	  situada.	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‘The	  social	  world	  is	  accumulated	  history,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  not	  to	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  discontinuous	  series	  of	  instantaneous	  mechanical	  equilibria	  between	  agents	  who	  are	  treated	  as	  interchangeable	  particles,	  one	  must	  reintroduce	  into	  it	  the	  notion	  of	  capital	  and	  with	  it,	  accumulation	  and	  all	  its	  effects.’	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I.	  Establishing	  the	  phenomenon	  
1	  Theory	  and	  research	  in	  Sociology	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  (Leyte,	  2014)	  that	  in	  Le	  Mythe	  de	  Sisyphe	  (Camus,	  1942),	  Albert	  Camus	   wanted	   to	   state	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	   human	   beings	   to	   produce	   any	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world,	  since	  what	  we	  usually	  understand	  as	  the	  world	  around	  us	  is	  nothing	  but	  human	  conscience	  and,	  given	  that	  we	  cannot	  escape	  from	  that	  very	  consciousness	   that	  makes	   up	   our	  world,	   it	   is	   then	   not	   possible	   to	   objectivize	   it,	  enabling	   its	   study	   and,	   therefore,	   making	   it	   impossible	   to	   produce	   any	   genuine	  knowledge	  of	  reality.	  Thus,	  opposing	  Spinoza’s	  famous	  quotation	  Deus,	  sive	  natura1	  (Spinoza,	  2005[1677],	  part	  IV:	  115),	  by	  which	  the	  Dutch	  philosopher	  equated	  God	  with	  nature,	  Camus	  built	  up	  an	  opposition	  between	  God	  and	  nature,	  equating	  the	  latter	  with	   the	   existence	   and,	   hence,	   embracing	   phenomenology	   to	   some	   extent.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  limit	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  build	  up	  knowledge	  on	   the	   human	  nature.	   This	   knowledge	  would	   be	   defined	   as	   only	   able	   to	   provide	  mere	  descriptions	  of	  subjective	  facts	  and,	  thus,	  we	  should	  abandon	  any	  pretension	  of	  a	  real	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  one	  of	  the	  many	  arguments	   against	   the	   possibility	   of	   truly	   producing	   scientific	   knowledge	   of	   the	  social	   world,	   which	   would	   eventually	   lead	   us	   to	   the	   discovery	   of	   truth.	   If	   the	  scientific	  task,	  in	  the	  abstract,	  has	  been	  harshly	  criticized,	  then	  the	  epistemological	  foundations	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  social	  sciences	  have	  been	  submitted	  to	  an	  even	  harder	  criticism,	   as	  we	  will	   show	   in	   this	   chapter.	   Shall	  we	   abandon,	   hence,	   any	  positive	  expectation	  regarding	  the	  scientific	  advancement	  of	  the	  study	  of	  human	  behavior?	  This	  thesis	  is,	  above	  all,	  an	  attempt	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “God,	  that	  is,	  nature”.	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  Henceforth	  all	  translations	  will	  be	  done	  by	  the	  author,	  unless	  the	  contrary	  is	  indicated.	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is	  no.	  We	   think	   that	   this	   task	   is	  not	  only	  possible,	  but	  also	  desirable;	   to	  build	  up	  scientific	  knowledge	  on	  how	  and	  why	  human	  beings	  behave	  the	  way	  we	  do	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  achieve	  higher	  levels	  of	  freedom.	  However,	  this	  scientific	  advancement	  must	   proceed	   with	   the	   greatest	   caution,	   for	   it	   is	   well	   known	   that	   it	   does	   not	  produce	  by	   itself	  higher	   levels	  of	  well	  being	  (Beck,	  1992).	  The	  sociologist,	  Weber	  explained,	   is	   in	   charge	   of	   producing	   scientific	   knowledge	   on	   how	   society	  works,	  while	  it	   is	  the	  task	  of	  the	  politician	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  that	  allows	  people	  to	  benefit	  from	  this	  knowledge	  (Weber,	  2012[1918]).	  	  	  
1.1	  Some	  difficulties	  affecting	  sociological	  research	  Robert	   K.	   Merton,	   in	   a	   famous	   article	   published	   in	   1987	   explained	   that	  “establishing	  the	  phenomenon”	  should	  be	  the	  first	  step	  to	  be	  taken	  before	  starting	  out	   any	   further	   scientific	   endeavor,	   as	   it	   “involves	   the	   doctrine	   (universally	  accepted	  in	  the	  abstract)	  that	  phenomena	  should	  of	  course	  be	  shown	  to	  exist	  or	  to	  occur	  before	  one	  explains	  why	  they	  exist	  or	  how	  they	  come	  to	  be”	  (Merton, 1987: 
1).	  This	  seemingly	  obvious	  remark	  was	  highlighted	  by	  Merton	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  sociologists	   from	   committing	   that	   classical	   error	   in	   logics	   that	   drove	   Seneca	   to	  develop	  an	  explanation	  on	  why	  there	  are	  waters	  so	  dense	  that	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  any	  object	  to	  sink	  in	  them,	  independently	  of	  their	  weight2.	  This	  kind	  of	  mistake,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  “(…)	  erat	  in	  Sicilia,	  est	  adhuc	  in	  Syria	  stagnum	  in	  quo	  natant	  lateres	  et	  mergi	  proiecta	  non	  possunt,	   licet	   grauia	   sint.	   Huius	   rei	   palam	   causa	   est.	   Quamcumque	   uis	   rem	   expende	   et	  contra	  aquam	  statue,	  dummodo	  utriusque	  par	  sit	  modus;	  si	  aqua	  grauior	  est,	  leuiorem	  rem	  quam	   ipsa	   est	   fert	   et	   tanto	   supra	   se	   extollet	   quanto	   erit	   leuiro;	   grauiora	   descendent.”	  
(Seneca, 1979 [63], p. 142). “(…)	  There	  was	  in	  Sicily	  –there	  is	  still	  in	  Syria-­‐	  a	  pond	  in	  which	  bricks	  float	  and	  there	  is	  no	  possibility	  of	  sinking	  the	  objects	  which	  are	  thrown	  into	  it,	  no	  matter	  how	  heavy	  they	  are.	  The	  reason	  is	  evident:	  check	  the	  weight	  of	  whatever	  object	  and	  compare	  it	  with	  that	  of	  the	  water,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  measurement	  is	  equal	  to	  one	  another.	  When	  the	  water	  is	  heavier,	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known	  as	  the	  problem	  of	  pseudo-­‐facts,	  has	  been	  appropriately	  dealt	  with	  in	  many	  scientific	   fields.	   Taking	   medicine	   as	   an	   example,	   we	   see	   that	   in	   1865	   Claude	  Bernard,	   a	   well-­‐known	   19th	   century	   French	   physiologist,	   published	   a	   celebrated	  treatise	  on	  experimental	  medicine	  (Bernard, 1966[1865]),	   in	  which	  he	  stressed	  out	  the	  importance	  of	  gathering	  detailed	  observations	  before	  starting	  out	  any	  attempt	  oriented	  towards	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  scientific	  explanation	  for	  a	  given	  observed	  phenomenon;	  thus,	  Bernard	  wrote:	  
«	  L’art	  de	   l’investigation	  scientifique	  est	   la	  pierre	  angulaire	  de	  toutes	   les	  sciences	  expérimentales.	  Si	   les	   faits	  qui	  servent	  de	  base	  au	  raisonnement	  sont	  mal	  établis	  ou	   erronés,	   tout	   s’écroulera	   ou	   tout	   deviendra	   faux	  ;	   et	   c’est	   ainsi	   que,	   le	   plus	  souvent,	  les	  erreurs	  dans	  les	  théories	  scientifiques	  ont	  pour	  origine	  des	  erreurs	  de	  faits	  »	  3	  	  (Bernard, 1966[1865]: 21).	  
In	  a	  similar	  way,	  the	  problem	  of	  pseudo-­‐facts	  has	  famously	  affected	  physics.	  During	  millennia,	  people	  believed	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  that	  bodies	  in	  the	  space	  have	  a	  natural	  state	  of	  immovability	  (Aristotle,	  1999[4th	  c.	  BC]).	  The	  bigger	  the	  mass	  of	  an	  object,	  thus,	   the	   higher	   its	   acceleration	   in	   free	   fall,	   since	   its	   trend	   towards	   the	   natural	  motionless	  state	  would	  include	  more	  matter.	  However,	  Galileo	  proved	  that	  objects	  do	   indeed	   fall	   at	   exactly	   the	   same	  acceleration	   rate,	   independently	  of	   their	  mass	  (Settle,	  1983).	  If	  it	  takes	  more	  time	  for	  a	  feather	  to	  fall	  down	  than	  an	  hammer,	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	   lighter	   object	   stays	   afloat,	   raised	   by	   the	  water	   to	   its	   surface,	   as	  more	   as	   lighter	   the	  object	  is;	  the	  heavier	  ones	  will	  sink”.	  3	  “The	  art	  of	  scientific	  research	  is	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  all	  experimental	  sciences.	  If	  the	  facts	  used	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   reasoning	   are	   poorly	   established	   or	   are	   erroneous,	   everything	   will	  collapse	   or	   become	   false;	   thus,	   in	   most	   cases,	   errors	   in	   scientific	   theories	   originate	   in	  errors	  of	  fact”.	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is	   just	   because	   of	   air	   resistance	   –in	   fact,	   the	   astronaut	   David	   Ross	   made	   this	  experiment	  on	  the	  moon,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  air,	  and	  indeed	  the	  feather	  touched	  the	  ground	   at	   exactly	   the	   same	   time	   than	   the	   hammer	   (NASA,	   1971)–.	  Without	   that	  fundamental	  observation	  by	  Galileo	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  for	  Newton	  to	  develop	  his	  laws	  of	  motion,	  stating	  that	  a	  body	  will	  either	  remain	  at	  rest	  or	  in	  continuous	  movement	  unless	  some	  force	  acts	  upon	  it	  (Newton,	  1999[1687]).	  	  
The	  problem	  of	  pseudo-­‐facts	  has	  had,	  however,	   a	  persistent	  presence	   in	  modern	  sociology	   probably,	   following	   Merton’s	   argument,	   because	   of	   the	   political	  implications	   that	   inevitably	   complement	   any	   description	   of	   social	   reality.	   The	  argument	   was	   perhaps	  more	   deeply	   developed	   by	   the	   French	   sociologist	   Pierre	  Bourdieu,	   who	   explained	   that	   “the	   spontaneous	   theories	   imposed	   on	   traditional	  research	   (…)	   are	   the	   product	   of	   the	   social	   conditions	  with	  which	   the	   sociologist	  must	  do	   science,	   so	   that	   the	  obstacles	   to	   the	  adequate	   construction	  of	   the	  object	  are	  part	  of	  the	  object	  of	  adequate	  science”	  (Bourdieu, 1971: 8).	  This	  stance	  is	  at	  the	  core	   of	   Bourdieu’s	   indefatigable	   insistence	   on	   the	   necessity	   of	   always	   basing	  sociological	   research	   on	   empirical	   data	   (Bourdieu,	   1980).	   It	   is	   also	   linked	   to	   the	  fact	   that	   social	   constructs,	   which	   are	   the	   object	   of	   study	   for	   sociology,	   have	   the	  capacity	  of	  shaping	  the	  form	  of	  reality	  –not	  only	  of	  social	  reality,	  as	  ANT	  shows4–	  under	   the	   eyes	   of	   social	   agents,	   including	   sociologists,	   who	   participate	   of	   social	  interactions.	   This	   makes	   Merton’s	   claim	   on	   the	   relevance	   of	   establishing	   the	  
phenomenon	  a	  particularly	  important	  and	  complex	  task	  for	  a	  science	  of	  society,	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  “Actor	   Network	   Theory”,	   whose	   main	   representatives	   are	   Bruno	   Latour	   and	   Michel	  Callon,	   embedded	   by	   radical	   constructionist	   epistemology,	   establishes	   that	   reality	   is	  constructed	   within	   networks	   of	   interactions	   which	   are	   developed	   by	   human	   and	   non-­‐human	  actors.	  Vid.	  for	  a	  good	  synthesis	  of	  the	  ANT	  approach,	  Callon	  (1986).	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compared	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  scientific	  research.	  To	  cite	  a	  well-­‐known	  example	  of	  the	  difficulties	   posed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   science	   of	   society	   inevitably	   remains	  immersed	  within	  society	  itself,	  we	  can	  mention	  the	  methodological	  tacit	  agreement	  that	  usually	  identifies	  societies	  with	  nations,	  which	  is	  of	  course	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  the	  
banal	  nationalism	  that	  defines	  our	  modern	  world	  (Billig, 1995).	  As	  Ulrich	  Beck	  puts	  it:	  
“The	   nation-­‐state	   society	   is	   the	   dominant	   societal	   paradigm.	   The	   mainstream	  considers	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   society	   is	   applicable	   only	   to	   the	   nation-­‐state.	  Accordingly,	  the	  sociological	  perspective	  or	  gaze	  (the	  sociology	  of	  inequality,	  of	  the	  family,	   of	   politics	   and	   so	   on)	   is	   geared	   to	   and	   organized	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state.	   On	   the	   whole,	   sociology	   observes,	   measures	   and	   comments	   on	   its	  phenomena,	   for	   example,	   poverty	   and	   unemployment	   within	   a	   national	   context	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  context	  of	  world	  society.”	  (Beck, 2000: 80).	  
Consequently	   if	   reality	   and,	   especially,	   social	   reality	   is	   shaped	   by	   the	   social	   lens	  with	   which	   society	   is	   viewed	   by	   agents,	   and	   given	   that	   agents	   are	   clustered	   in	  different,	  often	  conflictive,	  groups,	  thus	  it	  follows	  that	  common-­‐sense	  descriptions	  of	  facts	  are	  interest-­‐loaded5,	  as	  they	  are	  designed	  to	  either	  perpetuate	  or	  subvert	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  According	  to	  the	  school	  of	  the	  “interest	  approach”,	  firstly	  developed	  by	  a	  group	  of	  social	  scientists	  working	  at	  the	  ‘Science	  Studies	  Unit’	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Edinburgh	  from	  the	  late	  1970’s	   to	   the	   early	  1990’s,	   knowledge	   is	   interest-­‐driven	  not	   only	   in	   its	   naïve	   forms,	   but	  also	   in	   its	   sophisticated	   scientific	   versions	   (Barnes,	   1977;	   Barnes	   &	   Bloor,	   1982;	   Bloor,	  Henry,	   &	   Barnes,	   1996;	   MacKenzie,	   1981).	   This	   approach	   opposes	   the	   possibility	   of	  breaking	  through	  reflexivity	  those	  biases	  derived	  from	  the	  conflict	  of	  interests	  at	  the	  core	  of	   scientific	   production,	   as	   Bourdieu	   pointed	   out	   (Bourdieu,	   1976).	   This	   PhD	   thesis	  adheres	  Bourdieu’s	  point	  of	   view,	   as	   it	  does	  not	  deny	   the	   social	  underpinnings	  affecting	  scientific	  development.	  However,	  Bourdieu’s	  approach	  starts	  from	  the	  assumption	  of	  that	  point	   to	   offer	   a	   solution	   for	   the	   overcoming	   of	   the	   negative	   effects	   that	   it	   produces.	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given	  social	  order,	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  position	  occupied	  in	  the	  social	  space	  by	   the	   group	   to	  which	   the	   agent	   belongs	   is	   either	   dominant	   or	   dominated6.	   It	   is	  necessary,	   then,	   for	   anyone	   who	   aims	   to	   build	   up	   social	   science,	   to	   distil	  descriptions	   through	   the	   sieve	   of	   the	   rigorousness	   provided	   by	   the	   scientific	  method,	   introducing	   thus	   the	   first	   step	   of	   a	   necessary	   “epistemic	   rupture”	  (Bourdieu,	  et	  al.,	  1968)	  in	  which	  reflexivity	  plays	  a	  central	  role.	  We	  understand	  this	  reflexivity	  alongside	  Bourdieu,	  who	  pointed	  out	   that	   “the	   important	   is,	   therefore,	  to	  know	  how	  to	  objectivate	  the	  relation	  to	  the	  object	  so	  that	  the	  discourse	  over	  the	  object	   is	   not	   a	   simple	   projection	   of	   an	   unconscious	   relation	   towards	   the	   object”	  (Bourdieu,	  2011	  [1984]:	  84).	  
We	   can	   conclude	   that,	  when	   talking	   about	   social	   facts,	   descriptions	   are	   always	   a	  matter	  of	   conflict	  between	  confronted	  groups	  of	   agents,	   that	  will	   try	   to	  establish	  their	   own	   version	   of	   reality	   “to	   capture	  what	  Heidegger	   (1927 [1962])	   called	   the	  ‘public	  interpretation	  of	  reality’”	  (Merton, 1973: 110).	  This	  idea	  of	  confronted	  social	  groups	   fighting	   to	   establish	   the	   dominant,	   common	   sense,	   version	   of	   how	   social	  things	  are	  has	  a	   long	   tradition	  of	   research	   in	   the	  social	   sciences,	  being	  Gramsci’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Therefore,	  we	  will	   try	   to	  make	  a	  scientific	  contribution	  that	  will	  unveil	  some	  portions	  of	  reality	   behind	   people’s	   electoral	   behavior,	   assuming	   Searle’s	   definition	   of	   reality	   as	   a	  correspondence	  with	  facts	  (Searle,	  1993;	  1995).	  6	  Bourdieu	  put	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  strategies	  of	  the	  obvious	  and	  strategies	  of	  subversion	  applied	  respectively	  by	  the	  dominant	  agents	  and	  by	  newcomers	  within	  a	  given	  social	  field	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  or	  to	  obtain	  the	  best	  position	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  benefits	  at	  stake	  on	  that	  given	   field:	   “against	   these	   strategies	   of	   subversion	   of	   the	   vanguard,	   those	  who	   hold	   the	  legitimacy,	   i.e.,	   the	   occupants	   of	   the	   dominant	   position,	   will	   always	   hold	   the	   vague	   and	  pompous	  discourse	  of	  the	  ineffable	  ‘it	  is	  evident”	  (Bourdieu,	  1984:	  118).	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notion	   of	   hegemony7 	  particularly	   well-­‐known	   and	   illustrative	   of	   this	   process	  
(Gramsci, 1971 [1926-1937]; Hall, 1987).	  However,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  old	  and	  has	  been	  correctly	  diagnosed	  a	  significant	  time	  ago,	  we	  can	  still	  find	  it	  in	  modern	  social	  sciences,	  in	  which	  it	  is	  not	  as	  usual	  as	  it	  should	  to	  find	  detailed,	  well-­‐informed,	   descriptions	   of	   the	   social	   facts	   to	   be	   explained	   preceding	   further	  theorizing	  on	  the	  subject	  matter.	  This	  detachment	  of	  theory	  and	  research	  has	  been	  defined	  by	  Goldthorpe	  as	  “the	  scandal	  of	  sociology”	  (Goldthorpe, 1997),	  meaning	  a	  “manifest	   lack	  of	   integration	  of	   research	  and	   theory”	   as	   a	  defining	   feature	  of	   the	  discipline	   in	   its	  current	  state (Goldthorpe, 1997).	   Several	  authors8	  have	  exposed	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  notion	  of	  hegemony	  relates	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  unjust	  social	  relations	  need	  more	  than	  just	  coercion	  in	  order	  to	  be	  maintained.	  According	  to	  Crossley’s	  manual	  on	  critical	  social	  theory:	  	  “What	   is	   needed,	   if	   a	   relationship	   of	   domination	   is	   to	   be	   rendered	   relatively	   secure,	  Gramsci	  argues,	  is	  intellectual	  and	  moral	  leadership.	  The	  bourgeoisie	  must	  win	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  the	  people,	  persuading	  them	  (without	  even	  seeming	  to	  do	  so	  or	  to	  need	  to	  do	  so)	   that	   the	   status	  quo	   is	  natural	   and	   inevitable,	   beneficial	   for	   all,	   and	   inducing	   them	   to	  identify	  with	  it”	  (Crossley, 2005, p. 114). 	  8	  Some	  authors	  have	  worked	  on	  the	  development	  of	  an	  explicit	  critique	  of	  ‘general	  theory’	  –see,	  e.g.,	  van	  den	  Berg	  (1998),	  Davis	  (1994),	  Voas	  (2003),	  for	  a	  general	  perspective;	  also	  van	  den	  Berg	  (1980)	  for	  the	  application	  of	  the	  same	  approach	  to	  general	  critical	  theory-­‐.	  We	  could	  enumerate	  here,	  however,	  all	  those	  sociologists	  that	  are	  proponents	  of	  analytical	  sociology	   –see	   Hedström	   &	   Bearman	   (2009)	   for	   a	   synthesis-­‐	   concerned	   with	   providing	  detailed	   theoretical	   explanations	   of	   social	   regularities,	   down	   to	   the	   detail	   of	   individual	  mechanisms	   that	  will	   eventually	   free	   theory	   from	  black	   boxes,	   such	   as	   undemonstrated	  attributed	  motivations	  or	  beliefs	  assumed	  to	  be	  held	  by	  individuals.	  This	  has	  led	  many	  of	  these	  theorists	  to	  embrace	  rational	  action	  theory	  (RAT),	  as	  a	  way	  to	  provide	  this	  high	  level	  of	  individual	  detail	  when	  explaining	  social	  phenomena.	  In	  any	  case,	  there	  are	  also	  theorists	  outside	  the	  world	  of	  RAT	  that	  have	  developed	  similar	  critical	  approaches	  in	  relation	  with	  the	  deattachment	  of	  research	  and	  theory	  that	  usually	  affects	  sociology	  –see	  Bourdieu	  et	  al.	  (1968)	  and,	  particularly,	  Bourdieu	  &	  Wacquant	  (1992)–.	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similar	  view	  as	  they	  try	  to	  explain	  the	  detachment	  of	  theory	  and	  research,	  usually	  carrying	  most	   of	   responsibility	   upon	   the	   shoulders	   of	   the	   proponents	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘general	   theory’,	   who	   would	   treat	   sociological	   theory	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   self-­‐contained	  sub-­‐discipline	  within	  sociology	  and	  not	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  explaining	  empirical	  regularities9.	   This	   critique	   is	   ironically	   synthesized	   by	   Hacking,	   who	   referred	   to	  this	   kind	  of	   theory	   as	   “not	   theory	   about	   something,	   just	   theory”	   (Hacking,	   1999:	  99).	   Moreover,	   it	   has	   been	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   ‘theoretical	   deviation’	   has	   a	  methodological	  counterpart,	  defined	  as	  “the	  propensity	   to	  separate	   the	  reflection	  on	   the	   methods	   from	   its	   actual	   use	   in	   the	   scientific	   work	   and	   to	   cultivate	   the	  method	   for	   its	   own	   sake”	   (Bourdieu	   &	   Wacquant,	   1992:	   28),	   forgetting,	   thus,	  Schutz’s	  comments	  on	  methodology	  not	  as	  the	  tutor	  of	  the	  scientist	  but	  as	  “always	  its	  pupil”	  (Schutz,	  1970:	  315).	  
These	  two	  problems,	  the	  excessive	  independence	  of	  either	  theory	  or	  methodology,	  are	   still	   present	   in	   nowadays’	   sociology,	   as	   John	   Goldthorpe	   declares	   on	   the	  introduction	  to	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  his	  celebrated	  work,	  On	  Sociology;	  here,	  after	  summarizing	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  lack	  of	   integration	  between	  theory	  and	  research	  that	  affects	  the	  discipline,	  Goldthorpe	  wrote:	  “Writing	  now	  some	  six	  years	  later,	  I	  would	  see	   little	   reason	   for	  any	  major	  revision	  of	   this	  analysis	  of	   the	  condition	  of	  sociology”	  (Goldthorpe,	  2006,	  p.	  2).	  	  
Underlying	   these	   problems	   affecting	   sociological	   research,	   ultimately	   causing	   a	  lack	  of	  coordination	  between	  theory	  and	  research,	   is	   the	  shadow	  of	  relativism.	   It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Examples	   of	   these	   general	   theorists	  would	   be,	   according	   to	   Goldthorpe	   (2000a,	   p.	   2),	  Alexander	  (1998)	  or	  Giddens	  (1984).	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has	  been	  said	  that	  relativism	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  kinds:	  cognitive	  relativism,	  
perceptual	  relativism,	  and	  epistemic	  relativism	  (Goldthorpe,	  2006:	  1-­‐27).	  
Cognitive	   relativism	   has	   been	   described	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   influence	   that	  postmodern	  philosophy	  has	  had	  on	  the	  social	  sciences	  during	  the	  last	  thirty	  years	  of	   the	   twentieth	  century	  (Outhwaite	  &	  Bottomore,	  1993).	   It	   refers	   to	   the	  already	  commented	  notion	  of	  scientific	  paradigm,	  meaning	  a	  grid	  that	  establishes	  what	  can	  and	  what	  cannot	  be	  scientifically	  known	  in	  every	  epoch	  (Kuhn,	  1962)10.	  According	  to	   this	   idea,	   science	   is	   a	   contextual	   enterprise	   unable	   to	   discover	   a	   pre-­‐existent	  truth,	   as	   its	   social	  bonds	  will	  prevent	   it	   to	  do	   so11.	  We	   find	  a	   similar	   conception,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  It	   is	  worth	  saying	  that	  Kuhn	  has	   later	  distance	  himself	   from	  the	  strong	  assumptions	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  “the	  strong	  program”:	  “It	  is	  needed,	  that	  is,	  to	  defend	  notions	  like	  truth	  and	  knowledge	  from,	   for	  example,	   the	  excesses	  of	  post-­‐modernist	  movements	   like	  the	  strong	  program”	   (Kuhn,	   1990,	   p.	   4).	   The	   critique	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘strong	   program’	   has	   been	  summarized	  by	  Hacking,	  who	  argued	   that	   substantive	  differences	   in	   the	   sciences	   should	  have	  been	  emerged,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  differences	  in	  the	  historical	  and	  social	  contexts	  in	  which	  these	  sciences	  emerged	  (Hacking,	  1999).	  	  11	  There	   is	   a	   similarity	   with	   Bourdieu’s	   ideas	   on	   science,	   commented	   above,	   in	   that	   he	  recognizes	   the	   social	  underpinnings	  of	   science	   that	   cognitive	   relativism	  uses	   in	  order	   to	  define	   science	   as	   intrinsically	   contextual,	   what	   endangers	   the	   scientific	   promise	   of	  revealing	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  reality.	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  substantial	  difference	  that	  keeps	  Bourdieu	   aside	   from	   cognitive	   relativists,	   as	   he	   thinks	   that	   social	   science	   is	   possible	  through	   a	   process	   of	   scientific	   reflexivity	   that	   will	   make	   sociologists	   aware	   of	   the	  influences	   derived	   from	   the	   social	   anchorage	   of	   the	   science	   that	   they	   produce,	   enabling	  them	  to	  neutralize	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  social	  bond	  (Bourdieu,	  1990;	  Bourdieu	  &	  Wacquant,	  1992);	  this	  process	  of	  scientific	  reflexivity	  is	  possible	  thanks	  to	  the	  socio-­‐analysis	  and	  self-­‐analysis	   by	  which	   the	   sociologist	   becomes	   aware	   of	   the	  way	   in	   which	   his	   or	   her	   social	  positioning	   is	   affecting	   his	   or	   her	   scientific	   production	   (Bourdieu,	   Chamboredon,	   &	  Passeron,	   1968;	   Bourdieu,	   1991).	   Bourdieu	   developed	   systematically	   this	   sociological	  analysis	  of	  oneself,	  needed	  to	  neutralize	  bias	  in	  research	  (Bourdieu,	  2004).	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perhaps	   more	   radical,	   in	   the	   Foucauldian	   notion	   of	   épistémè	   (Foucault,	   1966;	  1969),	  which	  we	  will	  discuss	  in-­‐depth	  later.	  
Perceptual	  relativism	  has	  been	  summarized	  by	  Edward	  Sapir	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  is	  that	  the	  “real	  world”	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  unconsciously	  built	  up	  on	  the	   language	  habits	   of	   the	   group’	   (Sapir,	   1929:	  209).	  This	   refers	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  reality	  is	  constructed	  socially	  (Berger	  and	  Luckmann,	  1966)	  or	  performed	  through	  speech	  acts	  –involving	  that	  different	  languages	  provide	  different	  versions	  of	  reality	  (Whorf,	   1956;	   Sapir,	   1984)–,	   undermining	   the	   idea	   of	   reality	   as	   a	   pre-­‐existing	  objective	  set	  of	  facts.	  As	  Alex	  Callinicos	  has	  pointed	  out,	  twentieth-­‐century	  thought	  was	   characterized	   by	   a	   “revolution	   in	   language”,	   which	   largely	   transformed	  philosophy	  and	  sociological	  theory,	  both	  in	  its	  postmodern	  and	  modern	  branches	  (Callinicos,	  1999,	  p.	  282)12;	   this	   linguistic	  turn,	   as	  Richard	  Rorty	   (1967)	   called	   it,	  has	   eventually	   lead	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   philosophical	   deconstruction,	   introduced	   by	  Jacques	  Derrida	  (1967)	  and	  developed	   later	  by	  other	  authors	  –see	  Butler	   (1990)	  for	  an	  application	  of	  deconstruction	  to	  the	  social	  category	  of	  gender–.	  	  
Finally,	   epistemic	   relativism	   is	   presented	   as	   the	   most	   radical	   of	   the	  aforementioned	   forms	   adopted	   by	   relativism,	   going	   down	   to	   the	   point	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	   modern	   branch	   is	   usually	   identified	   with	   those	   thinkers	   who,	   after	   the	   crisis	   of	  structuralism,	   and	   in	   particular	   of	   Althusserian	   Marxism	   in	   the	   1970s,	   decided	   not	   to	  embrace	   the	   list	   of	   postmodern	   thinkers	   and	   to	   carry	   on	   the	  modern	   tradition	   –mainly	  Jürgen	   Habermas	   and	   Pierre	   Bourdieu-­‐.	   The	   postmodern	   branch	   alluded	   relates	   to	   the	  explosion	   of	   post-­‐structuralism,	   represented	   by	   authors	   such	   as	   Michel	   Foucault	   or	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  whose	   thought	   has	   usually	   been	   defined	   as	   an	   evolution	   of	  Nietzsche’s	  
gegenaufklärung	   (see,	   e.g.,	   Callinicos,	   1999,	   pp.	   258-­‐295).	   The	   encounter	   of	   these	   two	  traditions	  has	  created	  one	  of	  the	  most	  passionate	  intellectual	  debates	  of	  the	  last	  fifty	  years	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Habermas,	  1981;	  1985;	  Derrida,	  2006;	  Thomassen,	  2006).	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contextualizing	  the	  criteria	  of	  truth	  and	  logic,	  questinoning,	  hence,	   the	  possibility	  of	   knowledge	   acquisition	   through	   science,	  what	   originated	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘science	  wars’	   during	   the	   1990s	   (Parsons,	   2003).	   The	   contenders	   in	   these	   science	   wars	  were,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   postmodern	   philosophers	   and,	   on	   the	   other,	   a	   group	   of	  scientists	   led	  by	  Alan	  Sokal,	   the	   formal	  rejecting	   the	  possibility	  of	  discovering	  an	  objective	   reality	   through	   the	   use	   of	   reason13,	   the	   latter	   defending	   this	   task14.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 	  This	   idea	   appears	   in	   key	   poststructuralist	   thinkers,	   as	   Foucault:	   “Couldn’t	   it	   be	  concluded	  that	  the	  promise	  of	  Aufklärung	  (Enlightenment),	  of	  attaining	  freedom	  through	  the	   exercise	   of	   reason,	   has	   been	   overturned	  within	   the	   domain	   of	   Reason	   itself,	   that	   is	  taking	  more	  and	  more	  space	  away	  from	  freedom?”	  (Foucault,	  1981:	  117).	  Also	  Derrida,	  in	  his	  famous	  quote:	  “Il	  n’y	  a	  pas	  de	  hors-­‐texte”	  (Derrida,	  1967:	  158-­‐159)	  (“There	  is	  nothing	  outside	   the	   text”).	   These	   view	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   as	   pure	   discourse	   is	   stressed	   by	  Rorty,	  as	  well,	  when	  he	  says:	  	  “Truth	   cannot	   be	   out	   there	   –cannot	   exist	   independently	   of	   the	   human	   mind-­‐	   because	  sentences	   cannot	   exist,	   or	   be	   out	   there.	   The	  world	   is	   out	   there,	   but	   descriptions	   of	   the	  world	  are	  not.	  Only	  descriptions	  of	  the	  world	  can	  be	  true	  or	  false.	  The	  world	  on	  its	  own	  –unaided	  by	  the	  describing	  activities	  of	  human	  beings-­‐	  cannot.	  The	  suggestion	  that	  truth,	  as	  well	   as	   the	  world,	   is	   out	   there	   is	   a	   legacy	  of	   an	   age	   in	  which	   the	  world	  was	   seen	  as	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  being	  who	  had	  a	  language	  of	  his	  own”	  (Rorty,	  1989:	  5).	  It	   has	   been	   indicated	   that	   the	   postmodern	   abandonment	   of	   science	   has	   its	   roots	   on	  Nietzsche	  –what	  gave	  way	  to	  one	  of	  its	  many	  critics,	  as	  Nietzsche’s	  thoughts	  are	  rooted	  in	  the	  very	  modern	  19th	  century	  (Callinicos,	  1991)-­‐,	  as	  in	  Habermas:	  	  “Nietzche’s	   critique	   of	   modernity	   has	   been	   continued	   along	   both	   paths.	   The	   skeptical	  scholar	  who	  wants	  to	  unmask	  the	  perversion	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power,	  the	  revolt	  of	  reactionary	  forces,	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   subject-­‐centered	   reason	   by	   using	   anthropological,	  psychological,	  and	  historical	  methods	  has	  successors	  in	  Bataille,	  Lacan,	  and	  Foucault;	  the	  initiate-­‐critic	  of	  metaphysics	  who	  pretends	  to	  a	  unique	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  and	  pursues	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  subject	  back	  to	  its	  pre-­‐Socratic	  beginnings	  has	  successors	  in	  Heidegger	  and	  Derrida”	  (Habermas,	  1987:	  97).	  	  14 	  The	   book	   of	   Gross	   &	   Levitt	   (1994)	   was	   probably	   the	   first	   attempt	   to	   discredit	  postmodernist	   relativization	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	  made	   by	   practicing	   scientists.	   Two	  years	  later,	  Alan	  Sokal’s	  publication	  in	  Social	  Text	  –an	  academic	  journal	  of	  postmodernist	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Epistemic	  relativism	  has	  been	  also	  critized	  from	  philosophy.	  Thus,	  John	  Searle	  has	  defended	   the	   notion	   of	   truth	   as	   a	   correspondence	   with	   facts	   (Searle,	   1995),	  whereas	   Nagel	   has	   worked	   on	   the	   rehabilitation	   of	   reason	   as	   a	   valid,	   positive,	  category	   for	   understanding	   the	   world	   (Nagel,	   1997).	   This	   task	   was	   shared	   also	  with	   Habermas	   (1984),	   who	   developed	   a	   critique	   equally	   applicable	   to	  postmodernists	   and	   to	   the	   dead-­‐end	   to	   which	   the	   Frankfurt	   School	   had	   arrived	  during	   its	   latter	  years.	  This	  dead-­‐end	   is	   identified	  with	   its	  despair	  on	   the	   role	  of	  reason	   as	   the	   key	   category	   for	   human	   progress,	   epitomized	   in	   the	  Dialektik	   der	  
Aufklärung:	   ‘Myth	   is	   already	   enlightenment,	   and	   enlightenment	   reverts	   to	  mythology’	   (Horkheimer	  &	  Adorno,	   2002	   [1947]:	   xviii),	  while,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  ‘Enlightenment’s	   program	   was	   the	   disenchantment	   of	   the	   world.	   It	   wanted	   to	  dispel	  myths,	  to	  overthrow	  fantasy	  with	  knowledge’	  (Horkheimer	  &	  Adorno,	  2002	  [1947]:	  1).	  	  
This	   PhD	   thesis	   is	   draw	   on	   the	   tradition	   of	   critique	   to	   these	   three	   commented	  forms	  of	  relativism,	  being	  focused	  thereby	  on	  the	  recovery	  of	  truth	  and	  reason	  as	  valid	  ways	   through	  which	  objective	   knowledge	   can	  be	   achieved.	  Thus,	   aiming	   to	  produce	  true	  knowledge	  of	  the	  social	  world	  through	  the	  use	  of	  social	  science,	  we	  have	  defined	  the	  research	  question	  guiding	  this	  work	  as	  Why	  people	  vote	  the	  way	  
they	  do.	  As	  this	  is	  the	  question	  that	  we	  want	  to	  respond	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  work,	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  first	  reasonable	  step	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  scientific	  answer	  to	  it	  is	  to	  describe	  how	  people	  is	  actually	  voting.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  orientation-­‐	  of	  an	  article	  arguing	   that	  quantum	  gravity	   is	  a	  mere	  social	   construct	   (Sokal,	  1996),	  largely	  discredited	  postmodernists’	  attitude	  towards	  science,	  as	  the	  article	  was	  just	  a	  fake,	  only	  charged	  with	  postmodern	  jargon	  (see	  also	  (Sokal	  &	  Bricmont,	  1997).	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1.2	  How	  to	  proceed?	  This	  work	  wants	  to	  contribute	  to	  our	  general	  understanding	  of	  how	  people	  decide	  what	  to	  do	  when	  a	  democratic	  political	  election	  takes	  place.	   It	  has	  been	  said	  that	  the	  academic	   literature	  on	   the	   topic	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  holds	   the	   title	  of	  being	  the	  widest	  within	   the	   very	   extensive	   tradition	   of	   political	   science	   as	   a	   discipline	  (Lago,	  2005:	  1)	  and	  it	  is	  our	  belief	  that	  this	  proliferation	  of	  studies	  in	  our	  selected	  area	  of	  research	  is	  double-­‐edged.	  On	  the	  one,	  positive,	  hand	  we	  can	  celebrate	  that,	  certainly,	  we	  are	  not	  starting	   from	  scratch;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	   it	  seems	  difficult	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  an	  original	  or	  relevant	  contribution	  to	  what	  may	  seem	  an	  exhausted	  field.	  Regarding	  this	  latter	  stance,	  we	  may	  counter	  pose	  that	  science	  is	  a	  never-­‐ending	  task,	  defined	  by	  a	  continuous	  forward	  movement	  in	  which	  new	  research	   strengthens,	   modifies	   or,	   sometimes,	   entirely	   contradicts	   old	  approaches15.	  	  
The	  study	  of	  voting	  behavior	  has	  deep	  roots	   in	  Sociology	  (Lazarsfeld,	  Berelson	  &	  Gaudet,	  1944),	  Social	  Psychology	  (Campbell,	  Converse,	  Miller,	  &	  Stokes,	  1960)	  and	  Behavioral	  Economics	  (Downs,	  1957).	  It	  has	  called	  the	  attention	  of	  social	  thinkers,	  however,	  since	  the	  time	  when	  the	  discipline	  was	  being	  founded	  –vid.	  e.g.,	  Siegfried,	  2010[1913])–,	   and	   it	   has	   clear	   precedents	   in	   the	  Marxist	   theory	   of	   ideology	   and	  alienation	   (Marx	   and	   Engels,	   1998[1846];	   Marx,	   1974[1844]).	   However	   these	  developments	  within	  Marxism	  were	  prematurely	  stopped	  probably,	  as	  happened	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  We	  are	  aware	  that	  this	  statement	  contradicts	  the	  Foucauldian	  notion	  of	  épistémè	  as	  the	  underlying	   concept	   that	   defines	   changes	   in	   scientific	   discourse.	   Meaning	   that	   every	  historical	   period	   is	   characterised	  by	   its	   own	  epistemological	   realm,	  which	   acts	   as	   a	   grill	  that	   defines	  what	   can	   be	   and	  what	   cannot	   be	   scientifically	   known,	   Foucault	   contradicts	  any	  possible	  evolutionist	  idea	  of	  science	  (Foucault,	  1969;	  1966).	  We	  are,	  however,	  pretty	  sure	  that	  our	  research	  will	  not	  initiate	  a	  new	  epistemological	  era	  in	  science	  and,	  thus,	  that	  we	  are	  operating	  under	  contemporary	  paradigms	  within	  the	  social	  sciences.	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with	   the	  Marxist	   theorization	   on	   the	   national	   question,	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	  events	   taking	   place	   at	   USSR	   after	   Stalin	   took	   power	   in	   1922	   (Haupt,	   Löwy	   and	  Weill,	  1974).	  In	  a	  broader	  sense	  we	  can	  affirm,	  moreover,	  that	  the	  voting	  behavior	  research	   question,	   i.e.,	  why	  people	   vote	   the	  way	   they	   do,	   has	   been	   occupying	   the	  research	   agenda	   of	   every	   generation	   of	   social	   thinkers	   since	   we	   have	   records.	  Thus,	   this	   question	  was	   at	   the	   core	  of	   the	   famous	  dispute	  between	  Socrates	   and	  Protagoras,	  narrated	  by	  Plato	   in	  his	  Protagoras	  dialogue	  (Plato,	  2008[5th	  c.	  BC]);	  discussing	   if	   virtue	   can	   or	   cannot	   be	   taught,	   the	   dialogue	   goes	   on	   showing	   the	  difficulties	   to	  provide	  a	   clear	  definition	  of	  what	  virtue	   really	   is,	   and	   it	   eventually	  concludes	   that	   these	   matters	   are	   too	   complex	   to	   arrive	   to	   a	   final,	   definite,	  solution16.	   So,	   in	   a	   sense,	   Plato	  was	   anticipating	   the	   debates	   taking	   place	   in	   late	  20th	   century,	   known	   as	   the	   ‘science	  wars’,	   validating	   Alfred	  Whitehead’s	   famous	  quotation:	   ‘The	   safest	   general	   characterization	   of	   the	   European	   philosophical	  tradition	  is	  that	  it	  consists	  of	  a	  series	  of	  footnotes	  to	  Plato’	  (Whitehead,	  1978:	  39).	  We	  can	  affirm,	  hence,	  that	  there	  has	  always	  been	  an	  interest	  in	  providing	  a	  correct	  understanding	  of	  why	  people	  behave	  politically	  as	  they	  (we)	  do17.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Underlying	   the	   dialogue	   we	   can	   see	   the	   tension	   between	   the	   Sophists,	   who	   made	   a	  fortune	   teaching	   rhetoric	   to	   wealthy	   citizens	   and	   Plato’s	   critique	   of	   democracy.	   Plato’s	  critique	  of	  democracy	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  those	  wealthy	  citizens	  who	  can	  afford	  for	  the	   Sophists’	   lessons	   have	   more	   chances	   to	   win	   a	   political	   election.	   Consequently	  democracy,	  for	  Plato,	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  adequate	  framework	  for	  the	  government	  of	  the	  experts,	  which	  would	  lead	  to	  common	  good	  (Plato,	  2012[4th	  c.	  BC]:	  Book	  VI).	  17	  See	  Del	  Águila	  and	  Vallespín	  (1998)	  for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  classical	  tradition	  on	  the	  theory	  and	  critique	  of	  democracy,	   initiated	   in	   the	  Classical	  Greece.	  We	  can	  even	   trace	  back	   this	  line	   of	   thinking	   to	   classical	   Chinese	   philosophy,	   6th	   century	   BCE,	   in	   Confucius’	   political	  philosophy	  (Shihlien, 2005[1932])	  or	  in	  the	  proto-­‐libertarian	  ideas	  of	  Lao	  Tse	  (Kaltenmark, 
1969).	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We	   are	   basing	   our	   research	   on	   the	   tradition	   of	   scientific	   sociology,	   in	  which	   the	  role	   of	   theory	   is	   just	   to	   provide	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   observed	   facts	   (Boudon,	  2002).	   This	   is	   the	   role	   attributed	   to	   theory	   by	   the	   logic	   of	   scientific	   knowledge,	  typically	   since	   the	   times	   of	   rationalist	   philosophy,	   epitomized	   in	   Descartes’	  philosophy	  of	  the	  cogito	  (Descartes,	  2000	  [1637])	  and	  in	  Galileo	  uses	  of	  reason	  and	  logic	  to	  study	  physical	  phenomena	  –vid.	  Hawking	  (1988;	  2009)	  for	  a	  consideration	  on	  Galileo’s	  role	  as	  the	  father	  of	  modern	  science–.	  This	  epistemology	  has,	  however,	  clear	   precedents	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   Muslim	   Golden	   Age	   (10th	  century	  AD),	  and	  particularly	  in	  the	  huge	  work	  of	  polymath	  Ibn	  al-­‐Haytham,	  who	  often	   takes	   over	   Galileo’s	   condition	   of	   ‘father	   of	   science’	   –vid.	   Steffens	   (2006)–.	  Some	   recent	   intellectual	   fashions,	   namely	   postmodernism	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	  ‘general	  theory’	  (Goldthorpe,	  2000:	  2),	  affecting	  the	  social	  sciences	  in	  general	  and	  sociology	  in	  particular,	  have	  put	  into	  question	  this	  role	  of	  theory,	  due	  to	  different	  reasons	  (vid.	  supra).	  We	  are	  adhering	  the	  methodological	  critique	  to	  these	  currents	  (Goldthorpe,	  2000;	  Noguera,	  2006;	  Boudon,	  2004)	  and,	  thus,	  bringing	  back	  theory	  to	   its	   traditional	   scientific	   role.	   As	   we	   have	   discussed	   these	   ideas	   above	   with	  greater	  detail,	  we	  only	  want	  now	  to	  restate	  our	  position,	  with	  just	  one	  aggregate.	  Sometimes	  this	  traditional	  role	  of	  theory	  is	  identified	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Weberian	  temptation”	  by	  some	  social	   scientists,	  particularly	  sympathizing	  with	   the	  Marxist	  tradition	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   (Wright,	   1989a,	   pp.	   313-­‐323).	   Thus	   Wright	  commented:	   “(…)	   Weberians	   have	   an	   easier	   time	   than	   Marxists	   in	   forming	   a	  concept	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  because	  in	  the	  Weberian	  tradition	  the	  concept	  of	  class	  structure	  is	  relieved	  of	  three	  theoretical	  burdens	  which	  must	  be	  contended	  with	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  within	  a	  Marxist	   framework	  (…)”	   (Wright,	  1989a:	  315).	  This	  has	  been	  an	   issue	  on	   the	  well-­‐known	  debate	  on	  classes	   (Wright,	  1989;	  2005),	   in	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which	   neo-­‐Marxists	   counterpose	   their	   schema	   –we	   are	   referring	   to	   the	   last	  versions	  of	  the	  Wright	  schema,	  vid.	  Wright	  (1997),	  not	  to	  the	  initial	  ones	  in	  Wright	  (1978),	   later	   abandoned	   by	   Wright	   himself–	   to	   the	   neo-­‐Weberian	   approach	   –Erikson-­‐Goldthorpe-­‐Portocarero	   (EGP)	   approach	   (Erikson,	   Goldthorpe,	   &	  Portocarero,	   1979;	   Erikson	   &	   Goldthorpe,	   1992)–.	   In	   this	   sense,	   neo-­‐Marxists	  usually	  argue	   that	  one	  of	   the	  advantages	  of	   their	   schema,	  when	  compared	   to	   the	  neo-­‐Weberian	   one,	   is	   that	   they	   depart	   from	   theory	   to	   create	   a	   coherent	   class	  schema,	   whereas	   neo-­‐Weberians	   produce	   a	   more	   explanatory	   schema	   without	  starting	  from,	  or	  attaching	  to,	  any	  broader	  theoretical	  tradition.	  We	  argue	  that	  this	  dispute	  has	  more	  to	  be	  with	  the	  symbolic	  appropriation	  of	  an	  extremely	  politicized	  concept,	  such	  as	  social	  class	  by	  rival	  political	  ideologies	  –socialism,	  associated	  with	  Marxism,	   and	   liberalism,	   associated	   with	   the	   Weberian	   tradition–.	   What	   is	  probably	  happening	  here	  is	  that	  neo-­‐Marxist	  social	  classes	  are	  designed	  not	  only	  to	  explain	   social	   mobility	   –as	   the	   EGP	   class	   schema	   does–	   but	   also	   to	   complete	   a	  general	   framework	   of	   capitalist	   functioning,	   from	   a	   critical	   point	   of	   view.	  Significantly	   enough,	   the	  main	  proponent	  of	  neo-­‐Marxist	   class	   analysis,	  Erik	  Olin	  Wright,	  called	  in	  a	  recent	  article	  for	  an	  integration	  of	  both	  traditions,	  arguing	  that	  the	  main	  difference	  between	  both	  is	  Weberians’	  denial	  to	  integrate	  the	  notions	  of	  exploitation	   and	   domination	   within	   their	   class	   schema	   (Wright,	   2009).	   We	   can	  conclude,	  hence,	   that	  neo-­‐Marxists	   and	  neo-­‐Weberians	   are	   just	   talking	  about	   the	  same	  reality	   from	  different	  perspectives,	   the	   former	  going	   further	   than	  the	   latter	  as	   a	   consequence	   of	   embracing	   a	   far-­‐reaching	   normative	   program.	   This	   is	   also	  suggested	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   their	   later	   versions,	   Wright’s	   and	   Goldthorpe’s	  schemas	  are	  in	  fact	  very	  similar18.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  I	   want	   to	   thank	   Dr	   García	   Docampo	   and	   Dr	   Pau	   Mari-­‐Klose	   for	   having	   called	   my	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Since	   the	  role	  of	   theory	   in	  science	   is	   just	   to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  of	   the	   trends	  observed	   and	   described	   through	   the	   rigorousness	   of	   the	   scientific	  methodology,	  and	  not	  an	  end	  in	  itself,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  proceed	  as	  follows.	  Firstly	  we	  will	  present	  some	   observations	   on	   how	   people	   are	   actually	   behaving	   when	   democratic	  elections	  are	  held.	  We	  have	  to	  state	  now	  the	  most	  important	  of	  our	  methodological	  limitations:	   there	   is	   no	   single	   exhaustive	   international	   database	   registering	  people’s	  electoral	  behavior.	  As	  a	  consequence	  we	  have	  two	  possibilities.	  The	  first	  one	  would	   be	   to	   try	   to	   combine	   different	   election	   polls	   in	   order	   to	   build	   up	   an	  international	  comparative	  framework	  on	  electoral	  behavior.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  option	  is	  that	  methodologies	  diverge	  from	  country	  to	  country	  and	  although	  there	  are	   some	   ongoing	   international	   attempts	   to	   build	   such	   a	   comprehensive	  database 19 ,	   we	   are	   not	   yet	   on	   a	   stage	   that	   enables	   complex	   international	  hypothesis	  testing.	  Consequently	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  develop	  comparative	  electoral	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  attention	  on	  this	  point.	  19	  It	  is	  particularly	  remarkable,	  in	  this	  regard,	  the	  leading	  role	  of	  the	  ACE	  Project,	  Electoral	  Knowledge	  Network	  (ACE,	  2014).	  The	  ACE	  Project	  is	  a	  combined	  effort	  between	  different	  international	  organizations,	  including	  the	  following	  partners:	  
• United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP)	  
• Electoral	  Institute	  for	  Sustainable	  Democracy	  in	  Africa	  (EISA)	  
• Elections	  Canada	  
• International	  Foundation	  for	  Electoral	  Systems	  (IFES)	  
• International	  Institute	  for	  Democracy	  and	  Electoral	  Assistance	  (IDEA)	  
• Instituto	  Nacional	  Electoral	  (INE-­‐Mexico)	  
• United	  Nations	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  (UN	  ECOSOC)	  
• The	  Carter	  Center	  Although	  a	  great	  effort	  with	  many	  different	  results	  on	  the	  field	  of	  democracy	  promotion	  an	  electoral	   assistance,	   the	   ACE	   database	   does	   not	   yet	   include	   enough	   variables	   to	   test	  complex	  hypothesis	  on	  electoral	  behavior	  theory.	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research	  within	  a	  highly	  reliable	  statistical	  framework.	  The	  case	  of	  Spain	  suits	  this	  condition,	  for	  two	  reasons:	  
1. The	   Spanish	   Center	   for	   Sociological	   Research	   (CIS)	   has	   been	   developing	  electoral	  research	  since	  its	  foundation	  in	  1963.	  One	  of	  the	  leading	  areas	  of	  research	   at	   the	   CIS	   is,	   undoubtedly,	   elections.	   Particularly,	   the	   Spanish	  general	  elections.	  2. According	  to	  Linz	  and	  Montero	  the	  multinational	  reality	  of	  Spain	  makes	  it	  a	  unique	  case	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  provided	  that	  we	  should	  speak	  of	  Spanish	  party	  systems,	  in	  plural	  (Linz	  &	  Montero,	  2001:	  152).	  We	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  Spanish	   case	  enables	   comparative	   research	   in	   terms	  of	   economic,	   cultural	  and	  political	  diversity.	  	  
In	  the	  end,	   if	  we	  believe	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  developing	  social	  science,	  we	  should	  be	   able	   to	   unveil	   the	   laws	   determining	   people’s	   electoral	   behavior	   with	  comparative	  data	  from	  a	  diverse	  country	  such	  as	  Spain.	  We	  may	  say	  that	  Newton	  did	  not	  need	  to	  see	  pears	  and	  oranges	  falling	  down,	  apart	  from	  apples,	  in	  order	  to	  build	  up	  his	  powerful	  theoretical	  framework20.	  	  
Secondly,	  once	  we	  have	  observed	  the	  empirical	  trends	  defining	  people’s	  electoral	  behavior,	   we	   will	   try	   to	   develop	   an	   explanation	   of	   these.	   For	   this	   task	   we	   will	  summarize	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art	  on	  the	  social	  sciences	  regarding	  electoral	  behavior.	  Our	  intention	  is	  to	  see	  if	  the	  existing	  theoretical	  knowledge	  can	  or	  cannot	  explain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The	   anecdote	   of	   the	   apple	   hitting	   Newton’s	   head,	   although	   widespread,	   seems	   to	   be	  apocryphal.	  As	  Hawking	  put	  it:	  ‘The	  story	  that	  Newton	  was	  inspired	  by	  an	  apple	  hitting	  his	  head	   is	   almost	   certainly	   apocryphal.	   All	   Newton	   himself	   ever	   said	   was	   that	   the	   idea	   of	  gravity	  came	  to	  him	  as	  he	  sat	  “in	  a	  contemplative	  mood”	  and	  “was	  occasioned	  by	  the	  fall	  of	  an	  apple”’	  (Hawking,	  1988:	  5).	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the	   patterns	   and	   regularities	   detected	   in	   people’s	   electoral	   choices.	   We	   will	  summarize	  the	  achievements	  of	  theory	  in	  this	  regard	  and	  we	  will	  point	  out	  some	  of	  its	  weaknesses,	  too.	  Thus,	  we	  will	  see	  if	  the	  explanations	  provided	  are	  completely	  satisfactory	   or	   if,	   otherwise,	   they	   provide	   only	   partial	   explanations	   of	   the	  described	   voting	   patterns.	   If	   this	   were	   to	   be	   the	   case,	   we	   will	   hypothesize	   new	  theoretical	   developments	   in	   order	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   boundaries	   of	   nowadays’	  sociology	  of	  electoral	  behavior.	  Finally	  we	  will	  try	  to	  test	  our	  hypothesis	  with	  the	  data	  at	  our	  disposal.	   If	  our	  research	  is	  successful	  we	  will	   improve	  our	  theoretical	  explanations	  on	  why	  people	  vote	  the	  way	  they	  do.	  	  
1.3	  A	  comparative	  macrosociological	  analysis	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  Now	   that	   we	   have	   made	   clear	   the	   importance	   for	   sociological	   research	   of	  establishing,	   in	   the	   first	  place,	  which	  are	   the	  social	   facts	   that	  we	  want	   to	  explain	  before	   trying	   to	   develop	   any	   theoretical	   explanation	   of	   them,	   we	   are	   going	   to	  describe	   our	   phenomenon,	   i.e.,	   voting	   behavior	   in	   liberal	   democracies.	   Our	  purpose	   is	   to	   develop	   a	   thorough	   description	   of	   electoral	   behavior,	   which	   will	  uncover	   those	   empirical	   regularities	   which,	   thereafter,	   we	   will	   try	   to	   explain	  through	   the	   application	   of	   one	   or	   various	   existing	   sociological	   theories	   or,	   if	  necessary,	   through	   the	   application	   of	   newly	   developed	   theory	   with	   which	   to	  interpret	  our	  data.	  
The	  aim	  of	  our	  work	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  correct	  understanding	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  in	  liberal	  democracies.	  It	  remains	  clear	  that	  our	  work	  is,	  thus,	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  explanation	   of	   any	   national	   or	   regional	   electoral	   behavior,	   being	   this	   British,	  American,	  Spanish,	  European,	  etc.	  The	  design	  of	  this	  research	  is	   inspired,	  thus,	   in	  comparative	   macrosociology,	   as	   our	   ultimate	   goal	   is	   to	   unveil	   the	   general	   laws	  determining	   people’s	   electoral	   behavior,	   without	   being	   specifically	   concerned,	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hence,	  with	   the	  detailed	   explanation	   of	   the	   results	   of	   a	   given	  particular	   election.	  Together	   with	   Goldthorpe	   (2000b),	   we	   think	   that	   the	   explanation	   of	   national	  differences	  relies	  on	  the	  particular	  combination	  of	  social	  variables	  that	  takes	  place	  within	   the	   administrative	   limits	   of	   the	   nation,	   and	   not	   on	   any	   immeasurable	  
essence,	  only	  to	  be	  grasped	  with	  the	  poetic	  lens	  instead	  of	  the	  sociological	  ones21.	  
Since	   we	   do	   not	   have	   yet	   complete	   global	   databases	   registering	   cross-­‐national	  electoral	  information22,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  select	  the	  frame	  from	  which	  we	  will	  take	  our	  variables.	  We	  have	  decided	  to	  base	  our	  study	  on	  data	  from	  Spain,	  due	  mainly	  to	  two	  reasons.	  In	  the	  first	  place	  it	  enables	  us	  to	  develop	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  two	  relevant	  variables	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  electoral	  behavior:	  social	  class	  (Evans	  &	  De	  Graaf,	   2013;	   Evans,	   1999)	   and	   national	   identity	   (Bieber	   &	   Wolff,	   2005;	   Brown,	  2005),	   together	   with	   other	   common	   variables	   generally	   spread	   throughout	   the	  globe,	   such	   as	   leadership	   or	   ideology23.	   While	   these	   two	   latter	   variables	   are	  present	  virtually	   in	  every	  modern	  democracy	  –together	  with	  party	   identification,	  economic	  preferences,	  etc.–	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case	  of	  national	  identity,	  making	  Spain	  a	  good	   framework	   for	   addressing	   comprehensively	   our	   much	   general	   research	  question,	   i.e.,	   why	   people	   vote	   the	   way	   they	   do.	   Spain	   is	   also	   a	   good	   case	   to	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  social	  class	  on	  electoral	  behavior,	  as	  it	   is	  quite	  an	  unequal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Primordialist	   theories	   on	   the	   origin	   of	   nations,	   based	   on	   Herder’s	   idea	   of	   volksgeist	  (Dover,	  1952),	  once	  widely	  spread,	  are	  now	  generally	  discredited	  (Özkirimli,	  2010).	  Vid.,	  
e.g.,	  Siegfried	  (1950).	  22	  Attempts,	   however,	   have	   been	  made	   in	   this	   line;	   see	  Nieuwbeerta	  &	  De	  Graaf	   (1999).	  The	  work	  of	   the	  ACE	  Project	   is	  very	  remarkable	  on	  this	  aspect	  (ACE,	  2014).	   Its	  electoral	  database,	  however,	  does	  not	  enable	  yet	  the	  conduction	  of	  wide	  behavioral	  research,	  as	  the	  number	  of	  variables	  included	  is	  still	  very	  limited.	  	  23	  According	   to	   Torcal	   &	   Chhibber	   (1995:	   7)	   leadership	   and	   ideology	   are,	   together	  with	  national	  identity,	  the	  main	  variables	  to	  explain	  electoral	  behavior	  in	  Spain.	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society	  in	  terms	  of	  income	  distribution,	  vide	  infra.	  Although	  the	  relevance	  of	  social	  class	  as	  an	  explanatory	  variable	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  has	  been	  questioned	  –mainly	  during	  the	  1990s	  (Clark,	  Lipset,	  &	  Rempel,	  1993;	  Franklin,	  Mackie,	  &	  Valen,	  1992)–	  it	   has	  more	   recently	   been	   reassessed,	  with	   promising	   results	   suggesting	   a	  more	  complex	   class	   voting	   pattern	   than	   originally	   expected	   (Evans,	   1999;	   Evans	  &	  De	  Graaf,	  2013).	  In	  addition,	  we	  have	  to	  say	  that	  the	  work	  of	  the	  CIS	  –Spanish	  Center	  of	   Sociological	   Research–	   since	   its	   foundation	   in	   1963	   –initially	   as	   ‘Institute	   of	  Public	   Opinion’–	   provides	   us	   high	   quality	   comparative	   quantitative	   data,	   what	  strengthens	  the	  methodological	  dimension	  of	  our	  research.	  We	  will	  now	  comment	  briefly	  the	  pertinence	  of	  Spain	  as	  a	  case	  where	  to	  study	  the	  relationship	  between	  electoral	   behavior	   and	   the	   two	   aforementioned	   variables,	   national	   identity	   and	  social	   class,	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   the	   selection	   of	   Spain	   as	   the	   framework	   of	   our	  research.	   The	   other	   big	   cleavage	   delimiting	   what	   Brooks	   et	   alii	  have	   defined	   as	  “recent	   debates”	   in	   the	   study	   of	   electoral	   behavior	   is	   the	   religious	   one	   (Brooks,	  Manza,	   &	   Bolzendahl,	   2003),	   and	   it	   is	   also	   present	   in	   Spanish	   politics	   with	   the	  enough	   strength	   to	   allow	   its	   assessment	   and	   analysis	   (Cordero, 2014; Orriols,	  2013).	   As	  we	   stated	   above,	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   general	   variables	   assumed	  by	   current	  theory	  as	  relevant	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  electoral	  behavior,	  are	  of	  a	  general	  kind	  and,	  hence,	  we	  can	  count	  with	  their	  presence	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  Spanish	  case	  –vid. 
Bartels (2010) or Antunes (2010) for a good synthesis of these variables–.	  
1.3.1	  Some	  brief	  commentaries	  on	  the	  economic	  unevenness	  and	  the	  national	  question	  in	  
Spain	  In	  this	  section	  we	  are	  going	  to	  analyze	  the	  uneven	  nature	  of	  Spain	  regarding	  these	  two	  fundamental	  variables:	  economic	  and	  cultural	  variations.	  The	  idea	  behind	  this	  analysis	   is	   to	   see	   if	   the	  observation	  of	   electoral	   trends	   in	  Spain	  will	   enable	  us	   to	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draw	  some	  conclusions	  regarding	  two	  structural	  variables	  that	  undeniably	  have	  a	  strong	   effect	   on	   people’s	   political	   behavior,	   attending	   to	   well-­‐established	  theoretical	  works	  –we	  are	  referring	  to	  cleavage	  theory	  (Lipset	  and	  Rokkan,	  1967),	  that	  we	  will	  describe	  with	  more	  depth	  later	  on,	  in	  our	  chapter	  on	  theory–.	  
1.3.1.1	  Economic	  unevenness	  	  As	  Linz	  and	  Moreno	  stated	   in	  a	   classic	   text,	   “the	  multinational,	  multicultural	   and	  
asymmetric	   federal	   state	  makes	   Spain	   quite	   unique	   in	  Western	   Europe”	   (Linz	   &	  Montero,	  2001:	  152).	  This	  means	  that	  within	  Spain	  we	  have	  enough	  variation	  to	  be	  able	   to	  examine	  different	  relevant	   topics	   that	  are	  general	   in	   the	  modern	  study	  of	  electoral	   behavior,	   such	   as	   class	   structure	   and	  nationalism.	   Indeed,	  within	   Spain	  we	   can	   analyze	   the	   cases	   of	   Catalonia	   and	   of	   the	   Basque	   Country	   that,	   together	  with	   Galicia,	   conform	   the	   so-­‐called	   historical	   nationalities,	   a	   term	   present	   in	   the	  Spanish	   Constitution	   and	   in	   the	   different	   Statutes	   of	   Autonomy	   of	   those	   three	  Autonomous	   Communities	   (Requejo,	   2001;	   Moreno,	   2002;	   Aja,	   2001;	   Aja,	   1999:	  53-­‐54).	   The	   usage	   of	   data	   from	   Spain	   will	   also	   give	   us	   analytical	   advantages	   in	  relation	  with	   the	  measurement	   of	   class	   voting,	   as	   it	   offers	   enough	   variability	   to	  enable	  such	  an	  analysis.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  Franco’s	  dictatorship,	  Professor	  Juan	  J.	  Linz	  already	   described	   Spain	   as	   a	   “slightly	   and	   unevenly	   developed”	   country	   (Linz,	  1967:	   41-­‐46).	   This	   “unevenness”	   diagnosed	   by	   Linz	   in	   the	   60s	   was	   to	   be	   an	  enduring	  feature	  of	  Spanish	  society,	  as	  we	  can	  deduce	  from	  the	  data	  presented	  in	  Table	  I.	  This	  table	  shows	  the	  Gini	  coefficient	  for	  each	  of	  the	  current	  34	  members	  of	  the	  OECD,	  calculated	  as	  the	  arithmetic	  mean	  of	  the	  available	  data	  since	  the	  1974	  to	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201124.	  Here	  Spain	  occupies	  the	  third	  from	  last	  position	  of	  the	  third	  quartile,	  what	  indicates	   that	   Spain	   is	   amongst	   the	   OECD	   countries	   with	   the	   higher	   levels	   of	  inequality,	  rendering	  Spain	  as	  a	  country	  with	  enough	  internal	  variability	  in	  terms	  of	   income	   distribution	   to	   conform	   a	   good	   study	   case	   of	   class	   voting.	   In	   order	   to	  understand	  our	  data	  we	  are	  going	  to	  explain	  during	  the	  next	  sub-­‐section	  how	  the	  Gini	  coefficient	  is	  calculated.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Not	  all	  countries	  have	  the	  same	  data,	  oscillating	  from	  the	  case	  of	  Canada,	  with	  35	  points	  in	   the	   time	   series	   to	   that	   of	   Switzerland,	   with	   just	   one	   point.	   In	   the	   Annexes	   we	   have	  presented	  the	  full	  data	  (Table	  IA).	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  Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  from	  data	  of	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐Operation	  and	  Development	  (OECD,	  2014),	  see	  Table	  IA	  in	  the	  Annexes.	  
.228	   .237	   .243	   .243	  
.249	   .256	   .260	   .265	   .265	   .268	  
.272	   .273	   .287	   .287	   .288	  
.298	   .301	   .311	   .311	   .311	   .317	  
.321	   .322	   .324	   .325	   .325	   .338	   .338	  

















































































































































































Table	  I.	  Gini	  index	  at	  disposable	  income,	  post	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  for	  the	  
OECD	  countries.	  Mean	  values	  from	  the	  available	  data	  over	  	  
the	  period	  1974-­‐2011	  
First	  quarHle	   Second	  quarHle	   Third	  quarHle	   Fourth	  quarHle	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The	  Lorenz	  Curve	  and	  the	  Gini	  coefficient	  In	  1912	  the	  Italian	  sociologist	  Corrado	  Gini	  published	  a	  book	  (Gini,	  1912)	  where	  he	  developed	   thirteen	   different	   formulations	   of	   an	   index	   to	   measure	   statistical	  variability.	  What	  is	  today	  known	  as	  the	  Gini	  coefficient	   is	  an	  index	  based	  on	  those	  first	   developments	   by	  Corrado	  Gini,	   but	   improved	   and	   refined	  by	   generations	   of	  statisticians	   (Ceriani	  and	  Verme,	  2012);	   it	   is	  often	  used	  as	  a	  measure	   for	   income	  inequality	   by	   organisms	   such	   as	   the	   OECD	   or	   the	   United	   Nations	   (OECD,	   2014;	  UNDP,	  2014).	  
The	  Gini	  coefficient	  is	  based	  on	  the	  Lorenz	  curve,	  that	  ‘plots	  the	  percentage	  of	  total	  income	   earned	   by	   various	   portions	   of	   the	   population	   when	   the	   population	   is	  ordered	  by	  the	  size	  of	  their	  incomes’	  (Gastwirth,	  1971,	  p.	  1037).	  According	  to	  this	  standard	   definition	   of	   the	   Lorenz	   curve,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   expose	   it	   with	   two	  equations	   (Kendall	  &	  Stuart,	  1969,	  p.	  48);	   given	   that	  𝑥	  is	   the	   salary	  of	  one	  of	   the	  members	   of	   the	   population	   being	   studied,	   then	  𝐹(𝑥)	  refers	   to	   the	   proportion	   of	  that	  population	  receiving	  salaries	  equal	  to	  or	  less	  than	  𝑥,	  so	  
𝑝 = 𝐹 𝑥 = 𝑓 𝑡 𝑑𝑡,!! 	  
whereupon	  
𝐿 𝑝 = 𝜙 𝑥 = 1𝜇    𝑡𝑓 𝑡 𝑑𝑡!! 	  
Thereby,	   given	   the	   following	   distribution	   representing	   a	   fictional	   country	   called	  Lorenzland	  with	  a	  population	  of	  ten	  individuals	  shown	  in	  Table	  II,	  we	  will	  obtain	  a	  Lorenz	  curve	  as	  represented	  in	  Figure	  1.	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(Cumulative	  percentage)	  1	   2,000	  €	   10,00	  %	   0,48	  %	   0,48	  %	  2	   5,000	  €	   20,00	  %	   1,20	  %	   1,69	  %	  3	   8,000	  €	   30,00	  %	   1,93	  %	   3,61	  %	  4	   10,000	  €	   40,00	  %	   2,41	  %	   6,02	  %	  5	   20,000	  €	   50,00	  %	   4,82	  %	   10,84	  %	  6	   30,000	  €	   60,00	  %	   7,23	  %	   18,07	  %	  7	   40,000	  €	   70,00	  %	   9,64	  %	   27,71	  %	  8	   80,000	  €	   80,00	  %	   19,28	  %	   46,99	  %	  9	   100,000	  €	   90,00	  %	   24,10	  %	   71,08	  %	  10	   120,000	  €	   100,00	  %	   28,92	  %	   100,00	  %	  
Total	   415,000	  €	  
	  
	   	  	  
Thus,	   the	   “line	   of	   equality”	   –where	  𝑦 = 𝑥–	   would	   represent	   a	   perfect	   income	  distribution,	   involving	  that	  everybody	  in	  our	  fictional	  country,	  Lorenzland,	  would	  earn	  exactly	   the	   same	  salary.	  As	   this	   is	  not	   the	   case,	   since	   individual	  number	  10	  earns	   120,000	   €	   whereas	   individual	   number	   1	   earns	   only	   2,000€,	   we	   have	   a	  Lorenz	  curve	  notably	  deviated	   from	  the	   line	  of	  equality.	  According	   to	   the	  Lorenz	  curve	   in	   Figure	   1	   we	   can	   say	   that	   more	   or	   less	   the	   50%	   of	   the	   population	   of	  Lorenzland	  earns	  less	  than	  10%	  of	  the	  wealth	  that	  the	  country	  has;	  we	  can	  also	  say	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that	  the	  richest	  20%	  of	  the	  population	  in	  Lorenzland	  accumulates	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  country’s	  wealth.	  Lorenzland	  would	  certainly	  be	  an	  unequal	  society.	  	  
	  
	  





























Popula>on	  (cumula>ve	  percentage)	  
Figure	  1.	  Lorenz	  curve	  of	  Lorenzland	  
Line	  of	  equality	  
Lorenz	  curve	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𝐺 = 1 2𝑛!𝑌! 𝑛! 𝑛! 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑦! − 𝑦!)	  
























Population	  (cumulative	  percentage)	  
Figure	  2.	  Delimita>on	  of	  areas	  within	  the	  
Lorenz	  curve	  of	  Lorenzland	  
Line	  of	  equality	  Lorenz	  curve	  A 
B
	   67	  
In	   our	   fictional	   distribution	   for	   Lorenzland	   (exposed	   above,	   in	   Table	   2),	  𝑛! 𝑛! 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑦! − 𝑦!)	  equals	   4,374,000	   (see	   Table	   II	   in	   the	   Annexes).	   The	   total	  population,	  represented	  by	  𝑛,	  equals	  10	  in	  our	  fictional	  case	  and	  the	  mean	  salary	  equals	   41,500€	   (415,000/10	   people).	   Therefore,	   the	   Gini	   coefficient	   for	  Lorenzland	  is	  0.527,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  applied	  equation:	  
𝐺 = 12×10!×41,500 ×4,374,000 = 0.527	  
1.3.1.2	  The	  national	  question	  Much	   has	   been	   written	   on	   the	   effect	   played	   by	   national	   identity	   on	   Spanish	  electoral	   behavior	   (Serrano,	   2013;	   Hernández,	   1994;	   Montabes	   &	   Fernández-­‐Llébrez,	   1994;	   Llera,	   1994;	   Pallarés	   &	   Font,	   1994;	   Pallarés,	   2000).	   As	   we	   will	  dedicate	   a	   full	   chapter	   to	   the	  analysis	  of	   this	   complex	   relationship,	   it	   is	   our	  only	  intention	   now	   to	   provide	   some	   empirical	   evidences	   of	   the	   important	   role	   that	  national	   identity	  plays	   in	   the	   electoral	  behavior	   in	   Spain.	   In	  order	   to	  do	   this,	  we	  will	  show	  the	  relevance	  that	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘peripheral’	  national	  identities	  (vid.,	  e.g.,	  Pérez-­‐Agote,	   2008)	   play	   in	   those	   Autonomous	   Communities	   with	   relevant	  presence	  of	  nationalist	  political	  parties.	  This	  will	  only	  be	  a	  first	  approximation	  to	  the	  complex	  study	  of	   the	  bond	   that	   links	  nationalism	  and	  voting	  behavior,	  as	  we	  will	   dedicate	   a	   whole	   in-­‐depth	   chapter	   to	   it,	   deploying	   multivariate	   statistical	  techniques	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  unveil	  this	  bond.	  	  
There	  are	  two	  remarkable	  cases	  of	  wide	  support	  to	  nationalist	  political	  parties	  in	  Spain,	  Catalonia	  and	   the	  Basque	  Country.	  We	   take	  as	  a	   starting	  point	  1980,	  once	  the	  restoration	  of	  democracy	  was	  completed,	  the	  Spanish	  constitution	  of	  1978	  was	  in	   full	   force	   and	   the	   processes	   of	   administrative	   devolution	   were	   being	  implemented.	   In	   the	   thirty-­‐four	   years	   between	   1980	   and	   2014,	   the	   Catalan	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government	   was	   directed	   by	   the	   nationalist	   party	   Convergència	   i	   Unió	   during	  twenty-­‐seven	  years,	  that	  is	  all	  the	  legislatures	  with	  two	  exceptions:	  the	  7th	  (2003-­‐2006)	   and	   the	   8th	   (2006-­‐2010)	   legislatures;	   the	   Catalan	   government	   during	   this	  period	   was	   a	   tripartite	   between	   three	   left-­‐wing	   Catalanist	   forces	   –Partit	   dels	  
Socialistes	   de	   Catalunya	   (PSC),	   Esquerra	   Republicana	   de	   Catalunya	   (ERC)	   and	  
Iniciativa	  per	  Catalunya	  Verds	  (ICV)-­‐	  being	  one	  of	  them,	  ERC,	  pro-­‐independence.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Basque	  Country,	  its	  government	  since	  1980	  was	  always	  in	  the	  hands	  of	   the	  Basque	  Nationalist	   Party,	  Partido	  Nacionalista	  Vasco	  (PNV),	  with	   only	   one	  exception:	   the	   9th	   legislature	   between	  2009	   and	  2012,	  when	   a	   pact	   between	   the	  
Partido	  Socialista	  de	  Euskadi	  (PSE),	   the	  Popular	  Party	   (PP)	   and	  Unión,	  Progreso	  y	  
Democracia	   (UPyD),	   enabled	   the	   PSE	   to	   govern	   during	   that	   time	   –being	   this	  possible	  due	  to	  the	  illegalization	  of	  a	  wide	  pro-­‐independence	  left-­‐wing	  sector–.	  
Taking	   as	   a	   reference	   the	   ‘Autonomic	   Barometers’,	   elaborated	   by	   the	   Spanish	  
Centre	  for	  Sociological	  Research	  (CIS)	  we	  can	  say	  that	  there	  are	  notable	  deviations	  regarding	   the	   national	   identification	   of	   respondents	   in	   the	   aforementioned	   two	  Autonomous	   Communities.	   The	   Autonomic	   Barometers	   are	   surveys	   based	   on	  statewide	   representative	   samples,	   enabling	   statistical	   representation	   for	   each	   of	  the	  seventeenth	  Autonomous	  Communities	   in	  which	  the	  Spanish	  State	   is	  divided.	  Up	   to	   the	   present	   day	   the	   CIS	   has	   elaborated	   three	   Autonomic	   Barometers.	   The	  first	  one	  of	  them	  was	  conducted	  in	  2005,	  the	  second	  one	  in	  2010,	  and	  the	  last	  one	  in	   2012.	   In	   order	   to	   measure	   these	   differences	   on	   national	   identity	   we	   have	  devised	  an	  index	  of	  peripheral	  nationalism:	  
𝐼!"#$ = 100 ∗ 𝑝𝑛/𝑠𝑛	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being	  pn	  the	  number	  of	  people	  ascribing	  themselves	  to	  peripheral	  national	  identity	  and	   sn	   the	   number	   of	   people	   identifying	   themselves	   with	   a	   state-­‐wide	   national	  identity.	   The	   so-­‐called	  Moreno	  Question25	  enables	   us	   to	   quantify	   these	   feelings	   of	  national	  belonging,	  as	  it	  offers	  five	  possible	  categories	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  ‘Do	  you	  see	  yourself	  as…’:	  
1/	  [sub-­‐state	  identity]	  only.	  2/	  More	  [sub-­‐state	  identity]	  than	  [state-­‐wide	  identity].	  3/	  Equally	  [sub-­‐state	  identity]	  and	  [state-­‐wide	  identity].	  4/	  More	  [state-­‐wide	  identity]	  than	  [sub-­‐state	  identity].	  5/	  [state-­‐wide	  identity]	  only.	  
In	  order	  to	  better	  quantify	  the	  index	  of	  peripheral	  nationalism,	  we	  have	  equated	  pn	  to	   “[sub-­‐state	   identity]	   only”	   and	   sn	   to	   “[state-­‐wide	   identity]	   only”.	   As	   the	  statistical	   sample	   of	   the	   three	   Autonomic	   Barometers	   applies	   only	   to	   Spaniards	  who	  are	  18	  year	  old	  or	  older,	  we	  have	  to	  limit	  the	  conclusions	  of	  our	  index	  to	  that	  full	  age	  group.	  The	  last	  methodological	  commentary	  concerning	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	   index	   of	   peripheral	   nationalism	   refers	   to	   the	   fact	   that,	   obviously,	   the	  information	   provided	   by	   the	   CIS’	   surveys	   is	   given	   in	   percentages	   that	   we	   have	  converted	   into	  an	  actual	  number	  of	   citizens	  ascribed	   to	   sub-­‐state	  and	  state-­‐wide	  identities;	   for	   that	   purpose,	   we	   have	   taken	   into	   account	   the	   official	   population	  figures	  published	  by	  the	  Spanish	  National	  Statistical	  Institute	  (INE)	  for	  each	  one	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  We	  will	   engage	   critically	  with	   the	   available	  measures	   of	   national	   identity,	   particularly	   the	  
“Moreno	  Question”,	  in	  our	  chapter	  devoted	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  national	  identity	  and	  
electoral	   behavior.	   The	   index	   of	   nationalism,	   however,	   offers	   a	   straightforward	   intuitive	  
measure	  of	  the	  strength	  that	  peripheral	  nationalisms	  have	  in	  a	  given	  society.	  
	   70	  
the	  years	  when	  the	  surveys	  were	  conducted.	  Hence,	  for	  July	  the	  1st	  2012,	  the	  INE	  reports	   that	   there	  were	  38,403,105	   Spaniards	  18	   years	   old	   or	   older;	   for	   July,	   1st	  2010,	   38,284,909	   Spaniards	   18	   year	   old	   or	   older	   were	   counted	   and,	   finally,	  35,999,010	  18	  year	  old	  or	  older	  Spaniards	  were	  registered	  in	  July,	  1st	  2005	  (INE,	  2014).	  We	   can	   now	   calculate	   the	   index	   of	   peripheral	   nationalism	   from	   the	   data	  provided	   by	   the	   Autonomic	   Barometers,	   registering	   Table	   III	   the	   result	   of	   this	  operation.	  	  
Table	  III.	  Index	  of	  peripheral	  nationalism	  for	  Spain,	  Catalonia	  and	  the	  
Basque	  Country	  
	   2005	   2010	   2012	  Spain	  (Total)	   48.54	   41.44	   58.25	  
Catalonia	   185.71	   165.85	   384.21	  Basque	  Country	   433.93	   551.16	   734.38	  
Source:	   Elaborated	   by	   the	   author	  with	   data	   from	   CIS	  Autonomic	  Barometers	   I,	   II	   and	   III	   (studies	   no.	   2,610,	  2,829	  and	  2,956,	  respectively).	  Population	  figures	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  official	  INE	  reports	  (INE,	  2014).	  	  
Thus,	   we	   see	   that	   in	   2012	   there	   was	   a	   ratio	   in	   Spain	   of	   58.25	   peripheral	  nationalists	   to	   100	   statewide	   nationalists.	   This	   same	   ratio	   was,	   in	   Catalonia,	   of	  384.21	   peripheral	   nationalists	   to	   100	   statewide	   nationalists	   and,	   in	   the	   Basque	  Country,	   rose	   to	   734.38	   peripheral	   nationalists	   to	   100	   statewide	   nationalists	   in	  Spain	  for	  that	  year.	  
Of	  course,	  this	  simple	  information	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  accurate	  measurement	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  national	  identity	  on	  people’s	  electoral	  behavior,	  but	  it	  certainly	  offers	  some	  intuitive	  information	  showing	  that	  something	  is	  probably	  happening	  in	  that	  direction.	  As	  we	  have	  already	  said,	  we	  will	  examine	  such	  relationship	  later	  on,	  in	  a	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chapter	  that	  discusses	  specifically	  this	  linkage,	  but	  we	  have	  positively	  exposed	  that	  Spain	  is	  a	  good	  case	  study	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  association	  between	  nationalism	  and	  voting	  behavior,	  being	  this	  modest	  objective	  our	  only	  one	  for	  now.	  
2	  Spatial	  analysis	  of	  the	  electoral	  behavior	  in	  Spain	  Once	  we	  have	  justified	  the	  selection	  of	  Spain	  as	  a	  case	  study	  for	  our	  research,	  as	  it	  gathers	  enough	  internal	  variability	  in	  some	  key	  explanatory	  variables	  of	  electoral	  behavior,	   it	   is	   time	   to	   start	   to	   find	   out	   those	   empirical	   regularities	   that	   will	   be	  explained	   by	   theory	   later	   on.	   During	   this	   section	   we	   are	   going	   to	   present	   a	  descriptive	  analysis	  of	  Spanish	  electoral	  behavior.	  We	  have	  elaborated	  a	  data	   file	  with	  the	  electoral	  behavior	  in	  the	  Spanish	  general	  elections	  since	  democracy	  was	  restored	  after	  Franco	  dictatorship;	   this	  means	   that	  we	  will	  be	  working	  with	  data	  from	  the	  eleven	  general	  elections	  initiated	  in	  1977:	  
• June,	  the	  15th	  1977	  
• March,	  the	  1st	  1979	  
• October,	  the	  28th	  1982	  
• June,	  the	  22nd	  1986	  
• October,	  the	  29th	  1989	  
• June,	  the	  6th	  1993	  
• March,	  the	  3rd	  1996	  
• March,	  the	  12th	  2000	  
• March,	  the	  14th	  2004	  
• March,	  the	  9th	  2008	  
• November,	  the	  20th	  2011	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2.1	  Aggregation	  of	  parties	  and	  coalitions	  and	  its	  location	  in	  the	  political	  space	  In	   order	   to	   build	   this	   file	   we	   have	   taken	   our	   data	   from	   the	   Spanish	  Ministry	   of	  Interior	   (Ministry	   of	   Interior	   of	   Spain,	   2013).	   The	   file	   contains	   the	   results	   of	  Spanish	   general	   elections	   for	   the	   democratic	   period	   since	   the	   restoration	   of	  democracy	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Franco’s	  regime,	  i.e.,	  since	  the	  general	  elections	  of	  1977	  to	  the	  general	  elections	  of	  2011.	  Each	  case	  of	  our	  file	  corresponds	  to	  each	  one	  of	  the	  municipalities	  of	  Spain26.	  In	  parallel	  with	  the	  debugging	  of	  this	  electoral	  file,	  we	  have	   created	   six	   different	   categories	   to	   summarize	   the	   vote	   for	   the	   different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 	  According	   to	   the	   official	   data	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Ministry	   of	   Finance	   and	   Public	  Administrations	   for	   March	   2014,	   in	   Spain	   there	   are	   8,126	   municipalities	  (MinisterioHacienda,	   2014).	   During	   the	   last	   37	   years	   there	   have	   been	   many	   changes	  involving	   the	   merging	   and	   divisions	   of	   some	   of	   the	   Spanish	   municipalities.	   We	   have	  debugged	   our	   data	   in	   order	   to	   enable	   comparison	   throughout	   the	   year,	   producing	   a	   file	  with	  8,119	  municipalities.	  This	  was	  a	   long	  process,	  as	  each	  elections’	  voting	  percentages	  must	   be	   calculated	   in	   relation	  with	   the	   existing	  municipalities	   of	   that	   time.	   In	   order	   to	  enable	   comparison	   we	   needed	   to	   melt	   municipalities	   that	   were	   not	   separated	   until	  recently	   in	   the	   files	  of	   the	   first	  general	  elections.	  There	  are,	  as	  well,	   some	  municipalities	  where	   no	   votes	   were	   casted	   in	   the	   first	   elections	   of	   1977;	   in	   these	   cases	   we	   have	  substituted	  the	  “0”	  of	  the	  data	  file	  for	  “no	  information”.	  Thereby,	  we	  are	  merging	  the	  data	  of	  old,	  now	  extinguished,	  municipalities	  into	  new	  municipalities,	  according	  to	  the	  process	  of	  municipal	  restructuration	  developed	  in	  Spain	  during	  the	  last	  37	  years;	  this	  merging	  will	  enable	  comparison	  of	  electoral	  data	  across	  elections.	  All	  these	  necessary	  changes	  are	  fully	  explained	  in	  the	  Annexes	  with	  greater	  detail	  (see	  Tables	  IIIa,	  IIIb,	  IIIc,	  IIId,	  IIIe).	  We	  have	  to	   say,	   however,	   that	   this	   file	   was	   readapted	   to	   the	   general	   classification	   of	   the	  municipalities	   offered	   by	   the	   National	   Institute	   of	   Statistics	   of	   Spain	   (INE)	   and,	   where	  appropriate,	   by	   the	   National	   Geographic	   Institute	   of	   Spain	   (IGN),	   with	   the	   objective	   of	  representing	  spatially	  our	  electoral	  data.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  last	  operation	  would	  be	  too	  drastic	   if	  we	   integrated	   those	   records	   corresponding	   to	   the	  oldest	   general	   elections,	  we	  have	  decided	  to	  work,	  concerning	  the	  spatial	  analysis,	  with	  a	  reduced	  electoral	  data	  file	  which	  comprises	  the	  five	  last	  general	  elections,	  from	  1996	  to	  2011,	  both	  included.	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electoral	  options	  apart	  from	  the	  two	  main	  ones,	  i.e.,	  apart	  from	  the	  Partido	  Popular	  (PP)	  and	  the	  Partido	  Socialista	  Obrero	  Español	  (PSOE)27.	  These	  categories	  are:	  	  
1. Other	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  2. Other	  left-­‐wing	  parties	  3. Nationalist	  (non-­‐Spanish	  national)	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  4. Nationalist	  (non-­‐Spanish	  national)	  left-­‐wing	  parties	  5. Green	  parties	  6. Others	  
This	   classification	   has	   been	   done	   according	   to	   the	   different	   CIS’	   Time	   Series	   on	  ideological	   location	  of	  political	  parties28.	   In	   the	  questions	   from	  which	  these	  Time	  Series	  are	  built,	  respondents	  are	  asked	  to	  locate	  different	  political	  parties	  in	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  10,	  being	  1	  “extreme	  left”	  and	  10	  “extreme	  right”29.	  We	  have	  combined	  these	   ideological	   series	   –measuring	   left/right	   ideology–	   with	   their	   nationalism	  counterpart;	   according	   to	  González	   (2004,	  p.	  119)	   these	  are	   the	   two	  axis	  around	  which	  the	  Spanish	  party	  system	  was	  established,	  i.e.,	  the	  left/right	  axis	  and	  the	  axis	  associated	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   peripheral	   nationalisms	   that,	   according	   to	   Giner	   &	  Moreno	  (1990)	  –see	  also	  Linz	  and	  Montero	  (2001,	  pp.	  180-­‐193)–	  have	  produced	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Partido	  Popular,	  in	  English	  “Popular	  Party”,	  known	  as	  Alianza	  Popular	  (Popular	  Alliance)	  until	   1989,	   is	   the	  main	   right-­‐wing	   party	   in	   Spain	   (Verge,	   2007,	   pp.	   56-­‐62).	   The	  Partido	  
Socialista	  Obrero	  Español,	  in	  English	  Spanish	  Socialist	  Workers’	  Party,	  is	  the	  main	  left-­‐wing	  party	  in	  Spain	  (Verge,	  2007,	  pp.	  48-­‐55).	  28	  The	  “Centro	  de	  Investigaciones	  Sociológicas”,	  Centre	  for	  Sociological	  Research	   (CIS)	   is	  a	  Spanish	  official	   institute	   for	   sociological	   research,	   dependant	   on	   the	   Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Presidency.	  29	  The	  sample	  is	  representative	  of	  Spain’s	  total,	  state-­‐wide,	  population	  for	  the	  parties	  with	  presence	   in	  every	  Autonomous	  Community	  (AC).	   In	   those	  political	  parties	  with	  a	   limited	  presence	  to	  an	  specific	  AC,	  the	  sample	  is	  representative	  of	  that	  AC.	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centre/periphery	  contradiction,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  classic	  model	  enunciated	  by	  Lipset	  &	   Rokkan	   as	   a	   “conflict	   between	   the	   central	   nation-­‐building	   culture	   and	   the	  increasing	   resistance	   of	   the	   ethnically,	   linguistically	   and	   religious	   subject	  
population	   in	   the	   provinces	   and	   peripheries”	   (Lipset	   &	   Rokkan,	   1967,	   p.	   14;	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  If,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Billig	  (1993;	  1995),	  we	  were	  to	  treat	  nationalism	  as	  an	  ideology,	  we	  should	  measure	  not	  only	  the	  degree	  of	  “peripheral”	  nationalisms	  in	  Spain,	  but	  also	  the	  statewide	  Spanish	  nationalism	  –in	  line	  with	  the	  recent	  work	  of	  Spanish	  scholars,	  such	  as	  Muñoz	  Mendoza	  (2012)–.	  The	  Time	  Series	  at	   the	  CIS,	  however,	  give	  us	  only	  a	  measure	  of	   the	  degree	  of	  peripheral	  –Basque,	  Catalan,	  Galician…–	  nationalism	  of	  the	  different	  political	  parties;	  there	  is	  no	  Time	  Series	  measuring	  the	  degree	  of	  Spanish	  nationalism,	  neither	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  10	  in	  which	   1	  where	   a	   given	   peripheral	   nationalism	   and	   10	   Spanish	   nationalism.	   The	  result	  is	  that	  CIS’	  Time	  Series	  are	  only	  available	  for	  the	  Autonomous	  Communities	  (ACs)	   of	   the	   Basque	   Country,	   Catalonia	   and	   Galicia;	   given	   that	   this	   is	   the	   only	  information	   at	   our	   disposal,	   we	   have	   calculated	   the	   arithmetic	  mean	   combining	  these	  three	  ACs	  for	  those	  political	  parties	  with	  statewide	  presence,	  such	  as	  the	  PP,	  the	  PSOE,	  or	  IU30.	  Figure	  3	  presents	  the	  distribution	  in	  the	  political	  space	  of	  all	  the	  political	  parties	  of	  which	  the	  CIS	  has	  a	  Time	  Series	  for	  both	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Formally,	  in	  Galicia,	  Catalonia	  and	  the	  Basque	  Country,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  the	  same	  political	  parties,	  but	  autonomous	  branches.	  For	  example,	  the	  PSOE	  is	  not	  present	  as	  such	  in	  those	  three	   ACs,	   being	   the	   Partit	   dels	   Socialistes	   de	   Catalunya	   (PSC)	   –Party	   of	   the	   Catalan	  Socialists–	   in	   Catalonia,	   the	   Partido	   Socialista	   de	   Euskadi	   (PSE)	   –Socialist	   Party	   of	   the	  Basque	  Country,	  presented	  in	  coalition	  with	  Euskadiko	  Ezkerra	  (Basque	  Left)	  since	  1993–	  in	  the	  Basque	  Country,	  and	  the	  Partido	  dos	  Socialistas	  de	  Galicia-­‐Partido	  Socialista	  Obrero	  
Español	  (PSdeG-­‐PSOE)	  –Party	  of	  the	  Socialists	  of	  Galicia-­‐Spanish	  Socialist	  Worker’s	  Party–	  with	  a	  Galician	  national	  internal	  structure	  (PSdeG-­‐PSOE,	  2014),	  in	  Galicia.	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axis31;	  we	  have	  merged	  the	  data	  of	  the	  Popular	  Alliance	  (AP)	  and	  the	  Popular	  Party	  (PP),	  as	  the	  former	  was	  the	  historical	  antecedent	  of	  the	  latter	  –“AP”	  became	  “PP”	  in	  1989–,	   following	   the	  mainstream	  methodology	   in	   Spanish	   political	   science	   –see,	  
e.g.,	  Orriols	  (2013)–.	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  In	  order	   to	  produce	  a	  Time	  Series,	   the	  CIS	  must	  have,	   at	   least,	   five	  points	  of	   the	   same	  question.	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  on	  the	  LeD/Right	  axis	  
Figure	  3.	  Ideological	  loca?on	  of	  the	  main	  Spanish	  poli?cal	  par?es	  
included	  in	  CIS'	  ?me	  series	  for	  both	  axes	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In	   the	  case	  of	   those	  political	  parties	  or	   coalitions	   for	  which	  we	  do	  not	  have	   time	  series	   for	   both	   ideological	   axis	   –left/right	   axis	   and	   nationalist	   axis–	   we	   have	  proceeded	  as	  follows	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  integrate	  them	  in	  one	  of	  our	  six	  analytical	  categories.	   In	   the	   first	   place	  we	  used	   the	   time	   series	   available	   in	   one	   of	   the	   two	  commented	   axis,	   for	   the	   location	   on	   that	   axis.	   Secondly,	   we	   used	   particular	  locations,	   not	   constitutive	   of	   time	   series,	   from	   several	   CIS’	   studies	   (barometers,	  electoral	  studies,	  etc.).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  lacking	  any	  reliable	  statistical	  indicator	  for	  the	  location	  of	  a	  party	  or	  coalition	  in	  one	  of	  the	  two	  cited	  ideological	  axes,	  we	  followed	  a	  more	  ‘objectivist’	  strategy,	  by	  making	  use	  of	  the	  content	  analysis	  of	  the	  different	  party	  manifestos32,	  or	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  archive,	  of	  press	  and	  other	  media	  that	   have	   made	   explicit	   reference	   to	   the	   ideological	   position	   with	   which	   the	  different	  parties	  or	  coalitions	  present	  themselves	  publicly	  –and	  not	  with	  regard	  to	  the	   interpretations	  or	  classifications	  that	  subjectively	  could	  have	  made	  any	  other	  particular	   media–.	   In	   order	   to	   facilitate	   reading	   and	   following	   the	   principle	   of	  simplicity,	  we	  decided	  not	  to	  plot	  each	  and	  every	  one	  of	  our	  classifying	  processes,	  as	  the	  procedure	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  shown	  on	  Figure	  3,	  because	  regardless	  of	  the	  sources	  used,	  the	  result	  has	  always	  been	  the	  location	  of	  each	  party	  or	  coalition	  in	  a	  political	  space	  defined	  by	  the	  two	  axes	  shaping	  that	  plot.	  
2.2	  The	  territorialization	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  Spain	  Once	  we	  have	  disclosed	   the	  methodology	   in	  which	  we	  base	  our	   analysis,	  we	   are	  going	  to	  present	  the	  results	  obtained.	  A	  first	  spatial	  analysis	  of	  the	  voting	  behavior	  of	   the	  Spanish	  population	   refers	   to	   the	   spatial	  distribution	  of	   the	  vote.	  The	  most	  widespread	   statistic	   synthesizing	   this	   information	   is	   Moran’s	  𝐼,	   which	   measures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  We	  have	   consulted,	  with	   regard	   to	   this	  point,	   the	  database	   ‘Manifesto	  Project’	   (2014),	  funded	  by	  the	  Deutsche	  Forschungsgemeinschaft	  (German	  Research	  Foundation).	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the	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  of	  a	  variable,	  so	  that	  a	  perfect	  dispersion	  of	  a	  variable	  𝑋	  in	  space	  would	  correspond	  to	  an	  𝐼 = −1,	  whereas	  a	  total	  concentration	  in	  space	  of	  that	   same	   variable	   will	   make	   up	   an	  𝐼 = +1.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   spatial	  autocorrelation,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   a	   total	   dispersion	   or	   concentration	   of	   the	  𝑋	  variable,	   Moran’s	  𝐼 	  will	   equal	   value	  0 ;	   LISA	   indicators	   are	   derived	   from	   this	  statistic33.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  While	  the	  initial	  article	  by	  Moran	  (1950)	  defines	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  statistic	  that	  bears	  his	  name,	   the	   Moran’s	  𝐼	  statistic,	   as	   we	   know	   it	   and	   use	   it	   today,	   was	   not	   developed	   until	  twenty	  years	  had	  passed	  since	  his	  early	  work	  of	  1950,	  as	  Li,	  Calder	  and	  Cressie	  (2007,	  p.	  359)	  have	  pointed	  out.	  This	  statistic	  was	  first	  defined	  by	  Moran	  as	  𝐼 ≡ Σ!!!! Σ!!!! 𝛿!"Ζ!Ζ!Σ!!!! Ζ!! 	  for	   any	   independent	   variable	   	  𝑛{𝑋!:  𝑖 = 1,…    , 𝑛} 	  in	   spatial	   locations	  𝛿{𝑠!: 𝑖 = 1,…    , 𝑛} ,	  taking	  𝛿!" 	  as	   a	   measure	   for	   adjacency,	   being	  𝛿!" = 1 	  if	   the	  𝑖 ith	   and	  𝑗 ith	   positions	   are	  adjacent	   and	  𝛿!" = 0	  in	   the	   case	   that	   they	   are	   not.	   In	   order	   to	   eliminate	   the	   cumulative	  effects	  on	  large	  datasets,	  showing	  only	  the	  absolute	  changes	  in	  the	  values	  of	  the	  variable	  in	  question,	  and	  assuming	  a	  constant	  mean	   in	   the	  observations,	   it	   is	  defined	  Ζ! = Χ! − Χ	  for	  𝑖 = 1,…    , 𝑛.	   From	   this	   initial	   work,	   Cliff	   &	   Ord	   (1981)	   developed	   a	   statistic	   capable	   of	  measuring	   the	   spatial	   dependence	   from	   the	   residues	   of	   a	   linear	   regression	   model,	  emulating	  the	  popular	  Durbin-­‐Watson	  test;	  this	  statistic,	  called	  Moran’s	  𝐼,	  was	  defined	  as	  	  𝐼 ≡ Ζ′𝑊ΖΖ′Ζ 	  where	  𝑊	  represents	  the	  spatial	  neighbourhood	  matrix	  –vid.	  Li,	  Calder	  &	  Cressie	  (2007,	  p.	  359ff)–.	   For	   an	   assumption	   of	   inhomogeneity	   in	   the	   sample	   –applicable	   to	   those	   more	  frequent	   cases	   in	  which	   there	   is	   no	   global	   spatial	   correlation–	   the	   LISA	   indicators	   have	  been	   developed,	   acronym	   for	   “Local	   Indicators	   of	   Spatial	   Association”,	   enabling	   the	  calculation	  of	  a	  global	  Moran’s	  𝐼	  for	  each	  local	  spatial	  unity	  𝐼! ,	  so	  𝐼 ≡ 𝐼!𝑁! 	  where	   the	   global	   Moran’s	   𝐼 	  is	   calculated	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   measure	   of	   local	  autocorrelation	  𝐼! ,	  being	  𝑚!	  constant	  for	  every	  locations,	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2.2.1	  The	  territorialization	  for	  the	  left/right	  axis	  In	   order	   to	   determine	   the	   spatial	   patterns	   in	   the	   voting	   behavior	   of	   the	   Spanish	  citizenry	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  already	  commented	  left/right	  axis,	  we	  have	  introduced	  a	  novelty	  in	  our	  methodology.	  Following	  the	  argument	  given	  by	  Linz	  and	  Montero	  when	  commenting	  
“(…)	  This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  Spanish	  party	  systems	  rather	  than	  a	  party	  system:	  the	  multinational,	  multicultural	  and	  asymmetric	  federal	  state	  makes	  Spain	  quite	  unique	  in	  Western	  Europe”.	  (Linz	  &	  Montero,	  2001,	  p.	  152;	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original)	  
we	   have	   decided	   to	   add	   the	   already	   mentioned	   categories	   ‘PSOE’,	   ‘other	   leftist	  political	  parties’,	  and	  ‘peripheral	  nationalist	  leftist	  parties’,	  doing	  the	  same	  for	  the	  right-­‐wing	  parties,	  putting	   together	   the	  categories	   ‘PP’,	   ‘other	  right-­‐wing	  parties’,	  and	   ‘peripheral	   nationalist	   right-­‐wing	   parties’.	   Otherwise,	   every	   general	   spatial	  analysis	  for	  the	  entire	  State	  that	  seeks	  to	  measure	  variations	  on	  the	  left/right	  scale	  would	   be	   distorted	   by	   the	   evident	   spatial	   concentration	   presented	   by	   either	   left	  wing	  or	  right-­‐wing	  peripheral	  nationalist	  parties.	  We	  need	  to	  clarify,	  too,	  that	  our	  analysis	   were	   performed	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   vote	   for	   electoral	   lists	   with	  reference	  to	  the	  electoral	  census	  and	  not	  to	  valid	  vote,	  because	  our	  intention	  is	  to	  determine	   the	   spatial	   variations	   in	   voting	   behavior	   of	   the	   citizenry	   and	   not	   the	  voting	   variations	   to	   political	   parties	   or	   coalitions.	   While	   working	   with	   electoral	  results	   and	   not	   with	   survey	   data	   provides	   the	   advantage	   of	   eliminating	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝐼! = (𝑧! 𝑚!) 𝑤!"𝑧!! 	  of	  every	  spatial	  unity	   included	   in	   the	  analysis,	   the	  entirety	  of	  which	   is	   represented	  by	  𝑁	  (Anselin,	  1995,	  p.	  99).	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statistical	  error	  that	  characterizes	  every	  survey,	  it	  also	  shows	  the	  difficulty	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  link	  abstention	  to	  a	  given	  direction	  of	  the	  left/right	  axis.	  We	  present	  below	  the	  analysis	  corresponding	  to	  the	  ‘left’	  of	  the	  left/right	  axis.	  
Figure	   4	   consists	   of	   two	   axes,	   with	   its	   values	   standardized	   so	   that	   the	   units	  correspond	   to	   standard	   deviations	   calculated	   from	   the	   variance	   of	   the	   variable	  ‘left-­‐wing	   vote’	   (LV).	   While	   the	  𝑥	  axis	   consists	   of	   the	   values	   presented	   by	   the	  municipalities	   according	   to	   their	   distance	   or	   proximity	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  arithmetic	  mean	  calculated	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘LV’,	  the	  𝑦	  axis	  accounts	  for	  the	  simple	  average	  of	  those	  same	  values	  in	  the	  neighboring	  municipalities	  (spatial	  lag).	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Figure	  4.	  Moran’s	  scatter	  plot	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘left-­‐wing	  vote’	  (LV)	  
Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  5.	  Box	  plot	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘left-­‐wing	  vote’	  (LV)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.
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We	   note	   that	   Moran’s	  𝐼	  presents	   a	   positive	   value	   of	   0.532938,	   pointing	   to	   the	  existence	   of	   a	   spatial	   concentration	   pattern	   for	   those	   municipalities	   presenting	  either	  high	  or	  low	  relative	  values	  of	  voting	  for	  leftist	  political	  parties	  or	  coalitions.	  Thus,	   the	  cases	   included	  in	  Quadrant	  I	  of	  Figure	  4	  represent	  those	  municipalities	  characterized	   by	   a	   high	   level	   of	   lef-­‐wing	   voting	   which	   are	   surrounded	   by	  municipalities	   presenting	   the	   same	   trend,	   corresponding	   to	   the	   cases	   exceeding	  the	  median	  value	   in	   the	  box	  plot	   that	   is	  presented	   in	  Figure	  5.	  Quadrant	   II	   cases	  correspond	  to	  municipalities	  with	  low	  support	  for	  leftist	  candidates	  surrounded	  by	  other	  municipalities	  with	   high	   support	   for	   that	   option,	   while	   Quadrant	   III	   cases	  represent	   municipalities	   with	   low	   support	   to	   left-­‐wing	   parties	   or	   coalitions	  surrounded	  by	  municipalities	  presenting	  an	  identical	  trend.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  validity	  of	  these	  results,	  and	  given	  that	  the	  size	  of	  our	  data	  file	   is	   large	  enough,	  as	   it	   includes	  every	  Spanish	  municipality,	  we	  have	   increased	  the	  randomization	  of	  the	  data	  to	  999	  permutations	  for	  the	  calculation	  of	  Moran’s	  𝐼;	  the	   calculation	   of	   this	   statistic	   was	   therefore	   conducted	   generating	   a	   reference	  distribution	   of	   itself	   from	   999	   random	   permutations.	   In	   a	   second	   step	   we	  calculated	  a	  pseudo	  significance	   level,	  used	  to	  evaluate	  the	  statistical	  significance	  of	  the	  distribution.	  Wanting	  to	  be	  strict	  about	  the	  validity	  of	  our	  results,	  we	  have	  implemented	  a	  strict	  cut	  value	  (𝑝 = 0,01),	   turning	  very	  difficult	  the	  replication	  of	  our	  results	  under	  the	  null	  hypothesis,	  for	  which	  there	  would	  be	  no	  relationship	  at	  all	   between	   the	   two	   phenomena	   included	   in	   our	   analysis,	   i.e.,	   the	   formation	   of	  spatial	  clusters	  defined	  by	  the	  level	  of	  vote	  to	  the	  left	  of	  an	  municipality	  𝑋	  and	  its	  neighbor	  municipalities	  𝑆(𝑥).	  Thus,	  the	  probability	  that	  these	  spatial	  clusters	  were	  reproduced	   identically	   in	   the	   same	  way	   exposed	   in	   Figure	  4	   rises	   to	   99%	  of	   the	  times	  that	  we	  repeat	  our	  analysis,	  inviting	  to	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis.	  Finally,	  it	  is	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worth	  saying	  that	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  file	  of	  spatial	  weighting,	  used	  to	  calculate	  the	  neighbourhood	  matrix	  needed	  to	  perform	  the	  calculation	  of	  Moran’s	  𝐼,	  we	  used	  a	   ‘rook’	   criterion	   of	   contiguity,	   which	   in	   some	   cases	   allowed	   left	   aside	   those	  neighbours	  which	  do	  not	  have	  total	  shared	  boundaries.	  We	  are	  presenting,	  thus,	  a	  conservative	  methodology,	  which	  ensures	  the	  statistical	  robustness	  of	  the	  results	  of	   our	   analysis.	   This	  methodology	  will	   be	   replicated	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   analysis	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter,	  so	  we	  will	  not	  reiterate	  its	  details.	  	  
Finally,	   Figure	   6	   shows,	   over	   the	   Spanish	   municipal	   map,	   the	   different	   spatial	  clusters	  based	  on	  the	  vote	  for	  the	  left,	  whose	  calculation	  was	  introduced	  in	  Figure	  4.	  We	  can	  now	  see	   the	   location	   in	  space	  of	   these	  clusters	  and	   it	   seems	  clear	   that	  there	   is	   a	   clear	   pattern	   that	   affects	   their	   territorial	   distribution.	   There	   is	   a	   large	  spatial	   cluster	   which	   occupies	   most	   of	   the	   southern	   half	   of	   the	   country	  (municipalities	   presenting	   high	   rates	   of	   left-­‐wing	   voting	   surrounded	   by	   others	  with	  the	  same	  trend).	  This	  cluster	  initiates	  in	  the	  North	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Cáceres	  (municipalities	   of	   Jerte,	   Cabezuela	   del	   Valle,	   Cerezo	   and	   Casar	   de	   Palomero),	  extends	  South	  through	  the	  Autonomous	  Community	  (AC)	  of	  Extremadura	  (with	  the	  notable	  exception	  of	  its	  two	  provincial	  capitals,	  Cáceres	  and	  Badajoz	  which,	  being	  contiguous,	  make	   up	   a	   high-­‐low	   cluster)	   and	   occupies	   almost	   entirely	   the	   AC	   of	  Andalusia	  (with	   few	  exceptions,	  being	   important	   the	   low-­‐high	  clusters	   that	  make	  up	   the	  municipalities	   of	   La	   Palma	  del	   Condado	   and	   Sanlúcar	   de	  Guadiana	   in	   the	  province	  of	  Huelva,	  the	  municipality	  of	  Carataunas	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Granada,	  and	  the	  municipalities	  of	  Beires,	  Paterna	  del	  Río	   and	  Santa	  Cruz	  de	  Marchena,	   in	   the	  province	  of	  Almería).	  This	  large	  cluster	  of	  the	  South	  is	  broken,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  by	  the	  AC	  of	   the	  Region	  of	  Murcia,	  although	  this	  AC	  does	  not	  present	  a	  well-­‐defined	  pattern	  of	  spatial	  voting.	  Apart	  from	  this	  great	  southern	  cluster,	  no	  major	  clusters	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of	   municipalities	   with	   a	   high	   vote	   for	   the	   left	   neighbouring	   with	   municipalities	  presenting	   the	   same	   pattern	   are	   registered,	   although	   we	   find	   some	   exceptions.	  Thus,	   we	   see	   several	   ‘high-­‐high’	   clusters	   around	   the	   mining	   towns	   of	   Mieres,	  Laviana	  and	  Morcín	  in	  the	  AC	  of	  Asturias,	  as	  in	  Páramo	  del	  Sil,	  in	  the	  Bierzo	  region,	  province	   of	   León.	   To	   the	  East,	  we	   see	   the	   “high-­‐high”	   clusters	   of	  Alcalá	   de	  Ebro,	  Cariñena,	  Luceni,	  Sástago	  and	  Cosuenda,	  all	  of	   them	  belonging	   to	   the	  province	  of	  Zaragoza.	  Also	  the	  municipalities	  of	  El	  Masroig	  and	  Falset,	  both	  in	  Tarragona,	  and	  Salas	   Altas,	   in	   Huesca	   complete	   the	   “high-­‐high”	   clusters	   of	   left	   voting	   in	   the	  northern	   half	   of	   the	   peninsula.	   Finally,	   it	   is	   worth	   to	   signal	   the	   “high-­‐high”	  concentrations	   observed	   in	   the	   provinces	   of	   Castellón	   (Almedíjar,	   Azuébar	   and	  Chóvar),	   Valencia	   (Camporrobles	   and	   Sagunto),	   Cuenca	   (Belmonte),	   Madrid	  (Villarejo	  de	  Salvanes)	  and	  Toledo	  (Villamuelas).	  
It	   is	   also	   noteworthy	   the	   presence,	   in	   Figure	   6,	   of	   several	   spatial	   clusters	   of	  municipalities	   with	   a	   small	   percentage	   of	   electoral	   support	   for	   left-­‐wing	  candidates.	   These	   groups	   have	   a	   greater	   spatial	   dispersion	   than	   those,	   already	  mentioned,	   with	   a	   high	   electoral	   support	   for	   the	   left.	   We	   note,	   however,	   some	  characteristics	  that	  define	  these	  groups,	  starting	  with	  its	  most	  northerly	   location.	  With	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   “low-­‐low”	   cluster,	   more	   central,	   located	   between	   the	  provinces	   of	   Salamanca	   (municipalities	   of	   Valverde	   de	   Valdecasa,	   El	   Tejado,	  Sorihuela,	   Horcajo	   de	   Montemayor,	   Gallegos	   de	   Solmirón,	   Escurial	   de	   la	   Sierra,	  Colmenar	   de	   Montemayor),	   Ávila34,	   Segovia	   and	   Guadalajara,	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  We	  put	  here	  the	  reference	  to	  those	  Ávila	  municipalities	  which	  are	  part	  of	  this	  cluster,	  as	  they	  are	  high	  in	  number	  and	  will,	  therefore,	  difficult	  the	  reading	  if	  they	  were	  included	  in	  the	   main	   text.	   We	   have	   to	   indicate	   that	   we	   will	   only	   mention	   those	   municipalities	  belonging	  to	  the	  South	  of	  the	  province,	  as	  the	  rest	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  northern	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clusters	  are	   located	   to	   the	  North	  of	   the	  peninsula	  (provinces	  of	  Álava,	  Barcelona,	  Burgos,	  Girona,	  León,	  Lleida,	  Navarra,	  Ourense,	  Palencia,	  Cantabria,	  Soria,	  Teruel,	  Valladolid,	   Vizcaya,	   Zamora	   and	   Zaragoza).	   We	   finally	   refer	   to	   groups	   with	   low	  support	  on	  the	   left	  present	   in	  the	  Canary	  Islands,	  particularly	   in	  the	  provinces	  of	  Santa	   Cruz	   de	   Tenerife	   (cities	   of	   El	   Paso	   and	   El	   Rosario)	   and	   Las	   Palmas	  (municipalities	   of	   Agüimes,	   San	   Bartolomé	   de	   Tirajana,	   Santa	   Brígida,	   Tinajo,	  Valsequillo	  de	  Gran	  Canaria	  and	  Vega	  de	  San	  Mateo).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  clusters	  with	  low	  support	  on	  the	  left.	  These	  are:	  Santiago	  del	  Tormes,	  San	  Juan	  de	  Gredos,	  Villatoro,	   Villanueva	   del	   Campillo,	   Villafranca	   de	   la	   Sierra,	   Vadillo	   de	   la	   Sierra,	   Umbrías,	  Santiago	  del	  Collado,	  Santa	  María	  de	  los	  Caballeros,	  Santa	  María	  del	  Berrocal,	  San	  Martín	  de	   la	  Vega	  del	  Alberche,	   San	  Lorenzo	  de	  Tormes,	   San	   Juan	  del	  Molinillo,	   Puerto	  Castilla,	  Piedrahíta,	   Navatejares,	   Navatalgordo,	   Navarredondilla,	   Navaquesera,	   Navalperal	   de	  Tormes,	   Navalacruz,	   Navaescurial,	   Navadijos,	   Nava	   del	   Barco,	   Navacepedilla	   de	   Corneja,	  Narrillos	  del	  Álamo,	  El	  Mirón,	  Mesegar	  de	  Corneja,	  Malpartida	  de	  Corneja,	  Los	  Llanos	  del	  Tormes,	   Hoyos	   del	   Espino,	   Hoyorredondo,	   Hoyocasero,	   La	   Horcajada,	   Cepeda	   la	   Mora,	  Casas	   del	   Puerto,	   Bonilla	   de	   la	   Sierra,	   Becedillas,	   Becedas,	   El	   Barco	   de	   Ávila	   and	   La	  Aldehuela.	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Figure	  6.	  LISA	  cluster	  map	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘voting	  for	  left-­‐wing	  parties	  or	  coalitions’	  (LV)	  







Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  (See	  Figure	  1A	  in	  the	  Annexes	  for	  the	  significance	  map).
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We	  will	  now	  proceed	  to	  present	  the	  same	  spatial	  analysis	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘voting	  for	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  or	  coalitions’	  (RV),	  again	  calculated	  over	  the	  electoral	  census.	  Since	  the	  methodology	  that	  we	  will	   follow	  here	   is	   identical	   to	   that	  used	  with	   the	  previous	  variable,	   ‘voting	   for	   leftist	  parties	  and	  coalitions’,	  we	  will	  avoid	  delving	  back	   into	   its	  details.	  Thus,	  Figure	  7	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  variable	  RV;	  here	  we	  observe	  that	  the	  Moran’s	  𝐼	  statistic	   for	   this	  variable	   is	  slightly	  higher	   than	  that	  calculated	   for	   left-­‐wing	   voting,	  what	   indicates	   a	   trend	   towards	   the	   spatial	   concentration	   of	   right-­‐wing	  voting.	  Again,	   those	  municipalities	   included	   in	  Quadrant	   I	  of	   the	  scatter	  plot	  are	   the	  same	  ones	  that	  exceed	  the	  median	  value	  in	  the	  box	  plot	  shown	  in	  Figure	  8.	  
Figure	  9	  shows	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  large	  cluster	  of	  municipalities	  with	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  voting	  for	  right-­‐wing	  options	  in	  the	  centre-­‐North	  area	  of	  the	  peninsula,	  occupying	  a	  space	  that	  finds	  its	  North-­‐Eastern	  boundary	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Álava	  (municipalities	  of	  Kripan,	   Bilar,	   Laguardia,	   Lantziego	   and	   Lekora)	   and	   goes	   through	   Ávila,	   Burgos,	  Cuenca,	  Guadalajara,	  León,	  La	  Rioja,	  Madrid,	  Palencia,	  Salamanca,	  Cantabria,	  Segovia,	  Soria,	  Teruel,	  Valladolid	  and	  Zamora.	  To	   the	  East,	   the	  cluster	   finds	   its	  boundaries	   in	  the	   province	   of	   Castellón,	   and	   to	   the	   Southeast	   in	   the	   province	   of	   Murcia.	  Concentrations	  of	  municipalities	  with	  low	  electoral	  support	  on	  the	  right	  are	  presented	  in	  three	  groups;	  one	  on	  the	  Northeast	  of	   the	  peninsula,	  another	  Northwest	  –without	  reaching	   Galicia–	   and	   the	   last	   one	   located	   in	   the	   South.	   The	   first	   one	   includes	   the	  provinces	   of	   Álava	   (municipality	   of	   Aramayona),	   Barcelona,	   Guipuzkoa,	   Huesca,	  Zaragoza	  and	  Navarra.	  The	  second	  one	  includes	  some	  municipalities	  of	  Northwestern	  León	   (mainly	   the	   Bierzo)	   and	   Asturias,	   while	   the	   third	   one	   occupies	   almost	   the	  entirety	  of	  the	  AC	  of	  Andalusia	  and	  some	  municipalities	  of	  Extremadura.	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We	  can,	  thus,	  conclude	  that	  there	  are	  two	  main	  spatial	  clusters	  that	  polarize	  Spanish	  electoral	  behavior	  in	  the	  left-­‐right	  axis.	  There	  is	  one	  right-­‐wing	  cluster	  in	  the	  centre-­‐North	  of	  the	  peninsula,	  and	  one	  left-­‐wing	  cluster	  in	  the	  South	  of	  the	  country.	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Figure	  7.	  Moran’s	  scatter	  plot	  for	  the	  	  variable	  ‘right-­‐wing	  vote’	  
(RV)	  
Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	  	  	  
Figure	  8.	  Box	  plot	  for	  variable	  ‘right-­‐wing	  vote’	  (RV)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	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Figure	  9.	  LISA	  cluster	  map	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘voting	  for	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  or	  coalitions’	  (RV)	  
(Randomization:	  999	  permutations.	  Significance	  filter:	  p=0.01)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  (See	  Figure	  2A	  in	  the	  Annexes	  for	  the	  significance	  map)
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2.2.2	  The	  territorialization	  for	  the	  peripheral	  nationalist	  axis	  The	   vote	   for	   peripheral	   nationalist	   political	   options	   presents	  much	   higher	   levels	   of	  spatial	   concentration	   than	   those	   already	   discussed	   for	   the	   left/right	   axis.	   Thus,	  Moran’s	  𝐼	  calculated	   for	   this	   variable	   reaches	   a	   level	   close	   to	   1,	   which	  would	  mean	  perfect	   spatial	   concentration	   (Figures	   10	   and	   11).	   As	   we	   have	   applied	   the	   same	  methodology	  as	  for	  the	  left/right	  axis,	  we	  are	  not	  explaining	  it	   in	  detail	  again	  in	  this	  section.	  	  
In	   this	   case,	   we	   observe	   two	   clear	   spatial	   clusters	   characterized	   by	   a	   well-­‐defined	  voting	  pattern	  to	  peripheral	  nationalist	  political	  options.	  These	  correspond	  neatly	  to	  the	   AC	   of	   Catalonia	   and	   the	   Basque	   Country.	   There	   is,	   moreover,	   a	   large	   cluster	  consisting	   of	   municipalities	   with	   a	   notable	   low	   support	   for	   peripheral	   nationalist	  options	   which	   reaches	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   country,	   with	   some	   remarkable	   exceptions;	  these	   exceptions	   coincide	   with	   the	   ACs	   of	   Galicia,	   Andalusia,	   Asturias,	   Aragón,	  Valencia,	  part	  of	  Navarre	  (another	  part	  of	  this	  AC	  joins	  the	  great	  Basque	  cluster),	  the	  Balearic	  Islands	  and	  the	  Canary	  Islands.	  The	  Northeastern	  region	  of	  Castile	  and	  León	  should	   be	   included	   as	   well.	   For	   all	   these	   areas,	   spatial	   clusters	   are	   not	   statistically	  significant,	  without	  a	   clear	  homogeneous	  pattern	  of	   voting	   for	  or	  against	  peripheral	  nationalist	  political	  options.	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Figure	  10.	  Moran’s	  scatter	  plot	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘peripheral	  
nationalist	  vote’	  (NAC)	  
Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  11.	  Box	  plot	  for	  variable	  ‘right-­‐wing	  vote’	  (RV)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	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Figure	  12.	  LISA	  cluster	  map	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘voting	  for	  peripheral	  nationalist	  parties	  or	  coalitions	  (NAC)	  
(Randomization:	  999	  permutations.	  Significance	  filter:	  p=0.01)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  (See	  Figure	  3A	  in	  the	  Annexes	  for	  the	  significance	  map).
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2.2.3	  The	  territorialization	  of	  the	  abstention	  Finally,	   we	   present	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   territorialization	   of	   abstention	   for	   the	  Spanish	  case,	  using	   the	  same	  technical	  parameters	   than	   in	  previous	  analysis.	  But	  before	  we	  start	  explaining	  the	  results	  of	  this	  analysis,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  say	  that	  the	  measurement	  of	  the	  territorialization	  of	  the	  abstention	  in	  Spain	  is	  rather	  complex,	  given	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  legislation	  currently	  in	  force.	  Thus,	  the	  “Ley	  Orgánica	  6/2002”,	  of	  27	  June	  2002,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  law	  of	  political	  parties	  (Spain,	  2002),	  which	  produced	  an	  exacerbation	  of	  the	  active	  abstention	  in	  the	  Basque	  Country,	  as	  it	   made	   illegal	   some	   left-­‐wing	   pro-­‐independence	   parties	   due	   to	   their	   refusal	   to	  condemn	   ETA’s	   terrorism.	   The	   methodological	   alternatives,	   since	   we	   only	   have	  spatial	   data	   form	   the	   1996	   general	   election,	   are	   two:	   either	   representing	   the	  percentages	   of	   abstention	   only	   for	   the	   general	   elections	   of	   1996	   and	   2000,	   or	  representing	  the	  percentages	  of	  abstention	  for	  the	  period	  1996-­‐2011	  excluding	  the	  Basque	  Country.	  After	  considering	  the	  possibility	  of	  presenting	  our	  analysis	  for	  the	  general	   elections	   of	   1996	   and	   2000,	   we	   finally	   decided	   to	   exclude	   the	   Basque	  Country	   and	   Navarre,	   because	   we	   saw	   that	   even	   representing	   only	   those	   two	  elections,	   the	   Basque	   Country	   and	   Navarre	   continued	   to	   concentrate	   almost	  exclusively	   the	   largest	   percentages	   of	   abstention.	   The	   complex	   electoral	  experience	  of	  the	  pro-­‐independence	  left	  Basque	  political	  parties	  during	  the	  1990s,	  unmatched	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  country,	  made	  this	  happen.	  If	  we	  had	  proceeded	  otherwise	   it	  would	  have	  been	   impossible	   to	  observe	   the	   trend	  set	  by	  abstention,	  due	   to	   the	   distortion	   introduced	   by	   active	   abstention,	   meaning	   the	   kind	   of	  abstention	  which	  is	  actively	  exercised	  by	  an	  electorate	  that	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  political	  options	  of	  its	  choice	  –in	  the	  case	  of	  Spain,	  this	  means	  voting	  for	  the	  Basque	  left-­‐wing	  pro-­‐independence	  parties–.	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Now	  that	  we	  have	  explained	  our	  methodological	   strategy	   to	  measure	  abstention,	  we	  can	  analyze	  our	  results.	  As	  we	  can	  see	  in	  Figures	  13	  and	  14,	  the	  abstention	  is	  the	  variable	  presenting	   the	   less	   levels	  of	   concentration	   in	   its	  distribution,	  with	  a	  value	   of	   0.405168	   for	   the	   Moran’s	  𝐼	  statistic.	   Figure	   15	   presents	   the	   different	  spatial	   clusters	   for	   the	   abstention	   that,	   although	   quite	   dispersed,	   show	   a	  North-­‐South	  cleavage,	  besides	  some	  remarkable	  concentrations	  in	  the	  Canary	  Islands.	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Figure	  13.	  Moran’s	  scatter	  plot	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘abstention’	  (ABS)	  
Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  14.	  Box	  plot	  for	  variable	  ‘abstention’	  (ABS)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	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Figure	  15.	  LISA	  cluster	  map	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘abstention’	  (ABS)	  
(Randomization:	  999	  permutations.	  Significance	  filter:	  p=0.01)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  (See	  Figure	  4A	  in	  the	  Annexes	  for	  the	  significance	  map.	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2.3	  Habitat	  analysis	  of	  the	  electoral	  behavior	  in	  Spain	  Taking	   into	   account	   the	   results	   produced	   in	   previous	   research	   on	   the	   relationship	  between	  territory	  and	  society	  (García	  &	  Otero,	  2012;	  García,	  2013),	  we	  have	  classified	  the	  municipalities	  that	  make	  up	  the	  Spanish	  territory	  in	  four	  different	  types	  of	  habitat:	  cities,	   peripheries,	   small	   urban	   areas	   (SUA)	   and	   rural.	   In	   a	   second	   step	   we	   have	  disaggregated	  the	  rural	  habitat	  into	  three	  categories:	  manualized	  rural,	  agrarian	  rural,	  and	   deactivated	   rural.	   These	   divisions	   have	   been	   made	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  inclusion	   criteria	   illustrated	   in	   the	   Annexes	   (see	   Table	   VA	   and	   Table	   VIA	   in	   the	  Annexes).	  In	  the	  following	  pages	  we	  are	  going	  to	  show	  the	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  habitat	   and	  electoral	   behavior.	  Thus,	  Table	   IV	   shows	   the	  arithmetic	  means	  and	   standard	  deviations	   (𝜎)	   for	   the	   variables	   ‘left-­‐wing	  voting’	   (LV)	   and	   ‘right-­‐wing	  voting’	   (RV),	   both	   calculated	   over	   the	   Spanish	   electoral	   census.	  We	   have	  measured	  these	   variables	   taking	   as	   cases	   the	   list	   of	   Spanish	   municipalities;	   we	   take	   into	  consideration	  the	  results	  registered	  by	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  for	  the	  eleven	  general	  elections	  celebrated	  after	  in	  Spain	  after	  Franco’s	  death	  (1977-­‐2011).	  	  















































Source: Elaborated by the author with the electoral results registered and published by the Spanish Ministry of 
Interior. 
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 As	  we	  see,	  there	  are	  some	  relevant	  differences,	  summarized	  in	  table	  V.	  Rural	  habitats	  have	  the	  highest	  tendency	  to	  vote	  for	  candidates	  of	  the	  right,	  while	  urban	  habitats	  are	  characterized	   by	   high	   support	   for	   the	   left.	   Although	   we	   are	   still	   in	   the	   initial	  descriptive	   section	   of	   our	   work,	   without	   having	   referred	   yet	   to	   theory,	   we	   could	  advance	  that	  this	  trend	  would	  confirm	  the	  findings	  shown	  by	  research	  on	  class	  voting,	  which	   situates	  unskilled	  manual	  workers	   as	   the	   class	  with	  greater	   tendency	   to	  vote	  leftist	  options	  and	  farmers	  as	  the	  class	  with	  less	  tendency	  to	  do	  so	  (Nieuwbeerta	  &	  de	  Graaf,	  1999,	  p.	  35).	  However,	  this	  pattern	  of	  class	  voting	  does	  not	  satisfy	  entirely	  the	  explanation	  of	   the	   trends	  detected	   in	  our	  analysis.	  Thus,	   if	  we	  were	   to	  attribute	   the	  results	  of	  our	  description	  of	  voting	  patterns	  in	  the	  different	  habitats	  of	  Spain	  only	  to	  class	  voting,	   then	  we	  should	  have	  recorded	   the	  presence	  of	   spatial	   clusters	  of	   right-­‐wing	  voting	  municipalities	  that	  coincide	  with	  those	  municipalities	  in	  the	  rural	  habitat,	  and	   this	   has	   not	   been	   the	   case	   (vid.	   Figure	   9).	   We	   must	   therefore	   provide	   an	  alternative	  or	  complementary	  explanation	  to	  account	  for	  our	  results.	  	  
Table V.  Deviations of each habitat from the arithmetic mean of the Spanish 
total  
Support for the left Support for the right 
Type of habitat (𝜎) Deviation from the 
mean 
Type of habitat (𝜎) Deviation from the mean 
Small urban areas 10.94 +5.72% Agrarian rural 16.09 +5.01% 
Peripheries 10.78 +5.66% Deactivated rural 14.06 +1.59% 
Cities 6.97 +2.63% Manualized rural 13.61 -1.1% 
Manualized rural 12.63 +2.13% Peripheries 12.76 -5.13% 
Deactivated rural 12.55 -2.37% Cities 8.04 -5.39% 
Agrarian rural 14.25 -5.49% Small urban areas 10.87 -6.48% Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  from	  the	  electoral	  results	  published	  by	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  and	  the	  habitats	  elaborated	  from	  the	  data	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Institute	  of	  Statistics.	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Thus	  we	  have	  decided	  to	  analyze	  again	  the	  relation	  between	  vote	  and	  habitat	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  results	  obtained	  in	  our	  exploratory	  analysis	  of	  the	  spatial	  clusters	  of	  Spanish	  municipalities.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Table	  VI	  illustrates	  the	  same	  information	  that	  is	  shown	  on	  Table	  V,	  with	  the	  peculiarity	  that	  its	  percentages	  have	  been	  calculated	  only	  for	  those	  municipalities	  included	  in	  the	  ‘high-­‐high’	  cluster	  of	  each	  one	  of	  the	  variables	  (left-­‐wing	  voting	  and	  right-­‐wing	  voting)1.	  	  
Table VI. Deviations of each habitat relative to the average of the Spanish 
total for those municipalities within ‘high-high’ spatial clusters 
Support for the left Support for the right 
Type of habitat (𝜎) Deviation from the 
mean 
Type of habitat (𝜎) Deviation from the mean 
Agrarian rural 2.65 +0.92 Agrarian rural 3.18 +1.62 
Manualized rural 2.74 +0.6 Deactivated rural 2.62 -0.19 
Deactivated rural 2.29 -0.58 Peripheries 2.35 -0.9 
Small urban areas 2.36 -0.67 Manualized rural 2.22 -1.42 
Peripheries 2.21 -1.07 Cities 1.18 -2.15 
Cities 1.17 -4.26 Small urban areas 3.25 -2.22 Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  from	  the	  electoral	  results	  published	  by	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  and	  the	  habitats	  elaborated	  from	  the	  data	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Institute	  of	  Statistics.	  	  We	  see	  that	  if	  we	  analyze	  those	  municipalities	  included	  in	  a	  ‘high-­‐high’	  spatial	  cluster,	  the	  general	  trend	  presented	  in	  Table	  V	  is	  reversed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  support	  for	  the	  left,	  while	  it	  remains	  the	  same,	  though	  softened,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  support	  for	  the	  right.	  Thus,	  rural	  habitats	  –and	  particularly	  the	  agrarian	  rural–	  are	  presented	  as	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  vote	   for	   left-­‐wing	   options	   in	   the	   spatial	   clustering	   of	  municipalities	  with	   high	   voter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  We	  are	  using	  here	  the	  same	  database	  that	  was	  used	  in	  the	  previous	  spatial	  analysis,	  i.e.,	  the	  one	   which	   compiles	   the	   electoral	   results	   of	   the	   general	   elections	   from	   1996	   to	   2011,	   both	  included	  (vid.	  footnote	  2).	  
	   101	  
support	   for	   this	   political	   option.	   Similarly,	   rural	   habitats	   –again	   we	   find	   the	  prominence	   of	   the	   agrarian	   rural–	   have	   the	   highest	   support	   for	   right-­‐wing	   options	  within	   the	   spatial	   cluster	   of	  municipalities	  with	   high	   support	   rates	   for	   this	   political	  option.	   These	   results	   would	   also	   provide	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   high	   standard	  deviations	  shown	  in	  Table	  V,	  as	  the	  filter	  by	  spatial	  cluster	  reduces	  significantly	  this	  measure,	   indicative	   of	   a	   trend	   toward	   internal	   homogeneity	   accompanying	   the	  filtering	   by	   spatial	   clusters.	   We	   see,	   for	   instance,	   how	   the	   standard	   deviation	   of	  agrarian	  rural	  goes	  from	  a	  value	  of	  14.25	  to	  another	  one	  of	  2.65	  in	  the	  case	  of	  left	  wing	  voting,	  and	  from	  a	  value	  of	  6.09	  to	  another	  one	  of	  3.18	  in	  the	  case	  of	  right	  wing	  voting.	  	  We	  will	   now	   see	  what	   happens	  with	   the	   support	   for	   peripheral	   nationalist	   political	  options	   (Table	   VII).	   Given	   the	   inexistence	   of	   this	   option	   in	   most	   of	   the	   Spanish	  territory,	   we	   will	   restrict	   our	   analysis	   to	   those	   municipalities	   that	   are	   part	   of	   the	  spatial	  cluster	  with	  a	  high	  support	  for	  peripheral	  nationalist	  candidates.	  	  
Table VII. Deviations of each habitat relative to the average of the Spanish 
total for those municipalities within ‘high-high’ spatial clusters 
Support for peripheral nationalist options 
Type of habitat Standard 
deviation 
Deviation from the 
arithmetic mean 
Manualized rural 4.80 +1.62 
Agrarian rural 4.91 +0.99 
Deactivated rural 4.42 +0.55 
Small urban areas 4.34 -2.85 
Peripheries 4.88 -2.99 
Cities 2.04 -7.07 Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  from	  the	  electoral	  results	  published	  by	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  and	  the	  habitats	  elaborated	  from	  the	  data	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Institute	  of	  Statistics.	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We	   see	   that	   rural	   municipalities	   are	   the	   ones	   presenting	   a	   ratio	   of	   support	   for	  peripheral	   nationalist	   options	   above	   average,	   while	   the	   remaining	   types	   of	   habitat	  present	  lower	  or	  much	  lower	  percentages,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  of	  cities.	  	  Finally,	  the	  measures	  for	  the	  abstention	  are	  presented	  in	  Tables	  VIII	  and	  IX.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  calculated	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  average	  of	  the	  Spanish	  total,	  while	  the	  second	  one	  measures	   the	   deviations	   for	   the	  municipalities	   presenting	   high	   abstention	   rates.	   In	  this	   case,	   the	   pattern	   of	   reversal	   is	   not	   as	   obvious	   as	   it	   is	   in	   the	   previous	   cases,	  presenting	   a	   clear	   predominance	   of	   the	   abstention	   among	   the	   small	   urban	   areas,	  followed	  by	  the	  agrarian	  rural	  habitat.	  Deactivated	  rural	  reverses	  the	  trend	  when	  we	  limit	   the	   analysis	   to	   those	   clusters	   with	   high	   abstention	   rates,	   although	   it	   shows	   a	  variation	  of	  1.03	  points.	  Cities	  clearly	  reversed	  the	  trend,	  as	   the	  peripheries	  and	  the	  deactivated	   rural	  did.	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note,	   however,	   that	   the	  abstention	  presents	  the	   greatest	   standard	   deviations	   among	   the	   variables	   that	   we	   have	   analyzed,	  indicating	   that	   this	   is	  a	  more	  complex	  pattern,	  whose	   logic	  has	  not	  been	  completely	  unraveled.	  	  
Table VIII and Table IX. Deviations of each habitat for the abstention 
Table VIII. Over the Spanish total Table IX. Over ‘high-high’ spatial clusters 
Type of habitat (𝜎) Deviation from the 
mean 
Type of habitat (𝜎) Deviation from the mean 
Cities 4,87 +5,06 Small urban areas 6,84 +1,97 
Small urban areas 6,28 +2,31 Agrarian rural 6,59 +1,04 
Peripheries 6,77 +2,27 Deactivated rural 7,54 +0,86 
Agrarian rural 8,18 +0,35 Cities 6,56 -0,21 
Manualized rural 6,72 -0,97 Peripheries 5,18 -0,75 
Deactivated rural 7,47 -0,17 Manualized rural 4,58 -2,00 Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  from	  the	  electoral	  results	  published	  by	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  and	  the	  habitats	  elaborated	  from	  the	  data	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Institute	  of	  Statistics.	  	  
	   103	  
2.4	  Conclusions	  The	   main	   contribution	   of	   this	   descriptive	   chapter	   is	   the	   provision	   of	   empirical	  evidence	   that	   belie	   simple	   associations	   regarding	   the	   relation	  between	  habitats	   and	  voting	   behavior.	   While	   the	   initial	   analysis	   of	   the	   spatial	   clusters	   shows	   a	   trend	  consistent	   with	   the	   theory	   generated	   by	   studies	   of	   class	   voting	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   a	  positive	   correlation	   between	   agrarian	   social	   classes	   and	   conservative	   voting	  (Nieuwbeerta	   and	   de	   Graaf,	   1999),	   further	   descriptive	   analysis	   which	   takes	   into	  account	   spatial	   concentrations	   of	   voting	   reveals	   that	   this	   association	   does	   not	   hold.	  Thus,	   it	   is	   precisely	   among	   rural	   habitats	  where	  we	   find	   a	   bigger	   predisposition	   to	  vote	   for	   left-­‐wing	   options	   among	   all	   those	   municipalities	   within	   a	   spatial	   cluster	  defined	   by	   a	   high	   vote	   for	   left-­‐wing	   options.	   Similarly,	   although	   it	   might	   seem	  paradoxical,	  rural	  habitats	  are	  also	  more	  prone	  to	  vote	  for	  right-­‐wing	  options	  among	  those	  municipalities	   forming	  spatial	   clusters	  defined	  by	  a	  high	  vote	   for	   this	  political	  option.	  Therefore,	  one	  of	  the	  conclusions	  of	  our	  work	  is	  that	  rural	  habitats	  are	  always	  the	  places	  presenting	  higher	  electoral	  support	  for	  the	  hegemonic	  political	  options	  in	  a	  given	   territory,	   as	   an	   identical	   trend	   is	   registered	   for	   the	   support	   to	   peripheral	  nationalist	   options.	   The	   trend	   is,	   however,	   less	   clear	   for	   the	  more	   complex	   case	   of	  abstention.	  We	   believe	   that	   this	   empirical	   finding	   needs	   further	   research	   efforts	   to	  offer	   a	   satisfactory	   explanation,	   and	   so	   we	   will	   try	   to	   provide	   it	   within	   the	   next	  chapters.	   Our	   data	   provide,	   however,	   a	   contribution	   to	   the	   scientific	   debate	   on	   the	  relationship	  between	   type	  of	  habitat	   and	  voting	  behavior;	   thus,	   in	  a	   study	   that	   took	  the	  AC	  of	  Andalusia	  as	  its	  context,	  Ortega	  et	  al.	  (2011,	  pp.	  79-­‐85)	  showed	  the	  presence	  of	   a	   significant	   causal	   relation,	   for	  which	   smaller	  habitats	   goes	  hand	   in	  hand	  with	  a	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higher	   proportion	   of	   electoral	   participation.	   While	   this	   trend	   seems	   clear	   for	   the	  Andalusian	  case,	  our	  analysis	  reveal	  that	  the	  association	  between	  variables	  claimed	  by	  this	   study	   is	   not	   generalizable,	   in	   line	  with	   previous	  work	  which,	   at	   the	   state	   level,	  have	  dealt	  with	  this	  same	  issue	  (vid.,	  e.g.,	  Dahl	  &	  Tufte,	  1973).	  Our	  results	  contradict,	  however,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  conclusions	  of	  that	  classic	  study	  by	  Dahl	  and	  Tufte,	  because	  although	  these	  authors	  explain	  that	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  whereby	  larger	  habitats	  go	  together	  with	  greater	  political	  heterogeneity,	  our	  data	   indicate	  rather	  the	  contrary	  –the	  measure	   of	   the	   standard	   deviations	   of	   rural	   habitats	   is	   higher	   than	   it	   is	   for	   the	  urban	  ones	   for	   every	   case	   taken	   into	  account	   (general	  behavior	   and	   spatial	   clusters	  with	   high	   support	   for	   left-­‐wing	   options,	   for	   right-­‐wing	   options,	   for	   peripheral	  nationalist	  options,	  and	  clusters	  presenting	  high	  abstention	  rates)–.	  This	  is	  a	  relevant	  finding,	   because	   that	   relationship	   had	   been	   only	   partially	   questioned	   (vid.	  Anckar,	  1999).	  We	  can	  also	  say	  that	  our	  analysis	  nuance	  some	  national	  trends	  set	  on	  the	  case	  of	   abstention.	   In	   this	   sense	   Justel	   (1995)	   claimed	   to	   have	   detected	   a	   pattern	   of	  relationship	  between	  economic	  activity	  and	  the	  different	  types	  of	  abstention:	  “There	  is	   a	   certain	   indication	   that	   the	   tertiary	   activity	   is	   associated	   with	   higher	   levels	   of	  abstention”	   (Justel,	   1995,	   p.	   113);	   that	   statement	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   find	   empirical	  support	  in	  our	  analysis,	  as	  Table	  IX	  shows	  that	  the	  most	  tertiarized	  habitats,	  i.e.,	  cities	  and	  peripheries,	   are	   below	   the	   average	   of	   abstention,	   reversing	   the	   trend	   shown	   in	  Table	  VIII,	  with	  percentages	  calculated	  over	  the	  Spanish	  total.	  This	  information	  shows	  the	  importance	  of	  establishing	  a	  segmentation	  of	  the	  analysis	  among	  spatial	  clusters,	  which	  often	  reverses	  the	  information	  offered	  by	  an	  aggregated	  national	  trend.	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Finally,	  we	  will	  conclude	  that	  it	  is	  not	  appropriate	  from	  a	  sociological	  point	  of	  view	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  Spanish	  kind	  of	  habitats,	  as	  the	  data	  show	  high	  in-­‐group	  variation	  for	  each	  one	  of	  these	  habitats.	  As	  we	  noted	  above,	  we	  need	  greater	  research	  developments	  in	  order	   to	   unravel	   the	   differential	   logics	   characterizing	   each	   one	   of	   these	   in-­‐group	  divergences.	  What	   is	   now	   clear	   is	   the	   scientific	   futility	   of	   talking	   about	   the	   Spanish	  rural	  or	  about	  the	  Spanish	  urban,	  as	  if	  these	  were	  homogenous	  habitats.	  Quite	  often,	  sociological	   studies	   based	   on	   aggregate	   data	   are	   criticised	   alluding	   to	   the	   problem	  posed	  by	   the	  ecological	   fallacy	  –to	  associate	  mistakenly	  a	   certain	  group	   tendency	   to	  each	  one	  of	   the	  cases	  making	  up	   that	  group–	  and	  yet,	   the	  analysis	  presented	   in	   this	  chapter	   illustrate	   that	   if	  we	  make	   proper	   use	   of	   spatial	   statistics	  we	   can	   break	   this	  type	   of	   logical	   fallacy.	   Thus,	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   the	   aggregate	   calculation	   of	   the	  different	   habitat	   categories	   for	   the	   Spanish	   total	   may	   lead	   to	   fall	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	  Simpson’s	  Paradox	  (Blyth,	  1972),	  according	  to	  which	  a	  well-­‐defined	  group	  trend	  may	  disappear	   or	   even	   be	   reversed	   if	   we	   aggregate	   such	   groups	   into	   a	   higher	   category	  lacking	   an	   appropriate	   empirical	   foundation.	   So,	   as	   a	   general	   conclusion,	   our	   data	  demonstrate	   (1)	   that	   it	   is	   inappropriate	   to	   speak	   about	   rural	   or	   urban	   Spanish	  habitats	  as	  homogeneous	  categories	  defined,	  in	  the	  political	  level,	  by	  similar	  electoral	  patterns,	  as	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  we	  have	  to	  talk	  about	  different	  urban	  and	  rural	  habitats	  with	  divergent,	  even	  opposing,	  electoral	  trends,	  and	  (2)	  that	  greater	  research	  efforts	  are	   necessary	   to	   account	   for	   these	   differences	   and	   contradictions.	   During	   the	   next	  chapters	  we	  will	  implement	  these	  research	  efforts.	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II.	  Explaining	  the	  phenomenon	  
3	  On	  the	  shoulders	  of	  giants	  In	   this	   section	   we	   are	   going	   to	   summarize	   the	   three	   general	   theories	   of	   electoral	  behavior:	  
• The	  school	  of	  Columbia	  
• The	  school	  of	  Michigan	  
• The	  school	  of	  Rochester	  We	   refer	   to	   them	   as	   general	   theories	   because	   each	   one	   of	   them	   presents	   a	  differentiated	  set	  of	  propositions	  to	  explain	  why	  people	  vote	  the	  way	  they	  do.	  These	  propositions	   are	   different	   in	   essence,	   and	   have	   underpinnings,	   respectively	   on	  sociology,	   social	   psychology	   and	   behavioral	   economics.	   These	   are	   grand	   theories,	  because	  they	  have	  successfully	  set	  up	  a	  program	  of	  research	  that	  extends	  to	  present	  day.	  Thus,	  we	  are	  still	  registering	  advances	  for	  every	  three	  of	  them,	  with	  a	  continuous	  flow	  of	   scientific	  publications	  on	  specific	   journals1.	  The	   field	  of	  electoral	  behavior	   is	  undoubtedly	  situated	  at	   the	  highest	  degree	  of	   technical	  refinement	   in	  modern	  social	  science,	   with	   a	   level	   of	   development	   that	   is	   probably	   only	   matched	   by	   the	   field	   of	  social	   mobility.	   Moreover,	   there	   are	   not	   so	   many	   areas	   of	   research	   with	   such	   an	  interdisciplinary	  character,	  what	   is	  related	  to	  the	   fact	   that	   the	  three	  main	  schools	  of	  research	  that	  originated	   its	  modern	  study	  are	  rooted	   in	  three	  differentiated	  areas	  of	  social	   science.	   These	   three	   schools	   are	   not	   general	   theories	   in	   the	   critical	   sense	  established	  by	  Goldthorpe,	  referring	   to	   those	  perspectives	   focused	  on	  theory	   for	   the	  sake	  of	  theory,	  with	  no	  direct	  link	  to	  empirical	  research.	  All	  these	  three	  grand	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Examples	  of	  these	  international	  journals	  are	  Electoral	  Studies,	  Research	  in	  Political	  Sociology,	  
Political	  Behavior,	  or	  Journal	  of	  Elections,	  Public	  Opinion	  and	  Parties.	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theories	   have	   been	   built	   up	   as	   a	   response	   to	   empirical	   research,	   and	   its	   current	  extensions	  are	  usually	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  technical	  refinement	  within	  social	  science.	  We	   can	   anticipate,	   however,	   that	   neither	   of	   the	   three	   has	   provided	   a	   satisfactory	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  This	  may	  be	  due	  to	  two	  possibilities:	  	  
1. The	  theoretical	  underpinning	  of	  one	  of	  the	  three	  schools	  is	  correct,	  while	  the	  other	  two	  are	  wrong.	  If	  the	  correct	  theory	  has	  not	  yet	  provided	  a	  satisfactory	  explanation	   of	   electoral	   behavior	   is	   because	   it	   has	   not	   been	   properly	  developed.	  	  2. The	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  of	  all	  three	  schools	  are	  wrong.	  	  
Of	   course,	   much	   debate	   has	   been	   produced	   among	   the	   proponents	   of	   the	   three	  schools.	  They	  argue	  with	  each	  other	  trying	  to	  defend	  the	  strength	  of	  their	  preferred	  theory	  and	  they	  are	  continuously	  trying	  to	   improve	  its	  heuristic	  power1.	  But	  before	  stating	  our	  view	  of	  the	  problem,	  let	  us	  examine	  with	  greater	  detail	  what	  these	  three	  theories	  are	  claiming.	  	  
3.1	  Three	  traditions	  in	  the	  study	  of	  electoral	  behaviour	  Few	   questions	   in	   the	   history	   of	   social	   thought	   have	   received	   the	   attention	   that	  thinkers	   of	   all	   epochs	   have	   paid	   to	   the	   problem	   posed	   by	   voting	   behaviour.	  Why	  
people	   vote	   the	   way	   they	   do	   is	   indeed	   a	   profound	   issue	   that	   we	   find	   complexly	  theorized	  in	  the	  works	  of	  the	  ancient	  Greeks	  –vid.	  (Barber,	  1986;	  Farrar,	  1988)2–.	  We	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  It	  is	  worth	  saying	  that	  outside	  the	  schools	  of	  Columbia,	  Michigan	  and	  Rochester	  there	  have	  been	  other	  theoretical	  attempts	  to	  explain	  electoral	  behavior.	  Thus,	  for	  instance,	  in	  an	  article	  published	  in	  2007,	  Ethington	  and	  McDaniel	  defended	  an	  ecological	  approach	  (Ethington	  and	  McDaniel,	   2007).	   In	   the	   article	   they	   complaint	   about	   the	   fact	   that	   behaviorism	   rule	   over	  electoral	  behavior	  research,	  leaving	  aside	  possible	  contributions	  from	  human	  ecology.	  	  2	  To	  cite	  but	  a	   few	  direct	   classical	  Greek	  sources	  on	   this	  matter,	   it	   is	   relevant	   to	   talk	  about	  Plato’s	  dissertation	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  people’s	  political	   judgment,	  presented	  in	  his	  well-­‐
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can	  state	  without	  fear	  of	  being	  wrong	  that	  this	  attention	  was	  constantly	  maintained	  throughout	  the	  epochal	  developments	  of	  social	  and	  social	  scientific	  thought3.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  we	  will	  now	  focus	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  developments	  experienced	  by	  the	   voting	   behaviour	   question	   on	   its	   most	   evolved	   versions	   of	   the	   20th	   and	   21st	  centuries.	  The	  theoretical	  advances	  belonging	  to	  this	  contemporary	  period	  of	  modern	  social	   sciences	   are	   usually	   classified	   within	   a	   triad	   of	   traditions	   on	   this	   subject	  matter,	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as:	  
1. The	  sociological	  school	  of	  Columbia.	  2. The	  psychosocial	  school	  of	  Michigan.	  3. The	  economic	  school	  of	  Rochester.	  
These	   three	   traditions,	   which	   synthesize	   the	   whole	   scope	   of	   social	   science	   itself	   –alluding	   to	   the	   homo	   sociologicus,	   homo	   psychologicus	   and	   homo	   economicus,	  respectively 4 –	   have	   been	   establishing	   a	   scientific	   dialogue	   that	   enriched	   our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  known	   Protagoras	   dialogue,	   where	   Socrates	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   teach	   the	  virtuousness	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   a	   good	   political	   judgment,	   and	   the	   sophist	  Protagoras,	  whose	  work	  was	  to	  teach	  Athenians	  how	  to	  develop	  their	  political	  skills,	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  indeed	  both	  possible	  and	  desirable	  (Plato,	  2012[4th	  c.	  BC]).	  It	  is	  mandatory	  to	  cite,	  as	  well,	  Aristotle’s	  Politics	  (Aristotle,	  2009	  [350	  B.C.]),	  as	  in	  this	  work	  it	  is	  developed	  the	  link	  between	   virtuousness	   and	   good	   citizenry	   and,	   particularly,	   the	   association	   between	   good	  government	  and	  social	  equality,	   i.e.,	  better	  governments	  are	   to	  be	   found	  within	  those	  cities	  where	  the	  middle	  class	  (sic.)	  overhangs	  both	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor	  (Aristotle,	  2009	  [350	  B.C.],	  Book	  IV-­‐Ch.	  XI).	  3	  Vid.	  Del Águila (1998) for the ancient Greek period, Rivero (1998) for the Republican tradition, 
García (1998) for the Liberal one, Vallespín (1998) for the radical democracy perspective, and De 
Gabriel (1998) for the point of view of the elite theorists.	  4	  These	   terms	   synthesize	   three	   different	   anthropological	   paradigms,	   the	   first	   one	  meaning	  that	  human	  behaviour	  is	  mainly	  caused	  by	  human	  roles	  and	  socialisation	  (Dahrendorf,	  2010),	  the	  second	  one	  stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  cognitive	  processes	  on	  human	  behaviour	  (Jager	  et	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comprehension	  of	  the	  complex	  process	  that	  defines	  our	  research	  question,	  leading	  us	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  why	  people	  vote	  the	  way	  they	  do.	  In	  fact,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  each	  of	  these	  academic	  traditions	  has	  constituted	  a	  social	  scientific	  model.	  According	  to	  Lave	  and	  March’s	  definition,	  a	  model:	  
“(…)	   is	   a	   simplified	   picture	   of	   a	   part	   of	   the	   real	   world.	   It	   has	   some	   of	   the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  real	  world,	  but	  not	  all	  of	  them.	  It	  is	  a	  set	  of	  interrelated	  guesses	  about	   the	   world.	   Like	   all	   pictures,	   a	   model	   is	   simpler	   than	   the	   phenomena	   it	   is	  supposed	   to	   represent	   or	   explain	   (…)	   Since	   a	   model	   has	   only	   some	   of	   the	  characteristics	   of	   reality,	   it	   is	   natural	   to	   have	   several	   different	  models	   of	   the	   same	  thing,	  each	  of	  which	  considers	  a	  different	  aspect”	  (Lave	  and	  March,	  1993[1975]:	  3)	  
This	   definition	   of	   a	   model	   is	   certainly	   appropriate	   to	   define	   the	   nature	   and	  relationship	   between	   the	   aforementioned	   theoretical	   traditions	   on	   the	   analysis	   of	  voting	   behaviour.	   The	   dialogue	   maintained	   between	   those	   three	   models	   took	  sometimes	  the	  form	  of	  academic	  confrontation	  but	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  in	  many	  other	  occasions	   it	   pinpointed	   the	   principles	   of	   a	   future	   agreement	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   voting	  behaviour.	  	  
In	   this	   chapter	   we	   will	   examine	   the	   main	   characteristics	   of	   each	   of	   the	   three	  aforementioned	  models,	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  modern	  analysis	  of	  voting	  behaviour	  and	  electoral	  politics	  (Bartels,	  2010).	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  section	  we	  will	  also	  take	  a	  look	  at	  the	  perspective	  developed	  from	  political	  geography,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  Columbia	  model.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  al.,	   2000)	   and	   the	   third	   one	   presupposing	   an	   instinct	   in	   human	   beings	   according	   to	  which	  human	  behaviour	  would	  respond	  to	  a	  self-­‐interest	  rationale	  (Persky,	  1995).	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3.1.1	  The	  Columbia	  model	  It	   all	   seems	   to	   have	   started	   in	   1944	  when	   a	   group	   of	   social	   scientists	   lead	   by	  Paul	  Felix	  Lazarsfeld5	  published	  a	  seminal	  work	  entitled	  The	  People’s	  Choice:	  how	  the	  voter	  
makes	  up	  his	  mind	  in	  a	  presidential	  campaign	  (Lazarsfeld,	  Berelson	  and	  Gaudet,	  1968	  [1944]),	  laying	  the	  foundations	  of	  this	  model.	  The	  theory	  was	  later	  developed	  in	  two	  other	   major	   works	   entitled	   Voting:	   a	   study	   of	   opinion	   formation	   in	   a	   presidential	  
campaign	   (Berelson,	   Lazarsfeld	   and	  Mcphee,	  1954)	   and	  Personal	  Influence:	  the	  part	  
played	  by	  people	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  mass	  communications	  (Katz	  and	  Lazarsfeld,	  1955)6.	  The	  seminal	   work	   included	   on	   their	   first	   work	   from	   1944	   was	   a	   product	   of	   the	   work	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Paul	   F.	   Lazarsfeld	   (Vienna	  1901-­‐	  New	  York	  1976),	  mathematician,	   later	  psychologist	   and,	  finally,	  sociologist,	  had	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  the	  development	  of	  quantitative	  social	  research.	  He	  was	   the	   1962	   President	   of	   the	   American	   Sociological	   Association.	   Born	   in	   Vienna	   into	   a	  middle-­‐class	   Jewish	   family,	  he	  was	  a	   committed	  and	  active	   socialist	  during	  his	  youth	   (Sills,	  1987,	  pp.	  258-­‐259).	  In	  1933	  he	  got	  a	  grant	  from	  the	  Rockefeller	  Foundation	  that	  brought	  him	  to	   the	   United	   States,	   where	   he	   finally	   decided	   to	   stay,	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   increasingly	  dangerous	  political	  situation	  in	  Europe,	  especially	  for	  a	  person	  with	  his	  political	  background	  –most	   members	   of	   Lazarsfeld’s	   family	   were	   imprisoned	   at	   the	   time,	   and	   Lazarsfeld’s	   job	  position	   in	   Vienna	   was	   suppressed	   (Cole,	   2004,	   p.	   313)–.	   The	   astonishing	   increase	   of	  electoral	   support	   in	   the	   German	   Federal	   elections	   for	   the	   Nationalsozialistische	   Deutsche	  
Arbeiterpartei	  between	  the	  mid-­‐1920s	  and	  the	  mid-­‐1930s	  -­‐6.5%	  of	  the	  votes	  in	  1924,	  43.9%	  in	   1933-­‐	   (Eberhard,	   2005	   [1984],	   pp.	   224-­‐225)	   as	   well	   as	   the	   defeat	   of	   the	   Vienna’s	   July	  Revolt	  of	  1927	  stimulated	  Lazarsfeld’s	   interests	   in	  people’s	  political	  behaviour	   to	   the	  point	  that	  he	  stated:	  “A	  fighting	  revolution	  requires	  economics	  (Marx);	  a	  victorious	  revolution	  requires	  engineers	  (Russia);	  a	  defeated	  revolution	  calls	  for	  psychology	  (Vienna)”	  (quoted	  in	  Sills,	  1987,	  p.	  256).	  6	  We	   must	   note	   here	   the	   precedent	   defined	   by	   the	   quantitative	   research	   carried	   out	   by	  George	   Gallup	   during	   the	   1940s	   (Gallup,	   1972),	   influential	   within	   the	   Scandinavian	   world	  (Valen	   and	   Aardal,	   1994),	   as	   well	   as	   the	   work	   by	   sociologists	   Robert	   and	   Helen	   Lynd,	   in	  search	  for	  a	  middletown	  that,	  within	  the	  USA,	  could	  statistically	  match	  the	  political	  opinion	  of	  the	   whole	   nation	   (Lynd	   and	   Lynd,	   1929).	   Inspired	   by	   this	   notion	   of	   statistical	   matching	  between	  a	  peculiar	  small	  part	  of	  the	  electorate	  –not	  a	  random	  sample–	  and	  the	  electorate	  as	  a	  whole,	  was	  worked	  out	  the	  median	  voter	  theorem,	  firstly	  developed	  by	  Hotelling	  (1929).	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developed	   at	   the	   Bureau	   of	   Applied	   Social	   Research,	   founded	   and	   directed	   by	   Paul	  Lazarsfeld	  at	  Columbia	  University,	  in	  New	  York.	  	  It	  presents	  an	  empirically	  contrasted	  model	  of	  voting	  behaviour	  mainly	  based	  upon	  variables	  related	  to	  social	  structure.	  It	  is	   worth	   saying	   that	   this	   idea	   of	   voting	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   one’s	   social	   position,	  laconically	  summarized	  in	  the	  famous	  quotation	  “a	  person	  thinks,	  politically,	  as	  he	  is,	  socially”	   (Lazarsfeld,	   Berelson,	   &	   Gaudet,	   1968	   [1944],	   p.	   69),	   was	   not	   among	   the	  initial	   hypothesis	   that	   Lazarsfeld	   and	   his	   colleagues	   had	   firstly	   in	   mind.	   These	  scholars,	   Lazarsfeld	   in	   particular,	   were	   highly	   shocked	   by	   the	   electoral	   rising	   of	  Nazism	  and	  Fascism	   in	  Europe,	   as	  well	   as	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   so	  many	  people	  pledged	  allegiance	   to	   the	   far	   right	   political	   and	   military	   agenda	   run	   by	   the	   governments	  emerged	   from	   that	  movements.	   Both	   the	   extraordinary	   prominence	   that	   the	   Nazis	  gave	  to	  propaganda7	  as	  well	  as	  the	  unprecedented	  catastrophic	  consequences	  caused	  by	  the	  implementation	  of	  their	  political	  program,	  made	  scholars	  like	  Lazarsfeld	  see	  in	  political	  propaganda	  an	  extremely	  powerful	  weapon	   for	  controlling	  people’s	  minds.	  Lazarsfeld’s	   work	   started	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   impossibility,	   due	   to	   political	  reasons,	  of	  going	  back	  to	  Vienna	  after	  his	  two	  years	  fellowship	  in	  America,	  funded	  by	  the	  Rockefeller	  Foundation	   (1933-­‐1935).	  He	  was	   then	  director	  of	   the	  Office	  of	  Radio	  
Research,	   a	   newly	   created	   institution	   dedicated	   to	   the	   study	   of	   the	   impact	   of	  mass	  communication	   on	   citizens	   that	   in	   1944	   became	   part	   of	   the	   Columbia	   University,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Reichsministerium	  für	  Volksaufklärung	  und	  Propaganda,	   in	  English	  ‘Reich	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Enlightenment	  and	  Propaganda’,	  was	  the	  expressive	  name	  chosen	  for	  the	  office	  directed	  by	  Joseph	  Goebbels	  during	  the	  Third	  Reich,	  whose	  extremely	  sophisticated	  work	  would	  change	  the	  way	  in	  which	  political	  propaganda	  was	  to	  be	  developed	  since	  then.	  The	  relevance	  given	  to	  propaganda	   by	   Nazi	   leaders	   is	   historically	   unquestionable,	   as	   we	   see	   in	   Goebbels’	   words,	  uttered	  in	  1934:	  “Propaganda	  is	  an	  inalienable	  and	  vital	  function	  of	  the	  modern	  state”	  (cited	  in	  Taylor,	  1983,	  p.	  29).	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being	  renamed	  as	  the	  Columbia	  University	  Bureau	  of	  Applied	  Social	  Research	  (BASR).	  Lazarsfeld	  directed	  the	  BASR	  between	  1938	  and	  1949	  (Garfinkel,	  1987,	  p.	  5;	  Knight	  &	  Marsh,	   2002).	   He	   was	   trained	   as	   a	   mathematician	   at	   the	   Universität	   Wien,	   and	  introduced	   to	   the	   social	   sciences	   due	   strictly	   to	   political	   reasons,	   being	   his	   main	  motivation	   to	   provide	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   failed	   revolution	   of	   1927	   Vienna	  (Lazarsfeld,	  1972).	  Later	  on	  he	  would	  become	  one	  of	  the	  major	  figures	  in	  20th	  century	  social	  science,	  with	  a	  highly	  recognized	  work	  based	  on	  strong	  empirical	  basis	  (Sills,	  1987).	  	  The	  Columbia	  school	  is	  an	  approach	  very	  much	  focused	  on	  dynamics	  of	  social	  conflict.	  Its	   internal	   logic	   is	  based	  on	  the	   idea	  that	  each	  social	  group	  –such	  as	  social	  classes,	  ethnic	   and	   national	   communities,	   etc.–	   has	   its	   own	   common	   interests,	  making	   that	  group	  members	  will	  cast	  their	  votes	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  group	  interests.	  Thus,	  it	  was	   possible	   for	   Lazarsfeld	   and	   his	   colleagues	   to	   define	   an	   “Index	   of	   Political	  Predisposition”	   (IPP)	   for	   the	   Erie	   County	   vote	   in	   the	   USA	   presidential	   election	   of	  1940,	   including	   three	   factors:	   socio-­‐economic	   level,	   religion	   and	   residence	  (Lazarsfeld,	   Berelson	   and	   Gaudet,	   1968	   [1944])8.	   The	   IPP	   was	   a	   landmark	   on	   the	  history	  of	  political	  research;	  its	  internal	  rationale	  was	  to	  be	  later	  developed	  by	  other	  scholars,	  notably	  by	  the	  American	  Seymour	  Martin	  Lipset	  and	  by	  the	  Norwegian	  Stein	  Rokkan.	   These	   two	   social	   scientists	   introduced	   the	   notion	   of	   cleavage,	   relating	   to	  those	  social	  divisions	  that	  will	  eventually	  produce	  political	  alignments	  between	  group	  members	   and	   political	   parties	   (Lipset	   and	  Rokkan,	   1967).	   In	   this	   highly	   influential	  work,	   Lipset	   and	   Rokkan	   argued	   that	   cleavages	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   by-­‐product	  of	   two	   interrelated	  processes:	   the	  development	  of	   the	   industrial	  revolution	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	   IPP	   was	   later	   applied	   by	   the	   BASR	   team	   to	   a	   nation-­‐wide	   sample	   in	   the	   1944	  presidential	  elections,	  with	   fairly	  good,	  confirmatory,	   results,	  as	  explained	   in	   the	  preface	  of	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  The	  People’s	  Choice	  (Lazarsfeld,	  Berelson	  and	  Gaudet,	  1949).	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and	  the	  establishing	  of	  modern	  nation-­‐states.	  The	  result	  of	  these	  two	  processes	  was	  the	   division	   of	   society	   in	   different	   groups	   with	   different,	   often	   opposed,	   interests	  giving	  birth	  to	  four	  basic	  cleavages:	  
• Owner	  v.	  worker;	  
• Church	  v.	  State;	  
• Urban	  v.	  rural;	  	  
• Centre	  v.	  periphery.	  
This	  cleavage	  approach	  was	  thereafter	  constantly	  developed	  by	  generations	  of	  social	  scientists	   to	   the	   present	   day,	   when	   it	   has	   acquired	   a	   remarkable	   level	   of	  methodological	   sophistication	   –see,	   e.g.,	   Evans	   and	   de	   Graaf	   (2013)–.	   Finally,	   this	  sociological	  model	  of	  electoral	  research	  makes	  also	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  played	  by	  
social	   networks	   (Berelson,	   Lazarsfeld	   and	   Mcphee,	   1954).	   Thus,	   people’s	   social	  environment	   and	   connections	   would	   either	   reinforce	   or	   soften	   their	   political	  predispositions.	   This	   line	   of	   research	   based	   on	   social	   network	  was	   also	   very	  much	  developed	  until	  the	  present	  day	  –see,	  specially,	  Huckfeldt	  and	  Sprague	  (1995)–.	  
3.1.2	  The	  Michigan	  model	  The	   socio-­‐structural	   model	   of	   the	   Columbia	   School	   had	   a	   great	   impact	   on	   the	  academic	   field,	  originating	  a	  debate	   that	  soon	   introduced	  serious	  critiques.	  Perhaps	  the	  strongest	  of	  these	  critiques	  was	  summarized	  in	  the	  celebrated	  book	  The	  American	  
Voter	  (Campbell	  et	  al.,	  1960)	  written	  by	  a	  group	  of	   researchers	  at	   the	  University	  of	  Michigan.	   This	   seminal	   work	   started	   a	   new	   approach	   on	   the	   study	   of	   electoral	  behaviour,	   known	   as	   the	   Michigan	   School.	   The	   approach	   was	   based	   on	   a	   social	  psychological	  model	  built	  up	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  a	  set	  of	  political	  polls	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Survey	  Research	  Centre,	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan.	  These	  polls	  were	  conducted	  during	  the	  USA	  presidential	  elections	  of	  1948,	  1952	  and	  1956.	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Like	   the	   Columbia	   School,	   the	   Michigan	   model	   understood	   voting	   behaviour	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   alignments	   between	   the	   electorate	   and	   the	   different	   political	   parties.	  However,	  the	  theories	  differed	  greatly	  on	  the	  description	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  bond.	  This	  link	  was,	  for	  Campbell	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  defined	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  socialization,	  as	  explained	   by	   authors	   like	   Hyman	   (1959)	   or	   Strodtbeck	   (1958),	   and	   not	   by	   the	  location	  of	  individuals	  within	  social	  structure.	  The	  idea	  was	  that	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  lives	   individuals	   develop	   affinities	   to	   some	   parties	   and	   antipathies	   to	   others.	  Therefore,	   party	   identification	   was	   considered	   as	   the	  main	   explanatory	   variable	   of	  voting	  behaviour	  and,	  in	  its	  turn,	  it	  was	  considered	  a	  product	  of	  political	  socialization,	  starting	  from	  early	  childhood.	  One	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  the	  Michigan	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  provides	   an	   explanation	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   strong	   partisanship	   feelings	   among	  people	  with	   no	   significant	   political	   knowledge9.	  Within	   the	  Michigan	  model	   voters	  resemble	  football	  supporters	  rather	  than	  rational	  individuals.	  These	  assumptions	  on	  the	   identification	   between	   the	   electorate	   and	   political	   parties,	   however,	   have	   also	  been	   submitted	   to	   criticism.	   Some	   authors	   have	   questioned	   the	   origins	   of	  partisanship	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  political	  socialization;	  thus,	  it	  is	  now	  generally	  seen	  as	   the	   outcome	   of	   other	   processes	   apart	   from	   socialization,	   like	   changes	   in	   policy	  preferences	   (Erikson,	   MacKuen	   and	   Stimson,	   2002).	   There	   is	   as	   well	   an	   on-­‐going	  debate	  questioning	  the	  model’s	  proposal	  of	  partisanship	  as	  a	  steadily	  sustained	  bond,	  with	  empirical	  arguments	  showing	  its	  corrosion	  (Nie,	  Verba	  and	  Petrocik,	  1976).	  The	  Michigan	  model	  was	  initially	  devised	  with	  the	  American	  party	  system	  in	  mind	  and	  its	  suitability	   for	   the	   multiparty	   European	   case	   has	   been	   put	   into	   question	   (Budge,	  Crewe	   and	   Farlie,	   1976).	   Nevertheless,	   the	   influence	   of	   the	  model	   and	   the	   amount	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Results	  from	  the	  Survey	  Research	  Centre	  has	  shown	  that	  a	   large	  part	  of	  the	  electorate	  did	  not	   manage	   basic	   political	   concepts	   such	   as	   “liberal”	   and	   were	   characterized	   by	   their	  ignorance	  of	  important	  political	  issues	  (Campbell	  et	  al.,	  1960).	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research	  it	  is	  still	  producing	  today	  are	  evidences	  of	  the	  huge	  influence	  that	  it	  has	  on	  the	  scientific	  study	  of	  electoral	  behaviour.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  work	  by	  González	  and	  Bouza	  (2009),	  focused	  on	  agenda-­‐setting	  theory	  (McCombs	  and	  Shaw,	  1972),	  represents	  the	  best	   example	   to	   understand	   Spanish	   electoral	   behavior	   through	   the	   Michigan	  approach.	  We	  consider	  agenda-­‐setting	  theory	  as	  a	  particular	  branch	  of	  the	  Michigan	  school,	   given	   that	   it	   is	   focused	   on	   the	   influence	   of	   the	  media	   agenda	   on	   the	   public	  agenda.	  This	  is	  why	  we	  are	  not	  going	  into	  the	  details	  of	  the	  theory,	  since	  each	  one	  of	  the	  three	  schools	  have	  undoubtedly	  many	  branches,	  although	  they	  share	  a	  common	  emphasis	  regarding	  decision-­‐making	  rationale.	  	  
3.1.3	  The	  Rochester	  model	  We	  will	   now	   consider	   the	  work	   developed	   from	   the	   tradition	   of	   economics	   and	   of	  Rational	  Choice	  Theory.	  This	  tradition	  constitutes	  today	  one	  of	  the	  most	  productive	  areas	  of	   research	  within	   the	  social	   sciences	  as	  a	  whole,	  being	  particularly	  active	  on	  the	   field	   of	   electoral	   behaviour	   (Dowding,	   2005;	   Edlin,	   Gelman	   and	   Kaplan,	   2007).	  The	  model	  has	  been	   initially	   identified	  with	  the	  works	  by	  William	  H.	  Riker,	  chair	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Rochester	  between	  1962	  and	  1977	   (Riker	   and	   Ordeshook,	   1973).	   The	  model	   relies	   heavily	   on	   game	   theory	   and	  rational	  action	  theory,	  presupposing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  will	  for	  the	  maximization	  of	  utility	  behind	  people’s	  voting	  decisions.	  One	  very	  important	  work	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  this	   model	   was	   the	   book	   by	   Anthony	   Downs	   An	   Economic	   Theory	   of	   Democracy	  (Downs,	  1957).	  Like	  for	  the	  Columbia	  model,	  this	  theory	  is	  based	  on	  the	  individual’s	  
objective	   social	   position,	   what	   differentiates	   it	   from	   the	   Michigan	   School,	   which	   is	  focused	  on	  people’s	   subjective	   social	   location.	   The	  Rochester	  model	   is	   an	   economic	  one	  that	  sees	  voters	  as	  individuals	  seeking	  to	  maximize	  the	  utility	  of	  their	  vote,	  as	  a	  way	  for	  the	  maximization	  of	  their	  personal	  interests.	  	  
	   116	  
This	   utilitarian	   model	   understands	   that	   people	   order	   their	   voting	   preferences	  hierarchically;	   thus,	   the	   different	   options	   at	   their	   disposal	   are	   rationally	   compared	  before	  casting	  their	  votes.	  Underlying	  this	  rationalization	  of	  the	  vote,	  there	  is	  a	  utility	  function	   that	   compares	   the	   expected	   results	   of	   each	   possible	   vote.	   Simply	   put,	  according	  to	  Downs,	  voters	  are	  self-­‐located	  on	  a	  left/right	  scale	  of	  political	  ideology.	  As	   they	  are	  able	  as	  well	   to	   locate	   the	  different	  political	  parties	   in	  such	  a	  scale,	   they	  will	  then	  take	  their	  electoral	  decision	  in	  terms	  of	  proximity	  or,	  using	  rational	  choice	  jargon,	   in	   terms	   of	   utility	   maximization.	   This	   decision	   is	   also	   framed	   by	  presuppositions	   on	   the	   chances	   of	   each	  party	   to	  win	   the	   elections,	   giving	  way	   to	   a	  calculus	  of	  voting	  that	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  “strategic”	  or	  “tactical”	  (Cox,	  1997;	  Fisher,	  2001).	  Criticism	  to	  this	  model	  came	  both	  from	  its	  specific	  application	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  electoral	  behaviour	  (Blais,	  2000)	  as	  well	  as	   from	  a	  general	  opposition	  to	  rational	  choice	  theory	  (Green	  and	  Shapiro,	  1994).	  
3.1.4	  The	  Ecological	  model	  Finally	  we	  will	  take	  into	  account	  the	  specific	  contributions	  from	  political	  geography,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ecological	  approach.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  trace	  back	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  analysis	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  territory	  and	  voting	  behaviour,	  we	  should	  consider,	  in	   the	   first	  place,	  André	  Siegfried’s	  pioneer	   studies	  on	  political	   sociology,	  where	  he	  established	  a	  formal	  correlation	  between	  place	  and	  vote	  (Sigfried,	  2010	  [1913]).	  This	  relation	  was	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  granitic	  soils	  produced	  a	  kind	  of	  social	  structure	  conducive	   to	   right-­‐wing	   voting,	   while	   those	   composed	   mainly	   of	   limestone	   would	  promote	  a	  social	  structure	  conducive	  to	  a	  predominance	  of	  the	  leftist	  vote.	  Siegfried’s	  analysis,	   however,	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   an	   antecedent	   of	   the	   Columbia	   School,	   for	  different	   soil	   compositions	   will	   promote	   different	   agricultural	   models,	   conforming	  different	   kinds	   of	   social	   structures	   that	  will	   produce,	   in	   turn,	   an	   effect	   on	   electoral	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behaviour.	  Hence,	  it	  was	  social	  structure,	  and	  not	  territory	  in	  itself,	  the	  independent	  variable	  determining	  people’s	  voting	  patterns	  in	  Siegfried’s	  model.	  	  
This	   indirect	   relation	  between	   territory	   and	   vote	  was	   to	   be	   further	   theorised	   forty	  years	   later.	   In	   an	   intellectual	   environment	   dominated	   by	   Modernization	   theorists,	  who	   argued,	   following	   Weber	   (Weber,	   2013	   [1905]),	   that	   poor	   societies’	   cultural	  values	   were	   at	   the	   core	   of	   an	   explanation	   for	   their	   economic	   and	   political	  underdevelopment	   (Lerner,	   1958;	   Pye	   &	   Verba,	   1963),	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   good	  economic	   performance	   is	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   a	   stable	   democracy	   (Lipset	   ,	   1959).	  Modernization	   would	   transform	   societies,	   through	   nation-­‐building	   processes,	   in	   a	  way	   that	   their	   old	   political	   cleavages	   –such	   as	   those	   based	   on	   clan	   or	   regional	  membership–	  were	  to	  be	  substituted	  by	  new	  modern	  nation-­‐wide	  ones,	  among	  which	  social	   class	   would	   hold	   a	   central	   role,	   leading	   authors	   to	   define	   elections	   as	   “the	  expression	   of	   the	   democratic	   class	   struggle”	   (Lipset,	   1960,	   Ch.	   VII-­‐VIII).	   It	   can	   be	  stated,	   then,	   that	   authors	   within	   this	   tradition	   described	   a	   homogeneous	   trend	  accompanying	   the	  process	   of	  modernization,	   by	  which	   local	   differences	  would	   lose	  relevance,	   as	   these	   were	   going	   to	   be	   surpassed	   by	   new	   modern	   nation-­‐wide	  cleavages;	  if	  territorial	  variations	  were	  to	  be	  found	  in	  people’s	  voting	  patterns,	  these	  should	  be	  attributed	  not	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  spatial	  effect,	  but	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  social	  composition	  of	  the	  national	  territory.	  	  
Modernization	   theory,	   however,	   was	   harshly	   criticized	   during	   the	   1970s	   and	   80s,	  even	   60s,	   by	   Dependency	   and	   World-­‐System	   theorists	   (Chase-­‐Dunn,	   1989;	   Chirot,	  1977;	  Frank,	  1966;	  Wallerstein,	  1974).	  This	  critique	  of	  Modernization	  theory	  spread	  to	   its	   application	   to	  democracy	  and	  voting	  behaviour,	   as	  exposed	  by	  Lipset	  and	  his	  colleagues	  during	  the	  60s,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  in	  the	  1980s	  arose	  a	  new	  locally-­‐oriented	  political	   sociology	   focused	  on	   the	   importance	  of	   spatial	  political	  divergences	  within	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societies	   (Agnew,	   1984;	   1987;	   Johnston,	   1986;	   Johnston,	   Pattie,	   &	   Allsop,	   1988;	  Johnston	  &	  Pattie,	  1989;	  Savage,	  1987).	  Drawing	  on	  Giddens’	  theory	  of	  structuration	  (Giddens,	  1977;	  1979;	  1981;	  1984),	  theorists	  like	  Agnew	  wanted	  to	  demonstrate	  “the	  geographical	   rootedness	   of	   political	   life”	   (Agnew,	   1987,	   p.	   1),	   leading	   them	   to	   a	  profound	  critique	  of	  Lipset’s	  homogenization	  thesis,	  that	  treated	  the	  local	  variations	  of	  societies	  as	  evanescent	  features	  that	  will	  eventually	  be	  banished	  within	  a	  process	  of	   progressively	   national	   uniformity.	   This	   was	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   habit	   of	   social	  scientists	  who	  usually	  match	  societies	  with	  the	  national	  communities	  they	  belong	  to,	  and	  it	  was	  supported	  not	  only	  from	  a	  theoretically	  standpoint,	  but	  also	  by	  empirical	  evidence;	  as	  Agnew	  puts	  it:	  “It	  is	  quite	  remarkable	  how	  much	  empirical	  sociology	  has	  suggested	   the	   importance	   of	   place	   without	   its	   authors	   making	   the	   connection”	  (Agnew,	  1987,	  p.	  12).	  	  
Ecological	   theorists	   also	   warned	   of	   the	   vivacity	   of	   local	   space	   as	   a	   political	  determinant,	  even	  in	  neatly	  modern	  societies	  like	  Great	  Britain	  or	  the	  USA,	  for	  place	  is	   seen	   as	   a	   source	   of	   collective	   identity	   that	   should,	   consequently,	   produce	  differences	   in	   voting	   patterns.	   We	   can	   state	   that,	   at	   this	   stage,	   space	   was	   already	  treated	   as	   an	   independent	   variable	   from	   social	   structure,	   and	   thus	   differentiated	  from	  the	  effect	  of	  unequal	  territorial	  distribution	  of	  social	  classes,	  or	  any	  other	  social	  structural	   variables.	   It	   remained	   attached,	   however,	   to	   processes	   of	   political	  socialization,	  resembling	  the	  Michigan	  model.	  
Thus,	  the	  spatial	  effect,	  now	  formally	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “neighbourhood	  effect”,	  firstly	  theorized	   by	   Cox	   (1969)	   and	   significantly	   developed	   by	   Miller	   (1978),	   can	   be	  summarized	  as	  the	  idea	  that	  everyday	  contact	  with	  fellow	  neighbours	  will	  produce	  a	  tendency	   towards	   the	   homogenization	   of	   political	   behaviour	   within	   local	  communities;	   in	   Miller’s	   words:	   “People	   who	   talk	   together,	   vote	   together”	   (Miller,	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1978,	  p.	  65).	   Strong	  empirical	   evidence	  of	   this	  argument	  has	  been	  provided	  (Pattie	  and	   Johnston,	   2000).	  Neighbourhood	   effect	   has	   also	   been	   empirically	   proved	  using	  the	   British	   General	   Election	   of	   1997,	   which	   presented	   clear	   patterns	   of	   voting	  variations	  not	  related	  to	  class,	  but	  to	  differences	  among	  constituencies’	  life	  standards	  (MacAllister,	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  Consequently,	  the	  debate	  is	  now	  focused	  on	  the	  logic	  and	  nature	  of	  these	  tendencies.	  One	  possible	  explanation	  is	  the	  idea,	  already	  mentioned,	  that	   social	   structural	   variables	   are	   not	   homogeneously	   distributed	   in	   the	   territory.	  This	  idea	  remembers	  us	  the	  indirect	  effect	  analyzed	  by	  Siegfried	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	   20th	   century	   and	   would	   eventually	   end	   up	   in	   a	   sophistication	   of	   the	   cleavage	  approach.	   This	   line	   of	   research	   has	   demonstrated	   to	   be	   highly	   productive,	   and	   in	  recent	  years	  we	  have	  witnessed	  a	  resurgence	  of	  class	  voting	  theorizing,	  in	  what	  is	  a	  sophistication	   of	   early	   class	   voting	   theory10	  (Bartolini	   &	   Mair,	   1990;	   Evans,	   1999;	  Manza,	  Hout,	  &	  Brooks,	  1999;	  Manza	  &	  Brooks,	  1999;	  Evans	  &	  de	  Graaf,	  2013).	  
On	  the	  other	  hand	  we	  have	  explanations	  for	  the	  neighbourhood	  effect	  focused	  on	  the	  role	  played	  by	  local	  political	  cultures	  (MacIntyre,	  1980)	  and	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  not	  social	   structure	   that	   varies,	   but	   economic	   realities	   that	   differ	   from	   one	   region	   to	  another	   (Heath,	  et	  al.,	  1991).	  On	  an	   intermediary	   level,	  Savage	  et	  al.	  have	  proposed	  the	   alternative	   interpretation	   of	   seeing	   social	   class	   as	   still	   politically	   relevant,	   but	  arguing	   that	   its	   expression	   and	  mobilization	   is	   nowadays	   symbolically	   attached	   to	  local	  scenarios	  (Savage,	  Warde	  and	  Ward,	  2003).	  It	  can	  be	  argued,	  however,	  that	  this	  approach	   is	   nationally	   biased,	   since	   it	   owes	   very	  much	   to	   the	   social	   reality	   of	   the	  United	   Kingdom,	   characterised	   by	   the	   erosion	   of	   nation-­‐wide	   working-­‐class	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  We	  are	  referring	   to	   the	  work	  of	  Robert	  Alford,	  who	  developed	   the	  so-­‐called	  Alford	  Index,	  which	  is	  calculated	  by	  ”(…)	  subtracting	  the	  percentage	  of	  persons	  in	  non-­‐manual	  occupations	  voting	  for	  Left	  parties	  from	  the	  percentage	  of	  persons	  in	  manual	  occupations	  voting	  for	  Left	  parties”	  (Alford,	  1963,	  pp.	  79-­‐80).	  	  
	   120	  
organisations	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  Thatcherism	  during	  the	  1980s	  (Savage,	  Warde,	  &	  Ward,	  2003,	  pp.	  190-­‐191).	  
3.2 Some	  commentaries	  on	  the	  models	  In	   this	   section	   we	   are	   going	   to	   introduce	   what	   we	   see	   as	   improvements	   to	   these	  models.	  Without	  abandoning	  the	  internal	  logics	  of	  these	  models	  we	  think	  we	  are	  able	  to	   improve	   their	  methodological	   rigor.	  As	  we	   are	  basing	  our	   analysis	   on	  data	   from	  Spain,	   we	   should	   pay	   special	   attention	   to	   the	   two	   main	   political	   cleavages	   that,	  according	   to	   experts,	   divide	   the	   Spanish	   society:	   social	   class	   and	   national	   identity;	  Juan	  Jesús	  González	  put	  it	  this	  way:	  
‘In	  the	  Spanish	  case,	  the	  party	  system	  of	  the	  transition	  was	  configured	  in	  accordance	  with	  two	  axes:	  the	  traditional	  opposition	  between	  left	  and	  right	  and	  the	  opposition	  between	  nationwide	  Spanish	  forces	  and	  ethno-­‐cultural	  peripheral	  nationalisms	  (the	  opposition	  center-­‐periphery;	  Giner	  and	  Moreno,	  1990)’	  
3.2.1 Some	  methodological	  comments	  on	  the	  measurement	  of	  class	  voting	  
in	  Spain	  If	   we	   think	   about	   Siegfried´s	   pioneering	   analysis	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	  income	   group	   and	   vote	   (Siegfried,	   2010	   [1913]),	   then	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   class	  
voting,	   as	   it	   is	  now	   called,	   appears	   as	   one	   of	   the	   earliest	   voting	   phenomena	   to	   be	  studied	   by	   social	  scientists	   interested	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	  electoral	  behavior.	  We	  can	  even	   trace	   back	   this	   interest	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   class	   and	   vote	   until	   the	  very	   origins	   of	   sociology	   itself,	   in	   the	   form	  of	   Engels’	   statement	   that	   the	  working	  class	  would	  vote	  for	  socialist	  parties	  if	  suffrage	  were	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  a	  workers’	  right	  (Engels,	  1895).	  This	   interest	  on	  class	  voting	  was	  to	  be	  a	  constant	  maintained	  through	   the	   history	   of	   electoral	   sociology.	   Lipset’s	   classical	   studies	   viewed	   class	  voting	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   class	   interests	   (Lipset	   et	   al.,	   1954),	   a	   standpoint	   that,	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although	  submitted	  to	  strong	  criticism	  (Franklin,	  1985;	  Clark	  and	  Lipset,	  2001),	  has	  also	   been	   establishing	   notable	   counterarguments	   (González,	   1993;	   1996;	  2001).	   Thus,	   as	   Polavieja	   commented:	   ‘One	   of	   the	   strongest	   regularities	  observed	   in	   electoral	   behavior	   is	   that	   support	   for	   left-­‐wing	   parties	   is	   higher	  among	   the	  working	   class	   than	   the	  petty	  bourgeoisie	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   service	  class	   (Heath	   and	   Weakliem,	   1994:	   243)’	   (Polavieja,	   2001:	   1).	   New	  
groundbreaking	   research	   was	   developed	   in	   mid-­‐20th	   century	   by	   American	   social	  scientists;	   Angus	   Campbell,	   a	   representative	   author	   of	   the	   psycho-­‐social	   school	   of	  Michigan,	   argued	   that	   political	   attitudes	   and	   partisan	   identification	   were	   the	   key	  variables	   to	   explain	   electoral	   behavior,	   although	   both	  were	  themselves	   influenced	  by	  the	  voter’s	  social	  position	  (Campbell	  et	  al.,	  1960).	  The	  huge	  amount	  of	  research	  on	  class	  voting	  can	  be	  explained	  due	  to	  the	  centrality	  of	  social	  classes	   in	  the	  sociological	   tradition,	  not	  only,	  of	  course,	   in	  Marxism11,	  but	   for	  Weberians	   (Breen,	   2005)	   and	   Durkheimians	   (Grusky	   and	   Galescu,	   2005)	   as	   well.	  Given	  its	   importance	  and	  relevance	   for	   the	  study	  of	  electoral	  behavior,	   there	  have	  been	  different	  proposals	  for	  the	  measurement	  of	  class	  voting.	  Perhaps	  the	  so-­‐called	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	   analysis	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   democratic	   voting	   and	   social	   class	   has	   been	  present	   in	  Marxism	  since	   its	  very	  origins.	  Marx	  himself	  agreed	  that	   the	  revolution	  could	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  democratic	  means,	  given	  a	  requirement	  of	  enough	  class	  consciousness:	  	  ‘But	  universal	  suffrage	  is	  the	  equivalent	  of	  political	  power	  for	  the	  working	  class	  of	  England,	  where	   the	   proletariat	   forms	   the	   large	  majority	   of	   the	   population,	   where,	   in	   a	   long	   though	  underground	  civil	  war,	  it	  has	  gained	  a	  clear	  consciousness	  of	  its	  position	  as	  a	  class	  and	  where	  even	  the	  rural	  districts	  know	  no	  longer	  any	  peasants,	  but	  only	  landlords,	  industrial	  capitalists	  (farmers)	  and	  hired	  labourers.	  The	  carrying	  of	  universal	  suffrage	  in	  England	  would,	  therefore	  be	  a	  far	  more	  socialistic	  measure	  than	  anything	  which	  has	  been	  honoured	  with	  that	  name	  on	  the	  continent.	  Its	  inevitable	  result,	  here	  is	  the	  political	  supremacy	  of	  the	  working	  class.’	  (cited	  in	  Hallas,	  1983:	  20).	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Alford	   Index	   represents	   the	   best	   known	   and	   more	   influential	   of	   these	   attempts;	  developed	  by	  Robert	  Alford	  it	  is	  presented	  as	   “the	  percentage	  of	  persons	   in	  manual	  occupations	   voting	   for	   Left	   parties	  minus	   the	  percentage	  of	  persons	   in	  nonmanual	  occupations	   voting	   for	   Left	   parties”	   (Alford,	   1963;	   pp.	   79-­‐80).	   The	   Alford	   Index,	  calculated	   through	   time,	   shows	   that	   there	   has	   been	   a	   general	   waning	   trend	  regarding	   the	   levels	   of	   class	   voting	   in	   virtually	   every	   Western	   society	   (Clark,	  Lipset	   and	   Rempel,	   1993).	   Different	   sociological	   explanations	   of	   this	   empirically	  registered	  loss	   of	   influence	   have	  been	  signaled	  (Parkin,	  1968;	  Cohen,	  1982;	  Dalton,	  
et	   al.,	   1984;	   Przeworski	   and	   Sprague,	   1986;	   Halle	   and	   Romo,	   1991;	   Piven,	   1992).	  However,	   explanations	   of	   trendless	   class	  voting	   fluctuation,	   supported	   by	   advanced	  statistical	   techniques,	   have	   emerged	   as	   a	   counter-­‐critique	   of	   class	   voting	   decline	  theories	  (Heath,	  et	  al.,	  1985;	  Evans,	  et	  al.,	  1991;	  Manza,	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  	  Our	   point	   here	   is	   that	   theories	   for	   or	   against	   class	   voting	   are	  mainly	  worked	   out	  from	   data	   corresponding	   to	   advanced	   capitalist	   societies	   –mainly	   the	   USA–	   in	   an	  example	  of	  what	  postcolonial	  theorizing	  has	  called	  geopolitics	  knowledge	  (Mignolo,	  2001).	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  these	  societies	  have	  experienced,	  during	  the	  last	  decades,	  a	   well-­‐known	   growth	   of	   its	   services	   sector,	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   industrial	   one,	  giving	   way	   to	   what	   has	   been	   known	   as	   post-­‐industrial	   societies	   (Bell,	   1973).	   It	   is	  true,	   however,	   that	  within	   the	   framework	   of	   big	  Western	   nation-­‐states,	   there	   are	  still	   wide	   regions	   and	  areas	   whose	  economic	  structure	  is	  not	  utterly	  embedded	   in	  the	   market	   sphere.	   Such	   is	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Galician	   economic	   structure,	   which	  features	   a	   strong	   presence	   of	   non-­‐market	   economic	   activity,	   what	   renders	   the	  Galician	  case	  as	  a	  particularly	  good	  case	  study	  for	  what	  can	  be	  an	  analysis	  of	  class	  voting	   in	   pre-­‐capitalist	   societies	   (Beiras,	   1995).	   Analyzing	   this	   version	   of	   class	  voting	   will	   shed	   light	   on	   our	   comprehension	   of	   the	   electoral	   behavior	   in	   large	  Western	   non-­‐market	   embedded	   areas	   as	   well	   as	   in	   those	   countries	   with	   recent	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democratic	   history	   that	   are	   still	   defined	   by	   strongly	   pre-­‐capitalist	   economic	  structures12.	  
3.2.1.1	  Still	  European	  pre-­‐capitalist	  societies?	  	  It	  is	  not	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  work	  to	  ground	  its	  argumentation	  on	  a	  narrow	  definition	  of	  what	  a	  pre-­‐capitalist	   society	   is,	  as	  established	   in	   its	  original	  Marxist	   theorization	  (Marx,	  1964[1857-­‐58]).	  On	  the	  contrary	  we	  base	  our	  work	  on	  a	   looser	  definition	  of	  pre-­‐capitalist	  societies,	  as	  those	  societies	  characterized	  for	  having	  economic	  activities	  which	  are	  not	  embedded	  in	  the	  capitalist	  market	  sphere,	  but	  rather	  oriented	  to	  self-­‐consumption.	   As	   French	   anthropologist	   Claude	   Meillassoux	   put	   it,	   pre-­‐capitalist	  societies	  are	  those	  societies	  with	  economic	  activities	  oriented	  towards	  reproduction	  instead	  of	  production	   (Meillasoux,	  1972).	  Thus	  defined,	   it	   is	   obvious	   that	   there	   are	  still	  wide	  areas	  within	  advanced	  Western	  economies	  that	  can	  be	  categorized	  as	  pre-­‐capitalist.	  Of	  course	  we	  are	  not	  arguing	  that	  the	  entire	  Galician	  economic	  structure	  is	  nowadays	  pre-­‐capitalist,	  but	  we	  can	  affirm	  that	  this	  is	  so	  for	  a	  considerable	  segment	  of	  it.	  This	  segment	  has	  been	  declared	  in	  decay	  and	  its	  disappearance	  in	  a	  near	  future	  has	  been	  predicted	  (Beiras, 2008),	  but	   it	   is	  still	  present	   in	  today’s	  Galician	  economy.	  We	  use	  the	  case	  of	  Galicia	  as	  a	  mere	  example	  of	  what	  must	  be	  a	  general	  phenomenon	  not	  only	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  EU,	  but	  also	  within	  virtually	  every	  nation-­‐state	  in	  the	  Western	  world	  and,	  of	  course,	  outside	  of	  it.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  the	  critique	  by	  some	  colleague	  anthropologists	  following	  the	  presentation	  of	   a	   draft	   version	   of	   this	   work	   at	   the	   5th	   Summer	   Seminar	   on	   Sociological	   and	   Political	  Research,	  at	  Harvard	  University,	  September	  2012.	  Their	  critique	  saw	  an	  evolutionist	  bias	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  pre-­‐capitalist	  society.	  Thus,	  we	  want	  to	  state	  that	  by	  its	  use	  we	  are	  referring	  to	  those	  societies,	   such	  as	  Galicia,	  which	  are	  embedded	   in	   fully	  capitalist	  economies,	  although	  still	  keeping	  relevant	   features	  of	   the	  economic	  structure	  previous	  to	  capitalism.	  We	  are	  not	  saying,	   therefore,	   that	   every	   society	   necessarily	   needs	   to	   go	   through	   different	   stages	   of	  economic	  development,	   including	   capitalism,	   as	   if	   this	  were	   a	   law	  of	   historic	   development,	  like	  in	  Marx’s	  work.	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Thus,	  we	  have	  developed	  an	  “agricultural	  index”,	  to	  measure	  the	  level	  of	  the	  agrarian	  sector	   in	   Galicia’s	   economy.	   This	   agricultural	   index	   can	   be	   expressed	   with	   this	  formula:	  
𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   ×  100	  	  We	  have	  calculated	  the	  agricultural	  index	  not	  just	  for	  Galicia,	  but	  also	  for	  each	  one	  of	  the	   seventeenth	   Spanish	   Autonomous	   Communities,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   the	   two	  Autonomous	   Cities	   of	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla	   (see	   figure	   16),	   and	   we	   see	   Galicia	   as	  occupying	  the	  seventh	  place	  of	  all	  the	  nineteen	  autonomous	  communities	  and	  cities.	  	  
Source: Prepared by the author based on data from the ‘Agricultural Census 2009’, of the Spanish National 




3.08$ 2.86$ 2.81$ 2.68$
2.29$
1.82$












































































































	   125	  
Figure	   17	   illustrates	   the	   proportion	   of	   farms	   depending	   solely	   on	   familiar	   labor,	  with	  no	  extra	   wage-­‐earner	   employees.	   This	   familiar	   type	   of	   primary	   exploitation	  is	   typical	   of	   pre-­‐capitalist	   economies	   and	  we	   see	   that	   Galicia	   ranks	   second,	   only	  after	  Asturias,	  which	  has	  a	  lower	  Agricultural	  Index,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  figure	  16.	  	  	  	  
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on data from the ‘Agricultural Census 2009’, of the Spanish National 
Institute of Statistics (INE). 	  This	  high	  proportion	  of	  familiar-­‐exploited	  farms,	  producing	  and	  consuming	  primary	  goods	  outside	  the	  sphere	  of	  the	  capitalist	  market,	  derives	  from	  the	   late	  redemption	  of	  the	  medieval	  system	  of	  “foros”,	  which	  took	  place	  in	  1926.	  This	  system	  established	  that	  the	  peasant	  working	  the	  land	  was	  not	  its	  owner,	  but	  its	  usufructuary,	  having	  to	  pay	   some	   stipulated	   tributes	   to	   a	   rentier	   conservative	   class	   that	   block	   any	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possibility	  of	  capitalist	  development	  (Beramendi, 2007).	   After	   the	   redemption	  of	   the	  “foros”	   many	   peasants	   became	   owners	   of	   small	   portions	   of	   land,	   but	   due	   to	  different	   factors	   there	   was	   no	   immediate	   capitalist	   exploitation	   of	   these	   lands	  within	  the	  market	  system,	  but	  rather	  a	  sustained	  pre-­‐capitalist	  mode	  of	  production	  that	  extends	  until	  the	  present	  day13.	  Thus,	   small	   landowners	   outside	   the	   circulation	   of	   capitalist	   economy,	   are	  registered	   on	   the	   Spanish	   National	   Classification	   of	   Occupations	   or	   Clasificación	  
Nacional	   de	   Ocupaciones	   (CNO)	   used	   by	   the	   Spanish	   Centre	   for	   Sociological	  Research	   in	   its	   post-­‐electoral	   studies	   for	   Galicia.	   There	   has	   been	   three	   approved	  CNO	   in	  Spain,	  but	  only	  two	  of	   them	  were	  used	   in	   these	   electoral	   studies:	   CNO-­‐94	  and	  CNO-­‐79.	  CNO-­‐94	  was	  used	   in	   the	   last	   post-­‐electoral	  study	  of	  the	  CIS,	   no.	   2796.	  CNO-­‐79	   was	   implemented	   for	   the	   studies	   no.	   2611,	   2434,	   2263	   and	   2070,	   all	   of	  them	  being	   post-­‐electoral	   studies	   developed	  between	  years	   1993	   and	   2005.	   There	  are	  two	   post-­‐electoral	   studies,	   no.	   1497	   and	   1292,	   related	  to	   the	   1985	   and	   1981	  Galician	   autonomous	   elections,	   which	   does	   not	   make	   use	   of	   any	   of	   the	   CNO	  classifications.	  	  CNO-­‐94	  has	  one	  category	  containing	  Galician	  non-­‐capitalist	  landowners,	  defined	  as	  “Self-­‐employed	   skilled	  workers	  on	   farms”,	   no.	  601.	   In	  CNO-­‐79	   this	   same	   category	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Beiras	   has	   argued	   that	   this	   relative	   ‘underdevelopment’	   was	   caused	   by	   a	   situation	   of	  internal	   colonialism,	   by	  which	   the	   three	   greater	   economies	   of	   the	   State	   –Castilian,	   Basque	  and	   Catalan–	   used	   the	   State	   power	   to	   perpetuate	   a	   system	  of	   dependency	   regarding	   other	  minor	   economies,	   like	   the	   Galician	   one	   (Beiras,	   1972:	   57-­‐60).	   It	   is	  well	   known	   that	   Beiras	  built	  this	  approach	  inspired	  by	  the	  work	  of	  the	  economists	  at	  the	  ‘Economic	  Commission	  for	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean’,	  one	  of	  the	  five	  Regional	  Commissions	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.	  The	   whole	   approach	   owes	   much	   to	   the	   works	   by	   Robèrt	   Lafont	   	   (1967).	   This	  colonial/dependent	   approach	   opened	   up	   a	   school	   in	   Galician	   economics	   –vid.	   e.g.,	   (López-
Suevos, 1977; 1979),	  also	  Vence (2011)–.	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receives	   the	   code	  611.	   In	   the	  post-­‐electoral	   study	  1,497,	   corresponding	   the	  1985	  Galician	   autonomous	   elections,	   the	   category	   is	   04.	   Finally,	   in	   the	   study	  no.	   1,292,	  corresponding	   the	   1981	   Galician	   elections,	   the	   number	   of	   this	   category	   is	   03.	   In	  order	  to	  see	  the	  weight	  that	  these	  individuals	  have	  on	  Galician	  social	  structure	  we	  have	   elaborated	   figure	   18.	   The	   low	   percentage	   registered	   in	   the	   study	   no.	   1,292	  could	  be	   the	  result	   of	  an	  error	  in	  the	  measurement	  of	   the	  occupational	   categories	  in	   that	   first	   post-­‐electoral	   study.	   It	   must	   be	   said	   that	   this	   category	   of	   “Self-­‐employed	   skilled	   workers	   on	   farms”	   has	   the	   highest	   frequencies	   among	   the	  overall	   occupations	   in	   every	   post-­‐electoral	   study,	   making	   Galicia	   a	   society	   very	  much	   defined	   by	   pre-­‐capitalist	   economic	   and	   social	   structures.	   We	   observe	   that,	  although	   the	   category	   is	   clearly	   diminishing	   over	   time,	   it	   still	   represents	   a	  considerable	  proportion	  of	  the	  occupied	  Galician	  population.	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3.2.1.2	  Pre-­‐capitalist	  electoral	  profile	  	  In	   this	   section	   we	   present	   the	   electoral	   profile	   of	   Galician	   pre-­‐capitalist	   “Self-­‐employed	  skilled	  workers	  on	  farms”	  occupation.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  social	  class	  has	  an	   impact	   on	  electoral	  behavior	   that	   can	  be	   larger	   or	   smaller,	   in	   the	   form	  of	  class	  
voting.	   As	   commented	  above,	   the	  Alford	   Index	   enables	   us	   to	  measure	   the	   levels	   of	  class	   voting	   for	   every	   democratic	   election.	   Figure	   19	   illustrates	   the	   evolution	   of	  the	   Alford	   Index	   for	   Galician	   elections,	  while	   Figure	   20	   shows	   the	   same	   trend	   for	  the	  general	  elections	  of	  Spain.	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Ideological	   self-­‐identification	   in	   the	   left-­‐right	   axis	   has	   been	   considered	   as	   one	   of	  the	   major	   explanatory	   factors	   of	   the	   Spanish	   electoral	   behavior	   (Torcal	   and	  Medina,	  2002).	  Thus,	  we	  have	  described	   the	   subjective	  identification	  on	   the 	   le f t -­‐r ight 	   ax is 	   for	   this	   Galician	   pre-­‐capitalist	   electorate,	  while	   comparing	   it	   with	   the	  overall	   Galician	   electorate;	   figure	  22	   illustrates	   this	   difference.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   pre-­‐capitalist	   electorate	   is	   situated	   to	   the	   right	   of	   the	   general	   electorate,	   maintaining	  differences	   of	   around	   one	   point	   to	   its	   right.	   This	   evidence	   could	   lead	   to	   an	  explanation	   in	   terms	   of	   ideological	   voting	   of	   the	   right-­‐voting	   trend	   shown	   by	   pre-­‐capitalist	   electorate.	   However	   we	   need	   to	   check	   the	   other	   big	   ideological	   axis	  operating	   in	   Galician	   politics:	   the	   Galician	   nationalist	   axis.	   As	   we	   see	   in	   figure	   23,	  there	   are	   no	   noticeable	   differences	   between	   pre-­‐capitalist	   and	   general	   electorates	  regarding	  the	  Galician	  nationalism	  axis.	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Source:	  Prepared	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Centre	  for	  Sociological	  Research.	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3.2.1.3	  Discussion	  In	   this	   section	   we	   have	   defined	   a	   particular	   segment	   of	   the	   Galician	   electorate	  that	   cannot	  be	  understood	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  working-­‐class	  or	   in	  terms	  of	  service	  
class	  or	  bourgeoisie.	  We	  argued	   that	   this	   fragment	   of	   the	   electorate	   is	   properly	  a	   pre-­‐capitalist	   one,	   for	   it	   is	  made	  up	   by	  workers	   that	   are	  not	   integrated	  within	  the	  capitalist	  spheres	  of	  production	  or	  of	  capital	  circulation.	  They	  are	  outside	  any	  recognizable	  form	  of	  capitalist	  market	  economy,	  while	  still	  integrated	  within	  logics	  of	   self-­‐consumption	   or,	   using	  Meillasoux	   conceptual	   framework	   (Meillasoux,	   1972),	  still	   on	   the	   sphere	   of	   reproduction,	   not	   production.	   We	   have	   seen	   that	   this	   pre-­‐capitalist	   class	   has	   a	   strong	   presence	   in	  Galician	   social	   and	   economic	   structure,	  though	   its	   relative	   weight	   is	   progressively	   decreasing	   with	   time.	   This	   pre-­‐capitalist	   fraction	  of	   the	   electorate	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   have	   any	   kind	   of	  working-­‐class	   voting	   behavior	   under	   the	   Columbia	   approach,	   for	   its	   inclusion	   in	   our	  analysis	   involves	   an	   ever	   lower	   Alford	   Index,	   as	   measured	   in	   data	   from	   CIS’	  Galician	   post-­‐electoral	   studies.	   Finally	   we	   have	   also	   seen	   that	   this	   pre-­‐capitalist	   sector	   of	   society	   tends	   to	   identify	   itself	   as	   more	   right	  wing	   than	   the	  average	   Galician	  electorate,	  and	  as	  Galician	  nationalist	  as	  the	  overall	  electorate.	  Thus	  we	  may	  think,	  with	  the	  evidence	  presented	  hitherto,	  that	  this	  differentiated	  pre-­‐capitalist	  electorate,	   far	   from	  acting	  from	  a	  working-­‐class	  voting	  perspective,	  is	   situated	  near	   of	   the	   upper	   classes’	   voting	   behavior.	   Although	   our	   evidence	   is	  not	   conclusive,	   it	   allows	  us	   to	   open	  new	   research	  questions	   that,	   once	   resolved,	  could	   lead	   us	   to	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   pre-­‐capitalist	   electorates	   and,	  therefore,	   of	   class	   voting.	   In	   order	   to	   solve	   this	   apparent	   contradiction	  we	   can	  argue	  that	  pre-­‐capitalist	  social	  sectors,	  although	  away	  from	  the	  capitalist	  market,	  are	   landowners.	   This	   private	   property	   ownership	   works	   as	   an	   element	   of	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capitalism	   within	   their	   non-­‐capitalist	   general	   framework,	   in	   a	   way	   similar	   to	  that	   described	   by	   Wright	   when	   talking	   about	   the	   New	   Middle	   Class	   as	   a	  contradictory	   class	   position	   (Wright,	   1985).	   If	   this	   were	   to	   be	   true,	   then	   it	  follows	   that	   pre-­‐capitalist	   electoral	   behavior	  will	   turn	   closer	   to	   either	   working-­‐class	   or	   to	   upper-­‐classes	   political	   behavior	   depending	   on	   the	   context	   that	  surrounds	   each	   election14.	   This	   hypothesis,	   however,	   does	   not	  match	   the	   data,	   for	  there	   is	   a	   strong	   trend	   pointing	   to	   a	   continuity	   of	   electoral	   results	   in	   rural	  municipalities	  (vid.	  supra).	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   it	   has	   been	   correctly	   pointed	   out	   that	   pre-­‐capitalist	  social	  sectors	  do	  not	  present	  any	  logic	  of	  capital	  accumulation,	  neither	   any	  other	  class	   logic	   within	   the	   wage-­‐labor	   schema15.	   It	   is	   possible	   to	   argue	   that	   their	  voting	  behavior	  is	  not	  the	  product	  of	  a	  class	  rationale	  in	  the	  terms	  postulated	  by	  the	   Columbia	   approach.	   We	   see,	   nevertheless,	   that	   this	   pre-­‐capitalist	   class	   is	  steadily	   located	   on	   the	   right	   side	   of	   the	   ideological	   axis	   and	   that	   they	   have	  been	   largely	   supporting	   the	  political	   right.	  This	  could	  be	  explained	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  
class	  alignment	  with	  the	  political	  party	   identified	  with	  the	   local	  political-­‐economic	  
elite,	  no	  matter	  its	  ideological	  location,	  what	  would	  produce	  remarkable	  ecological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  We	   are	   adapting	   here	   the	   argument	   by	   Callinicos	   and	   Harman	   regarding	   the	   dual	  position	  of	  new	  middle	  classes	   in	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  (Callinicos	  and	  Harman,	  1987).	  This	  argument	  is	  also	  implicit	  in	  Marx’s	  writings,	  as	  he	  considered	  the	  peasantry	  as	  a	  potential	  ally	  of	  the	  proletariat.	  15	  The	  first	  hypothesis,	  focused	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  private	  ownership,	  was	  suggested	  by	  Galician	  social	  scientist,	  professor	  Xavier	  Vence,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  conference	  organized	  at	  the	   Universidade	   da	   Coruña	   in	   2010.	   The	   counterargument,	   based	   on	   the	   pre-­‐capitalist	  condition	   of	   this	   form	   of	   property,	   was	   provided	   by	   Galician	   social	   scientist,	   professor	  Xosé	  Manuel	  Beiras,	   in	   the	  course	  of	  a	  conversation	  at	  his	  own	  house	   in	  February	  2011,	  specifically	  conducted	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis.	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  both	  for	  their	  useful	  insights,	  and	  especially	  professor	  Beiras	  for	  his	  kind	  hospitality.	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variations	  on	  both	  political	  values	  and	  voting	  behavior.	  This	  hypothesis	  is	  directly	  related	   to	   well-­‐documented	   patterns	   of	   clientelism,	   largely	   described	   by	  ethnographers	  –vid.	   Jablonski	   (2009) for	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  Galician	  case;	  vid.	  Silva	   (1998) for	   an	   analysis	   of	   northwest	   Portugal–.	   This	   version	   of	   class	  voting,	   however,	   does	   not	   match	   the	   assumptions	   of	   the	   Columbia	   model,	  based	  on	  class	  alignments	  between	  the	  lower	  classes	  and	  the	  political	  left	  and	  the	  higher	  classes	  and	  the	  political	  right.	  	  The	  data	  that	  we	  have	  already	  presented	  for	  the	  spatial	  analysis	  of	  Spain	  is	  in	  line	  with	  our	  different	  class-­‐voting	  hypothesis,	  which	  postulates	  an	  alignment	  between	   the	   lower	   classes	  and	   the	  parties	   related	   to	   the	   local	   economic	  and	  political	  elites.	  Let	  us	  remember	  one	  of	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  spatial	  analysis	  that	  we	  have	  presented	  above:	  ‘Therefore,	  one	  of	  the	  conclusions	  of	  our	  work	  is	  that	  rural	  habitats	  are	  always	  the	  places	  presenting	  higher	  electoral	  support	  for	  the	  hegemonic	  political	  options	  in	  a	  given	  territory,	  as	  an	  identical	  trend	  is	  registered	  for	  the	  support	  to	  peripheral	  nationalist	  options.’	  (vid.	  supra)	  
This	   well	   may	   be	   an	   obvious	   remark	   when	   comparing,	   e.g.,	   Galician	   and	  Andalusian	   rural	  municipalities,	   as	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   these	   differences	  are	   actually	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   higher	   Galician	   rates	   of	   private	   property	  ownership	  among	   the	   lower	  classes.	  But	  even	   if	  we	  analyze	  only	   the	  Galician	  case,	  we	  find	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  deactivated	  rural	  municipalities	  strongly	  supporting	  left-­‐wing	  options16.	  This	  empirical	   fact	  forces	  us	  to	  reconsider	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  Galician	  Nationalist	  Blog	  (BNG),	  which	  has	  an	  aggregated	  mean	  of	  2.87	  points	  on	  the	  left/right	  axis	  (vid.	  supra,	  figure	  3,	  p.	  75)	  governs	  the	  following	  deactivated	  rural	  councils:	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traditional	  assumptions	  of	  class	  voting.	  We	  will	  develop	   this	  argument	   in	   the	  following	   chapter,	   in	  which	  we	  will	   present	   a	  model	   of	   class	   voting	  which	   is	  different	  from	  the	  traditional	  Columbia	  approach.	  
Figure	  24.	  Galician	  municipalities	  classified	  by	  habitat	  
Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  (vid.	  Tables	  VA	  and	  VIA	  of	  the	  Annexes).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Pobra	   do	   Brollón,	   in	   the	   province	   of	   Lugo;	   Castrelo	   de	   Miño	   and	   A	   Mezquita,	   in	   the	  province	  of	  Ourense;	  San	  Sadurniño	  and	  Santiso,	  both	  in	  the	  province	  of	  A	  Coruña.	  The	   Party	   of	   the	   Galician	   Socialists	   (PSdeG),	   with	   an	   aggregated	   mean	   of	   4.19	   on	   the	  left/right	  axis,	  holds	  the	  office	  of	  the	  following	  deactivated	  rural	  councils:	  Camariñas,	   in	   the	   province	   of	  A	   Coruña.	   Silleda	   and	  Fornelos	   de	  Montes,	   in	   Pontevedra.	  Entrimo,	   Calvos	   de	   Randín,	   Castrelo	   do	   Val,	   Cortegada,	   Carballeda	   de	   Avia,	   Maside,	  Amoeiro,	   Parada	  de	   Sil,	   Castro	  Caldelas	   and	  Petín,	   in	  Ourense.	  Ribas	  de	   Sil,	   Pedrafita	  do	  Cebreiro,	   Samos,	   Becerreá,	   Cervantes,	   Navia	   de	   Suarna,	   Negueira	   de	   Muñiz	   and	  Castroverde,	  in	  Lugo.	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3.2.2 Some	  methodological	  comments	  on	  the	  measurement	  of	  the	  
nationalist	  cleavage	  in	  Spain	  This	  section	  tries	   to	   improve	  our	  understanding	  of	   the	  relation	  between	  national	  identity	  and	  electoral	  behavior.	  The	  study	  of	  this	  relationship	  has	  a	  long	  record	  in	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  social	  sciences,	   for	  it	  has	  been	  systematically	  analyzed	  since	  the	  early	  1970s	  –vid.,	  e.g.,	  Eisenstadt	  and	  Rokkan	  (1973)–	  only	  a	  decade	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  last	  one	  of	  the	  three	  major	  works	  that	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  modern	  scientific	   analysis	   of	   electoral	   behavior17 .	   The	   relationship	   between	   national	  identity	  and	  electoral	  behavior	  has	  been	  also	  put	  under	  the	  lens	  of	  cleavage	  theory.	  In	   his	   foundational	   work,	   Seymour	   Martin	   Lipset	   and	   Stein	   Rokkan	   considered	  nationalism	  as	  one	  of	  the	  four	  critical	  lines	  of	  cleavage	  making	  up	  a	  given	  society’s	  political/voting	   structure,	   referring	   to	   it	   as:	   “the	   conflict	   between	   the	   central	  
nation-­‐building	   culture	   and	   the	   increasing	   resistance	   of	   the	   ethnically,	  linguistically,	   or	   religiously	   distinct	   subject	   populations	   in	   the	   provinces	   and	   the	  peripheries”	  (Lipset	  and	  Rokkan,	  1967:	  14).	  	  
But	  the	  link	  between	  these	  two	  broad	  variables	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  straightforward	  one,	  as	  previous	  research	  has	  shown	  –see,	  e.g.,	  Bond	  (2000)–	  and,	  we	  will	  argue,	  its	  complexities	  have	  not	   yet	  been	  utterly	   revealed.	   In	  order	   to	   achieve	   this	   aim	  we	  are	   going	   to	   use	   primarily	   data	   from	   Spain,	   although	   a	   comparative	   perspective	  will	   be	   also	   sustained.	   We	   consider	   that	   drawing	   upon	   data	   from	   Spain	   will	  enhance	  our	  analysis	  due	  to	  two	  reasons	  and,	  probably	  a	  third.	  The	  first	  reason	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  We	  refer	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  influential	  book	  The	  American	  Voter	  (Campbell	  et	  al.,	  1960),	  which	   inaugurated	  the	  so	  called	  Michigan	  School,	   thus	  completing	  the	  triad	  of	   the	  modern	   traditions	   on	   the	   study	   of	   electoral	   behavior,	   being	   the	   other	   two	   the	  Columbia	  
School	  and	  the	  Rochester	  School.	  All	  these	  three	  traditions	  have	  been	  previously	  described	  in	  sufficient	  depth.	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that	  the	  Spanish	  case	  offers	  us	  an	  especially	  adequate	  framework	  for	  comparison	  among	   regions,	   as	   the	   Centro	   de	   Investigaciones	   Sociológicas (CIS)18 	  has	   been	  producing	  empirical	  data	  since	  its	  founding	  in	  1963,	  enabling	  comparative	  analysis	  throughout	   methodologically	   homogeneous	   quantitative	   data	   sets.	   The	   second	  reason	   is	   that	   Spain	   offers	   a	   diverse	  political	   scenario,	   containing	   an	   established	  nation-­‐state	  as	  well	   as	  different	  alternative	  nationalities	  and	   regions19.	  The	   third	  reason	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  paradox,	  for	  the	  work	  on	  our	  research	  question	  has	  been	  unevenly	  developed	  during	   the	   last	   forty	   years.	  Thus,	  we	   find	  many	  examples	  of	  academic	   research	   occupied	   with	   the	   study	   of	   sub-­‐State	   nationalisms	   in	   Spain,	  whereas	   it	   was	   not	   until	   recent	   times	   when	   we	   have	   seen	   the	   emergence	   of	  systematic	   social	   scientific	   accounts	   of	   Spanish	   nationalism	   as	   a	   self-­‐contained	  ideology,	   both	   from	   mainly	   empirical	   standpoints	   –vid.,	   e.g.,	   Muñoz	   Mendoza	  (2012)–,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  a	  more	  theoretical	  perspective	  –vid.,	  e.g.,	  Taibo (2007)–.	  As	  Muñoz	  puts	   it:	   “(…)	  while	   the	   emergence,	   development,	   reproduction,	   discourse,	  social	   bases,	   repertoires	   of	   action	   and	   implications	   of	   alternative	   nationalisms	  have	  been	  thoroughly	  analyzed,	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  game	  –Spanish	  nationalism–	  has	  been,	  for	  long,	  largely	  neglected	  by	  the	  empirical	  literature,	  or	  simply	  treated	  as	  a	  residual	  category”	  (Muñoz	  Mendoza,	  2008:	  xi).	  This	  trend	  is	  also	  commented	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	   Spanish	   Centre	   for	   Sociological	   Research.	   Founded	   in	   1963	   as	   the	  Instituto	   de	   la	  
Opinión	   Pública	   (Public	   Opinion	   Institute),	   it	   changed	   its	   name	   and	   structure	   in	   1977.	  Today	  it	  is	  run	  under	  the	  Ministry	  for	  the	  Presidency	  and,	  to	  date,	  it	  has	  developed	  more	  than	  2,000	  surveys	  and	  some	  qualitative	  studies.	  	  19	  This	   assertion	   is	   endorsed	   by	   the	   second	   article	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Constitution	   of	   1978:	  “The	   Constitution	   is	   based	   on	   the	   indissoluble	   unity	   of	   the	   Spanish	   nation,	   the	   common	  and	   indivisible	   homeland	   of	   all	   Spaniards,	   and	   recognizes	   and	   guarantees	   the	   right	   to	  autonomy	  of	  the	  nationalities	  and	  regions	  which	  make	  it	  up	  and	  the	  solidarity	  among	  all	  of	  them”	  (Spain,	  1978:	  28315).	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in	   Taibo	   (2007,	   p.	   9):	   “If	   someone,	   otherwise,	   miss	   in	   these	   pages	   a	   critical	  consideration	  of	  the	  discourses	  uttered	  by	  those	  nationalisms	  of	  the	  periphery,	   it	  will	   be	   good	   to	   remember	   that	   the	   object	   of	   this	   book	   is,	   rather,	   Spanish	  nationalism	  and	   that,	  while	   there	   are	  not	   too	  many	   considerations	  over	   this	   one	  among	  us,	  they	  are	  common,	  however,	  those	  interested	  in	  the	  former”.	  We	  have	  to	  acknowledge,	   in	   this	   regard,	   the	   impact	  of	   the	   influential	  work	  by	  Michael	  Billig,	  
Banal	  Nationalism	  (1995),	  for	  the	  development	  of	  these	  new	  lines	  of	  research.	  
Our	   work	   will	   be	   also	   very	   much	   grounded	   upon	   Billig’s	   theory	   of	   nationalism,	  which	  understands	  it	  mainly	  as	  a	  widespread	  ideology,	  opposing	  those	  views	  that	  see	   it	   as	   a	   psychological	   attribute	   of	   minority	   groups:	   “(…)	   The	  modern	   person	  considers	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  national	  identity	  to	  be	  as	  natural	  as	  having	  an	  arm	  or	  leg.	  However,	  this	  naturalness	  is	  itself	  something	  to	  be	  investigated,	  for	  it	  indicates	  the	  ideological	  nature	  of	  nationalism	  as	  an	  everyday	  phenomenon.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  functions	  of	   ideology	   that	  historical	  and	  socially	  contingent	   features	  of	   the	  social	  world	   are	   experienced	   as	   ‘natural’	   (…)”	   (Billig,	   1993:	   40).	   Thus,	   considering	  nationalism	  as	   an	   ideology	   entails	   that	   it	   should	  has	   active	   connections	  with	   the	  political	   realm	   and,	   so,	  we	   find	  many	   examples	   of	   scientific	   literature	   examining	  these	  connections	  between	  nationalism	  and	  political	  attitudes,	  relating	  topics	  such	  as	  immigration	  (Díez Medrano and Koenig, 2005),	  gender	  ideologies	  (Racioppi	  and	  O'Sullivan,	   2000),	   language	   ideologies	   (Heller,	   2011),	   etc.	   	   As	   any	   ideology,	  nationalism	   is	   constructed	   through	   the	   individual’s	   primary	   and	   secondary	  socialization	   (Dekker,	   Malova	   and	   Hoogendoorn,	   2003),	   establishing	   a	   set	   of	  political	   and	   pre-­‐political	   values	  which,	   eventually,	   will	   affect	   electoral	   behavior	  (Feldman,	  2003).	  However,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  connection	  takes	  place	  remains	  a	  black	   box	   in	   many	   aspects,	   although	   substantial	   advances	   in	   research	   have	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provided	  us	  some	  explanations	  of	  its	  mechanisms.	  In	  its	  early	  stages,	  research	  on	  the	   relationship	   between	   national	   identity	   and	   electoral	   behavior	   established	  outright	  patterns,	  such	  as	  those	  derived	  from	  Gellner’s	  well-­‐known	  standpoint	  on	  nationalism,	   seeing	   it	   as	   “primarily	   a	   political	   principle,	   which	   holds	   that	   the	  political	  and	  the	  national	  unit	  should	  be	  congruent”	  (Gellner,	  1983:	  1);	  there	  was	  a	  close	   link	  between	  national	   identity	  and	  electoral	  behavior	   implicit	   to	   this	  vision	  by	  which	  every	  nationalist	  living	  in	  a	  stateless	  nation	  should	  vote	  for	  secessionist	  political	  parties.	  However,	  empirical	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  is	  by	  no	  means	  what	   is	   happening	   and	   that,	   consequently,	   we	   should	   adopt	   more	   flexible	  conceptions	  of	  nationalism	  (Bond,	  2000:	  33).	  
3.2.2.1	  Preliminary	  considerations	  	  There	  are	  probably	  few	  social	  phenomena	  as	  reluctant	  to	  be	  fixed	  within	  the	  scope	  of	   the	   rigorousness	   provided	   by	   social	   scientific	   thought	   as	   national	   identity.	   Its	  confinement	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  doxa,	  in	  its	  twofold	  Platonian	  significance	  of	  pistis	  and	   eikasia	   (Plato,	   2012[4th	   c.	   BC]),	   is	   perhaps	   better	   understood	   when	   we	  compare	   its	   scientific	  development	  during	   the	   last	  one	  hundred	  years	  of	  modern	  social	  science	  with	  another	  old,	  politically	  loaded,	  concept	  like	  social	  class.	  Thus,	  if	  we	   take	   a	   look	   at	   two	   of	   the	  most	  widely	   respected	   recent	   compilations	   on	   the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   regarding	   social	   class	   and	   national	   identity,	   Wright	   (2005)	   and	  Özkirimli	  (2010),	  respectively,	  we	  can	  easily	  see	  that	  both	  from	  a	  theoretical	  and	  from	  a	  methodological	  point	  of	  view,	  social	  class	  has	  received	  a	  stricter	  treatment	  than	   national	   identity	   did.	   This	   relative	   underdevelopment	   on	   the	   scientific	  treatment	   of	   national	   identity,	   largely	   commented	   by	   several	   authors	   (vid.,	   e.g.,	  Rigger,	   2000;	   McCrone,	   1998a;	   Billig,	   1995:	   51-­‐55;	   Smith,	   1983),	   cannot	   be	  attributed	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  time,	  interest	  or	  relevance	  of	  the	  social	  issues	  underpinned	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by	   national	   identity.	   To	   justify	   these	   arguments,	   we	   could	   remember	   Ernest	  Renan’s	  famous	  conference	  Qu’est-­‐ce	  qu’une	  nation?	  given	  at	  the	  Sorbonne	  in	  1882	  (Renan,	   1997[1882]).	   The	   immense	   amount	   of	   texts	   dedicated	   to	   the	   ‘national	  question’	  came	  from	  both	  the	  Marxist	  and	  the	  Liberal	  traditions	  –see	  Haupt,	  et	  al.	  (1974)	   for	  a	  summary	  of	   the	   former,	  and	  Haugaard	  (2006)	   for	  a	  summary	  of	   the	  latter–.	   It	   attracted	   the	   interest	   of	   some	  of	   the	  most	   brilliant	   scholars	   of	   the	   last	  decades,	  like	  Ernest	  Gellner	  (1983),	  Eric	  Hobsbawm	  (1991)	  or	  Benedict	  Anderson	  (1991).	  Moreover	   it	   has	   an	   undeniable	   social	   interest,	   as	   it	   played	   an	   important	  role	   on	  many	   of	   the	  most	   destructive	   conflicts	   that	   humanity	   has	   suffered	   in	   its	  long	  history	  (Hall	  and	  Malešević,	  2013).	  It	  is	  perhaps	  in	  this	  exceptional	  relevance	  –as	  Billig	   (1995:	  22-­‐3)	  pointed	  out–	   that	  we	  are	   to	   find	   the	   reason	  why	  national	  identity	   was	   so	   impervious	   to	   the	   scientific	   realm	   of	   Platonian	   episteme.	  Nevertheless,	   this	   relative	   methodological	   underdevelopment	   must	   be	   qualified;	  there	  have	  been	   some	   relevant	   technical	   achievements	   that	   enabled	  us	   to	   better	  analyze	   the	   questions	   aroused	   by	   national	   identity.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   so-­‐called	  Moreno	  Question	  (MQ)	  (Moreno,	  1986)20	  is	  undeniably	  one	  of	  them,	  as	  it	  provides	  a	   robust	   methodological	   tool	   for	   the	   measurement	   and	   comparison	   of	   people’s	  national	   identity	   feelings.	  This	  article	  aims	   to	  draw	  upon	  the	  path	  opened	  by	   the	  MQ,	  in	  order	  to	  further	  strengthen	  the	  methodological	  tools	  at	  our	  disposal,	  which	  are,	   as	   Goldthorpe	   (2000)	   insistently	   states,	   at	   the	   core	   of	   any	   scientific	  advancement.	   This	   task	   seems	   particularly	   urgent	   today,	   when	   national	   identity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  It	   has	   been	   explained	   (Moreno,	   2006:	   3)	   that	   was	   actually	   Juan	   Linz	   who	   firstly	  introduced	   this	  question,	  applying	   it	   to	   the	  Spanish	  case	   (Linz,	  1973).	  This	  methodology	  was	   also	   applied	   thereafter	   by	   Gunther	   et	  al.	   (1986:	   317).	   Finally,	  Moreno	   applied	   it	   to	  Scotland	  (1986;	  1988).	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has	  become	  a	  source	  of	  issues	  defining	  the	  impact	  area	  of	  political	  communication	  (Bouza,	  2004)	  not	  only	  in	  Europe	  (Friend,	  2012),	  but	  worldwide	  (Ichijo,	  2013).	  
3.2.2.2	  Objectives	  In	   his	   classic	   work	   on	   the	   general	   sociology	   of	   Scotland,	   David	   McCrone	   has	  commented	   on	   the	   difficulties	   that	   scholarship	   has	   traditionally	   had	   in	   order	   to	  define	  what	   a	   nation	   is,	   stating	   that	   “(…)	   there	   seems	   little	   value	   in	   pursuing	   an	  ‘objective’	   set	  of	   criteria,	  and	  measuring	  Scotland	  against	   them”	   (McCrone,	  1992:	  198).	  He	   instead	  has	   stressed	   the	   importance	  played	  by	  consciousness	   on	  nation-­‐building	   processes,	   even	   claiming	   that	   “in	   many	   respects,	   the	   ‘nation’	   is	   an	  aspiration	  rather	  than	  a	  historical	  fact”	  (McCrone,	  1992:	  198).	  Drawing	  upon	  this	  social-­‐constructionist	   vision	   of	   nation-­‐building	   processes	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	  nationalism	  should	  be	  better	  understood	  as	  an	  ideological	  continuum	  rather	  than	  a	  five	  set	  categorical	  system,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  offered	  by	  the	  MQ.	  This	  constructionist	  view	  is	  of	  course	  the	  general	  background	  and	  starting	  point	  of	  every	  qualititative	  approach	  to	  national	  identity,	  neatly	  highlighted	  in	  Wodak’s	  et	  al.	  classical	  study	  of	  Austrian	   national	   identity:	   “We	   understand	   the	   concept	   of	   identity	   on	  which	  we	  base	  our	  study	  to	  be	  context-­‐dependent	  and	  dynamic”	  (Wodak,	  et	  al.,	  2009	  [1999],	  p.	   3).	   It	   has	   been	   pointed	   out	   that	   there	   is	   usually	   a	   dual	   identity	   underlying	  people’s	   national	   identification	   (Moreno	   and	   Arriba,	   1996),	   but	   this	   fact,	   in	   our	  opinion,	   does	   not	   neglect	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   identitarian	   continuum	   in	   those	   areas	  characterised	  by	  its	  subjection	  to	  two	  or	  more	  national	  projects	  claiming	  the	  same	  territory;	   on	   the	   contrary,	   it	   pressuposes	   the	   introduction	   of	   two	   or	   more	  identitarian	  continua,	  depending	  on	  the	  number	  of	  national	  projects	  at	  stake	   in	  a	  given	  territory.	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It	  is	  widely	  agreed,	  then,	  in	  social	  scientific	  literature,	  that	  nations	  are	  constructed	  through	   nation-­‐building	   processes,	   imagined	   in	   the	   well-­‐known	   expression	   by	  Benedict	  Anderson	  (1991).	  A	  definition	  that	  explains	  this	  point	  with	  greater	  detail,	  is	  the	  one	  given	  by	  Manuel	  Castells,	  who	  see	  nations	  as	  “cultural	  communities	  built	  up	   in	   people’s	   minds	   and	   collective	   memory	   by	   the	   fact	   of	   sharing	   history	   and	  political	   projects”	   (Castells, 2003: 82).	   This	   constructivist	   approach,	   however,	   is	  sometimes	   taken	   too	   far,	  as	   in	  Ernest	  Gellner’s	  assertion:	   “Nationalism	   is	  not	   the	  awakening	  of	  nations	   to	  self-­‐consciousness:	   it	   invents	  nations	  where	   they	  do	  not	  exist”	   (Gellner, 1964: 169).	   To	   consider	   nations	   as	   mere	   “inventions”	   has	   been	  thoroughly	  critized,	  and	  so	  Anderson	  states	  that	  “Gellner	  is	  so	  anxious	  to	  show	  that	  nationalism	  masquerades	  under	   false	  pretences	   that	  he	  assimilates	   ‘invention’	   to	  ‘fabrication’	  and	  ‘falsity’,	  rather	  than	  to	  ‘imagining’	  and	  ‘creation’”,	  concluding	  that	  “In	  fact,	  all	  communities	  larger	  than	  primordial	  villages	  of	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  contact	  (and	  perhaps	  even	  these)	  are	  imagined.	  Communities	  are	  to	  be	  distinguised,	  not	  by	  their	  falsity/genuineness,	  but	  by	  the	  style	  in	  which	  they	  are	  imagined”	  (Anderson,	  1991:	  6).	  A	  similar	  reasoning	  is	  pointed	  out	  by	  David	  McCrone	  when	  he	  states	  that	  “the	  nation	  is	  imagined	  rather	  than	  imaginary”	  (McCrone,	  2001a:	  49).	  	  
It	   has	   been	   said	   (Wimmer,	   2008:	   971)	   that	   it	   was	   social	   anthropologist	   Fredrik	  Barth	   the	   first	   scholar	   who	   broke	   with	   Johann	   Gottfried	   Herder’s	   essentialist	  perspective	  according	  to	  which	  nations	  are	  a	  natural	  expression	  of	  a	  deeper	  force,	  the	  volksgeist,	   often	   equated	  by	  Herder	   to	   language,	   as	   part	   of	   a	   general	   schema	  that	   postulates	   an	   identification	   between	   nature	   and	   human	   history,	   being	   both	  concepts	   subjected	   to	   similar	   general	   laws	   (Herder,	   2013	   [1744-­‐1803]).	   In	   his	  classical	  ethnographic	  comparative	  study,	  Barth	  states	  that	  “The	  cultural	  contents	  of	  ethnic	  dichotomies	  would	  seem	  analytically	  to	  be	  of	  two	  orders:	  (i)	  overt	  signals	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or	  signs	  –the	  diacritical	  features	  that	  people	  look	  for	  and	  exhibit	  to	  show	  identity,	  often	  such	  features	  as	  dress,	  language,	  house-­‐form,	  or	  general	  style	  of	  life,	  and	  (ii)	  basic	   value	   orientations:	   the	   standards	   of	   morality	   and	   excellence	   by	   which	  performance	   is	   judged”	   (Barth,	   1969:	   14).	   Thus,	   Barth	   reversed	   the	   logic	  underlying	  Herder’s	  assumptions,	  as	  cultural	  expressions,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  language	  or	  even	  manners,	  are	  used	  by	  groups	  in	  order	  to	  build	  up	  their	  own	  identities,	  and	  not	   the	   other	   way	   round.	   This	   theoretical	   standpoint	   has	   become	   commonly	  assumed	   in	   the	   vast	   field	   of	   nationalism	   studies	   which,	   although	   traditionally	  characterised	  by	  little	  communication	  in	  both	  discliplinary21	  and	  national22	  terms,	  it	  is	  starting	  to	  show	  now	  signs	  of	  integration	  (Brubaker,	  2009:	  21-­‐27).	  One	  of	  the	  few	   analytical	   approaches	  which	   has	   been	   traditionally	   widely	   accepted23	  in	   the	  field	   is	   Miroslav	   Hroch’s	   schema	   for	   explaining	   stateless	   nations’	   national	  awakening	   (Maxwell,	   2010:	   865);	   again,	   Hroch	   emphathizes	   the	   relevance	   of	  nations	  as	  constructed	  categories:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  “There	  was	  relatively	  little	  cross-­‐fertilization	  between	  work	  in	  sociology,	  anthropology,	  political	   science,	   and	   history,	   and	   still	   less	   between	   these	   and	   other	   disciplines	   such	   as	  archaeology,	   linguistics,	   economics,	   and	   disciplines	   in	   the	   humanities”	   (Brubaker,	   2009:	  22).	  22	  Loïc	   Wacquant	   put	   it	   this	   way:	   “The	   Summer	   1996	   issue	   of	   Dissent	   on	   “Embattled	  Minorities	   Around	   the	   Globe:	   Rights,	   Hopes,	   Threats”	   offers	   a	   good	   illustration	   of	   this	  imperialistic	   imposition	   operating	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   crossnational	   argumentation.	   It	  projects	  onto	  the	  whole	  humanity	  U.S.	  liberal	  common	  sense	  (and	  U.S.	  liberal	  guilt	  or	  good	  conscience)	  along	  with	  the	  category	  of	  “minority,”	  (sic.)	  which	  presupposes	  precisely	  what	  is	   being	   contested	   in	   social	   reality:	   that	   “culturally”	   or	   “ethnically”	   defined	   subgroups	  within	  a	  given	  nation-­‐state	  are	  or	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  some	  measure	  of	  civic	  and	  political	  recognition”	  (Wacquant, 1997: 232).	  23	  Michael	   Billig	   has	   developed	   a	   critique	   of	   Hroch’s	   schema	   (Billig,	   1995,	   p.	   43),	   but	   it	  relates	   only	   to	   the	   idea,	   implicit	   in	   Hroch’s	   model,	   that	   nationalism	   finishes	   with	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  nation-­‐state.	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“(…)	  The	   ‘nation’	   is	   not,	   of	   course,	   an	   eternal	   category,	   but	  was	   the	  product	   of	   a	  long	   and	   complicated	   process	   of	   historical	   development	   in	   Europe.	   For	   our	  purposes,	  let	  us	  define	  it	  at	  the	  outset	  as	  a	  large	  social	  group	  integrated	  not	  by	  one	  but	   by	   a	   combination	   of	   several	   kinds	   of	   objective	   relationships	   (economic,	  political,	  linguistic,	  cultural,	  religious,	  geographical,	  historical),	  and	  their	  subjective	  reflection	  in	  collective	  consciousness”	  (Hroch,	  1993:	  4).	  
This	   ‘collective	   consciousness’	   referred	   by	   Hroch	   can	   be	   active	   or	   latent,	   as	   it	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  process	  that	  “(…)	  could	  be	  interrupted,	  just	  as	  it	  could	  also	  be	  resumed	  after	  a	  long	  hiatus”	  (Hroch,	  1993,	  p.	  5).	  This	  process	  of	  (re)construction	  has	  been	  studied	  by	  many	  authors;	  Eric	  Hobsbawm	  has	  highlighted	  the	  role	  played	  by	   national	   traditions,	   frequently	   the	   outcome	   of	   elite-­‐led	   strategies,	   in	   order	   to	  activate	  nation-­‐building	  process	  (Hobsbawm	  and	  Ranger,	  1983),	  while	  others	  has	  been	   focused	   on	   the	   everyday	   nature	   of	   these	   national	   construction	   processes.	  Among	  the	  latter,	  Michael	  Billig’s	  theorization	  of	  nationalist	  (re)production	  (Billig,	  1995)	  has	  played	   a	   very	   important	   role,	   giving	  way	   to	  what	   became	  a	   sustained	  theoretical	  standpoint	  –vid.	  e.g.,	  Cram	  (2001)	  and	  Penrose	  (2011)–.	  Billig	  resorts	  to	  Anderson’s	   conception	  of	   imagined	  communities	   in	  order	   to	  define	   the	  nation	  as	  “imagined	   as	   a	   unique	   entity	   in	   terms	   of	   time	   and	   of	   space”	   (Billig	   1995,	   p.70),	  hence,	   the	   uniqueness	   in	   terms	   of	   time	   would	   be	   embodied	   in	   the	   national	  histories,	  while	  the	  uniqueness	  in	  terms	  of	  space,	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  national	  “homeland”	   (Billig	   1995,	   pp.	   74-­‐78).	   Nevertheless,	   from	   Billig’s	   point	   of	   view,	   a	  nation	  has	  to	  be	  imagined	  during	  its	  formation,	  but	  this	  imagination	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  employed	  continuously	  for	  its	  reproduction,	  which	  will	  be	  rather	  developed	  on	   a	   daily	   basis	   through	   processes	   of	   inhabitation,	   constituting	   Billig’s	   banal	  nationalism	  which,	  in	  his	  own	  words	  “is	  introduced	  to	  cover	  the	  ideological	  habits	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which	  enable	   the	  established	  nations	  of	   the	  West	   to	  be	  reproduced”	  (Billig	  1995,	  p.6).	   These	   processes	   of	   reproduction	   occur	   between	   the	   moments	   of	   special	  patriotic	  meaning,	  or	   flag-­‐waving	  situations,	   like	  “St.	  Andrews	  Day”	  or	   the	  “Burns	  Night”	   in	   Scotland	   or	   the	   “Day	   of	   the	   Country”	   or	   the	   “Day	   of	  Martyr	  Galicia”,	   in	  Galicia	  (McCrone	  and	  McPherson,	  2009).	  
Billig’s	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  habitus	  (Billig	  1995:	  42).	  Bourdieu	  developed	   his	   concept	   of	   habitus	   as	   part	   of	   his	   general	   theory	   of	   genetic	  structuralism	   or	   “constructivist	   structuralism”	   (Bourdieu,	   1989:	   14)	   created	   in	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  big	  debate	  between	  structure	  and	  agency,	  by	  giving	  back	  to	  agents	  the	  power	  to	  control	  their	  lives,	  power	  that,	  from	  Bourdieu’s	  point	  of	  view,	  had	  been	  banished	  in	  the	  works	  of	  structuralists	  such	  as	  Althusser	  (1965)	  or	  Lévi-­‐Strauss	   (1958).	   Bourdieu,	   consequently,	   defined	   habitus	   as	   a	   socially	   generated	  system	   of	   predispositions	   to	   guide	   “thoughts,	   perceptions,	   expressions	   and	  actions”	  (Bourdieu,	  1990	  [1980]:	  55).	  The	  habitus	  is	  constituted	  as	  an	  expression	  of	   an	   individual’s	   position	   within	   social	   structure	   or,	   using	   class	   analysis	  terminology,	   it	   is	   an	   expression	  of	   people’s	   class	   location	   (Weininger,	   2005:	  86),	  although	   it	   is	  not	  exactly	   the	  same	   for	  everybody	  within	  a	  particular	  social	  class,	  for	  it	  constitutes	  only	  a	  pre-­‐reflexive	  guide,	  not	  an	  absolute	  determinant	  of	  action	  (Bourdieu	   and	   Wacquant,	   1992:	   136).	   Therefore,	   for	   Billig,	   who	   understands	  nationalism	   as	   an	   ideology,	   there	   must	   be	   some	   social	   mechanisms,	   related	   to	  people’s	  social	  position	  –being	  national	  of	  a	  given	  nation-­‐state-­‐	  which	  are	  capable	  of	  constituting	  a	  general	  guidance	  of	  predispositions	  enabling	  identification	  with	  a	  given	   national	   community	   and	   which	   are	   constantly,	   unconsciously,	   expressed.	  Examples	   of	   these	   “national	   habitus”	   can	   be	   found	   in	   sports,	   when	   people	   gets	  excited	  with	   the	   triumphs	   of	   their	   national	   teams	   or	   sad	   in	   defeat,	   as	  well	   as	   in	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everyday	   life;	   a	   man	   or	   a	   woman,	   travelling	   abroad,	   will	   probably	   feel	   some	  emotional	   response	   when	   exposed	   to	   identity	   triggers,	   such	   as	   watching	   their	  national	  food	  in	  a	  menu	  of	  a	  restaurant	  or	  hearing	  people	  speaking	  their	  national	  language	  in	  the	  streets	  of	  a	  foreign	  city.	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  many	  examples	  of	  nation-­‐building	   processes	   boosted	   in	   distant	   diasporas	   –vid.	  Núñez	   Seixas	   (2001)	   for	   a	  study	   of	   Galician	   emigrants	   in	   Argentina,	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   Galician	   emigration	  destinations–	  illustrating	  these	  processes.	  
So	  the	  scope	  of	  study	  of	  banal	  nationalism	  pays	  attention	  to	  the	  (re)construction	  of	  nationalism	   within	   established	   nations,	   making	   a	   difference	   with	   those	   theories	  that	   understands	   nationalism	   as	   the	   condition	   of	   “others”	   –vid.,	   e.g.,	   Janowitz	  (1983)	   and	   Snyder	   (1976)–	   or	   even	   with	   those	   works	   based	   on	   the	   study	   of	  nationalism	  in	  moments	  of	  national	  pride,	  such	  as	  international	  sports	  competition	  –vid.,	  e.g.,	  van	  Hilvoorde,	  Elling	  and	  Stokvis	  (2010),	  and	  Abell	  et	  al.	  (2007)–	  leaving	  aside	   the	   question	   of	   how	  national	   identity	   is	  maintained	   between	   those	   special	  moments.	   In	   this	   sense,	   Billig	   explains	   that	   nations	   are	   inhabited	   through	  processes	  of	  routine	  formation,	  or	  inhabitation;	  these	  processes	  make	  reference	  to	  those	   elements	   which	   daily,	   almost	   continuously,	   are	   affecting	   people	   in	   an	  unconscious	  way,	   such	   as	   flags	   in	   public	   buildings,	   drawings	   in	   notes	   and	   coins	  alluding	   to	   glorious	  national	   history/persons/events,	   journalists’	  deixis	   by	  which	  the	  nation	  becomes	   the	  universe	  of	   information,	   unless	   the	   contrary	   is	   informed	  etc.	  Deixis	  is	  a	  concept	  in	  linguistics	  that	  makes	  reference	  to	  the	  contextual	  nature	  of	  language.	  According	  to	  Rauh,	  “(…)	  deictic	  expressions	  are	  those	  expressions	  of	  a	  language	  which	  in	  some	  way	  (…)	  are	  dependent	  upon	  or	  related	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  encoder	  (…)	  The	  term	  used	  here	  (derived	   from	  gr.	  deiktikos	   “apt	   for	  pointing	  with	   the	   finger”)	   also	   hints	   at	   this	   respect,	   namely	   at	   the	   function	   of	   deictic	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expressions	  to	  point	  at	  their	  referents”	  (Rauh,	  1983:	  10).	  Thus,	  by	  deixis	  we	  refer	  to	  those	   elements	   in	   language	   that	   need,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   fully	   understood,	   of	   extra-­‐linguistic	   indicators.	  Michael	  Billig	  widened	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  term	  to	  explain	  how	  national	  identity	  is	  reconstructed	  through	  language	  by	  authorized	  speakers24,	  who	  assume	   their	   particular	   nation	   as	   the	   background	   of	   the	   information	   and,	   thus,	  (re)produce	  it	  (when,	  for	  instance,	  a	  TV	  news	  presenter	  says	  that	  “the	  government	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  working	  on	  this	  problem”,	  assuming	  which	  nation	  is	  that).	  
Let	  us	  get	  back	  now	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  MQ.	  We	  can	  affirm	  that,	  by	  using	  the	  MQ	  to	  measure	  national	  identity	  we	  are	  losing	  detail.	  It	  will	  be	  impossible,	  for	  instance,	  to	   register	   those	   differences	   among	   individuals	   regarding	   the	   process	   of	  embodying	  –in	  their	  discourse	  and	  ideology-­‐	  a	  given	  national	  identity.	  The	  MQ	  is	  a	  relatively	   simple	   categorization	   of	   what	   in	   essence	   is	   a	   qualitatively	   rich	  phenomenon.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	   the	  MQ	   offers	   the	  possibility	   of	   obtaining	   quantitative	   measures	   of	   national	   identity,	   with	   higher	  detail	   than	   a	   dichotomous	   question,	   as	   Bond	   points	   out:	   “(…)	   Although	   it	  undoubtedly	   has	   its	   limitations	   –vid.	   McCrone	   (1998:	   7);	   Brown,	   McCrone	   and	  Paterson	  (1998:	  209)–	  it	  also	  has	  the	  virtues	  of	  consistency	  and	  continuity”	  (Bond,	  2000:	  16).	  
3.2.2.3	  Analytical	  implications	  and	  hypothesis	  We	   have	   seen,	   so	   far,	   that	   there	   is	   a	   substantial	   degree	   of	   agreement	   among	  scholars	  in	  dealing	  with	  nations	  not	  as	  static	  objective	  realities	  but,	  rather	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Authorized	  speakers	  are	  those	  speakers	  who	  “have	  such	  an	  authority	  that	  can	  speak	  to	  say	   nothing.	   Their	   discourse	   is	   effective:	   it	   is	   believed,	   obeyed,	   respected”	   (De	   Lemos,	  1993:	  85).	  They	  are	  the	  bearers	  of	  a	  symbolic	  skeptron,	  the	  stick	  held	  by	  public	  speakers	  in	  ancient	   Greece,	   in	   an	   example	   by	   Bourdieu	   (Bourdieu,	   1982:	   124).	   This	   figure	   is	   often	  identified	  in	  modern	  societies	  with	  newscasters.	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contrary,	  as	  on-­‐going	  intersubjective	  processes.	  Nations	  are	  therefore	  constructed	  at	  some	  point	  and,	  once	  they	  become	  accepted	  as	  useful	  realities	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  their	   population,	   they	   need	   to	   be	   constantly	   reconstructed,	   through	   discourse	  (Wodak	  et	  al.,	  2009	  [1999]),	  cultural	  practices	  (McCrone,	  Morris	  and	  Kiely,	  1995),	  the	  media	   (Eder	   et	   al.,	   2002),	   branding	   image25	  (Dinnie,	   2008),	   and	  many	   other	  everyday	   mechanisms	   (Billig,	   1995,	   pp.	   93-­‐127).	   So	   nations	   are	   modern	   social	  constructions	   built	   around	   some	   particular	   diacritics	   (Barth,	   1969)	   which	  preexisted	  to	  them,	  and	  which	  are	  articulated	  around	  an	  on-­‐going	  national	  project	  (Armstrong,	  1982).	  It	  is	  well-­‐known	  that	  language	  plays	  a	  strong	  central	  role	  as	  a	  diacritic	  for	  sub-­‐state	  national	  projects	  in	  Spain	  –see	  Shabad	  &	  Gunther	  (1982)	  for	  the	   Catalan	   and	   Basque	   cases	   and	   Beswick	   (2007)	   or	   Beramendi	   (2007),	   for	  analysis	  on	  Galicia–	  but	  there	  is	  of	  course	  a	  difference	  between	  national	  languages	  and	   prenational	   forms	   of	   talk.	   This	   difference	   between	   a	   national,	   standardized	  languages	  and	  prenational	   forms	  of	  talk	  was	  densely	  commented	  by	  Billig	  (1995:	  13-­‐36),	   linking	   it	   to	   his	   idea	   of	   a	   “syntax	   of	   hegemony”	   (Billig,	   1995:	   87),	   a	  phenomenon	   related	   to	   the	   process	   by	   which	   a	   part	   of	   the	   cultural/linguistic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Branding	  image	  as	  a	  part	  of	  national	  reconstruction	  has	  achieved	  a	  prominent	  position	  in	  Spain,	  as	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  strategies	  developed	  at	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry.	  See,	  e.g.,	  the	  news	   published	   by	   Spanish	   national	   newspaper	   ABC,	   in	   May	   2013:	   “Marca	   España,	  Margallo’s	   ‘flagship’”	   (Mora,	  2013).	  See	  also	   the	  news	  published	   in	  El	  Pais,	   in	  September	  2013:	   “Margallo	   launches	   in	   Paris	   the	   “Marca	   España”	   with	   a	   message	   of	   “excellence””	  (EFE,	   2013).	   The	   Foreign	   Ministry	   in	   Spain	   also	   launched	   a	   specific	   webpage	   on	   this	  www.marcaespana.es	  where	  it	  states:	  “Marca	  España	  is	  a	  state	  policy	  whose	  efficacy	  will	  be	  proven	  in	  the	   long	  term.	  The	  guarantee	  of	   the	  continuity	  of	   the	  Marca	  España	  project	  stems	   and	  develops	   from	  consensus	   that	   transcends	  political	   changes.	   Its	   objective	   is	   to	  improve	   the	   image	   of	   our	   country	   both	   domestically	   and	   beyond	   our	   borders	   for	   the	  common	  good.”	  (MarcaEspaña,	  2013).	  See,	  for	  an	  academic	  perspective	  on	  the	  topic,	  Noya	  (2004).	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mosaic	   that	   had	   the	   territory	   included	   within	   the	   limits	   of	   a	   future	   nation,	   will	  become	  dominant	   in	  order	   to	  construct	  a	  genuine	  national	   identity;	   in	   this	  sense	  we	   can	   observe	   a	   metonymic	   process	   by	   which	   a	   part	   claims	   to	   represent	   the	  whole.	   This	   concept	   is	   applied	   by	   Billig	   in	   order	   to	   analyze	   the	   construction	   of	  languages,	   insofar	   the	   process	   by	   which	   a	   given	   dialect26	  becomes	   the	   “official”	  language	  of	  a	  particular	  nation,	   is	   inextricably	   linked	   to	  power;	   in	  Billig’s	  words:	  “The	  middle	  class	  of	  metropolitan	  areas	  typically	  will	  make	  their	  meanings	  stick	  as	  the	  official	   language,	   relegating	  other	  patterns	  within	   the	  national	   boundaries	   to	  ‘dialects’,	   a	   term	   which	   almost	   invariably	   carries	   a	   pejorative	   meaning”	   (Billig	  1995:	  32).	  This	  process	  of	   linguistic	  hegemony	   is	  also	  central	   to	  Gellner’s	   theory	  (1983),	  which	  was	   a	  prolific	   starting	  point	   for	   subsequent	  works	   focused	  on	   the	  problems	   posted	   by	   linguistic	   substitution	   in	   terms	   of	   human	   rights	   (vid.,	   e.g.,	  Eriksen,	  1992).	  
This	   differentiation	   between	   pre-­‐national	   diacritics	   and	   standardized	   national	  forms	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  bounded	  only	  to	  language,	  and	  expands	  to	  whatever	  ethnic	  attributes	   usually	   understood	   as	   the	   objective	   foundations	   determining	   the	  existence	   of	   nations,	   constitutive	   of	   national	   differential	   facts.	   In	   McCrone’s	  opinion,	  those	  elements	  which	  are	  chosen	  in	  order	  to	  proclaim	  the	  differential	  fact	  of	  a	  given	  nation,	  are	  not	  independent	  from	  the	  socio-­‐political	  situation;	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  people	   who	   select	   what	   differential	   facts	   has	   to	   be	   proclaimed	   as	   identifiers	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  The	   term	  dialect	  has	  been	  problematized	  a	  number	  of	   times,	  as	   it	  usually	   involves	  not	  only	  a	  descriptive	   scientific	  definition	  on	   the	  variation	  of	   languages,	  but	  also	  differences	  regarding	   the	   status	   of	   each	   of	   these	   varieties	   –see	   Haugen	   (1966)	   for	   an	   in-­‐depth	  dissertation	   on	   the	   different	   implications	   of	   the	   term	   dialect-­‐.	   This	   is	   why	   we	   want	   to	  clarify	   that	   our	   use	   of	   the	   term	   in	   our	   text	   refers	   to	   its	  most	   descriptive	  non-­‐normative	  way.	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nationality.	  In	  other	  words,	  “being	  able	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  ethnic	  homogeneity	  in	  a	   given	   territory	   –or,	   rather,	   that	   people	   living	   there	   believe	   themselves	   to	   be	  homogeneous–	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   political	   and	   social	   processes,	   not	   their	  explanation,	   their	   cause”	   (McCrone	   D.	   ,	   2001b,	   p.	   23;	   Stavenhagen,	   1996)-­‐.	  Therefore,	  when	  nations	  bitare	  in	  an	  early	  stage	  of	  construction,	  when	  they	  are	  not	  established,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   find	   conflicts	   among	   national	   elites	   regarding	   these	  processes	  of	  standardization;	  the	  well-­‐studied	  Galician	  bitter	  orthographic	  conflict	  constitutes	  a	  good	  example	  of	  such	  conflicts	  (Herrero,	  2011).	  This	  differentiation	  between	  well-­‐established	  national	  languages	  and	  pre-­‐national	  forms	  of	  talk	  can	  be	  easily	  found	  in	  qualitative	  research;	  De	  Nieves	  (2008,	  pp.	  39-­‐42)	  has	  shown	  it	  for	  the	  Galician	  case,	   through	   the	   realization	  of	   semi-­‐structured	   in-­‐depth	   interviews.	  Galician	  nation-­‐building	  process	   is	   relatively	  underdeveloped	  when	   compared	   to	  those	  processes	  in	  Catalonia	  or	  the	  Basque	  Country	  (Martinez-­‐Herrera,	  2002)	  and	  we	  argue	  that	  this	  fact	  has	  relevant	  analytical	  implications	  in	  a	  context	  like	  Galicia,	  where	  90%	  of	   the	  population	  declares	   to	  be	  able	   to	  speak	  Galician	  at	   the	   turn	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  (Maiz	  and	  Losada,	  2000:	  65).	  We	  have	  seen,	  however,	  qualitative	  evidences	  showing	  that	  Galician	  is	  usually	  seen	  as	  a	  pre-­‐national	  way	  of	  talk	  rather	  than	   a	   modern	   national	   language,	   establishing	   an	   interpretative	   pattern	   that	  changes	  when	  talking	  about	   the	   language	  used	  by	  Galician	  nationalists,	   seen	  as	  a	  proper	  modern	  language	  (De	  Nieves,	  2008:	  40).	  It	  has	  been	  registered,	  showing	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  coin,	  processes	  of	  protest	  against	  standardized	  Galician	  language,	  carried	   out	   by	   native	   speakers	   defending	   their	   own	   particular	   ways	   of	   talking,	  usually	   characterized	   by	   clear	   lexical	   Spanish	   language	   interferences	   (Alvarez-­‐Caccamo,	  1993;	  O'Rourke	  &	  Ramallo,	  2013).	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  This,	   of	   course,	   is	   congruent	   with	   theories	   on	   nationalism	   highlighting	   the	  difference	   between	   pre-­‐national	   diacritics	   and	   national	   standardized	   forms.	   For	  that	  reason,	  we	  think	  that	  this	  empirically	  documented	  process	  related	  to	  Galician	  language	   engages	   as	   well	   with	   other	   kinds	   of	   ethnic	   diacritics	   and	   to	   Galician	  identity	  itself.	  If	  this	  were	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  the	  MQ	  cannot	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  reliable	  indicator	   of	   national	   identity	   for	   the	   Galician	   case,	   as	   Galician	   identity	   can	   be	  understood	  by	  large	  parts	  of	   its	  population	  as	  pre-­‐national.	   It	   is	  true	  that	  the	  MQ	  does	  not	  label	  territorial	  identities	  as	  “national”	  or	  otherwise,	  but	  then	  we	  have	  to	  accept	   that	   the	   measurement	   of	   national	   identity	   through	   the	   MQ	   will	   present	  problems	   in	   those	  contexts	  where	  different	   types	  of	   identities	  –national	  and	  pre-­‐national–	  are	  contained	  within	  the	  same	  label;	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Galicia,	   for	   instance,	  we	  will	  have	  some	  people	  stating	  that	  they	  feel	  mainly	  Galicians	  in	  a	  pre-­‐national	  way,	  while	  other	  people	  will	  state	  that	  they	  are	  mainly	  Galicians	  in	  a	  national	  way.	  It	  will	  be	  the	  same	  label,	  but	  with	  completely	  different	  meanings27.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Typically	   we	   can	   imagine	   a	   Galician	   speaker	   from	   a	   rural	   area,	   with	   no	   particular	  sympathy	  towards	  Galician	  nationalism	  and	  an	  electoral	  behavior	  that	  consistently	  relies	  on	  Spanish	  nationalistic	  parties,	  stating	  that	  he/she	  feels	  mainly	  Galician	  (due	  to	  his/her	  ethnic	  attributes,	  we	  may	  deduce).	  On	   the	  other	  hand	  we	  could	   find	  an	  Spanish	   speaker	  from	  one	  of	   the	  biggest	  Galician	  cities,	  without	  any	   link	  with	  Galician	  traditional	  culture,	  but	  with	   a	   strong	   nationalist	   ideology,	   stating	   that	   he/she	   feels	  mainly	   Galician	   (due	   to	  his/her	   political	   or	   ideological	   attributes).	   These	   are	   two	   completely	   different	   ways	   of	  considering	  oneself	   “mainly	  Galician”,	  put	   together	  by	   the	  MQ	  within	   the	  same	  category;	  however,	   in	   political	   or	   ideological	   terms	   these	   two	   terms	   are	   clearly	   different.	   As	  nationalism,	  we	  have	  already	  stated,	  belongs	  to	  the	  realm	  of	   ideologies,	   the	  MQ	  does	  not	  seem	  very	  useful	  to	  measure	  nationalism	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  contexts.	   In	  other	  words	  we	  can	  summarize	  this	  problem	  by	  saying	  that	  ethnic	  and	  ideological	  realities	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  to	  present	  any	  statistical	  correlation;	  Galician	  ethnicity	  can	  be	  integrated	  within	  any	  national	   project	   –Galician	   or	   Spanish–	  while	   ideology	   can	   be	   developed	  with	   any	   given	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Again,	   Michael	   Billig	   has	   commented	   this	   difference	   between	   pre-­‐national	   and	  national	   feelings	   of	   identity,	   explaining	   that	   Mediaeval	   times	   would	   be	  characterised	   by	   an	   idea	   of	   the	   terra	   as	   a	   sense	   of	   belonging	   tied	   up	   to	   limited,	  relatively	  small,	   territories	  “like	  valleys,	  uplands	  or	   lowlands”	  (Billig	  1995,	  p.	  74)	  and	   not	   to	   wider	   national	   communities	   spreading	   beyond	   direct	   human	  perception,	   imagined	   in	   terms	  of	  Anderson	  (1991).	  As	  a	  consequence	  we	  have	   to	  acknowledge	  that	  we	  do	  not	  know	  what	  kind	  of	  identity	  –national	  or	  prenational-­‐	  is	   actually	   measuring	   the	   MQ,	   and	   we	   instead	   should	   recognize	   that	   what	   is	  probably	  happening	  is	  that	  these	  two	  kinds	  of	  identities	  are	  being	  recorded	  within	  the	   same	   categories;	   this	  mixing	   in	   the	   type	   of	   identities	   subsumed	   in	   the	   same	  categories	  of	   the	  MQ	  does	  not	  make	  any	  difference	   to	  people’s	  self-­‐identification,	  but	   we	   should	   be	   aware	   of	   it	   when	   we	   use	   the	   MQ	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   national	  feelings.	   The	   point	   has	   been	   developed	   by	  Beramendi	  who,	   on	   the	   Spanish	   case,	  concluded:	  
“In	   other	   words,	   the	   development	   of	   a	   sub-­‐state	   national	   identity	   induces	   two	  opposing	   phenomena:	   the	   growth	   of	   a	   concordant	   regional	   identity	   in	  unnationalized	   parts	   of	   the	   community,	   and	   a	   reaction	   reaffirming	   the	   national-­‐state	   identity	   in	   other	   portions	   as	   well	   as	   among	   the	   population	   outside	   this	  community.	   In	   terms	  of	   identities,	   the	  region	   in	  question	   is	  divided,	  as	   it	  were,	   into	  
three	  persuasions:	  two	  are	  built	  around	  the	  same	  specific	  ethnicity	  but	  in	  different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ethnicity.	   It	   is	   worth	   saying	   that	   during	   Franco’s	   dictatorship	   there	   was	   an	   effort	   for	  integrating	  the	  different	  cultures	  of	  Spain	  as	  regional	  variations	  enriching	  Spanish	  cultural	  identity,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   detach	   ethnicity	   from	   sub-­‐state	   processes	   of	   nation	   building	  (Mira,	  2009).	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degrees	  (a	  national	  sub-­‐state	  versus	  a	  simple	  regional	  identity),	  and	  the	  third	  is	  centred	  on	  the	  national-­‐state	  identity”	  (Beramendi,	  1999:	  95;	  my	  emphasis).	  
There	  is	  no	  possible	  analytical	  way	  of	  discerning	  the	  first	  two	  identities	  referred	  by	  Beramendi	  taking	  only	  into	  account	  the	  five	  categories	  that	  make	  up	  the	  MQ	  and,	  particularly,	  the	  two	  categories	  priming	  the	  sub-­‐national	  identity;	  in	  a	  society	  like	  Galicia,	   defined	   for	   having	   two	   on-­‐going	   national	   projects,	   one	   poorly	   developed	  Galician	   national	   project	   and	   one	   strong	   established	   state-­‐wide	   nation	   project,	  such	  as	  the	  Spanish	  one,	  the	  MQ	  becomes	  a	  sort	  of	  bucket	  were	  different	  kinds	  of	  identities	   coexist,	  being	   impossible	   for	   the	  analyst	   to	  distinguish	   them.	  We	  could	  have	   some	  people	   identifying	   themselves	   as	  Galicians	   in	   a	   regional,	   not	  national,	  way,	  as	  they	  can	  understand	  that	  their	  cultural	  diacritics	  –being	  Galician	  speakers,	  playing/listening	   to	   Galician	   traditional	   music,	   etc.-­‐	   are	   regional	   expressions	   of	  Spanishness.	  On	   the	  other	  hand	  we	  could	  have	  some	  people	  with	  all	   the	   cultural	  diacritics	  associated	  to	  the	  Spanish	  national	  project	  –being	  Spanish	  speakers	  with	  no	  connections	  to	  traditional	  Galician	  culture-­‐	  identifying	  themselves	  as	  Galicians	  only,	   in	  a	  pure	  expression	  of	  Galician	  nationalist	   ideology.	  Our	  hypothesis	  then	  is	  that	  the	  MQ	  is	  only	  measuring	  national	  identity	  correctly	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  we	  find	   two	  highly	  developed	  national	  projects;	   this	  would	  be	   the	   case	  of	  Catalonia,	  the	   Basque	   Country	   or	   Scotland.	   Moreover,	   although	   in	   these	   cases	   the	   relation	  between	   the	  MQ	  and	  people’s	  national	   identities	   is	   clearer,	   there	   is	   always	   some	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  regarding	  those	  identities	  priming	  the	  sub-­‐national	  category,	  introducing	   a	   doubt	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   such	   assertions.	   However,	   in	   those	   cases	  where	  we	   find	  one	  strong	  state-­‐related	  national	  project	  and	  one	  underdeveloped	  sub-­‐state	  national	  project,	  the	  MQ’s	  would	  become	  fuzzy,	  mixing	  national	  and	  pre-­‐national	   identities	   within	   those	   categories	   priming	   the	   sub-­‐state	   identity;	   this	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would	  be	  the	  case	  of	  Galicia	  and,	  probably,	  of	  some	  other	  cases	  within	  Spain,	   like	  Andalusia	   or	   Asturias,	   which	   present	   even	   weaker	   national	   projects	   fighting	  against	   the	   state-­‐wide	   Spanish	  national	   project.	  We	  will	   try	   to	  provide	   empirical	  support	  for	  this	  hypothesis	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
3.2.2.4	  Descriptive	  analysis	  
Let us start our analysis by considering data from the CIS’ study ‘Autonomic Barometer 
(III)’, no. 2,956. This study consisted in the realization of a survey with 11,290 
interviews within Spain, with a sample that enables specific analysis for each one of the 
seventeen Spanish Autonomous Communities (ACs) 28 . The fieldwork took place 
between 13 September and 9 October 2012 and it is accessible online (CIS, 2012)29. 
Figure 25 presents a scatter plot, showing the relationship between two variables: 
feeling of attachment with the Spanish identity (Y axis) and feeling of attachment with 
the AC identity (X axis)30. Here we have two main groups of ACs, one group A, 
containing those ACs of the upper part of the figure and another group B, in the lowest 
part. We have then identified two subsets of ACs within each of the aforementioned big 
groups. The first subset A.1 (Castile-La Mancha, Valencia, Castile and León and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  figure	  IIIAa,	  IIIAb,	  IIIAc,	  IIIAd,	  and	  IIIAe	  in	  the	  Annexes.	  	  29	  There	  is	  no	  data	  available	  for	   including	  in	  our	  analysis	  the	  Autonomous	  Community	  of	  the	  Region	  of	  Murcia	  –absence	  of	  a	  question	  in	  its	  questionnaire	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  measure	  the	  multiple	   levels	  of	  Murcians’	   identity–.	  Murcia,	  however,	   is	   traditionally	  an	  AC	  with	  a	  weak	  sense	  of	  AC	  identity;	  the	  MQ	  for	  this	  AC	  in	  CIS’	  2,956	  study	  shown	  nobody	  answering	  ‘Only	  Murcian,	   not	   Spanish’	   and	   a	  6.3	  per	   cent	   of	   people	   answering	   ‘More	  Murcian	   than	  Spanish’.	  30	  The	  wording	   of	   this	   question	  was:	   ‘Everyone	   feels	   attached,	   to	   some	   extent,	   with	   the	  land	  where	  we	  live,	  but	  there	  are	  some	  areas	  to	  which	  we	  feel	  more	  attached	  than	  others.	  To	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  feel	  identified	  with	  the	  village	  or	  city	  where	  you	  live?	  Use	  a	  0	  to	  10	  scale	   to	  answer,	  where	  0	  means	   that	  you	  do	  not	   feel	   ‘any	   identification’	  and	  10	   that	  you	  feel	   ‘very	   identified’.	   This	   question	   –absent	   in	   the	   questionnaire	   for	   Murcia-­‐	   included	  identification	  with	  Spain	  and	  the	  AC,	  as	  well.	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Madrid) features high Spanish identifications (8 to 9 over 10) and relatively low AC’s 
identification (7 to 7.5 over 10)31. The second subset A.2 consists of ACs with high 
Spanish identifications (8 to 9 over 10) as well as high AC’s identification (9 to 9 over 
10) –Asturias, Extremadura, Aragon, Andalusia, Cantabria and La Rioja-. The second 
group of ACs present low feelings of Spanishness (means under 8 over 10). We have 
subdivided this B set into two subsets B.1 and B.2; the first one contains relatively low 
expressions of Spanishness (7 to 8 over 10) and high identifications with the AC (8 to 
9.03 over 10), including the Canary Islands, Galicia and the Balearic Islands. Finally, 
subset B.2 is characterized for having low expressions of Spanish identity (5 to 7 over 
10) and high expressions of identification with the AC (8 to 8.5 over 10); this subset 
includes Navarre, the Basque Country and Catalonia32. Adapting to our data the existing 
literature, particularly Herranz de Rafael (1996), we will define group A.1 as composed 
by strong state-wide nationalist ACs, groups A.2 and B.1 by weakly nationalized ACs 
and group B.2 by strong state-wide nationalist ACs. We hypothesize that he nature of 
this cleavage, as a division between strongly nationalized ACs versus weakly 
nationalized ACs, involves the existence of two different kinds of national conflict in 
Spain. ACs within subsets A.1 and B.2 in figure 1 will be characterized by having a 
belligerent structure of actors reproducing nationalism33, whereas ACs within subsets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  This	  data	  is	  based	  on	  mean	  values	  for	  each	  AC.	  32	  We	   have	   to	   note	   the	   peculiarity	   regarding	   the	   case	   of	   Navarre,	   as	   this	   AC	   has	   been	  traditionally	   claimed	   as	   part	   of	   the	   Basque	   Country	   by	   Basque	   nationalists	   –see,	   e.g.,	  Perez-­‐Agote	  (1989)	  or	  Conversi	  (1997:	  xvi).	  For	  a	  historical	  perspective	  during	  the	  Second	  Spanish	   Republic,	   see	   Chueca-­‐Intxusta	   (1999)–.	   There	   were	   two	   Basque	   nationalist	  coalitions	   concurring	   in	   the	   Spanish	   2011	   general	   election	   within	   Navarre,	   Amaiur	   and	  
Geroa	  Bai;	  they	  obtained	  91,623	  votes	  in	  the	  AC	  of	  Navarre,	  concentrating	  28.25	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  vote	  for	  political	  parties	  within	  this	  AC	  (MinisterioInterior,	  2013).	  33	  See,	  Eder	  et	  al.	   (2002)	   for	  a	  dramatist	  perspective	  on	  national	   identity	   reconstruction,	  formed	  by	  a	  basic	  matrix	  of	  three	  structural	  positions:	  ego,	  alter,	  and	  other.	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A.2 and B.1 will have a rather lower profile regarding their set of actors reproducing 
national identity. 
Figure	   25.	   Collective	   identity	   feelings	   in	   each	   Spanish	  
Autonomous	  Community	  
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from CIS’ study 2,956. 
In order to test this last hypothesis, pointing out differences on the degree of conflict 
associated to each group of ACs we will develop a qualitative content analysis of the 
press. If this hypothesis proves to be right, then the appropriateness of our proposed 
division for Spanish ACs will gain consistence, enabling subsequent analysis to test our 
main hypothesis, already explained, according to which the MQ only provides good 
measures of national identity in those contexts where we find highly developed national 
projects –ACs within subset B.2– but not in those places with either one national project 
–ACs within subset A.1– or presenting low intensity alternative sub-national projects –
ACs within subsets A.2 and B.1–.  
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3.2.2.5	  Some	  clarifications	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  dual	  identity	  It	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   dual	   identity,	   particularly	   developed	   by	   Luis	  Moreno	   on	   the	   Catalan	   case	   (Moreno,	   1986;	   Moreno,	   1988a;	   Moreno,	   1988b;	  Moreno	   and	   Arriba,	   1996)	   and	   assumed	   later	   by	   Spanish	   researchers	   to	   explain	  other	  cases	  within	  post-­‐1978	  Spain	  –vid.	  Coller	  and	  Castelló	  (1999),	  on	  the	  case	  of	  Valencia–	  contradicts	  our	  approach,	  more	  focused	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  conflict	  between	  different	  national	  identities	  within	  Spain.	  The	  dual	  identity	  approach	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  design	  of	  the	  MQ,	  as	  Moreno	  himself	  explains	  in	  his	  article	  on	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  ‘Moreno	  question’:	  
“The	  concept	  of	  dual	  identity	  or	  compound	  nationality	  concerns	  the	  way	  in	  which	  citizens	   identify	   themselves	   in	   sub-­‐state	   minority	   nations	   or	   regions.	   It	  incorporates	   in	   variable	   proportions	   the	   ethnoterritorial	   (regional)	   identity	   and	  the	   state	   (national)	   identity.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   this,	   citizens	   share	   their	   institutional	  loyalties	   at	   both	   levels	   of	   political	   legitimacy	   without	   any	   apparent	   fracture	  between	  them”	  (Moreno,	  2006:	  2).	  
The	   centrality	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   ‘dual	   identity’	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   the	  MQ	   as	   a	  methodological	   approach	   to	   measure	   national	   identity	   leads	   us	   to	   clarify	   our	  interpretation	   of	   how	   identities	   are	   intertwined	   in	   the	   Spanish	   state,	   which	   has	  been	   defined	   as	   a	   paradigm	   of	  multinational	   political	   organization	   (Linz,	   1989).	  Our	  view	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  unequal	  relation	  between	  the	  State-­‐wide	  Spanish	  national	  identity	  and	  the	  different	  sub-­‐State	  national	  identities;	  this	   unequal	   relation	   takes	   often	   the	   form	   of	   a	   hierarchy,	   in	   which	   a	   dominant	  national	  project	  conforms	  a	  dominant	  national	  identity	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  integrate	  the	   ethnoterritorial	   variations	   to	   itself,	   usually	   as	   regional	   identities,	   resembling	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the	   distinction	   applied	   in	   linguistics	   when	   regional	   dialects	   are	   to	   be	   defined	  against	  national	  languages,	  as	  Billig	  puts	  it:	  
“The	  idea	  of	  a	  dialect	  had	  little	  use	  before	  nation-­‐states	  started	  establishing	  official	  ways	   of	   speaking	   and	   writing.	   Differences	   between	   languages	   and	   dialect,	   then,	  become	   hotly	   contested	   political	   issues,	   as	  well	   as	   concerns	   for	   the	   discipline	   of	  linguistics	   (…)	   More	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   drawing	   the	   boundary	   of	   a	   language	   than	  linguistics.	  The	  battle	   for	  hegemony,	  which	  accompanies	   the	  creation	  of	  states,	   is	  reflected	  in	  the	  power	  to	  define	  language	  (…)”	  (Billig,	  1995,	  p.	  32)	  
This	  power-­‐related	  distinction	  between	   languages	   and	  dialects	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  by	  Gil	  (2006),	  on	  the	  Galician	  case.	  But,	  perhaps,	  it	  is	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  hegemony	  that	  we	  can	  best	  circumscribe	   the	  problems	  posed	  by	   the	   idea	  of	  a	  dual	   identity.	  Again,	  Michael	  Billig	  wrote	  that	  “(…)	  within	  the	  history	  of	  nationalism,	  one	  part	  of	  the	   imagined	  national	  whole	  has	  always	   sought	   to	  present	   itself	   as	   the	  universal	  voice	   of	   the	  whole	   (…)	   in	   attempting	   to	   construct	   a	   national,	   cultural	   unity,	   one	  part	  –one	  aspect	  of	  the	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  mosaic-­‐	  will	  become	  the	  dominant,	  metonymic	   representation	  of	   the	  whole	   (…)	  other	  ways	  of	  being	  national	  will	  be	  repressed,	   forgotten	  or	   relegated	   to	   the	   status	  of	  dialect”	   (Billig,	  1995:	  87).	   Such	  metonymic	   process	   by	   which	   a	   part	   of	   the	   national	   mosaic	   is	   discursively	  constructed	  as	  representing	  the	  entire	  nation,	  involves	  above	  all	  the	  set	  of	  a	  power	  relation	   by	  which	   the	   centre	   rules	   symbolically	   over	   the	   peripheries,	   identifying	  nationalistic	  discourses	  with	  Bakhtin’s	  idea	  that	  utterances	  involve	  centrifugal	  and	  centripetal	   aspects	   at	   the	   same	   time	   (Bakhtin,	   1981	   [1930s]).	   We	   can	   state,	  therefore,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  differential	  quantity	  of	  status	  associated	  to	  the	  collective	  cultural	   representations	   existing	   within	   the	   boundaries	   of	   a	   given	   nation-­‐state,	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enabling	  Pierre	  Bourdieu’s	  well	  known	  processes	  of	  capital	  conversions	  (Bourdieu,	  1986),	   in	   this	   case	   from	  social	   and	  economic	   capital	   into	   cultural	   capital,	   as	   “the	  middle	  class	  of	  the	  metropolitan	  areas	  typically	  will	  make	  their	  meanings	  stick	  as	  the	  official	   language,	   relegating	  other	  patterns	  within	   the	  national	   boundaries	   to	  ‘dialects’,	   a	   term	   which	   almost	   invariably	   carries	   a	   pejorative	   meaning”	   (Billig,	  1995:	   32).	   Also,	   Anthony	   Smith,	   in	   his	   ethno-­‐symbolist	   approach	   to	   nationhood,	  argues	   that	   many	   modern	   nation-­‐states	   were	   formed	   around	   a	   dominant	   pre-­‐modern	  ethnic	   community	   integrating,	  peacefully	  or	  by	  arms,	   another	  ethnies,	   as	  he	  calls	  those	  pre-­‐modern	  communities	  (Smith,	  1991:	  39).	  
It	   is	   easy	   now	   to	   express	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   dual	   identity	   as	   expressing	   the	   self-­‐identity	  of	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  stateless	  nations	  within	  wider	  nation-­‐states	  is	  not	  as	  explanatory	  as	   it	  should	  be,	   for	  there	   is	  much	  left	  unexplained	  in	  terms	  of	  power	  relations	  entangled	  within	   the	  social	  articulation	  of	   the	   two	   identities	  composing	  the	   duality	   or	   even	   within	   the	   articulations	   of	   various	   identities	   composing	  “multiple	   identities”,	   a	   term	   also	   used	   by	  Moreno	  when	   he	   explains	   the	   identity	  complex	   of	   modern	   societies	   (Moreno,	   2004).	   It	   is	   necessary	   to	   say	   that	   this	  critique	   is	   probably	   more	   accurate	   when	   applied	   to	   the	   case	   of	   Catalonia,	   the	  Basque	   Country	   or	   Galicia	   than	   when	   it	   is	   used	   in	   order	   to	   measure	   identity	  feelings	  in	  Scotland,	  and	  this	  is	  so	  due	  to	  a	  simple	  reason	  regarding	  the	  wording	  of	  the	   so-­‐called	   Moreno	   question.	   Thus,	   when	   deployed	   in	   Scotland,	   the	   question	  usually	   poses	   a	   distinction	   between	   Scottish	   and	   British	   identities,	   whereas	   in	  Catalonia,	   the	   Basque	   Country	   or	   Galicia	   that	   distinction	   is	   made	   between	  Catalan/Basque/Galician	  and	  Spanish	  identities.	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As	  we	  know	  that	  nations	  are	  constructed	   through	  discursive	   (Wodak	  et	  al.,	  2009	  [1999])	   and	   other	   symbolic	   unconscious	   processes	   (Billig,	   1995),	   then	   we	   can	  better	  talk	  about	  nations	  in	  terms	  of	  processes	  or	  projects,	  rather	  than	  established	  perpetual	   things.	   Consequently	   we	   will	   call	   the	   State-­‐wide	   national	   process	  operating	  in	  the	  Spanish	  state	  as	  the	  Spanish	  national	  project	  (SNPr),	  whereas	  the	  different	   sub-­‐State	   national	   processes	   will	   be	   identified	   as	   the	   Catalan	   national	  
project	   (CNPr),	   the	   Basque	   national	   project	   (BNPr),	   the	   Galician	   national	   project	  (GNPr),	  etc.	  Our	  point	  refers	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  SNPr	  maintains	  a	  discursive	  and	  symbolic	  war	  with	  the	  other	  national	  projects	  present	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Spanish	  state.	  As	  we	  know	  that	  every	  national	  project	  claims	  a	  given	  territoriality	  as	   their	   national	   territory	   (Penrose,	   2002),	   and	   a	   given	   people34	  within	   that	  territory	   as	   their	   nationals	   (Anderson,	   1991)35,	   it	   follows	   that	   two	   or	   more	  different	   genuine	   national	   projects	   cannot	   coexist	   within	   the	   same	   territorial	  boundaries	  without	  the	  presence	  of	  conflict.	  The	  dramatic	  situation	  of	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  conflict	  gives	  us	  a	  daily	  reminder	  of	  this	  social	  fact,	  as	  it	  does	  history	  –we	   can	   take	   as	   an	   example	   the	   Sino-­‐Vietnamese	   conflict,	   very	   much	   based	   on	  territorial	  disagreements	  among	  Pol	  Pot’s	  Cambodia	  and	  Vietnam,	  that	  eventually	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  Third	  Indochina	  War	  –see	  Hood	  (1992)	  and	  Young	  (1991)–.	  This	  incompatibility	   between	   the	   core	   assumptions	   of	   the	   SNPr	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  See	  Bourdieu	  (1990)	  for	  a	  critical	  reflection	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  power	  and	  the	  social	   construction	   of	   the	  people	   precisely	   by	   the	   elites	  who	   deploy	   this	   construction	   to	  reassert	  their	  social	  primacy	  over	  “the	  people”	  to	  which	  or	  for	  which	  they	  talk.	  35	  The	  cultural	  anthropologist	  Jaqueline	  Urla,	  who	  made	  extensive	  fieldwork	  in	  the	  Basque	  Country,	  has	  highlighted	  the	  role	  played	  by	  modern	  statistics	  in	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  national	  identities	  (Urla,	  1993).	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national	   projects	   within	   Spain	   produces	   a	   dynamic	   creating	   two	   correlated	  processes:	  	  
1. The	  SNPr	   tries	   to	   integrate	  within	   it	   the	  diverse	   set	   of	   ethnicities	  present	  within	  the	  territory	  imagined	  (Anderson,	  1991)	  as	  Spanish	  national.	  As	  the	  diacritics	   conforming	   Spain	   as	   a	   nation	  were	  mainly	   taken	   from	  Castile36,	  Billig’s	   first	   syntax	   of	   hegemony	   (Billig,	   1995:	   87)	   was	   built	   around	   the	  cultural	  symbols	  of	   this	  region	  –language	   is	  a	  good	  example	  of	   this,	  as	   the	  Spanish	   national	   language	   is	   commonly	   identified	   with	   Castilian 37 -­‐.	  Consequently,	  the	  more	  the	  ethnic	  diacritics	  of	  the	  peripheral	  areas	  of	  Spain	  differ	  from	  the	  Castilian	  standard,	  the	  higher	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  SNPr	  in	  order	  to	   integrate	   them	   within	   it.	   This	   process	   of	   integration	   necessarily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  In	  terms	  of	  Spanish	  political	  scientist,	  Carlos	  Taibo:	  “[…]	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  determination	  of	  the	  national	  character	  some	  stereotypes	  are	  imposed	  on	  others:	  it	  seems	  unnecessary	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  Spanish	  national	  character	   is	  often	  confused	  with	  the	  Castilian,	   to	  the	  point	  that	  the	  latter	  frequently	  becomes	  simply	  the	  former”	  (Taibo,	  2008:	  85;	  italics	  in	  the	  original).	  	  37	  This	  discursive	  construction	  of	  the	  Spanish	  syntax	  of	  hegemony	  around	  the	  language	  of	  Castile	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   Spanish	   Constitution	   of	   1978.	   Article	   3	   of	   this	   Constitution	  deals	  with	  language	  in	  Spain	  and	  is	  entitled	  “Castilian	  and	  the	  rest	  Spanish	  languages”.	  We	  can	  say	  that	  this	  legal	  formulation	  is	  constructing	  through	  discourse	  a	  hierarchical	  system	  that	  identifies	  a	  primary	  Spanish	  language	  –Castilian–	  and	  a	  secondary	  category	  formed	  by	  “the	  rest”	  of	  the	  languages	  within	  the	  Spanish	  state.	  This	  practice	  is	  consistently	  developed	  on	   a	   daily	   basis	   by	   the	   Spanish	   authorities.	   We	   can	   take	   as	   an	   example	   the	   “Instituto	  Cervantes”,	  which	  is	  “the	  public	  institution	  created	  in	  Spain	  in	  1991	  for	  the	  promotion	  and	  teaching	  of	   the	  Spanish	   language	  and	  of	   the	  co-­‐official	   languages	  and	   for	   the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  Spanish	  and	  the	  Spanish	  American	  culture”	  (InstitutoCervantes,	  2014).	  As	  we	  see	  in	  its	  own	   definition,	   the	   discursive	   construction	   of	   the	   Spanish	   syntax	   of	   hegemony	   around	  Castilian	   language	   appears	   to	   be	   self-­‐evident,	   as	   Castilian	   is	   implicitly	   identified	   as	   the	  Spanish	  language,	  relegating	  what	  the	  Constitution	  calls	  “the	  rest	  of	  the	  Spanish	  languages”	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  merely	  co-­‐official	  languages.	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regionalizes	  non-­‐Castilian	  diacritics	  –in	  the	  sense	  of	  recognizing	  them,	  but	  to	  the	  price	  of	  being	  imbued	  with	  a	  lower	  status	  than	  the	  Castilian	  standard-­‐	  as	   the	   syntax	   of	   hegemony	   of	   one	   national	   project	   can	   be	   only	   identified	  with	   one	   of	   the	   parts	   conforming	   the	   cultural	  mosaic	   of	   the	   nation38.	   The	  characterization	  of	  the	  non-­‐Castilian	  languages	  of	  Spain	  as	  “dialects”	  of	  the	  Spanish	  language	  during	  Francoism	  was	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this,	  and	  we	  can	  find	  as	  well	  historical	  antecedents	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  Spanish	  glotopolitics	  in	  the	  times	  of	  the	  colonization	  of	  the	  New	  World	  (Mannheim,	  1992).	  For	  a	  recent	  perspective	  on	  the	  topic,	  see	  the	  work	  of	  Galician	  sociolinguist	  García	  Negro	  (García	   Negro,	   2000;	   1993;	   1991).	   Also	   Álvarez	   Cáccamo	   (2005)	   for	   a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  present	  linguistic	  legislation	  and,	  for	  a	  general	  historical	  perspective	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  see	  Freitas	  (2008).	  	  2. The	  second	  process	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  dynamic	  generated	  by	  the	  different	  sub-­‐state	  nationalisms	  within	  Spain,	  as	  the	  CNPr,	  the	  BNPr	  or	  the	  GNPr,	  to	  cite	  the	  main	  three	  sub-­‐state	  national	  projects	  within	  the	  Spanish	  state.	  This	  dynamic	  works	   in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  than	  the	  aforementioned	  process	  regarding	   the	   SNPr;	   thereby,	   these	   sub-­‐state	   national	   projects	   want	   to	  nationalize	  their	  diacritics,	  against	  the	  regionalization	  defined	  by	  the	  SNPr.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  sub-­‐state	  nationalisms	  in	  Spain	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  reaction	  against	   the	   regionalization	   process	   developed	   by	   the	   SNPr;	   from	   a	  wider	  perspective,	   these	   movements	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   line	   with	   those	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  In	  Billig’s	  words:	  “Also,	   in	  attempting	  to	  construct	  a	  national,	  cultural	  unity,	  one	  part	  –one	   aspect	   of	   the	   cultural	   and	   linguistic	  mosaic-­‐	  will	   become	   the	   dominant,	  metonymic	  representation	  of	  the	  whole.	  […]	  other	  ways	  of	  being	  national	  will	  be	  repressed,	  forgotten	  or	  relegated	  to	  the	  status	  of	  dialect”	  (Billig,	  1995:	  87).	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anthropological	  perspectives	  claiming	  for	  a	  necessity	  of	  enhancing	  cultural	  diversity	  within	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐states	  (Lisón,	  1982).	  
Of	  course,	  this	  dialectic	  affects	  identity,	  and	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  how	  the	  different	   identities	   are	   intertwined	  within	   the	  Spanish	   state	  plays	  a	   fundamental	  role	  within	  the	  national	  conflict.	  Social	  scientists	  who	  adhere	  the	  process	  of	  nation	  building	  promoted	  by	  sub-­‐state	  national	  projects	  tend	  to	  problematize	  the	  relation	  between	   the	   different	   identities,	   indicating	   that	   the	   current	   form	   of	   Spanish	  identity	  undermines	  somehow	  the	  sub-­‐state	  identities.	  In	  Galicia	  we	  find	  examples	  of	   this	   trend	   in	   virtually	   all	   the	   disciplines	   within	   social	   sciences,	   from	   cultural	  anthropology	   (Gondar,	  1993:	  232-­‐244),	   to	  economics	   (Beiras,	  2013;	  2008;	  1979;	  López	   Suevos,	   1979),	   to	   linguistics	   (Gil,	   1986;	   2009),	   to	   general	   political	   essay	  (Subiela,	   2013;	   of	   course,	   Castelao,	   1996	   [1944]).	   Nationalism	   has	   been	  characterized	   as	   conflictive,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   either	  domination	  of	  subaltern	  cultures	  or,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  for	  resistance	  against	  that	  domination	  (Feinberg,	  1997);	  as	  Varshney	  puts	  it:	  
“In	   the	  nationalism	  of	  exclusion,	  a	  dominant	  group	  within	  a	  society	  –domestic	  or	  foreign-­‐	   seeks	   to	   impose	   its	   own	  values	   on	   the	   various	   other	   groups	  within	   that	  society	   or	   seeks	   to	   exclude,	   sometimes	   violently,	   other	   ethnic	   groups	   from	   the	  portals	  of	  power.	  Typically,	   this	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  enforcing	  language,	  religion,	  or	  culture	   via	   control	   of	   the	   state,	   or	   excluding	   groups	   from	  power	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  ethnic	   characteristics	   only.	   In	   the	   nationalism	   of	   resistance,	   a	   dominated	   group	  opposes	   such	   a	   move	   and	   seeks	   to	   preserve	   its	   cultural	   identity	   and	   resist	   the	  hegemony	  and	  power	  of	  the	  dominant	  group”	  (Varshney,	  2003:	  86).	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We	  can	  easily	  exemplify	  this	  differentiation	  by	  bringing	  up	  some	  extreme	  examples	  of	  these	  two	  types	  of	  nationalism;	  thus,	  we	  will	  easily	  agree	  that	  Nazi’s	  supremacist	  nationalism,	   as	   in	  Hitler’s	  Mein	  Kampf	   (1925)	  has	   little	   to	  do	  with	   the	   resistance	  nationalism	   of	   the	   anti-­‐colonialism	   movements,	   inspired	   by	   the	   writings	   of	  thinkers	  like	  Franz	  Fanon	  (1961).	  	  
We	  find	  a	  similar	  argumentation	  in	  Pérez-­‐Agote,	  when	  he	  argues	  that	  nationalism	  involves	   “a	   fight	   for	   the	  absolute	  objectivation	  of	  every	  social	   identity,	   i.e.	  one	  of	  them	   through	   the	   conversion	   in	   social	   evidence	   of	   the	   politically	   objectified	  identity,	   and	   the	   other	   through	   the	   political	   objectivation	   of	   the	   community	  neglected	  by	  the	  State”	  (Pérez-­‐Agote,	  1984:	  23)..	  In	  this	  line	  writes	  Cabrera,	  on	  the	  Galician	  case:	  
“Galician	   nationalism	   emerges	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   global	   “nationalistic”	   policy	  (economic,	  cultural	  and	  political)	  of	  the	  State	  in	  which	  it	  is	  historically	  integrated	  (…)	  This	  involves	  the	  logical	  impossibility	  for	  two	  national	  identities	  to	  coexist	  in	  the	  same	  cultural	  and	  geographical	  space,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  prevent	  a	  complementary	  conceptualization	   of	   that	   wider	   community	   (the	   State,	   Spain,	   etc.),	   avoiding	   any	  contradiction,	  both	  collectively	  and	  individually”	  (Cabrera,	  1992:	  183).	  
This	   duality	   has	   always	   been	   present	   in	   the	   Marxist	   tradition	   which,	   especially	  since	   Lenin	   (Lenin,	   1965	   [1920])	   –although	   we	   already	   find	   sketches	   of	   this	  approach	   in	  Marx’s	  writings	  on	   Ireland	   (Marx	  and	  Engels,	  1972)–,	   claims	   for	   the	  analytical	   necessity	   of	   distinguishing	   between	   pro-­‐revolutionary	   and	   pro-­‐reactionary	  nationalist	  movements	  (Haupt,	  Löwy,	  &	  Weill,	  1974;	  Callinicos,	  1999;	  Löwy,	   1976).	   The	   criterion	   by	   which	   a	   given	   nationalist	   movement	   is	   to	   be	  classified	   within	   one	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   categories,	   however,	   was	   its	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contribution	  to	  a	  general	  process	  of	  revolution	  focused	  on	  the	  emancipation	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  This	   is	  why	  we	   find	  so	  many	  debates	  and	  different	   standpoints	   in	  relation	   with	   the	   national	   question	   within	   Marxism,	   as	   nationalistic	   fights	   were	  almost	   invariably	   judged	  as	  a	  means	   to	   the	  end	  of	  a	   revolution	   to	  be	   lead	  by	   the	  working-­‐class39.	  
3.2.2.6	  Qualitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  press	  Before	   introducing	   further	   quantitative	   analysis	   on	   the	   analysis	   of	   these	   groups,	  we	  will	  show	  some	  qualitative	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  our	  hypothesis.	  We	  are	  going	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  media,	  particularly	  the	  press,	  as	  this	  is	  an	  actor	  playing	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  reproduction	  of	  national	   identity.	  Despite	  some	  skepticism	  on	  this	  relation	  (Schlesinger,	   1991a;	   1991b;	   1993),	   social	   scientists	   have	   boosted	   this	   area	   of	  research	   with	   remarkable	   success.	   See,	   for	   a	   general	   overview,	   Deutsch	   (1966),	  Anderson	   (1991),	   Tomlinson	   (1991),	   Billig	   (1995:	   93-­‐127),	   Eder,	   et	   al.	   (2002),	  Roosvall	  and	  Salovaara-­‐Moring	  (2010),	  and	  Mihelj	  (2011).	  For	  specific	  case	  studies	  see,	   e.g.,	   Brookes	   (1999),	   Britain,	   Law	   (2001)	   and	   MacInnes	   (1992),	   Scotland,	  Idoiaga	  and	  Ramirez	  (2002),	  the	  Basque	  Country,	  or	  Yumul	  and	  Özkirimli	  (2000),	  Turkey.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Significantly	  enough,	  we	  find	  that	  Marxism	  has	  produced	  new	  discourses	  on	  the	  role	  of	  nationalism	  when	  Marxism	  itself	  moved	  from	  a	  philosophical	  universe	  orbiting	  around	  the	  notion	   of	   labor	   towards	   another	   one	  mainly	   focused	   on	   the	   idea	   language	   and,	   thus,	   of	  interaction,	  as	  Habermas’	  work	  illustrates:	  “Of	   international	   importance	   are,	   too,	   the	   autonomy	   movements,	   fighting	   for	   regional,	  linguistic	   and	   cultural	   autonomy	   and,	   sometimes,	   fighting	   too	   for	   the	   autonomy	   of	  confession	   (…)	   I	   will	   try	   to	   show,	   briefly,	   that	   such	   conflicts	   can	   be	   understood	   as	  resistance	  trends	  towards	  the	  colonization	  of	  the	  lifeworld”	  (Habermas,	  2010	  [1981]:	  930-­‐931).	  See	  also	  Habermas	  (1988).	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As	   Teun	   Van	   Dijk	   states	   in	   his	   classical	   manual	   of	   news	   analysis,	   “linking	   news	  texts	  with	  societal	  macrostructures	   in	  general	   (…)	  requires	  a	   theoretical	  strategy	  that	   proceeds	   stepwise	   through	   different	   levels”	   (Van Dijk, 1988: 19).	   Thus,	   our	  theoretical	   approach	   is	   based	   on	   three	   traditions:	   the	   first	   one	   is	   based	   on	   the	  interdisciplinary	  studies	  that	  links	  news	  and	  nationalism,	  already	  commented,	  the	  second	  one	  will	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  grammar	  structure	  of	  news	  texts	  and,	  finally,	  we	  will	  be	  drawing	  upon	  a	  theoretical	  tradition	  within	  political	  science,	  related	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  political	  campaigns	  and	  strategies,	  that	  we	  are	  going	  to	  widen	  in	  order	  to	  apprehend	  the	  role	  of	  the	  media	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Spanish	  national	  conflict.	  Seeing	  nationalism	  as	  a	  political	  cleavage	  in	  Spanish	  politics,	  affecting	  differentially	  to	  our	  three	  types	  of	  ACs	  (strong	  sub-­‐state	  nationalistic	  ACs,	  weakly	  nationalized	  ACs	   and	   strong	   state-­‐wide	   nationalistic	   ACs),	   involves	   that	   we	   should	   find	   a	  difference	   in	   the	   news	   coverage	   of	   identity	   politics,	   if	   we	   are	   to	   see	   “news	  communication	  participants	   (journalists,	  media	  users)	  as	  social	  actors	  and	  group	  members	  [who]	  are	  the	  social	  representatives	  closest	  to	  news	  reports,	  because	  of	  their	   productive	   and	   interpreting	   activities	   in	   the	   news	   communication	   context”	  (Van	  Dijk,	  1988:	  19).	  
By	  using	  a	  common	  methodology	  in	  Political	  Science,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  classify	  the	  messages	  analyzed	  in	  three	  different	  categories:	  negative,	  neutral	  and	  positive,	  so	  we	   can,	   thereafter,	   produce	   a	   comparative	   framework	   for	   analysis	   of	   the	   news	  coverage	  on	  Spanish	   identity	  politics.	  Thus,	  according	   to	  Skaperdas	  and	  Grofman	  (1995),	   a	   negative	   campaign	   is	   defined	   as	   one	   that	   “attacks	   the	   other	   candidate	  personally,	   the	   issues	   for	   which	   the	   other	   candidate	   stands,	   or	   the	   party	   of	   the	  other	   candidate”	   (Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995: 49)	   or,	   in	   other	  words,	   negative	  campaigning	   is	   a	   political	   strategy	   mainly	   focused	   on	   “criticizing	   the	   opponent”	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(Lau and Pomper, 2001: 81).	  We	  will,	  hence,	  identify	  the	  news	  headlines	  as	  negative	  when	   they	   are	   focused	   on	   criticizing	   the	   oponent	   –either	   Catalan	   or	   Spanish	  national	  projects-­‐;	  consequently	  we	  will	  identify	  the	  opposite	  messages	  as	  positive	  and,	  when	   there	   is	   no	   evidience	   or	   either	   negative	   or	  positive	  messages,	  we	   are	  going	  to	  classify	  them	  as	  neutral.	  
3.2.2.6.1	  Strong	  statewide	  nationalistic	  ACs	  According	  to	  our	  hypothesis,	  ACs	  included	  in	  subsets	  A.1	  and	  B.2	  are	  characterized	  by	  a	  strong	  national	  conflict	  between	  state-­‐wide	  Spanish	  nationalism	  and	  sub-­‐state	  national	   projects.	   ACs	   within	   subset	   A.1	   are	   Castile–La	   Mancha,	   Valencia,	  Castile	  and	  León	  and	  Madrid.	  ACs	  within	  subset	  B.2	  are	  Catalonia,	  Navarre	  and	  the	  Basque	  Country.	  In	  this	  section	  we	  are	  going	  to	  deal	  with	  those	  ACs	  that	  better	  fits	  the	  category	  strong	  state-­‐wide	  nationalistic	  ACs,	  and	  thus	  those	  ACs	  within	  subset	  A.1.	  According	  to	  the	  study	  2,829,	  “Barómetro	  autonómico	  (II)”,	  conducted	  by	  the	  CIS	   between	   January	   and	   March,	   2010	   (CIS, 2010),	   these	   are	   the	   most	   read	  newspapers	   for	   the	   ACs	   within	   subsets	   A.140	  (we	   are	   only	   considering	   those	  newspapers	  which	  are	  read	  by	  at	  least	  5%	  of	  the	  respondents):	  
-­‐Castile-­‐	   La	  Mancha:	   El	   País	   (31.7%),	   El	   Mundo	   (17.5%),	   ABC	   (9.5%),	   La	   Razón	  (5.3%).	  
-­‐Valencia:	  El	  País	   (19.3%),	  Levante	   (18.6%),	   Información	  de	  Alicante	   (17.7%),	  El	  Mundo	  (11.5%),	  Las	  Provincias	  (11.2%).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  The	   wording	   of	   the	   question,	   only	   formulated	   to	   those	   aged	   18	   or	   more	   who	   admit	  reading	   the	   newspaper,	   is:	   “And	   what	   newspaper	   do	   you	   prefer	   to	   follow	   political	  information?”.	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-­‐Castile	  and	  León:	  El	  Norte	  de	  Castilla	  (21.6%),	  El	  País	  (14.3%),	  El	  Mundo	  (11.2%),	  Diario	  de	  Burgos	  (8.6%),	  La	  Opinión,	  el	  Correo	  de	  Zamora	  (7.3%),	  Diario	  de	  León	  (6.8%).	  
-­‐Madrid:	   El	   País	   (38.0%),	   El	   Mundo	   (19.3%),	   ABC	   (8.8%),	   La	   Razón	   (6.4%),	   20	  Minutos	  (6.2%).	  
We	  have	   consulted	   the	   front	   pages	   of	   these	   newspapers	   for	   two	   symbolic	   dates,	  exemplifying	   those	   flag-­‐waving	   situations	   commented	   by	   Billig	   as	   moments	   of	  special	   patriotic	   meaning.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   September,	   the	   11th,	   national	   day	   of	  Catalonia,	  while	   the	  second	  day	  will	  be	  October,	  12th,	  national	  day	  of	  Spain41.	  We	  have	  chosen	  the	  national	  day	  of	  Catalonia	  because	  the	  national	  question	  in	  Spain	  is	  very	  much	   focused	   on	   Catalonia,	   since	   the	   Catalan	   elections	   held	   on	   November,	  25th,	  2012,	  which	  were	  anticipated	  by	  the	  Catalan	  government,	  and	  presented	  by	  CiU	  –the	  coalition	  in	  government	  at	  that	  time–,	  as	  a	  monographic	  election	  around	  independence,	  explicitly	  defended	  by	  Convergència	  Democràtica	  de	  Catalunya,	  one	  of	  the	  two	  political	  parties	  making	  up	  the	  governing	  coalition	  –some	  leaders	  of	  the	  other	   party,	   Unió	   Democràtica	   de	   Catalunya,	   have	   shown	   some	   reluctance	   to	  independence,	  however	  (Piñol, 2012)–.	  We	  have	  analyzed	  the	  headlines	  regarding	  these	  two	  symbolic	  days	  in	  four	  front	  pages	  for	  each	  newspaper,	  the	  day	  after	  each	  celebration:	   September	   the	  12th,	   and	  October	   the	  13th,	   2013;	  we	  have	   also	   taken	  into	  account	  the	  year	  2012	  in	  order	  to	  widen	  our	  data.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  The	  first	  day,	  also	  “Diada	  Nacional	  de	  Catalunya”,	  commemorates	  the	  fall	  of	  Barcelona,	  defeated	  by	  the	  Bourbon	  Spanish	  troops	  during	  the	  War	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Succession,	  on	  11	  September	   1714.	   The	   second	   day	   is	   the	   “Fiesta	   Nacional	   de	   España”,	   also	   “Dia	   de	   la	  Hispanidad”,	   Spain’s	   national	   day,	   commemorating	   Columbus	   discovery	   of	   America,	   on	  October,	  12th,	  1492.	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Regarding	  the	  “National	  Day	  of	  Catalonia”	  we	  have	  obtained	  the	  following	  results.	  There	  are	  eight	  different	  subjects	   in	  the	  front-­‐page	  headlines	  of	  12	  October	  2012	  and	  2013:	  
1. Independence	  2. Catalonia	  3. CiU	  4. Diada	  5. Spanish	  Government	  6. Pro-­‐independence	  movement	  7. Artur	  Mas	  8. Barcelona	  
The	   first	   one,	   “independence”,	   is	   referred	   to	   in	   a	   neutral	   way	   three	   times,	   as	   a	  “historical	  display	  of	  force”.	  This	  neutrality,	  however,	  is	  questioned	  by	  an	  obvious	  deixis	   at	   work,	   making	   clear	   that	   it	   is	   not	   “our”	   independence,	   but	   the	  independence	   of	   “others”	   and	   thus	   reproducing	   the	   conflict	   between	   two	  differentiated	  national	  projects.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  time,	  independence	  is	  referred	  in	  a	  negative	  way:	   twice	   as	   a	   “game	   out	   of	  Mas’	   hands”42	  and,	   therefore,	   as	   a	   kind	   of	  political	   strategy	   emanated	   from	   the	  Catalan	   elites	   –the	  president	   of	   the	  Catalan	  government,	   in	   this	   case-­‐,	   which	   is	   getting	   out	   of	   control;	   this	   view	   is	   implicitly	  neglecting	   the	   rival	   vision	   of	   “independence”	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   pro-­‐independence	  popular	  movement.	   Independence	   is	  also	   referred	   to	  as	   “brag”	  and	  as	   “defiance”.	  These	   two	  expressions,	  apart	   from	  their	  obvious	  negative	  connotation,	   introduce	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Artur	  Mas	   is	  currently	  –September	  2013–	   the	  president	  of	   the	  Generalitat,	   the	  Catalan	  autonomous	  government.	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again	  a	  kind	  of	  homeland	  deixis	  (Billig,	  1995:	  105-­‐109)	  –for	  a	  general	  discussion	  on	   deixis	   practices	   see	   Jarvella	   and	   Klein	   (1982)–.	   This	   homeland	   deixis	  contributes	   to	   the	   social	   construction	   of	   two	   communities:	   one	   that	   defies	   and	  another	  one	  that	  is	  defied,	  or	  bragged,	  by	  the	  former.	  
The	  second	  subject	  is	  Catalonia.	  This	  is	  referred	  as	  “chained”,	  an	  obvious	  negative	  reference.	  The	  logic	  of	  this	  headline	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  pro-­‐independence	  movement	   organized	   a	   human	   chain	   on	   the	   “National	   Day	   of	   Catalonia”,	   thus	  reversing	  the	  democratic,	  peaceful,	  connotations	  pursued	  by	  the	  organizers	  of	  that	  initiative.	  
The	  third	  subject	  is	  CiU,	  the	  governing	  party	  in	  Catalonia.	  It	   is	  said	  that	  CiU	  “stirs	  the	   powder	   keg”;	   here	   the	   negative	   connotation	   is	   again	   obvious,	   although	   this	  time	  it	  has	  military,	  armed	  conflict,	  connotations.	  
The	  fourth	  subject	  is	  the	  “Diada”,	  a	  popular	  Catalan	  word	  for	  the	  “National	  Day	  of	  Catalonia”.	   The	   “diada”	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   defiance,	   again	   a	   negative	   term	   and,	  again,	   we	   see	   how	   it	   is	   reproduced	   a	   deixis	   by	   which	   two	   communities	   are	  constructed	   in	   discourse,	   for	   at	   least	   two	   subjects	   are	   needed	   if	   one	   of	   them	   is	  defying.	  
The	  fifth	  subject	   is	  the	  “Spanish	  Government”,	  which	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “inhibited”,	  carrying	  an	  implicit	  accusation	  of	  softness	  towards	  the	  Catalan	  pro-­‐independence	  events.	  
The	   sixth	   subject	   is	   the	   “pro-­‐independence	  movement”,	   although	   this	   time	   is	   an	  implied	  subject.	  The	  headline	  says	  only	  “They	  will	  not	  divide	  us”,	  and	  thus	  we	  find	  a	   clear	   reproduction	   of	   a	   deixis	   claiming	   the	   existing	   of	   a	   “them”	   –Catalan	   pro-­‐
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independence	   population–,	   and	   of	   an	   “us”	   –Spaniards–,	   as	   well	   as	   an	   implicit	  declaration	   of	   Spanish	   nationalism,	   alluding	   to	   the	   national	   integrity	   of	   Spain’s	  territory,	   which	   would	   include	   Catalonia.	   The	   message	   is	   also	   negative,	   as	   it	  presupposes	  a	  threat	  upon	  Spanish	  territorial	  integrity,	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Catalan	  pro-­‐independence	  movement.	  
The	   seventh	   subject	   is	  Artur	  Mas,	   the	  president	  of	   the	  Catalan	   government.	  Two	  headlines	   say	   that	   Mas	   “demands	   another	   tax	   treatment”,	   in	   what	   could	   be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  neutral	   assertion.	  The	  eighth	  and	  ninth	   subjects	  –Barcelona	  and	  the	  pro-­‐independence	  chain-­‐	  are	  also	  referred	  to	   in	  a	  neutral	  way	  –“collapsed	  by	  pro-­‐independence	   demonstrators”,	   the	   former,	   object	   of	   “massive	   support”,	   the	  latter–.	  	  
In	   summary,	   we	   can	   say	   that	   the	  majority	   of	  messages	   are	   negative,	   sometimes	  characterized	   by	   strong	   belligerent	   connotations	   and	   only	   in	   a	   few	   cases	   the	  subjects	  are	  referred	  to	  in	  a	  neutral	  way.	  
Regarding	   the	  other	  national	  day,	   the	   “National	  Day	  of	   Spain”,	  we	  have	  done	   the	  following	  analysis.	  There	  are	  only	  four	  different	  subjects:	  
1. The	  Spanish	  monarchy	  (the	  King	  and	  the	  Prince)	  2. The	  pro-­‐independence	  movement	  3. Artur	  Mas	  4. Unionist	  demonstration	  in	  Catalonia	  
Regarding	  the	  monarchy,	  all	  the	  headlines	  treat	  it	  in	  a	  positive	  way,	  depicting	  it	  as	  an	   institution	   that	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   Catalan	   pro-­‐independence	   movement,	  seen	  as	  a	  “problem”.	  The	  king	  of	  Spain	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  four	  different	  headlines,	  all	  
	   172	  
of	  them	  stating	  that	  “the	  king	  addresses	  Rajoy	  –Spanish	  Prime	  Minister–,	  to	  discuss	  Catalonia”,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  military	  parade.	  The	  prince	  of	  Spain	  is	  also	  a	  subject	  in	   three	   headlines,	   which	   make	   quotation	   of	   a	   prince’s	   speech,	   stating	   that	  “Catalonia	  is	  not	  a	  problem”	  and	  that	  the	  Spanish	  national	  day	  is	  a	  day	  to	  “celebrate	  what	  unite	  us”;	  this	  last	  statement	  is	  quoted	  twice,	  and	  it	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  deixis	  alluding	   a	   Spanish	   national	   “us”	   while	   stating	   that	   Catalonia	   is	   a	   part	   of	   that	  national	  “us”,	  in	  which	  we	  unite.	  The	  monarchy	  is	  thus	  presented	  as	  a	  key	  actor	  for	  tackling	   with	   the	   Catalan	   question	   in	   a	   context	   where	   the	   Government	   is	   being	  criticized	  by	  its	  alleged	  “inhibition”	  or	  lack	  of	  action	  on	  the	  matter	  (see	  above	  the	  analysis	  for	  the	  “Catalan	  National	  Day”).	  
The	  pro-­‐independence	  movement	  is	  referred	  in	  a	  very	  negative	  way,	  stating	  in	  one	  front	  page	  headline	  that	  it	  is	  “bleeding“	  the	  main	  political	  parties	  of	  Spain,	  the	  PP	  and	  the	  PSOE,	  and	  of	  Catalonia,	  CiU,	  alluding	  to	  the	  electoral	  effects	  that	  this	  issue	  is	  playing	  in	  both	  Spanish	  and	  Catalan	  politics.	  
Artur	   Mas,	   the	   president	   of	   the	   Catalan	   government,	   is	   also	   referred	   in	   a	   very	  negative	   way.	   A	   headline	   states	   that	   “Mas	   announces	   in	   the	   “Fiesta	   Nacional”	  (Spanish	  National	  Day)	  that	  he	  will	  try	  to	  destroy	  Spain”.	  
Finally,	   we	   find	  many	   references	   to	   a	   unionist	   demonstration	   that	   took	   place	   in	  Catalonia.	   It	   is	   referred	   neutrally,	   as	   a	   demonstration	   “against	   independence”,	  “pro-­‐Spanish	   constitution”	   or	   “massive	   pro-­‐unionist	   demonstration”.	   It	   is	   also	  referred	   to	   in	   a	   positive	   way,	   stating	   that	   the	   Catalans	   demonstrating	   are	  “Spaniards	   from	   the	   heart”,	   remembering	   Janowitz’s	   (1983)	   differentiation	  between	  patriotism	  and	  nationalism,	  the	  former	  involving	  feelings	  of	  love,	  and	  the	  latter	  of	  hate.	  Also	  Bar-­‐Tal	  (1993)	  dichotomy	  between	  patriotism	  –which	  would	  be	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related	  to	  good	  feelings	  of	  integration	  within	  the	  country–	  and	  nationalism	  –which	  would	  involve	  bad	  feelings	  of	  chauvinism	  and	  hate–43.	  Finally	  we	  can	  say	  that	  these	  unionist	   Catalans	  demonstrators	   are	   victimized	   in	   a	   couple	   of	   times,	   stating	   that	  the	  “cry	  of	  the	  silent	  minority”	  “demand	  protection	  against	  separatism”.	  
Table	  X	  below	  summarizes	  our	  qualitative	  analysis	  for	  the	  ACs	  within	  sub-­‐set	  A.1	  and	   thus,	   constitutive	   of	   our	   analytical	   category	   “strong	   state-­‐wide	   nationalistic	  ACs”.	   It	   shows	   an	   inversion	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  messages,	   depending	   on	  which	  context	  these	  are	  published;	  the	  messages	  are	  mainly	  negative	  when	  talking	  about	  the	   “Catalan	  National	  Day”	   and	  mainly	   positive	  when	   talking	   about	   the	   “Spanish	  National	   Day”.	   We	   see,	   moreover,	   how	   a	   discursive	   construction	   of	   national	  identity	   is	   fundamentally	   carried	   out	   within	   news	   published	   on	   the	   “Catalan	  National	   Day”,	   in	   what	   could	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   attempt	   of	   neutralize	   the	  discursive	   construction	   of	   the	   Catalan	   national	   project.	   Neutral	   messages	  constitute,	  in	  both	  cases,	  a	  minority	  of	  news	  publications.	  
Table	  X.	  Classification	  of	  the	  headlines	  published	  in	  the	  front	  page	  of	  the	  
main	  newspapers	  in	  those	  ACs	  within	  A.1	  sub-­‐set	  	   Negative	  messages	   Positive	  messages	   Neutral	  messages	   Homeland	  deixis	  Front	  page	  headlines	  published	  the	  day	  after	   the	   “Catalan	   National	   Day”,	  September	  12th,	  2012	  and	  2013	   9	  	  (60.0%)	   0	  	  (0%)	   6	  	  (40.0%)	   7	  Front	  page	  headlines	  published	  the	  day	  after	   the	   “Spanish	   National	   Day”,	  October	  13th,	  2012	  and	  2013	   2	  	  (14.3%)	   9	  	  (64.3%)	   3	  	  (21.4%)	   1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  These	   differentiations	   have	   been	   criticized	   by	   Billig,	   as	   mere	   rhetoric	   with	   no	   solid	  empirical	  basis	  (Billig,	  1995:	  55-­‐59).	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3.2.2.6.2	  Strong	  sub-­‐state	  nationalistic	  ACs	  In	  this	  section	  we	  are	  going	  to	  reproduce	  our	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  most	  read	  newspapers	  for	  each	  AC,	  this	  time	  applied	  to	  those	  ACs	  which	  we	  call	  “strong	  sub-­‐state	  nationalistic	  ACs”.	  These	  are	  those	  ACs	  included	  in	  subset	  B.2,	   i.e.	  Catalonia,	  the	  Basque	  Country	  and	  Navarre	  –although	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  the	  strong	  sub-­‐state	  nationalism	  at	  stake	  in	  Navarre	  is	  actually	  Basque–.	  Again,	  we	  draw	  upon	  data	  available	  in	  the	  study	  2,829	  “Barómetro	  autonómico	  (II)”,	  at	  the	  CIS,	  to	  check	  which	  are	  the	  most	  read	  newspapers	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  ACs	  –and	  again	  we	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  those	  newspapers	  read	  by	  at	  least	  5%	  of	  the	  respondents-­‐.	  
-­‐Catalonia:	   El	   Periódico	   de	   Catalunya	   (27.0%),	   La	   Vanguardia	   (24.7%),	   El	   País	  (9.4%),	  El	  Punt	  (5.7%).	  
-­‐The	   Basque	   Country:	   El	   Correo	   (42.8%),	   El	   Diario	   Vasco	   (25.6%),	   Gara	   (6.9%),	  Deia	  (6.9%).	  
-­‐Navarre:	  Diario	  de	  Navarra	  (56.9%),	  Diario	  de	  Noticias	  (25.1%).	  
The	  first	  thing	  that	  calls	  our	  attention	  is	  the	  almost	  complete	  absence	  of	  state-­‐wide	  Spanish	   newspapers	   –there	   is	   the	   exception	   of	   El	   País,	   which	   holds	   a	   9.4%	   of	  readers	  in	  Catalonia-­‐.	  This	  is	  already	  telling	  us	  about	  a	  detachment	  of	  the	  Spanish	  national	  project,	  as	  its	  media	  is	  barely	  present	  within	  these	  three	  ACs.	  Let	  us	  now	  examine	  the	  front-­‐page	  headlines	  for	  the	  days	  after	  our	  two	  flag-­‐waving	  situation.	  
These	   are	   the	   five	   subjects	   present	   in	   the	   issues	   published	   after	   the	   Catalan	  National	  Day,	  12	  October	  2012	  and	  2013:	  
-­‐Diada	  
-­‐The	  Catalan	  people	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-­‐Pro-­‐independence	  movement	  
-­‐Catalonia	  
-­‐The	  Catalan	  Pathway44	  
The	   first	   one,	   the	   Diada	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   “historical”,	   once,	   and	   “multitudinous”,	  twice.	  It	  is	  also	  said	  to	  be	  a	  “celebration”.	  These	  are	  all	  positive	  views	  of	  the	  Diada,	  a	   popular	   expression	   for	   the	   National	   Day	   of	   Catalonia,	   for	   they	   depict	   it	   as	   a	  success	  in	  both	  historical	  and	  social	  terms.	  Finally	  it	  is	  also	  called	  “the	  Diada	  of	  the	  independence”,	   which	   could	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   neutral	   expression,	   although	   it	  could	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  comment	  is	  discursively	  constructing	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  independence	  in	  the	  future,	  while	  identifying	  this	  Diada	  as	  its	  starting	  point,	  highlighting	  its	  historical	  relevance.	  
The	  Catalan	  people	  is	  often	  used	  to	  stress	  the	  roundness	  of	  the	  mobilization	  and,	  hence,	   discursively	   constructing	   a	   narrative	   by	   which	   the	   Catalan	   people	   is	  identified	  as	  the	  agent	  producing	  the	  mobilization.	  This	  is	  a	  clear	  contrast	  with	  the	  discourse	  found	  in	  the	  press	  published	  in	  those	  ACs	  within	  sub-­‐set	  A.1,	  where	  the	  agents	  are	  situated	  outside	   the	   “Catalan	  people”.	  Underneath	   these	  differences	   is	  the	   national	   conflict,	   as	   on	   the	   one	   hand	  we	   have	   a	   discursive	   construction	   of	   a	  Catalan	  nationality	  –the	  people	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  sovereignty–,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  we	  find	  a	  discursive	  de-­‐construction	  of	  that	  Catalan	  nationality	  –focusing	  on	  other	  subjects	   as	   agents	   of	   the	   mobilizations,	   without	   naming	   a	   Catalan	   people-­‐.	   This	  conflict	   engages	   with	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   origins	   of	   nations,	   as	   a	   product	   of	  modernity	  where	   it	   is	   produced	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   subject	   sovereignty,	   as	   the	  people	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  The	   Catalan	   Pathway	   was	   organized	   as	   a	   human	   chain	   crossing	   the	   entire	   Catalan	  territory	  during	  the	  “Catalan	  National	  Day”	  in	  2013.	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substituted	   God’s	   will	   (Hobsbawm,	   1991:	   14).	   Thus,	   it	   is	   used	   the	   expression	  “hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  Catalans	  take	  the	  streets	  with	  the	  ‘estelada’45	  as	  a	  symbol”,	  which	  we	  will	   interpret	  as	  an	  expression	  of	   the	  homeland	  deixis;	   this	  structure	  –large	   mobilization	   and	   “the	   Catalan	   people”	   as	   the	   subject	   of	   sovereignty-­‐	   is	  repeated	   eight	   times.	   It	   also	   appears	   implied	   in	   the	   headline	   “Decided”,	   written	  over	  a	  large	  image	  of	  the	  demonstration.	  
Pro-­‐independence	  movement	  is	  also	  cited	  many	  times	  in	  the	  headlines	  that	  we	  are	  reviewing.	  It	  is	  said	  that	  this	  movement	  “claim”	  to	  Mas	  for	  a	  2014	  referendum,	  thus	  reversing	  the	   logic	  of	   the	  headlines	  analyzed	   for	  ACs	   in	  sub-­‐set	  A.1	  –headlines	   in	  A.1	  ACs	  argued	  that	  the	  mobilization	  was	  promoted	  by	  Mas,	  while	  the	  headlines	  for	  B.2	   ACs	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   the	   pro-­‐independence	   movement	   which	   is	   forcing	   the	  president	  to	  fight	  for	  the	  referendum-­‐;	  again	  we	  see	  the	  discursive	  fight,	  between	  those	  trying	  to	  construct	  the	  nation	  and	  those	  trying	  to	  deconstruct	  it.	  We	  see	  that	  the	  media	  pattern	  already	  explained	   for	   the	   “Catalan	  people”	   is	  now	   reproduced	  for	  the	  “pro-­‐independence”	  movement,	  as	  it	  is	  frequently	  referred	  to	  as	  historically	  determinant	  and	  subject	  of	  great	  support.	  We	   find	  eight	  examples	  of	   this	  pattern	  among	  the	  headlines.	  
Catalonia	   appears	   four	   times	   as	   a	   personalized	   subject,	   as	   in	   “Catalonia	   says	  enough”.	  This	  personalization	  of	  the	  nation	  equals	  it	  with	  the	  Catalan	  people,	  as	  the	  nation	   is	   the	   embodiment	   of	   its	   people.	   Catalonia	   appears	   also	   objectified,	   as	   in	  “Catalonia	  is	  not	  Spain”,	  one	  of	  the	  mottos	  uttered	  during	  the	  demonstrations.	  
Finally,	   the	   Catalan	   Pathway	   always	   appears	   as	   a	   positive	   reinforcement	   of	   the	  previous	   assertions.	   We	   have,	   for	   instance,	   a	   headline	   saying,	   “Hundreds	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Catalan	  flag	  associated	  with	  the	  pro-­‐independence	  movement.	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thousands	  of	  people	  complete	  the	  400	  kms	  of	  the	  Catalan	  Pathway”.	  This	  positive	  reinforcement	  appears	  twice.	  
In	  relation	  with	  the	  “National	  Day	  of	  Spain”,	  we	  have	  registered	  eight	  subjects:	  




-­‐Spanish	  monarchy	  (King	  and	  Prince)	  
-­‐The	  Basque	  people	  
-­‐The	  Basque	  police	  
-­‐Fascism/Violence	  
José	  Ignacio	  Wert	  is	  the	  Spanish	  Minister	  of	  Education,	  Culture	  and	  Sport.	  He	  holds	  a	  central	  position	  within	  the	  Spanish	  national	  conflict	  largely	  because	  a	  statement	  that	  he	  uttered	  in	  the	  Spanish	  Parliament:	  “Our	  interest	  is	  to	  Spanishize	  the	  Catalan	  children”	  (Vanguardia,	  2012).	  The	  National	  Day	  of	  Spain	  took	  place	  in	  a	  few	  days	  after	  his	  polemic	  statement,	  thus	  attracting	  media	  attention.	  It	  is	  referred	  twice	  in	  a	  negative	  way,	  with	  newspapers	  often	  explaining	  that	  the	  Spanish	  King	  addressed	  the	  Spanish	  Prime	  Minister	  during	   the	  celebrations	   in	  order	   to	   talk	  about	  Wert’s	  statement.	  We	  find	  headlines	  such	  as	  “poor	  Wert”	  or	  “A	  royal	  slap	  on	  the	  ears:	  the	  king	  nags	  Rajoy	  due	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Education’s	  purpose	  of	  ‘Spanishize’	  Catalan	  children”.	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Spanish	   Prime	   Minister,	   Mariano	   Rajoy,	   appears	   as	   a	   neutral	   subject,	   with	  headlines	  focused	  on	  his	  conversation	  with	  the	  King	  regarding	  Wert’s	  utterances.	  It	   is	   also	   treated	   twice	   as	   a	   passive	   subject,	   being	   pressured	   by	   the	   pro-­‐independence	  movement.	  
Pro-­‐union	  demonstrators	   are	   object	   of	  many	   critics,	   both	   explicit	   and	   implicit.	   It	  appears	   twice	   in	   a	   slightly	   negative	   way,	   as	   in	   “the	   anti-­‐independence	  demonstration	   drew	   several	   thousands	   in	   Barcelona”;	   this	   could	   be	   a	   neutral	  headline,	   but	   the	   demonstration’s	   goals	   are	   depicted	   in	   a	   negative	   way	   –“anti-­‐independence”	   instead	   of	   “pro-­‐union”–.	   Pro-­‐union	   demonstrators	   are	   accused	   of	  having	   been	   violent	   in	   the	   past,	   stating	   that	   it	   was	   a	   success	   for	   them	   to	  demonstrate	  in	  a	  pacific	  way	  in	  2013;	  headlines	  for	  the	  pro-­‐union	  demonstration	  of	   2012	   also	   reproduce	   this	   accusation,	   as	   in	   “Tension	   in	   the	   “Fiesta	   Nacional”,	  published	   on	   October,	   13th,	   2012.	   Two	   newspapers	   stated	   that	   the	   pro-­‐union	  demonstration	   failure	   in	   attracting	   a	   large	   number	   of	   people,	   as	   we	   can	   see	   in	  “Modest	   pro-­‐Spanish	   demonstration”	   or	   in	   “Pro-­‐unionism	   deflates”.	   One	  newspaper,	   however,	   referred	   to	   pro-­‐union	   demonstrators	   in	   a	   positive	   way,	  qualifying	   the	  march	   as	   “multitudinous”.	   Conversely	   to	  what	   happened	  with	   the	  Catalan	   people,	   treated	   as	   the	   subject	   responsible	   for	   the	   pro-­‐independence	  demonstration,	   pro-­‐union	   demonstrations	   are	   seen	   as	   being	   the	   product	   of	   the	  efforts	  of	  two	  political	  parties,	   the	  PP	  and	  Ciutadans,	  both	  pro-­‐unionists:	  “The	  PP	  and	   Ciutadans	   celebrate	   12-­‐O	   and	   gathered	   around	   thirty	   thousand	   people	   in	  Barcelona”.	  The	  same	  mechanism	  of	  national	  de-­‐construction	  through	  discourse	  is	  once	  more	  clearly	  deployed.	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The	   Spanish	   monarchy	   appears	   in	   a	   similar	   way	   than	   it	   did	   in	   the	   newspapers	  published	  in	  A.1	  ACs,	  as	  a	  key	  mediating	  institution.	  We	  find	  this	  positive	  message	  in	  four	  newspapers.	  
The	  Basque	  people	  and	  police	  are	   introduced	   in	   two	  Basque	  newspapers,	   stating	  that	   “17%	   of	   Basques	   supports	   that	   the	   new	   Government	   boost	   independence”.	  This	   shows	   an	   absolute	   disconnection	  with	   the	   Spanish	   national	   project,	   for	   the	  “Spanish	  National	  Day”	  is	  not	  even	  commented.	  The	  Basque	  police	  appears	  in	  one	  newspaper,	   being	   accused	   of	   collaborating	   in	   the	   clearance	   of	   a	   garden	   where	  “Spanish	  fascism	  will	  be	  exalted”.	  
Finally,	   fascist	   violence	   or	   simple	   violence	   is	   also	   referred	   three	   times,	   after	   the	  events	   that	   took	   place	   in	   Madrid	   during	   the	   Catalan	   National	   Day,	   201346.	   One	  newspaper	  published	  that	  one	  of	  the	  aggressors	  was	  a	  participant	   in	  a	  pro-­‐union	  demonstration:	   “One	   of	   the	   Blanquerna	   attackers	   attends	   the	   extremist	  demonstration,	  controlled	  by	  the	  Mossos”47.	  
Table	  XI	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  results	  of	  our	  qualitative	  analysis	  for	  the	  ACs	  within	  sub-­‐set	  B.2,	  that	  we	  labeled	  “strong	  sub-­‐state	  nationalistic	  ACs”.	  We	  quickly	  recognize	  the	  inversion	  of	  negative	  and	  positive	  messages,	  regarding	  our	  previous	  analysis	   for	   those	   strong	   statewide	   nationalistic	   ACs.	   We	   think	   that	   these	   data	  supports	   our	   hypothesis	   on	   Spanish	   national	   conflict,	   which	   we	   expressed	   as	   a	  strong	  open	  conflict	  within	  strong	  nationalistic	  ACs.	  We	  have	  here	  more	  messages	  than	  we	  had	  for	  the	  strong	  state-­‐wide	  nationalistic	  ACs,	  as	  expected,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  During	  the	  Catalan	  National	  Day,	  several	  extreme-­‐right	   individuals	  sabotaged	  an	  act	  of	  celebration	   of	   several	   Catalan	   institutions	   that	   was	   taking	   place	   in	   the	   Blanquerna	  Bookshop,	  in	  Madrid;	  twelve	  people	  were	  arrested	  (ElPais,	  2013).	  47	  Mossos	  d’Esquadra	  is	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Catalan	  autonomous	  police.	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that	   it	   is	   the	  Catalan	  nationalism	  the	  one	  which	   introduced	   its	  claims	  on	  Spanish	  public	   agenda	   (McCombs	   and	   Shaw,	   1972;	   Behr	   and	   Iyengar,	   1985),	   after	   the	  massive	  pro-­‐independence	  demonstration	  on	  September,	  11th,	  2012.	  We	  take	  the	  proliferation	  of	  the	  homeland	  deixis	  as	  the	  expression	  in	  discourse	  of	  the	  political	  battle	  that	  is	  taking	  place	  among	  competing	  national	  projects.	  
	  
Table	  XI.	  Classification	  of	  the	  headlines	  published	  in	  the	  front	  page	  of	  the	  
main	  newspapers	  in	  those	  ACs	  within	  B.2	  sub-­‐set	  	   Negative	  messages	   Positive	  messages	   Neutral	  messages	   Homeland	  deixis	  Front	  page	  headlines	  published	  the	  day	  after	   the	   “Catalan	   National	   Day”,	  September	  12th,	  2012	  and	  2013	   0	  	  (0%)	   24	  (92.3%)	   2	  (7.7%)	   9	  Front	  page	  headlines	  published	  the	  day	  after	   the	   “Spanish	   National	   Day”,	  October	  13th,	  2012	  and	  2013	   9	  (56.3%)	   5	  (31.3%)	   2	  (12.5%)	   7	  	  
3.2.2.6.3	  Weakly	  nationalized	  ACs	  This	  section	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  media	  analysis	  of	  those	  ACs	  within	  subsets	  A.2	  and	  B.1,	   which,	   we	   have	   argued,	   are	   characterized	   by	   being	   weakly	   nationalized	   in	  either	  Spanish	  or	  alternative	  sub-­‐national	  projects.	  This	  feature	  should	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  media,	  as	  a	  mild	  national	  conflict,	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  one	  that	  is	  taking	  place	  within	  ACs	  in	  subsets	  A.1	  and	  B.2.	  We	  are	  going	  to	  address,	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  the	  analysis	   for	   those	  ACs	  within	  subset	  A.1,	  and	  thus	  weakly	  nationalized	   in	   the	  Spanish	   national	   project.	   We	   are	   going	   to	   use	   the	   same	   methodology	   that	   we	  already	  used	  before,	   so	  we	  will	   avoid	   a	  detailed	   explanation	  of	   the	  procedure	   in	  this	  section.	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Weakly	  state-­‐wide	  nationalized	  ACs	  within	  subset	  A.2	  The	  ACs	  within	  subset	  A.2,	  weakly	  nationalized	  in	  the	  Spanish	  national	  project,	  are	  the	  following:	  
	   -­‐La	  Rioja	  
	   -­‐Cantabria	  
	   -­‐Andalusia	  
	   -­‐Aragon	  
	   -­‐Extremadura	  
	   -­‐Asturias	  
According	  to	  CIS’	  study	  2,829,	  Barómetro	  autonómico	   II,	   these	  are	   the	  most	  read	  newspapers	  for	  each	  of	  these	  ACs	  (more	  than	  5%	  of	  readers):	  
-­‐La	  Rioja:	  La	  Rioja	  (63.8%),	  El	  Pais	  (12.6%).	  
-­‐Cantabria:	  El	  Diario	  Montanes	   (64.7%),	  Alerta	   (9.8%),	  El	  Mundo	   (7.2%),	  El	  Pais	  (5.5%).	  
-­‐Andalusia:	   El	   Pais	   (19.8%),	   Diario	   Sur	   (11.4%),	   Ideal	   (9.4%),	   El	  Mundo	   (7.9%),	  ABC	  (7.9%),	  Diario	  de	  Cadiz	  (5.1%).	  
-­‐Aragon:	  Heraldo	  de	  Aragon	  (60.1%),	  El	  Pais	  (10.0%),	  El	  Mundo	  (5.9%),	  Diario	  de	  Alto	  Aragon	  (6.9%).	  
-­‐Extremadura:	   Hoy,	   Diario	   de	   Extremadura	   (64.8%),	   Periodico	   de	   Extremadura	  (11.5%),	  El	  Pais	  (9.3%).	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-­‐Asturias:	  La	  Nueva	  España	  (62.1%),	  La	  Voz	  de	  Aviles	  (22.9%),	  El	  Pais	  (6.7%).	  
The	  subjects	  for	  the	  front-­‐page	  headlines	  within	  the	  day	  after	  the	  “Catalan	  National	  Day”	  in	  2012	  and	  2013	  were:	  
-­‐Independence	  
-­‐Catalan	  pro-­‐independence	  movement	  
-­‐Catalonia	  
-­‐CiU	  
-­‐The	  Spanish	  Government	  
Independence,	  the	  first	  one	  of	  the	  subjects	  alluded	  in	  these	  headlines,	  is	  neutrally	  referred	  as	  a	   “historical	  display	  of	   force”.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  during	   the	  analysis	  of	  A.1	   ACs,	   there	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   deixis	   involved	   in	   these	   headlines,	   discursively	  constructing	   independence	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   “others”.	   We	   have	   registered	   this	  discourse	   in	   the	   headlines	   of	   six	   different	   newspapers.	   We	   have	   also	   negative	  messages	  related	  to	  this	  subject,	  as	  a	  “game	  out	  of	  Mas’	  hands”,	  found	  twice;	  as	  we	  commented	   above,	   this	   assertion	   involves	   a	   discursive	   construction	   of	  independence	  as	  emanated	  from	  Catalan	  political	  elites,	  going	  out	  of	  control.	  As	  we	  have	   seen,	   this	   vision	   of	   independence,	   neglects	   the	   rival	   discourse	   of	  “independence	  as	  the	  product	  of	  a	  popular	  movement”.	  	  
The	  Catalan	  pro-­‐independence	  movement	  appears	  several	  times	  as	  a	  subject	  in	  our	  headlines.	  It	  is	  presented	  in	  a	  neutral	  way,	  as	  having	  displayed	  its	  force,	  six	  times.	  It	   is	   also	   presented	   in	   a	   negative	   way,	   identifying	   it	   with	   a	   “defiance”	   in	   four	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different	   times,	   reproducing	   a	   Spanish	   deixis	   as	   well,	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	  A.1	  ACs.	  
Catalonia	  appears	  in	  a	  negative	  manner	  once,	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  “chained”.	  It	  is	  also	  presented	  once	   in	   a	  negative	  way,	  while	   reproducing	   a	  deixis	   reconstructing	   the	  Catalan	   national	   project,	   in	   “Catalonia	   uses	   a	   multitudinous	   pro-­‐independence	  march	  to	  ask	  the	  State	  for	  more	  money”,	  and	  thus	  depicting	  “Catalonia”	  as	  an	  entity	  instrumentalizing	  the	  protests	  in	  a	  materialistic	  way.	  
The	  negative	  reference	  to	  CiU	  is	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  analysis	  for	  A.1	  ACs,	  “CiU	  stirs	  the	  powder	  keg”,	  already	  commented.	  
Finally,	   the	   reference	   to	   the	   Spanish	   Government	   is	   also	   the	   same	   as	   in	   the	  previous	  analysis	  for	  A.1	  ACs,	  as	  “inhibited”,	  in	  a	  negative	  way.	  
Let	  us	  analyze	  now	  the	  headlines	  of	  the	  day	  after	  the	  “Spanish	  National	  Day”.	  We	  have	  found	  the	  following	  subjects	  in	  the	  newspapers	  distributed	  in	  those	  ACs	  that	  we	  called	  weakly	  nationalized	  in	  the	  Spanish	  national	  project,	  subset	  A.2:	  
-­‐The	  Spanish	  monarchy	  (the	  King	  and	  the	  Prince)	  
-­‐The	  Catalan	  pro-­‐independence	  movement	  
-­‐Artur	  Mas	  
-­‐The	  Catalan	  pro-­‐union	  movement	  
The	  Spanish	  monarchy	  appears	   in	   the	   same	  way	  as	   in	   the	  ACs	  within	   subset	  A.1	  and	   B.2.	   This	   positive	   reference	   as	   a	   key	   mediating	   institution	   is	   found	   in	   ten	  different	  newspapers.	  We	  have	  also	  found	  two	  neutral	  references	  to	  the	  Prince,	  in	  “The	  Prince	  presides,	   together	  with	  Letizia,	  his	   first	  military	  parade	  of	   the	  Fiesta	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Nacional”,	  and	  in	  “Don	  Felipe	  stars	  in	  the	  reception	  with	  a	  message	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  King”.	  
The	   Catalan	   pro-­‐independence	   movement	   appears	   negatively	   once,	   in	   the	   same	  way	  described	  during	  the	  analysis	  of	  A.1	  ACs,	  as	  “bleeding”	  the	  main	  Spanish	  and	  Catalan	  political	  parties.	  
Artur	  Mas,	   president	  of	   the	  Catalan	  Government,	   appears	  negatively	  once,	   in	   the	  same	   way	   described	   above,	   for	   A.1	   ACs,	   in	   the	   headline	   “Mas	   announces	   in	   the	  “Fiesta	  Nacional”	  (Spanish	  National	  Day)	  that	  he	  will	  try	  to	  destroy	  Spain”.	  
Finally,	   the	   Catalan	   pro-­‐union	  movement	   appears	   victimized	   in	   one	   headline,	   “A	  multitude	   of	   Catalans	   ask	   for	   protection	   against	   separatism”,	   as	   we	   have	   seen	  previously	   for	  A.1	  ACs.	   It	   is	   also	  depicted	   in	   a	  neutral	  way	   twice,	  with	  headlines	  making	  reference	  to	  the	  pro-­‐union	  demonstration	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Barcelona.	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Table	  XII.	  Classification	  of	  the	  headlines	  published	  in	  the	  front	  page	  of	  the	  
main	  newspapers	  in	  those	  ACs	  within	  A.2	  sub-­‐set	  	   Negative	  messages	   Positive	  messages	   Neutral	  messages	   Homeland	  deixis	  Front	   page	   headlines	   published	  the	   day	   after	   the	   “Catalan	  National	   Day”,	   September	   12th,	  2012	  and	  2013	  
10	  (45.5%)	   0	  (0.0%)	   12	  (54.5%)	   10	  
Front	   page	   headlines	   published	  the	   day	   after	   the	   “Spanish	  National	  Day”,	  October	  13th,	  2012	  and	  2013	  
2	  (12.5%)	   10	  (62.5%)	   4	  (25.0%)	   4	  
	  
Weakly	  sub-­‐state	  nationalized	  ACs	  within	  subset	  B.1	  The	  last	  group	  of	  ACs	  that	  we	  are	  taking	  into	  account	  in	  our	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  the	   media	   is	   subset	   B.1,	   including	   weakly	   nationalized	   in	   a	   sub-­‐state	   national	  project.	  These	  are	  the	  ACs	  included	  in	  this	  group:	  
	   -­‐Galicia	  
	   -­‐The	  Canary	  Islands	  
	   -­‐The	  Balearic	  Islands	  
The	  Barómetro	  autonómico	  II,	  CIS’	  study	  2,829,	  identifies	  the	  following	  newspapers	  as	  the	  most	  read	  press	  within	  these	  three	  ACs:	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-­‐Galicia:	   La	   Voz	   de	   Galicia	   (42.7%),	   Faro	   de	   Vigo	   (15.7%),	   El	   Progreso	   de	   Lugo	  (11.6%),	  El	  Pais	  (9.3%).	  
-­‐The	   Canary	   Islands:	   La	   Provincia	   (26.2%),	   Canarias	   7	   (20.1%),	   El	   Pais	   (9.9%),	  
Diario	  de	  Avisos	  (7.7%).	  
-­‐The	   Balearic	   Islands:	  Ultima	  Hora	   (40.9%),	  Diario	   de	  Mallorca	   (32.2%),	   El	   Pais	  (7.6%),	  El	  Mundo	  (7.6%).	  
Four	  subjects	  are	  identified	  in	  the	  front	  page	  headlines	  of	  these	  newspapers:	  




With	  regard	  to	  the	  first	  subject,	  the	  Catalan	  pro-­‐independence	  movement,	  we	  have	  identified	  seven	  neutral	  references,	  as	  a	  “display	  of	  force”,	  similarly	  to	  the	  already	  commented	   trend	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   ACs.	   Some	   other	   headlines,	   two,	   added	   some	  positive	   nuances	   to	   these	   neutral	   references,	   depicting	   the	   mobilizations	   as	   a	  historical	  success.	  
Catalonia	  is	  cited	  once	  in	  a	  negative	  way,	  already	  commented	  “Catalonia	  in	  chains”.	  It	   is	   also	   alluded	   negatively	   in	   another	   headline,	   accusing	   Catalonia	   of	  instrumentalizing	   the	   mobilizations	   in	   order	   “to	   demand	  more	   money	   from	   the	  State”.	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Independence	   is	   referred	   to	   negatively,	   in	   a	   way	   already	   shown	   for	   previous	  analysis,	  as	  “a	  game	  out	  of	  Mas’	  hands”.	  
Finally,	  Barcelona	  appears	  as	  a	  subject	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  headline	  “Barcelona	  collapses	  with	  demands	  of	   fiscal	  agreement	  and	   independence”.	  This	   is	  a	  neutral	  structure,	  similar	  to	  those	  that	  uses	  Catalonia	  as	  a	  subject,	  but	  here	  we	  do	  not	  see	  any	  deixis	  reproducing	  Catalonia	  as	  a	  political	  subject.	  
The	   front	   page	   headlines	   published	   the	   day	   after	   the	   Spanish	   National	   Day,	  introduced	  the	  following	  subjects:	  
-­‐The	  Spanish	  monarchy	  (King	  and	  Prince)	  
-­‐Catalan	  pro-­‐independence	  movement	  
-­‐Artur	  Mas	  
-­‐Military	  parade	  
-­‐Catalan	  pro-­‐union	  movement	  
Again,	  we	  detect	  the	  same	  discursive	  pattern	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Spanish	  monarchy	  that	  we	   found	   in	   the	  rest	  of	  ACs.	  Three	  positive	  references	  were	   found	  depicting	  the	  monarchy	   as	   a	   key	  mediating	   institution	   to	   tackle	  with	   the	   national	   conflict,	  and	  two	  neutral	  references	  to	  the	  Prince’s	  activities.	  
We	   have	   also	   registered	   the	   already	   negative	   mention	   to	   the	   Catalan	   pro-­‐independence	   movement,	   as	   “bleeding”	   the	   main	   Spanish	   and	   Catalan	   political	  parties.	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Artur	  Mas	  appears	  again	  negatively	  in	  one	  headline,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  explained	  before,	  as	  wanting	  to	  destroy	  Spain.	  
We	   have	   to	   mention	   one	   reference	   to	   the	   military	   parade,	   held	   in	   Madrid,	   as	   a	  subject.	  It	  also	  makes	  reference	  to	  the	  Prince	  of	  Spain,	  in	  a	  neutral	  way,	  stating	  that	  “The	  first	  military	  parade	  of	  the	  Fiesta	  Nacional	  presided	  by	  the	  Prince	  was	  shorter	  and	  austere”.	  
Finally,	   the	  Catalan	  pro-­‐union	  movement	   is	   cited	  once,	   in	   the	  already	  mentioned	  victimizing	  discourse.	  
Table	   XIII	   summarizes	   the	   analysis	   for	   these	   three	   ACs.	   We	   see	   that	   there	   is	   a	  primacy	   of	   neutral	   messages	   for	   the	   Catalan	   National	   Day,	   whereas	   we	   have	  registered	  an	  equal	  proportion	  of	  negative,	  positive	  and	  neutral	  messages.	  We	  also	  see	  that	  the	  homeland	  deixis	  is	  not	  very	  active,	  neither	  for	  the	  Spanish	  nor	  for	  the	  Catalan	  cases.	  
	  
Table	  XIII.	  Classification	  of	  the	  headlines	  published	  in	  the	  front	  page	  of	  the	  
main	  newspapers	  in	  those	  ACs	  within	  B.1	  sub-­‐set	  	   Negative	  messages	   Positive	  messages	   Neutral	  messages	   Homeland	  deixis	  Front	  page	  headlines	  published	  the	  day	  after	   the	   “Catalan	   National	   Day”,	  September	  12th,	  2012	  and	  2013	   3	  (25.0%)	   2	  (16.7%)	   7	  (58.3%)	   2	  Front	  page	  headlines	  published	  the	  day	  after	   the	   “Spanish	   National	   Day”,	  October	  13th,	  2012	  and	  2013	   3	  (33.3%)	   3	  (33.3%)	   3	  (33.3%)	   2	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3.2.2.6.4	  Conclusions	  of	  the	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  press	  In	  this	  section	  we	  have	  developed	  a	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  front-­‐page	  headlines	  in	  the	  most	  read	  newspapers	  for	  the	  different	  groups	  of	  ACs	  that	  we	  have	  outlined.	  Four	  issues	  have	  been	  taken	  into	  account	  for	  each	  newspaper;	  in	  the	  first	  place	  we	  have	   seen	   the	   headlines	   published	   the	   day	   after	   the	   Catalan	   National	   Day,	  September	  11th,	  for	  years	  2012	  and	  2013.	  The	  other	  two	  issues	  are	  those	  published	  after	   the	  Spanish	  National	  Day,	  October	  10th,	   for	   the	   same	  years	  2012	  and	  2013.	  We	   have	   chosen	   these	   two	   dates	   because	   they	   are	   perfect	   examples	   of	   what	  Michael	   Billig	   defined	   as	   flag-­‐waving	   situations.	   We	   have	   chosen	   the	   Catalan	  National	   Day,	   and	   not	   any	   other	   representing	   some	   other	   sub-­‐state	   national	  project	   within	   Spain,	   because	   of	   the	   primacy	   that	   Catalan	   nationalism	   have	   got	  during	  the	  last	  two	  years,	  focusing	  the	  Spanish	  debate	  on	  the	  national	  question	  for	  that	  period.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  big	  pro-­‐independence	  demonstration	  celebrated	  in	  Barcelona	  in	  2012	  was	  largely	  responsible	  for	  this	  fact.	  
Our	   intention,	   as	   explained	   above,	   was	   to	   reinforce	   our	   main	   hypothesis	   with	  qualitative	  data.	  Thus,	  we	  argued	   that	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  differentiate	   the	  Spanish	  ACs	   in	   three	   groups,	   if	   we	   want	   to	   understand	   correctly	   the	   implications	   of	  national	  identity	  for	  political	  and	  electoral	  behavior	  in	  Spain.	  We	  commented	  some	  of	  the	  analytical	  limitations	  of	  the	  MQ	  regarding	  this	  matter,	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  a	  good	  index	  or	  national	  identity	  for	  those	  places	  with	  highly	  developed	  national-­‐projects,	  but	   that	   it	   is	  not	  when	   these	  projects	  are	  still	   in	   their	  early	  stages.	  Therefore	  we	  have	  implemented	  comparative	  analysis	  between	  the	  seventeenth	  Spanish	  ACs,	  as	  we	  have	  highly	   comparative	   quality	   data	   for	   a	   context	   comprising	   societies	  with	  different	  national	  projects,	  in	  different	  stages	  of	  development.	  After	  developing	  an	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initial	   quantitative	   analysis,	   we	   have	   classified	   the	   Spanish	   ACs	   in	   two	   general	  groups,	  thereafter	  divided	  into	  four:	  
1. Strong	  nationalistic	  ACs	  a. Sub-­‐state	  nationalistic	  ACs	  (B.2)	  b. State-­‐wide	  nationalistic	  ACs	  (A.1)	  2. Weakly	  nationalized	  ACs	  a. Sub-­‐state	  nationalistic	  ACs	  (B.1)	  b. State-­‐wide	  nationalistic	  ACs	  (A.2)	  
Our	  main	  hypothesis,	  then,	  was	  that	  the	  MQ	  should	  be	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  national	  identity	  only	  for	  the	  ACs	  that	  are	  classified	  as	  “strong	  nationalistic	  ACs”.	  However,	  the	  MQ	  should	  not	  be	  producing	  a	  reliable	  index	  of	  national	  identity	  for	  those	  ACs	  under	   the	   label	   “weakly	  nationalized	  ACs”.	  This,	  was	  argued,	   is	  a	   consequence	  of	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   categories	   offered	   by	   the	   MQ	   are	   collecting	   data	   that	   mixes	  national	  and	  pre-­‐national	   identities.	   If	   this	  were	   to	  be	   the	  case,	  we	  should	   refine	  our	  analytical	  tools	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  national	  identity	  and,	  in	  a	  second	  step,	  to	  determine	   its	   influence	  on	  political	   and	  electoral	  behavior.	  Thus,	   in	  order	   to	   test	  our	  hypothesis,	  we	  have	  designed	  a	  qualitative	  study	  of	  the	  newspapers	  published	  in	   each	   one	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   groups,	   classifying	   the	   Spanish	   ACs.	   If	   our	  hypothesis	  is	  true,	  then	  we	  should	  find	  substantial	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  national	  conflict	  is	  developed	  in	  Spain,	  adopting	  different	  general	  forms	  in	  the	  two	  main	  types	  of	  ACs.	  The	  conflict	  should	  be	  more	  opened	  and	  aggressive	  in	  the	  ACs	  belonging	  to	  subsets	  A.1	  and	  B.2,	  while	  it	  should	  be	  milder,	  more	  blurred,	  in	  those	  ACs	  within	  subsets	  A.2	  and	  B.1.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  our	  qualitative	  study	  of	  the	  press	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–summarized	   in	   table	   XIV-­‐	   confirmed	   this	   hypothesis,	   showing	   the	   expected	  differences	  for	  each	  of	  the	  postulated	  types	  of	  ACs.	  
We	  do	  not	  take	  for	  granted,	  nevertheless,	  that	  our	  hypothesis	  is	  correct	  and	  in	  the	  next	   pages	   we	   are	   going	   to	   develop	   quantitative	   analysis	   in	   order	   to	   test	   our	  hypothesis.	  However,	  we	  already	  have	  empirical	  evidence	  supporting	  our	  thesis.	  
	  
Table	  XIV.	  Main	  type	  of	  messages	  published	  in	  the	  media	  for	  each	  group	  of	  ACs	  	   A.1	   A.2	   B.1	   B.2	  Catalan	  National	  Day	   Negative	  	  (60%)	   Neutral	  (54.5%)	   Neutral	  (58.3%)	   Positive	  (92.3%)	  Spanish	  National	  Day	   Positive	  (64.3%)	   Positive	  (62.5%)	   Positive-­‐Neutral-­‐Negative	  (33.3%)	   Negative	  (56.3%)	  	  	  
3.2.2.6	  Quantitative	  testing	  In	   this	   section	  we	  are	   going	   to	  provide	   further	  quantitative	   evidence	   in	  order	   to	  test	  our	  hypothesis.	  We	  have	  shown,	  until	  now,	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  MQ	  should	  be	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  national	  identity	  for	   strongly	   nationalized	   areas,	   whereas	   this	   should	   not	   be	   the	   case	   for	   those	  weakly	   nationalized	   areas.	   We	   are	   presenting	   now	   some	   empirical	   evidence	  supporting	  this	  statement,	  based	  again	  on	  data	  from	  CIS’	  study	  2,956,	  “Barómetro	  
Autonómico	   III”,	   already	   commented.	   One	   of	   the	   questions	   asked	   in	   the	  questionnaire	  of	  the	  study	  refers	  directly	  to	  the	  political	  status	  of	  Spain:	  
Q.18	  What	  does	  Spain	  mean	  for	  you?	  (ONE	  ANSWER	  ONLY)	  
a.	  My	  country.	  
b.	  A	  nation	  that	  I	  am	  a	  member.	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c.	  The	  State	  of	  which	  I	  am	  a	  citizen.	  
d.	  A	  State	  made	  up	  of	  several	  nationalities	  and	  regions.	  
e.	  An	  alien	  State	  of	  which	  my	  country	  is	  not	  a	  part.	  
f.	  (DO	  NOT	  READ)	  None	  of	  the	  above.	  
g.	  Do	  not	  know.	  
h.	  Do	  not	  answer.	  
	  
Options	   “a”	   and	   “b”,	   are	   expressions	   of	   Spanish	   nationalism,	   as	   we	   can	   say	   that	  people	  answering	  these	  options	  consider	  Spain	  as	  a	  nation	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  as	  their	  nation.	  Options	  “d”	  and	  “e”,	  however,	  do	  not	  explicitly	  consider	  Spain	  as	  a	  nation,	   but	   simply	   as	   a	   State;	   moreover,	   people	   choosing	   options	   “d”	   or	   “e”	  consider	  that	  the	  Spanish	  State	  is	  made	  up	  from	  different	  sub-­‐state	  nations.	  Option	  “c”	   is	  a	  neutral	  one,	   for	   it	  only	  describes	   the	  reality	  of	  Spain	  being	  a	  State	  within	  international	  law.	  We	  can,	  thus,	  treat	  the	  categories	  of	  Q18	  as	  a	  continuum,	  going	  from	  1	  –strong	  Spanish	  nationalism-­‐	   to	  5	  –strong	  sub-­‐state	  nationalism-­‐.	  We	  will	  consider	  other	  response	  categories	  for	  Q18	  as	  missing	  values.	  As	  Q18	  is	  included	  in	  the	   questionnaire	   for	   every	   AC,	   we	   think	   that	   it	   is	   a	   good	   option	   to	   test	   our	  hypothesis,	   i.e.,	   the	   MQ	   is	   a	   good	   indicator	   of	   national	   identity	   within	   those	  territories	  which	  are	  strongly	  nationalized,	  but	  not	  when	  applied	  to	  those	  weakly	  nationalized	  regions.	  	  
Now	  we	  can	  formulate	  our	  hypothesis	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  can	  be	  tested	  quantitatively,	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  first	  place	  we	  are	  going	  to	  describe	  the	  general	  hypothesis	  behind	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the	  logic	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  sees	  the	  MQ	  as	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  national	  identity:	  As	  an	  individual	  moves	  from	  category	  1	  to	  category	  5	  in	  the	  MQ48,	  the	  probability	  for	  that	  individual	  to	  get	  a	  high	  value	  in	  Q18	  increases.	  We	  can	  test	  this	  hypothesis	  using	  a	  Logistic	  Regression	  (LR)	  where	  the	  dependent	  variable	  will	  be	  Q18,	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  an	  individual’s	  national	  loyalties.	  To	  transform	  our	  dependent	  variable	  into	  a	  binary	  variable,	  and	  as	  our	  hypothesis	  is	  oriented	  towards	  the	  highest	  values	  for	   this	   variable,	   we	   will	   dichotomize	   the	   responses	   to	   Q18	   into	   two	   groups,	  equating	  to	  ‘1’	  those	  ‘d’	  or	  ‘e’	  responses	  –absence	  of	  Spanish	  nationalism–.	  	  
Tables	  XV	  and	  XVI	  present	   the	   results	   for	  LR	  models	  with	   control	   variables.	  The	  MQ	  is	  statistically	  significant	  in	  every	  AC	  of	  subset	  B.2,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  subsets.	  Moreover,	  the	  pseudo	  R-­‐squared	  is	  particularly	  high	  for	  the	  models	   of	   subset	   B.2.	   These	   results	   are	   positively	   aligned	   with	   our	   research	  hypothesis,	   as	   they	   indicate	   considerable	   correlation	   between	   both	   variables	  within	   subset	   B.2,	   whereas	   this	   correlation	   is	   clearly	   diminished	   within	   other	  groups,	   as	   we	   move	   from	   B.2	   to	   A.1.	   Figure	   26	   illustrates	   the	   predicted	  probabilities	   of	   presenting	   absence	   of	   Spanish	   nationalism	   depending	   on	   the	  response	  given	  to	  the	  MQ	  for	  each	  of	  the	  four	  groups	  in	  which	  we	  have	  classified	  Spanish	  ACs;	  this	  figure	  clearly	  shows	  how	  probabilities	  decrease	  as	  we	  move	  from	  group	  B.2	  to	  group	  A.1.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Category	  1:	  Only	  Spanish,	  not	  X.	  	  Category	  2:	  More	  Spanish	  than	  X.	  	  Category	  3:	  Equally	  Spanish	  than	  X.	  	  Category	  4:	  More	  X	  than	  Spanish.	  	  Category	  5:	  Only	  X,	  not	  Spanish.	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Table XV. Binary logit estimates on the Absence Vs. Presence of Spanish National Identification (B.2 to 
A.2). Data from the Autonomic Barometer III, 2012 (CIS’ study 2,956) 
 B.2   B.1   A.2  
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0.63 0.54 0.76 0.57 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.18 
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Table XVI. Binary logit estimates on the Absence Vs. Presence of Spanish National Identification (A.2 
to A.1). Data from the Autonomic Barometer III, 2012 (CIS’ study 2,956) 









































































































































































0.23 0.20 0.28 0.06 0.07 0.24 0.12 0.39 
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1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
Source:	  CIS	  study	  2,956	  "Autonomic	  Barometer	  III"	  (2012)	  
Figure 26. Predicted probabilities of showing absence of Spanish 
nationalism according to response to the MQ 
B.2	  ACs	  B.1	  ACs	  A.2	  ACs	  A.1	  ACs	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After	   classifying	   Spanish	   Autonomous	   Communities	   into	   four	   categories	   in	  accordance	   to	   the	   identity	   feelings	  displayed	  by	   their	   citizens,	  we	  have	  seen	   that	  the	  MQ	  mirrors	  well	  national	  identity	  feelings	  in	  just	  one	  of	  these	  four	  groups,	  i.e.,	  those	   ACs	   in	   which	   we	   find	   two	   concurrent	   highly	   evolved	   national	   projects.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  working	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  national	  identity	  in	  those	  other	  cases	  of	   societies	   where	   we	   find	   only	   one	   national	   project	   or	   even	   more	   than	   one,	  providing	   that	   there	   is	   one	   dominant	   project	   while	   the	   others	   remain	  underdeveloped.	  We	  have	  developed	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  dual	  identity	  theory,	  which	  is	  the	  epistemological	  foundation	  of	  the	  MQ.	  Our	  critique	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  those	  societies	   in	  which	   there	   is	  a	  clear	  primacy	  of	  a	  state-­‐wide	  national	  project,	  sub-­‐state	   identity	   (or	   identities)	   is	  either	   totally	  or	  partially	  –if	   it	  were	   to	  be	   the	  case	  that	  some	  sub-­‐state	  national	  project	  were	  to	  be	  developed–	  subsumed	  within	  the	  dominant	  state-­‐wide	  national	  project,	   in	   the	   form	  of	   its	  regional	  expressions;	  this	   will	   produce	   what	   we	   may	   call	   a	   dialectalization	   of	   identity,	   through	   its	  regionalization.	   This	   regionalization	   process,	   based	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   symbolic	  dependencies	   –affecting	   those	   ethnic	   diacritics	   (Barth,	   1969)	   through	   which	  national	   or	   pre-­‐national	   sub-­‐state	   identities	   are	   socially	   constructed–	   initiates	   a	  dialectical	  process.	  In	  such	  a	  process	  the	  regionalization	  would	  be	  the	  thesis,	  while	  the	  antithesis	   is	  embodied	  in	  diverse	  social	  movements	  that	  can,	  to	  some	  degree,	  be	  identified	  under	  the	  label	  of	  pro-­‐independence.	  In	  fact	  we	  could	  easily	  cite	  many	  examples	   of	   these	   kind	   of	   movements	   in	   those	   places	   where	   there	   is	   sufficient	  cultural	   diversity	   to	  make	   the	   situation	   too	   charged	  of	   symbolic	   violence	   for	   the	  aforementioned	  dialectical	  process	  not	   to	   start.	  These	  would	   include	   the	  defense	  and	  promotion	  of	  language,	  natural	  and	  historical	  heritage,	  music,	  literature,	  etc.	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If,	   as	   Billig	   insistently	   states,	   we	   should	   treat	   nationalism	   as	   an	   ideology	   (Billig,	  1993)	  maybe	  we	  could	  start	  by	  measuring	  it	  as	  such,	  making	  use	  of	  a	  similar	  scale	  to	   the	   one	   that	  we	   usually	   employ	   in	   order	   to	  measure	   the	   left-­‐right	   ideology49,	  representing	  one	  of	   the	  extremes	   the	  complete	   identification	  with	   the	  state-­‐wide	  national	   project,	   and	   the	   other	   the	   complete	   identification	   with	   the	   sub-­‐state	  national	  project.	  Alternatively,	  researchers	  can	  develop	  indicators	  by	  combining	  at	  least	  two	  variables	  in	  order	  to	  actually	  measure	  national	  identity	  in	  those	  contexts	  in	  which	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  MQ	  proves	  to	  be	  limited.	  
4.	  Towards	  a	  new	  theoretical	  model	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  During	  this	  chapter	  we	  are	  going	  to	  evaluate	  the	  validity	  claims	  of	  the	  theoretical	  models	  proposed	  by	  the	  three	  main	  schools	  studying	  electoral	  behavior:	  Columbia,	  Michigan,	   and	   Rochester.	   Based	   on	   our	   previous	   analysis	   and	   work	   we	   will	  determine	   if	   the	   theory	  provided	  by	   these	  models	   is	   enough	   to	   argue	   that	   social	  science	  has	  understood	  why	  people	  vote	  the	  way	  they	  do.	  If	  this	  were	  not	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  either	  improve	  the	  models	  or	  to	  propose	  a	  new	  one.	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  have	  explained	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  three	  main	  theories	  to	  explain	  why	  people	  vote	   the	  way	   they	  do.	  Thanks	   to	   these	   three	   theories	  we	  are	  able	   to	   explain	   some	   of	   the	   variations	   on	   people’s	   electoral	   behavior.	   Thus,	   in	   a	  recent	  work	  on	  class	  voting,	  Spanish	  political	  scientist	  Lluís	  Orriols	  stated:	  
‘During	   the	  1982-­‐9	  period	   the	  predicted	  probability	   of	   voting	   for	   the	   left	   among	  the	  working	  class	  was	  about	  0.27	  higher	  than	  professionals.	  Yet	  this	  gap	  has	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	  wording	  of	  this	  question	  in	  CIS’	  studies	  is:	  ‘Usually,	  when	  talking	  about	  politics,	  the	  expressions	  left	  and	  right	  are	  used.	  If	  1	  was	  extreme	  left	  and	  10	  extreme	  right,	  which	  one	  would	  be	  your	  positioning?’	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substantially	   reduced	   during	   recent	   years	   and	   it	   was	   approximately	   0.08	   in	   the	  2008	  general	  election’	  (Orriols,	  2013:	  381).	  
The	  assumption	  underlying	  this	  model	  is	  that	  of	  the	  Alford	  index,	  i.e.,	  class	  voting	  is	  the	  alignment	  between	  workers	  and	  left-­‐wing	  parties	  and	  between	  the	  bourgeoisie	  and	  right-­‐wing	  parties.	  This	  class	  voting	  rationale	  was	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Columbia	  approach	  and,	  of	  course,	  defines	  the	  whole	  idea	  of	  political	  cleavage,	  as	  introduced	  by	  Lipset	   and	  Rokkan	   (1967).	  However,	  Orriols	   showed	   that	   the	   strength	  of	   this	  alignment	   is	   weak.	   Shall	   we	   conclude	   that	   the	   link	   between	   social	   class	   and	  electoral	  behavior	  has	  decreased	  over	  time?	  This	  was,	  in	  fact,	  the	  line	  followed	  by	  many	  researchers,	  and	  their	  arguments	  were	  summarized	  by	  González	  (González,	  1996:	  46)	  in	  these	  five	  points:	  
1. The	  impact	  of	  post-­‐industrialization	  2. The	  weakening	  of	  class	  solidarity	  3. The	  rise	  of	  the	  new	  social	  movements	  4. The	  embourgeoisiment	  of	  the	  working	  class	  5. The	  rise	  of	  post-­‐materialist	  values	  	  
Other	  researchers,	  however,	  have	  been	  arguing	  over	  the	  past	  decades	  that	  class	  is	  still	   relevant	   to	   explain	   people’s	   electoral	   behavior.	   These	   authors	   argued	   that	  either	   there	   was	   a	   trendless	   fluctuation	   (Manza,	   Hout	   and	   Brooks,	   1999),	   or	   a	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  cleavages	  in	  modern	  societies,	  which	  are	  more	  complex	  than	  they	  used	  to	  be	  (González,	  1996:	  73).	  	  
While	   the	  debate	  on	   the	  strength	  of	   the	  cleavages	   is	  still	  going	  on	   (Evans	  and	  de	  Graaf,	  2013),	   it	   is	  true	  to	  say	  that	  the	  other	  two	  theories	  have	  seen	  an	  increasing	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flow	  of	  research.	  In	  particular,	  rational	  choice	  has	  experienced	  a	  boost	  in	  research	  during	   the	   last	   decades	   (Blais,	   2000).	   But	   perhaps	   the	  main	   problem	   of	   rational	  choice	  applied	   to	  electoral	  behavior	   is	   that	   the	  expected	  utility	  of	  an	   individual’s	  vote	  is	  so	  small	  that	  the	  effort	  of	  bother	  to	  cast	  the	  vote	  cannot	  be	  worthy.	  This	  was	  sarcastically	   pointed	   out	   by	   Uhlaner,	   who	   wrote:	   ‘Unfortunately	   for	   the	   theory,	  people	   do	   vote’	   (Uhlaner,	   1989:	   390).	   New	   research	   based	   on	   expanded	  assumptions	  of	  rational	  choice,	  like	  bounded	  rationality	  or	  imperfect	  information,	  has	  certainly	   increased	  the	  strength	  of	   these	  models	  (Santana, 2014),	  but	   it	   is	  still	  lacks	  explanatory	  power	  to	  fit	  the	  variations	  in	  the	  data.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  we	  are	  going	  to	  introduce	  a	  new	  theory	  to	  explain	  why	  people	  vote	  the	  way	  they	  do,	  as	  we	  think	  that	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  all	  the	  three	  models	  is	  certainly	  not	   fitting	   the	  data,	   even	   after	   their	   sophistication,	   as	  we	  have	   seen.	   In	  order	   to	   do	   so,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   three	   main	   theories	   of	   electoral	  behavior	   are	   actually	   expressions	   of	   the	   same	   theory	   of	   human	   action.	   Once	  we	  establish	  this	  point,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  propose	  a	  theory	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  based	  on	  another	  theory	  of	  human	  action.	  	  
4.1	  Three	  theoretical	  models	  of	  electoral	  behavior?	  Until	  now	  we	  were	  discussing	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  three	  main	  theoretical	  approaches	   to	   understand	   electoral	   behavior:	   the	  models	   of	   Columbia,	  Michigan	  and	  Rochester.	  These	  three	  models	  are	  usually	  seen	  as	  expressions	  of,	  respectively,	  Sociology,	  Social	  Psychology	  and	  Economics.	  This	  is	  so	  because	  the	  causes	  defining	  people’s	   electoral	   behavior	   for	   each	   model	   are,	   respectively,	   social	   structure,	  socialization,	  and	  utility	  maximization.	  The	   logic	  of	   the	  Columbia	  model	  relies	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  person	  who	  thinks	  something	  like	  this:	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‘I	  am	  a	  worker	  and	  my	  life	  would	  be	  better	  off	  if	  the	  party	  in	  office	  defends	  workers’50	  
Therefore,	   we	   have	   an	   individual	   rationally	   trying	   to	   maximize	   the	   utility	   of	  his/her	   vote.	   The	   Columbia	   model	   is	   thus	   relying	   strongly	   on	   methodological	  individualism	   and,	   ultimately,	   postulating	   a	   rational	   choice	   model	   in	   which	   the	  utility	  is	  defined	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  by	  some	  position	  within	  the	  social	  structure.	  	  
The	   logic	  of	   the	  Michigan	  model	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  partisanship.	  The	  idea	   is	   that	   each	   individual,	   throughout	   his/her	   life,	   goes	   through	   different	  experiences	  that	  define	  his	  affinity	  for	  a	  given	  political	  party.	  Thus,	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  Michigan	  model	  could	  be	  expressed	  like	  this:	  
‘I	  vote	  for	  this	  party	  because	  I	  like	  it	  more’	  
Of	  course	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  sympathies	  that	  people	  have	  to	  parties	  relate	  to	  their	   socialization	   process.	   Again,	   we	   have	   individuals	   trying	   to	   maximize	   the	  utility	   of	   their	   votes	   when	   this	   utility	   is	   very	   much	   defined	   by	   their	   personal	  experiences.	   The	   model	   postulates	   an	   internal	   satisfaction	   for	   individuals	   when	  their	  preferred	  party	  wins,	  as	  if	  they	  were	  football	  supporters.	  Party	  identification,	  additionally,	   takes	  a	   long	   time	   to	  be	  established	  and	   it	   is	  very	  difficult	   to	   change	  (Green	   and	   Palmquist,	   1990).	   Thus,	   each	   individual	   has	   a	   particular	   party	  preference	  that,	  in	  turn,	  will	  determine	  his/her	  vote.	  
Finally,	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   Rochester	   model	   introduces	   decision-­‐making	   models	  originated	   in	  market	   economics.	   In	   this	   sense,	   a	   voter	  would	  be	   like	   a	   consumer	  trying	   to	  maximize	  his/her	  personal	  utility	   through	  the	  act	  of	  voting/purchasing.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  The	  same	  logic	  would	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  possible	  social	  cleavages.	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Consequently,	  political	  parties	  would	  be	  like	  firms	  trying	  to	  increase	  their	  benefits,	  now	  in	  terms	  of	  voting	  support.	  Elections	  are	  seen	   like	  a	  market	  ruled	  by	  supply	  and	   demand	   laws,	   where	   ‘parties	   formulate	   policies	   in	   order	   to	   win	   elections,	  rather	   than	   win	   elections	   in	   order	   to	   formulate	   policies’	   (Downs,	   1957:	   28).	  Ideology,	   in	   this	   model,	   is	   seen	   like	   a	   shortcut	   enabling	   a	   faster	   adjustment	   of	  supply	  (party)	  and	  demand	  (voter),	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  market;	  as	  Downs	  expressed	   it:	   ‘(…)	  With	   this	   short-­‐cut	   a	   voter	   can	   save	   himself	   the	   cost	   of	   being	  informed	   upon	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   issues’	   (Downs,	   1957:	   98).	   Therefore,	   the	  underlying	  logic	  of	  the	  Rochester	  model	  could	  be	  summarize	  like	  this:	  
‘It	  is	  more	  useful	  for	  me	  to	  vote	  for	  party	  A	  rather	  than	  for	  party	  B’	  
The	  model	   is	   based	   on	   the	   homo	   economicus,	   presupposing	   that	   complex	   utility	  equations	   are	   developed	   unconsciously	   by	   individuals	   in	   order	   to	   find	   the	   best	  results	   for	   themselves.	   In	   this	  model,	   people	   are	   very	  much	   like	   computers	  who	  tend	  to	  act	  more	  or	  less	  mechanically	  to	  take	  the	  highest	  benefit	  from	  their	  actions;	  human	  interaction	  can,	  thus,	  be	  modeled	  and	  predicted	  as	  the	  option	  which	  better	  maximizes	  the	  utility	  of	  its	  participants.	  This	  theory	  of	  human	  action	  produced	  an	  array	  of	  literature	  on	  game	  theory,	  particularly	  boosted	  thanks	  to	  the	  discovery	  by	  John	  Nash	  of	  an	  equilibrium	  for	  those	  games	  that	  apparently	  could	  not	  be	  solved	  with	   the	   pattern	   of	   mutual	   utility	   maximization,	   based	   on	   a	   purposed	  randomization	   of	   player’s	   strategies	   (Nash,	   1950).	   Rational	   choice	   theory,	   and	  game	   theory	   in	   particular,	   can	   be	   captivating	   for	   social	   scientists	   running	   away	  from	   a	   kind	   of	   work	   that	   is	   closer	   to	   opinion	   than	   to	   science.	   It	   introduces	   the	  possibility	   of	   modeling	   human	   interactions	   through	   an	   extensive	   use	   of	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mathematical	   procedures,	   offering	   the	   possibility	   of	   building	   up	   hard	   science51.	  However,	  and	  although	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  theory	  were	  very	  high	  (Goldthorpe,	  1998),	  it	  does	  not	  explain	  many	  aspects	  of	  human	  behavior,	  as	  Green	  and	  Shapiro’s	  influential	  work	  states	  (Green	  and	  Shapiro,	  1994).	  This	  well	  may	  be	  because	   it	   is	  still	   not	   fully	   developed,	   as	   many	   of	   its	   proponents	   argue,	   or	   simply	   because	   it	  departs	  from	  a	  wrong	  understanding	  of	  human	  interaction.	  This	  latter	  argument	  is	  our	  own.	  	  
It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  all	  these	  three	  approaches	  share	  the	  same	  basic	  assumption	  on	   human	   behavior.	   The	   three	   models	   depart	   from	   an	   idea	   of	   a	   subject	   that	  rationally	  chooses	  between	  different	  options.	  The	  point	  in	  which	  they	  differ	  is	  just	  on	   which	   are	   the	   basic	   variables	   motivating	   this	   decision:	   structural	   variables,	  personal	   affinities	  or	   cost/benefits	   evaluations	  on	  a	  market-­‐like	   situation.	  As	   the	  three	  models	  rely	  on	  the	  same	  general	  theory	  of	  human	  behavior	  –rational	  action–	  it	   is	  perfectly	  possible	   to	  combine	   them,	  and	  thus	  Anduiza and Bosch (2004)	  have	  done	   so.	   This	   combined	  model	   basically	   says	   that	   the	   electoral	   behavior	   of	   each	  individual	   is	   the	   aggregated	   result	   of	   the	   three	   groups	   of	   variables.	   For	   the	  aggregated	   model,	   structural	   variables	   are	   in	   the	   base	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	  process,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  cleavages;	  then	  these	  structural	  locations	  enable	  a	  different	  political	  socialization	  process	  and,	  finally,	  the	  amount	  of	  variability	  to	  be	  explained	  is	   attributed	   to	   costs/benefits	   rationales.	   Consequently	   the	   three	   main	   models	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Its	   impact	   on	   sociology	   and	   political	   science	   is	   huge.	   It	   seems	   that	   nowadays	   game	  theory	  and	  Rational	  Action	  Theory	  (RAT)	  are	  the	  hegemonic	  theoretical	  standpoint	  in	  the	  social	   sciences,	  with	  a	  big	  amount	  of	  papers	  published	  and	  research	  projects	  developed.	  This	   centrality	   has	   also	   provoked	   strong	   actions	   against	   it,	   notable	   the	   so-­‐called	  
Perestroika	   movement,	   which	   argued	   that	   RAT	   was	   impoverishing	   social	   and	   political	  research	  (Monroe,	  2005).	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defining	   the	   study	   of	   electoral	   behavior	   in	   modern	   social	   sciences	   are	   just	  variations	  of	  the	  same	  general	  theory,	  which	  is	  just	  rational	  action.	  And	  in	  fact,	  all	  three	  models	  can	  be	  modeled	  using	  rational	  choice	  equations	  for	  the	  maximization	  of	   utility,	   if	   some	   concessions	   are	  made	   concerning	   the	   relevance	   of	   each	   set	   of	  variables	  for	  an	  individual’s	  utility	  function.	  	  
We	   have	   to	   mention	   here	   Raymond	   Boudon’s	   work	   on	   classifying	   the	   different	  meta-­‐theories	   on	   people’s	   behavior	   (Boudon,	   2006).	   Basically,	   according	   to	  Boudon	   every	   theory	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   can	   be	   included	   in	   one	   of	   the	   three	  types	  that	  he	  proposes.	  Type	  I	  is	  identified	  with	  Rational	  Choice	  Theory	  (RCT),	  and	  relies	   on	   utilitarian	   psychology,	   Type	   II	   with	   socialization	   theories	   based	   on	  causalist	  psychology,	  and	  Type	  III	  with	  those	  theories	  postulating	  that	  the	  actions	  of	   individuals	   are	   explained	   by	   their	   subjective	   meanings,	   in	   accordance	   with	  rational	   psychology	   (Boudon,	   2006:	   151-­‐152).	   According	   to	   Boudon’s	  classification,	   we	   can	   quickly	   identify	   the	   Rochester	   school	   with	   Type	   I,	   the	  Michigan	   school	  with	   Type	   II,	   and	   the	   Columbia	   school	  with	   Type	   III.	  We	   argue,	  however,	  that	  Boudon’s	  classification	  is	  not	  fair,	  as	  it	  is	  clearly	  benefiting	  RCT,	  who	  he	  explicitly	  defends.	  Let	  us	  see	  why.	  
Boudon	   departs	   from	   the	   epistemological	   assumption	   of	   methodological	  individualism.	  As	  he	  puts	  it:	  
‘So,	  a	  general	  rule	  of	  any	  scientific	  investigation	  in	  any	  science	  is	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  a	  macroscopic	  phenomenon,	  the	  analyst	  should	  try	  to	  identify	  the	  ultimate	  elementary	  causes	  responsible	  for	  the	  observed	  macroscopic	  phenomenon.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  social	  sciences	  are	  concerned,	  Weber	  and	  Schumpeter	  have	  given	  this	  general	  rule	  a	  name:	  “methodological	  individualism”,	  since	  the	  elementary	  causes	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of	  any	  social	  phenomenon	  are	  obviously	  human	  individual	  actions’	  (Boudon,	  2006:	  150).	  
So,	   if	   individuals	   are	   the	   basic	   unity	   for	   explaining	   human	   action,	   then	   RCT	   is	  necessary	   the	   best	   theory	   to	   explain	   people’s	   actions.	   This	   is	   a	   tautology.	   In	  Newton’s	  physics	   the	   ‘ultimate	  elementary	  cause’	   to	  explain	   the	  orbits	  of	  planets	  around	   the	   Sun	  was	   a	  mysterious	   invisible	   force	   called	   gravity,	   not	   the	   internal	  atomic	   structure	   of	   elements.	   Neither	   is	   it	   in	   Einstein’s	   general	   relativity,	   which	  states	  that	  a	  curvature	  in	  space-­‐time	  caused	  by	  the	  mass	  of	  celestial	  bodies	  is	  the	  ‘ultimate	  elementary	   cause’	   explaining	   the	  orbits	  of	  planets	   around	   the	  Sun	   that,	  otherwise,	   would	   follow	   straight	   trajectories.	   So,	   why	   individuals	   should	   be	   the	  ‘ultimate	   elementary	   cause’	   to	   explain	   human	   behavior?	  We	   think	   that	   situating	  ‘in-­‐dividuals’	   as	   this	   ultimate	   cause	   is	   tricky	   and	   arbitrary,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   a	  statement	   deeply	   rooted	   on	   liberal	   philosophy.	   As	   Bourdieu	   commented,	   on	  neoliberalism:	  
‘On	  behalf	  of	  this	  scientific	  program	  of	  knowledge,	  transformed	  into	  a	  program	  for	  political	  action,	  it	  has	  been	  accomplished	  an	  immense	  political	  work	  (…)	  which	  aims	  to	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  design	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  “theory”;	  a	  
program	  of	  methodic	  destructions	  of	  the	  collective’	  (Bourdieu, 1998; emphasis in the 
original).	  
It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘society’	  made	  up	  of	  ‘individuals’	  was	  socially	  constructed;	   in	  other	  words,	   it	   is	   just	  one	  cultural	   schema	  among	  many	  enabling	  human	   understanding	   of	   their	   everyday	   life,	   but	   it	   is	   certainly	   not	   an	   immanent	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reality52.	   As	   Callinicos	   (1999)	   explains,	   we	   can	   trace	   back	   the	   establishment	   in	  Western	   political	   thought	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   ‘society’	  made	   up	   of	   ‘individuals’	   to	  Descartes’	  philosophy	  of	  the	  cogito	  (Descartes,	  2000	  [1637]),	  later	  on	  annihilated	  by	  Freud’s	   theory	  of	   the	  unconscious	  (Freud,	  1899),	   that	  divided	  what	  seemed	  to	  be	  in-­‐dividual.	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  rather	  aprioristic	  to	  situate	  the	  individual	  as	  the	  ‘ultimate	  elementary	  cause’	  of	  human	  action.	  To	  do	  so	  is	  arbitrary	  and,	  as	  Bourdieu	  explained,	   heavily	   politically	   loaded.	   And,	   apart	   from	   that,	   it	   is	   scientifically	  inaccurate,	  as	  theories	  are	  there	  to	  (firstly)	  account	  for	  the	  variations	  registered	  in	  the	   data	   and	   (secondly)	   to	   provide	   a	   possible	   truth	  when	   they	   are	   successful	   in	  their	  predictions;	  therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  scientific	  to	  try	  to	  depart	  from	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  true	  –methodological	  individualism–	  and	  then	  proceed	  to	  develop	  theories	  that	  explain	   empirical	   trends.	  But	   the	   greatest	  methodological	   problem	   relates	   to	   the	  fact	  that	  all	  three	  models	  are	  examples	  of	  subjectivism.	  Thus,	  they	  all	  understand	  vote	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  people’s	  inner	  symbolic	  representations,	  either	  related	  to	  their	  structural	  location,	  life	  experiences	  or	  utility	  maximization.	  They	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account,	  however,	  the	  structural	  component	  of	  human	  action	  and,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	   later	   on,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   understand	   correctly	   human	   behavior	   without	  taking	   into	   account	   the	   two	   components	   that	   define	   it,	   i.e.,	   subjectivism	   and	  structuralism.	   Later	   on	   we	   will	   discussed	   with	   some	   detail	   the	   social	   theory	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  To	   cite	   but	   an	   example,	   Buddhism	   relies	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘anatta’,	   that	  means	   precisely	  ‘not-­‐self’.	   Thus,	   each	   person	   is,	   in	   Buddhism,	   the	   embodiment	   of	   different	   processes,	  making	  everything	   in	  the	  universe	  part	  of	  a	  single	   individual	  reality,	   including	  people.	   In	  Buddhism	  the	   individual,	   thus,	   is	  not	   identified	  with	  a	  person,	  but	  each	  person	   is	  seen	  as	  part	   of	   an	   individual	   reality	   made	   up	   of	   all	   the	   things	   in	   the	   universe,	   interconnected	  through	  different	  processes	  (Buswell,	  2003).	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Pierre	   Bourdieu,	   as	   it	   presents	   a	   framework	   where	   these	   two	   components	   are	  integrated.	  	  
Furthermore,	   even	   if	   we	   agree	   that	   individuals	   are	   really	   in-­‐dividuals,	   obviating	  Freud’s	  work,	  we	  could	  still	  ask	  if	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  find	  the	   ‘ultimate	  elementary	  cause’	   in	  the	   irreducible	   last	  unit	  of	  our	  subject	  of	  study.	  Certainly	  this	   is	  not	   the	  case	   in	   physics;	   nobody	   in	   their	   right	  mind	   opposed	   Newton’s	   universal	   gravity	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  stupid	  to	  presupposed	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  an	  invisible	  force	  like	  gravity,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  needed	  to	  ‘open	  the	  black-­‐box’	  –to	  use	  RCT	  jargon–	  to	  get	  to	  the	  point	  of	  the	  atomic	  structure	  of	  elements.	  And,	  even	  then,	  why	  atoms	  should	  be	   the	   ultimate	   cause?	   Do	   not	   we	   should	   better	   find	   this	   ultimate	   cause	   within	  atomic	   nuclei?	   But,	   sadly	   enough,	   it	   happens	   that	   it	   was	   not	   until	   1911	   when	  Ernest	  Rutherford	  discovered	  that	  atoms	  have	  a	  nucleus.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  1932	  that	  Dimitry	   Ivanenko	   proposed	   his	   proton-­‐neutron	   model	   of	   atomic	   nuclei	   and,	  nowadays,	   quantum	  mechanics	   have	   largely	   discredited	   Ivanenko’s	  model	  while	  still	   trying	   to	   describe	   a	   definite	  model.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   humans	  were	   able	   to	  reach	  the	  moon	  thanks	  to	  a	  Newtonian	  model	  published	  more	  than	  300	  years	  ago,	  when	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  imagine	  any	  appropriate	  notion	  regarding	  atomic	  nuclei.	  However,	   these	  are	   the	  kind	  of	  arguments	  used	  against	   ‘socialization’	   theories	   in	  sociology,	  and	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  methodological	   individualism	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  individuals	  are	  the	  ultimate	  cause	  of	  social	  processes53.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  We	   do	   not	   want	   to	   insist	   much	   longer	   on	   this	   point.	   But,	   apart	   from	   the	   problem	  postulated	  by	  Freud’s	  theories	  to	  this	  view,	  which	  is	  big	  enough	  to	  disregard	  it,	  we	  should	  comment	   recent	   advancements	   in	   neuroscience.	   In	   fact,	   there	   is	   a	   whole	   new	   area	   of	  research	   on	   neuropolitics,	   that	   considers	   the	   ‘ultimate	   cause’	   to	   be	   found	   in	   neural	  networks,	   not	   in	   individuals.	   At	   the	   University	   of	   Edinburgh,	   Professor	   Laura	   Cram,	   to	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4.2	  A	  new	  theory	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  	  Thus,	   once	   we	   have	   argued	   that	   all	   three	   theories	   of	   electoral	   behavior	   are	  versions	  of	  a	  subjectivist	  meta-­‐theory,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  theoretical	  model	  outside	  the	  realms	  of	  RAT.	  And	  we	  are	  going	  to	  do	  so	  simply	  because	  RAT	  
does	  not	  match	  the	  data.	  It	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  correct	  explanation	  of	  the	  data,	  nor	  it	  is	   able	   to	  make	   accurate	   predictions	   on	   people’s	   electoral	   behavior,	   as	   we	   have	  seen.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Columbia	  approach	  is	  too	  rigid	  to	  explain	  electoral	  change	  and	  the	  Michigan	  one	  too	  soft	  to	  explain	  consistent	  trends.	  	  
Our	   new	   theory	   is	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   resources	   are	   unequally	   distributed	  among	  people	  and,	  in	  that	  sense,	  fits	  the	  tradition	  of	  materialism.	  It	  departs	  from	  Marx’s	   materialist	   version	   of	   Hegel’s	   dialectics,	   later	   on	   enriched	   by	   Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  capital	  conversion.	  We	  can	  synthesize	  the	  evolution	  of	  this	  theory	  so	  far	  by	  using	  a	  simple	  metaphor:	  Marx	  discovered	  that	  human	  action	  responds	  to	  the	  logics	  of	  a	  construction	  set	  and	  described	  the	  aspect	  of	  some	  of	  its	  pieces;	  Bourdieu	  opened	  the	  box,	  described	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  pieces,	  classified	  them	  in	  three	  basic	  groups,	   and	  discovered	   that	   the	  different	   pieces	   can	  be	   interchangeable	   to	   some	  degree.	  It	  is	  our	  intention	  to	  continue	  with	  this	  fruitful	  line	  of	  research.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  whom	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  her	  hospitality	  while	  I	  was	  a	  Visiting	  Researcher	  there,	  leads	  one	  of	  the	   leading	   projects	   in	   the	   area	   since	   2013.	   See	   also	   the	   work	   by	   neurologist	   Antonio	  Damasio	   (1995),	   largely	   applied	   in	   sociology	   recently	   by	   Manuel	   Castells	   (2009).	  Furthermore,	  it	  has	  been	  rightly	  indicated	  that	  every	  sub-­‐system	  of	  reality	  is	  ruled	  by	  its	  particular	  set	  of	  rules,	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  independence	  to	  one	  another	  (Romero,	  2013).	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4.2.1	  From	  alienation	  to	  habitus	  The	   three	   classical	   theories	   of	   electoral	   behavior	   are	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   an	  
alignment	   between	   the	   individuals	   and	   a	   given	   political	   party.	   This	   may	   be	   an	  alignment	  based	  on	  structural	   location	   (Columbia),	  personal	  affinities	   (Michigan)	  or	   costs/benefits	   calculations	   (Rochester).	   We	   will	   argue,	   however,	   that	   the	  alignment	   is	   not	   between	   voters	   and	   parties,	   but	   between	   voters	   and	   electoral	  habitus.	  But,	  let	  us	  first	  explain	  the	  reasoning	  that	  led	  us	  to	  this	  conclusion.	  	  
According	   to	  Santiago	   (2015),	   there	  are	   two	  different	   sociological	   traditions	   that	  have	   theorized	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘social	   structure’.	   One	   of	   them,	   initiated	   with	  Durkheim’s	  differentiation	  between	  mechanic	  and	  organic	  solidarities	  (Durkheim,	  1996[1893]),	  would	  be	  focused	  on	  institutional	  and	  cultural	  processes	  and	  on	  the	  ideas	   of	   socialization	   and	   role/status	   framework.	   The	   other	   one	   sees	   social	  structure	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  class	  structure,	  finding	  its	  peak	  on	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  practice,	  summarized	  in	  the	  famous	  equation	  presented	  in	  Distinction	  (Bourdieu,	  2012[1979]:	  101):	  
[(habitus)	  (capital)]	  +	  field	  =	  practice	  
It	  is	  on	  this	  latter	  materialist	  tradition	  that	  we	  want	  to	  build	  our	  work.	  Alongside	  the	   centrality	  of	   the	  unequal	  distribution	  of	   goods	  among	  people,	   the	  materialist	  tradition	  –at	  least	  in	  its	  versions	  by	  Marx	  and	  Bourdieu54–	  shares	  a	  common	  view	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  In	  fact,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Analytical	  Marxism	  (AM),	  do	  not	  share	  the	  same	  view	  of	  power	  than	  Marx	  and	  Bourdieu,	  as	  works	  by	  analytical	  Marxists	  rely	  heavily	  on	  rational	  choice	  theory	  and	   methodological	   individualism.	   The	   main	   authors	   of	   this	   current	   are	   Gerald	   Cohen	  (1989),	   John	   Roemer	   (1982)	   and	   Jon	   Elster	   (1985),	   including	   as	  well	   Adam	  Przeworski	  (1986)	   and	   Erik	  Olin	  Wright	   (1985).	   The	   divorce	   between	  AM	   and	  Marx’s	  writings	  was	  highlighted	  by	  Hunt:	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of	  power.	  Thus	  both	  Marx’s	  theory	  of	  alienation	  and	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  practice	  share	   the	   same	   idea	  of	  power.	  Probably	   the	   first	  exposition	  of	   the	   idea	  of	  power	  underlying	  the	  theories	  of	   these	  two	  authors	   is	   to	  be	  found	  on	  Plato’s	  allegory	  of	  the	   cave	   (Plato,	   2012[4th	   c.	   BC]:	   VII).	   Simply	   put,	   it	   understands	   that	   power	   is	  something	  with	  the	  capacity	  of	  determining	  people’s	  will	  and	  desires.	  Steven	  Lukes	  have	  called	  this	  conception	  of	  power	  as	  three-­‐dimensional,	  in	  his	  celebrated	  essay	  on	  the	  subject	  matter	  (Lukes,	  2005).	  Thus,	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s	  there	  was	  ‘an	  ongoing	   debate	   within	   American	   political	   science’	   (Lukes	   2005:	   60)	   around	   the	  idea	   of	   power,	   in	   which	   pluralist	   ideas	   of	   power	   had	   a	   great	   influence,	   notably	  Robert	  Dahl’s	  famous	  essay,	  Who	  Governs?	  (Dahl,	  1961).	  Lukes	  entered	  that	  debate	  in	  1974,	  with	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  his	  book,	  putting	  forward	  a	  theory	  of	  power	  based	  on	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  it.	  Lukes’	  work	  understood	  that	  all	  the	  standpoints	  in	  that	  debate	  might	  be	  summarized	  into	  three	  categories	  or	  views	  of	  power.	  He	  called	  the	  first	  one,	  which	  was	  represented	  by	  the	  pluralists,	  one-­‐dimensional	  view	  of	  power.	  The	  second	  one,	  identified	  with	  the	  different	  works	  by	  Peter	  Bachrach	  and	  Morton	  Baratz,	  was	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  view	  of	  power	  (vid.	  Bachrach	  and	  Baratz,	  1962).	  Finally,	  Lukes	  proposes	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  view	  of	  power.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘If	  this	  uninteresting	  Marxist	  feature	  of	  exploitation	  is	  Marxism’s	  most	  defensible	  feature,	  then	   Marxism	   would	   definitely	   seem	   to	   be,	   as	   the	   AM	   school	   suggests,	   intellectually	  bankrupt.	  The	  argument	  that	  Marxism	  is	  intellectually	  worthless	  is	  certainly	  nothing	  new;	  indeed	  this	  criticism	  has	  been	  made	  innumerable	  times	  over	  the	  last	  125	  years.	  For	  these	  critics	  to	  assert,	  however,	  that	  they	  constitute	  a	  “new	  school”	  of	  Marxism	  is	  fundamentally	  dishonest	  (…)	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  no	  member	  of	  the	  AM	  school	  has	  explained	  in	  what	  sense	  they	  are	  Marxists.	  Until	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  such	  an	  explanation	  and,	  indeed,	  find	  it	  convincing,	  I	  shall	   consider	   them	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	   the	   long	   tradition	  of	  anti-­‐Marxism–and	  a	  particularly	  virulent	  part’.	  (Hunt,	  1992:	  105).	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Thus,	   one-­‐dimensional	   view	   of	   power	   is	   committed	   to	   the	   study	   of	   behaviour,	  specifically,	   decision-­‐making	   on	   key-­‐issues	   affected	   by	   an	   observable	   conflict	   of	  interests.	   Two-­‐dimensional	   view	   of	   power	   is	   focused,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   typical	  features	  the	  one-­‐dimensional	  view,	  on	  the	  mobilization	  of	  bias;	  their	  central	  thrust	  is	   based	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   non-­‐decisions	   that	   reduce	   the	   scope	   of	   decision-­‐making.	  The	  three-­‐dimensional	  view	  of	  power	  is,	  however,	  focused	  on	  four	  aspects:	  	  
• Decision-­‐making	  and	  control	  over	  political	  agenda;	  
• Issues	  and	  potential	  issues;	  
• Subjective	  and	  real	  interests;	  
• Observable	  and	  latent	  conflict55.	  	  
Moreover,	   Lukes	   points	   out	   that	   behind	   each	   conception	   of	   power,	   there	   are	  political	  interests	  at	  stake.	  Consequently	  we	  may	  find	  liberalism	  entangled	  with	  the	  
one-­‐dimensional	  view	  of	  power,	  which	  legitimizes	  political	  decisions	  based	  on	  the	  belief	   that	   people	   can	   change	   politicians	   through	   franchise.	   Behind	   the	   two-­‐
dimensional	  view	  of	  power	  we	  can	  discern	  a	  reformist	  ideology.	  It	  is	  implicit	  to	  this	  standpoint	   the	   idea	   that	   people’s	   interests	   do	   not	   have	   the	   same	   relevance,	  although	  these	  interests	  can	  be	  enlightened	  through	  political	  ways.	  Finally,	   in	  the	  
three-­‐dimensional	  view	  of	  power,	  we	  find	  a	  radical	  conception	  of	  power	  relations.	  According	  to	  this	  view	  people’s	  wants	  and	  desires	  can	  be	  actually	  a	  product	  of	  the	  system,	  being	  that	  the	  system	  could	  be	  working	  against	  people’s	  interests.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Latent	   conflict	   will	   arise	   when	   there	   is	   a	   contradiction	   between	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  rulers	   and	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   population	   excluded	  by	   the	   rulers.	   This	   latter	   population	  might	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  conscious	  of	  their	  real	  interests.	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Only	  one	  year	  after	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  Power:	  A	  Radical	  View	  (Lukes	  2005	  [1974]),	  the	  Pandora’s	  box	  was	  opened	  in	  the	  power	  debate	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  Surveiller	  et	  punir	  (Foucault,	  1975),	  boosting	  up	  a	  long	  postmodern	  line	  of	  thought	  that	  only	  now	  seems	  to	  lose	  influence.	  Foucault’s	  theory	  introduced	  the	  possibility	   of	   a	   four-­‐dimensional	   view	   of	   power,	   according	   to	   which	   even	   its	  resistance	   is	   determined	   by	   power.	   But	   not	   only	   Foucault’s	   theory	   challenged	  Lukes’	   three-­‐dimensional	   view	   of	   power.	   In	   the	   history	   of	   social	   thought	  we	   can	  find	  different	  standpoints	  regarding	  power,	  which	  are	  different,	  complementary	  or	  even	   contradictory,	   from	   the	   one	   of	   Lukes.	   Therefore,	   we	  will	   examine	  Weber’s	  well-­‐known	   classification	   of	   the	   different	   forms	   of	   authority	   into	   charismatic,	  traditional	   and	   rational-­‐legal	   (Weber,	   1989[1910-­‐1914]).	   We	   will	   also	   take	   into	  account	   the	   works	   by	   Western	   Marxists	   György Lukács	   and	   Antonio	   Gramsci;	  particularly	  the	  concept	  of	  hegemony	  by	  Gramsci	  (Gramsci,	  1971[1926-­‐1937])	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  false	  consciousness	  by	  Lukács	  (Lukács,	  1968[1922]).	  Finally	  we	  will	  also	  comment	  briefly	  Habermas’	  Legitimation	  Crisis	  (Habermas,	  1997[1973]),	  due	  to	  its	  relevance	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  political	  power.	  	  
Lukes	  has	  commented	  Weber’s	  work	  in	  these	  terms:	  “For	  Weber	  domination	  was	  legitimate,	   that	   is,	   recognized	   as	   legitimate	   by	   those	   subject	   to	   it	   (he	   had	   no	  interest	  in	  illegitimate	  power)”	  (Lukes	  2005,	  p.112).	  In	  fact,	  Weber	  himself	  wrote	  “the	   existence	   of	   domination	   turns	   only	   on	   the	   actual	   presence	   of	   one	   person	  successfully	   issuing	   orders	   to	   others’	   (Weber,	   1989[1910-­‐1914]:	   53).	   Weber,	  thereby,	  was	   interested	   in	   the	   forms	  by	  which	  political	  power	   is	   legitimated	  and	  maintained.	  Developing	  a	  methodology	  based	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  ideal	  types	  he	  concluded	  that	  there	  are	  three	  types	  by	  which	  these	  legitimation	  and	  maintenance	  of	   political	   power	   is	   possible:	   traditional,	   charismatic,	   and	   legal-­‐rational.	   The	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problem,	  according	   to	  Lukes,	   is	   that	  Weber’s	   idea	  of	  power	  does	  not	  account	   for	  those	   relationships	  of	  power	  as	  an	   imposition,	   acting	  against	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  dominated.	  	  
The	  work	  by	  Western	  Marxists	  Antonio	  Gramsci	  and	  György Lukács	  is	  interesting	  because	   their	   theories	   answer	   one	   the	   fundamental	   question	   of	   domination.	   As	  Lukes	  put	  it:	  “When	  (…)	  does	  (…)	  shaping	  and	  imposition	  constitute	  domination?”	  (Lukes	  2005:	  144).	  For	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  work,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  Gramsci’s	  concept	  of	  
hegemony	   that,	   basically,	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   force	   that	   works	   to	   maintain	   society	   in	   a	  
negotiated	   consent.	   Thus,	   for	   Gramsci,	   the	   position	   of	   hegemony	   typical	   of	   the	  ruling	  class	  is	  maintained	  through	  a	  process	  of	  constant	  negotiation.	  As	  expressed	  by	   Perry	  Anderson,	   Gramsci’s	  hegemony	  meant	   “the	   ideological	   subordination	   of	  the	   working	   class	   by	   the	   bourgeoisie,	   which	   enables	   it	   to	   rule	   by	   consent”	  (Anderson,	  1976:	  26).	  This	   is	  why	  the	  role	  of	  the	  intellectuals	   is	  so	  important	  for	  Gramsci	   in	  order	   to	  make	   the	  revolution,	  because	   they	  can	  break	   this	   ideological	  subordination.	   According	   to	   this	   definition	   of	   hegemony,	   Gramsci	   concludes	   that	  those	  who	  are	  subordinated	  have	  two	  different	  contradictory	  consciousnesses;	  one	  that	   is	   “imposed”,	   inherited	   from	   the	   past,	   and	   another	   which	   is	   related	   to	  “commonsense”,	   i.e.	   that	   defines	   their	   real	   interests.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   liberal	  democracies,	  the	  first	  one	  of	  these	  types	  of	  consciousness	  would	  enable	  the	  agreed	  domination	   of	   the	  working	   class	   by	   the	   capitalists,	  while	   the	   latter	  would	   break	  this	  consent,	  liberating	  the	  working	  class.	  	  
Lukács’	   standpoint	   is	   more	   radical,	   as	   it	   departs	   from	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   real	  interests	   of	   people	   are	   determined	   by	   their	   location	   within	   the	   process	   of	  production;	  in	  his	  own	  words:	  ‘the	  appropriate	  and	  rational	  reactions	  imputed	  to	  a	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particular	  typical	  position	  in	  the	  process	  of	  production’	  (Lukács,	  1968[1922]:	  229).	  Consequently,	  if	  there	  is	  an	  appropriate	  and	  rational	  reaction	  associated	  with	  class,	  then	   it	  must	   be	   possible	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   inappropriate	   reaction,	   that	   Lukács	  called	   ‘false	   consciousness’.	   According	   to	   Lukács,	   the	   appropriate	   class	  consciousness	   is	  not	  at	  all	  given,	  but	  rather	  must	  be	  achieved,	  conquered,	  by	   the	  working	   class,	   following	   a	   process	   of	   intellectual	   struggle	   to	   understand	   the	  totality	  of	  the	  historical	  process,	  defined	  by	  dialectical	  materialism,	  that	  eventually	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  production	  that	  dominates	  it.	  This	  idea	  of	  false	  consciousness	  was	   also	   present	   in	   Engels,	   as	  we	   can	   see	   in	   this	   fragment	   of	   the	  letter	  he	  sent	  to	  German	  publicist	  Franz	  Mehring:	  
‘Ideology	  is	  a	  process	  accomplished	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  thinker	  consciously,	  it	  is	  true,	  but	  with	  a	  false	  consciousness.	  The	  real	  motive	  forces	  impelling	  him	  remain	  unknown	  to	  him;	  otherwise	  it	  simply	  would	  not	  be	  an	  ideological	  process.	  Hence	  he	  imagines	  false	  or	  seeming	  motive	  forces.	  Because	  it	  is	  a	  process	  of	  thought	  he	  derives	  its	  form	  as	  well	  as	  its	  content	  from	  pure	  thought,	  either	  his	  own	  or	  that	  of	  his	  predecessors.	  He	  works	  with	  mere	  thought	  material,	  which	  he	  accepts	  without	  examination	  as	  the	  product	  of	  thought,	  and	  does	  not	  investigate	  further	  for	  a	  more	  remote	  source	  independent	  of	  thought;	  indeed	  this	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  course	  to	  him,	  because,	  as	  all	  action	  is	  mediated	  by	  thought,	  it	  appears	  to	  him	  to	  be	  ultimately	  
based	  upon	  thought.’	  (Engels,	  2004[1893]:	  14).	  From	  Lukes’	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  problem	  with	  this	  kind	  of	  answers	  is	  twofold.	  Firstly	  people	   do	   not	   have	   only	   one	   sort	   of	   interests,	   they	   usually	   have	   interests	   of	  different	  kind.	  Moreover	  people’s	  identity	  is	  not	  reduced	  only	  to	  social	  class,	  they	  have	   much	   more	   identities	   than	   class,	   giving	   way	   to	   other	   interests.	   Secondly,	  Lukes	   identifies	  a	  problem	  typical	  of	  Marxist	  social	   theory,	   i.e.	   “the	  claim	  to	  have	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some	  sort	  of	  privileged	  access,	  external	  to	  the	  actors,	  to	  a	  “true”	  account	  of	  what	  is	  “real”	   and	   of	   what	   are	   “appropriate”	   and	   “rational”	   responses	   to	   subordination”	  (Lukes	   2005:	   135).	   Lukes	   goes	   on	   to	   state,	   regarding	   Marxist-­‐Structuralist	  standpoint:	  	  
“(…)	  the	  self-­‐assurance	  and	  often	  dogmatism	  with	  which	  Marxist	  thinkers,	  sectarians	  and	  party	  secretaries	  across	  the	  decades	  have	  been	  ready	  to	  attribute	  “real	  interests”	  and	  “false	  consciousness”	  to	  others”	  (Lukes	  2005,	  p.145-­‐146).	  
We	   think,	   however,	   that	   this	   critique	   is	   not	   attributable	   to	   the	   whole	   Marxist	  tradition	  –vid.	  e.g.	  Jameson	  (1991)–.	  This	  false-­‐consciousness	  approach	  is	  not	  even	  directly	   attributable	   to	   the	   original	   writings	   by	   Marx.	   Thus,	   the	   whole	   idea	   of	  alienation	   by	  Marx,	   can	   be	   classified	  within	   three-­‐dimensional	   view,	   as	  we	   shall	  explain	   later.	   According	   to	   the	   differentiation	   by	   Spinoza	   between	   power	   as	  
potentia	  and	  power	  as	  potestas	  –vid.	  Negri	  (1999)–	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  both	  Marx’s	  alienation	  and	  Lukes’	  three-­‐dimensional	  view	  of	  power	  are	  focused	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  power	   as	   potestas,	   i.e.,	   as	   domination.	   This	   version	   of	   power	   can	   determine	  people’s	   wants	   and	   desires	   in	   a	   way	   that	   may	   be	   contrary	   to	   their	   objective	  interests,	   whichever	   these	   may	   be.	   This	   is	   related	   to	   Habermas’	   work	  (1997[1973]),	   arguing	   that	   there	   are	   contradictions	   between	   some	   of	   the	   sub-­‐systems	   (economic,	   administrative…)	   that	   operate	   within	   advanced	   capitalist	  societies	   (Habermas	   1997[1973]:	   34).	   Thus,	   for	   instance,	   usually	   people	   find	   it	  difficult	   to	   combine	   the	   high	   expectations	   created	   by	   welfare	   politics	   with	   an	  everyday	   reality	   very	   much	   defined	   by	   dispossession	   and	   impoverishment.	  According	  to	  Habermas,	  such	  a	  contradiction	  involves	  a	  crisis	  of	   legitimation	  that	  increases	  electoral	  abstention,	  to	  which	  the	  State	  would	  respond	  by	  an	  increasing	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of	   its	   authority	   through	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   territories	   of	   law.	   The	   result	   is	   a	  colonization	  of	   the	   life-­‐world	  by	   the	   system,	  using	  Habermas’	   terminology,	   to	  be	  offset	   by	   social	   movements	   that	   defend	   autonomous	   spheres	   of	   action.	   But	  whereas	   Habermas	   sees	   a	   possibility	   of	   defense	   embodied	   in	   the	   social	  movements,	  Foucault	  does	  not.	  As	  we	  have	  already	  commented,	  Foucault’s	  ideas	  of	  power	  proposed	  a	  fourth-­‐dimensional	  view	  (Lukes	  2005:	  88).	  The	  aim	  of	  Foucault	  was	   to	   create	   a	   microphysics	   of	   power,	   making	   reference	   to	   the	   moment	   when	  power	   penetrates	   people’s	   bodies	   (Foucault,	   1975).	   This	   idea	   of	  microphysics	   of	  power	  was	  developed	  by	  comparison	  with	  Bentham’s	  insights	  on	  the	  panopticon,	  a	  new	   prison	   system	   where	   the	   prisoners	   interiorized	   a	   constant	   state	   of	   being	  watched.	   In	   this	   sense	   power	   appears	   to	   be	   everywhere,	   to	   the	   point	   that	   the	  subject	   is	   constituted	   through	   his/her	   subjection	   to	   power.	   The	   assumption,	  however,	  brought	  accusations	  of	  determinism,	  as	   in	  Foucault’s	  view	  there	  is	  very	  little	  space	  for	  agency.	  The	  debate	  very	  much	  got	  entangled	  in	  the	  broader	  debate	  on	   action/structure,	  what,	   for	   Lukes,	   dissolved	   the	   ultra-­‐radicalism	  of	   Foucault’s	  view	   of	   power	   (Lukes	   2005:	   88-­‐99).	   This	   vanishing	   of	   the	   subject	   in	   Foucault’s	  thought,	   which	   even	   denies	   the	   possibility	   of	   effective	   resistance	   –as	   it	  must	   be	  determined	  by	  power	  as	  well–	  constitutes	  what	  Callinicos	  has	  called	  the	  apories	  of	  post-­‐structuralism:	  rationality,	  resistance,	  and	  the	  subject	  (Callinicos,	  1991:	  128).	  
So,	  our	  theory	  departs	  from	  Marx’s	  alienation.	  Alienation	  is	  the	  English	  translation	  for	   the	   German	   Entfremdung,	   meaning	   distancing.	   Thus,	   alienation	   in	   Marx	   is	  simply	  a	  distancing	  from	  Gattungswesen,	  German	  for	  species-­‐being.	  Consequently,	  alienation	   is	   just	   a	   process	   by	   which	   people	   disconnect	   from	   their	   true	   human	  nature,	  being	  its	  cause	  their	  living	  in	  a	  non-­‐egalitarian	  mode	  of	  production.	  Every	  non-­‐egalitarian	  mode	   of	   production	   involves	   the	   premise	   that	   some	   people	   will	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occupy	  a	  location	  within	  the	  economic	  structure	  that	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  subjection	  to	  the	   economic	   interests	   of	   some	   other	   people	   who	   occupy	   a	   different	   structural	  position	  defined	  by	  its	  duty	  of	  extracting	  the	  most	  out	  of	  the	  first	  group	  of	  people.	  Although	  this	  is	  so	  for	  slavery	  and	  feudalism,	  for	  instance,	  Marx	  applied	  it	  mainly	  to	   capitalist	   relations.	   Thus,	   in	   capitalism,	   the	   bourgeoisie	   owns	   the	   means	   of	  production	   and	   employs	  workers	   through	  wage	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   surplus	  value	  through	  the	  application	  of	  work	  to	  source	  materials.	   In	  such	  a	  relationship,	  the	   meaning	   of	   the	   working	   class	   is	   basically	   to	   increase	   the	   surplus	   value	   by	  obeying	   the	   mandates	   of	   the	   bourgeoisie.	   This	   dynamic	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	  working	   class	   to	   achieve	   basic	   living	   conditions	   and	   it	   is	   also	   necessary	   for	   the	  bourgeoisie	  to	  gain	  competitiveness	  against	  its	  competitors;	  therefore	  it	  cannot	  be	  changed	  without	  changing	  the	  system.	  The	  argument	  by	  Marx	   is	   that,	  as	  the	  very	  basic	  material	  conditions	  of	  the	  working	  class	  depend	  on	  its	  satisfactory	  endeavors	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie,	  then	  its	  whole	  consciousness	  of	  the	  world	  and	  of	  themselves	  become	  altered.	  Workers	  start	  seeing	  their	  lives	  through	  the	   lens	  of	   the	  bourgeoisie,	  as	  this	  will	  give	  them	  more	  chances	  to	  ensure	  decent	  living	   conditions;	   eventually	   their	   very	   human	   nature	   is	   substituted	   by	   its	  economic	   role	   of	  workers,	   and	   this	   last	   condition	  will	   determine	   their	  will,	   their	  likes,	  their	  character,	  etc.	  The	  alienation	  of	  workers	  affects	  four	  different	  aspects	  of	  their	  life.	  There	  is	  an	  alienation	  of	  the	  worker	  from	  the	  work	  they	  produce,	  as	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  produced	  and	  designed	  depends	  on	  the	  bourgeoisie.	  There	  is	  an	  alienation	  as	  well	  from	  working	  itself;	  the	  worker	  is	  but	  a	  piece	  within	  a	  long	  chain	  of	   production	   of	   the	   final	   product,	   making	   it	   impossible	   to	   get	   the	   satisfaction	  associated	   with	   the	   development	   of	   a	   product	   in	   accordance	   to	   his/her	   own	  perspective.	  There	   is	  an	  alienation	  of	   the	  worker	   from	  his/her	  human	  nature;	  as	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the	   psychological	   well	   being	   of	   humans	   depends	   on	   their	   ability	   to	   develop	  meaningful	   activities,	   then	   workers	   cannot	   achieve	   that	   as	   they	   only	   develop	  partial	   tasks	   as	  mandated	  by	   the	  bourgeoisie,	  without	   a	   sense	  of	   totality.	   Finally	  there	   is	   an	   alienation	   of	   workers	   from	   their	   fellow	  workers;	   thus,	   as	   capitalism	  introduces	   the	   field	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   labor	  market,	  where	  workers	   compete	  with	  each	   other	   in	   order	   to	   get	   the	   highest	   possible	   salary,	   they	   end	   up	   internalizing	  such	   competition.	   According	   to	   Marx,	   human	   beings,	   however,	   are	   designed	   to	  build	  projects	  together	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  higher	  common	  standards	  in	  their	  well	  being,	  and	  so	  alienation	  builds	  a	  wall	  between	  workers	  and	  between	  workers	  and	  their	  human	  nature	  (vid.	  Marx,	  1974[1844];	  Marx	  and	  Engels,	  1998[1846]).	  	  
Hence	   Marx	   argued	   that	   the	   dynamics	   generated	   by	   the	   capitalist	   mode	   of	  production	  divided	  the	  population	  into	  two	  main	  classes	  of	  people.	  The	  ones	  who	  owned	   the	   means	   of	   production	   and	   the	   capacity	   to	   organize	   the	   way	   that	   the	  production	  process	   is	  managed,	  and	   the	  ones	  who	  only	  had	   their	   labor-­‐power	   to	  sell	  in	  the	  labor	  market,	  in	  exchange	  of	  a	  salary.	  Therefore,	  according	  to	  Marx,	  this	  artificial,	  socially	  constructed,	  relation	  in	  the	  level	  of	  the	  production	  process,	  have	  consequences	  on	  the	  self-­‐image	  of	  the	  individuals	  involved	  in	  such	  a	  process.	  The	  main	  effect	  is	  that	  of	  an	  estrangement	  of	  individuals	  from	  their	  human	  condition	  as	  it	   would	   be	   outside	   of	   this	   particular	   type	   of	   class	   relations.	   The	   role	   that	  individuals	  play	  as	  workers	  or	   capitalists	   colonizes	   their	  whole	   self	   and	   identity.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  Marx	  understood	  that	  the	  structural	  location	  occupied	  by	   people	   within	   the	   socioeconomic	   system 56 	  introduces	   limitations	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  It	  is	  important	  to	  highlight	  the	  term	  ‘socioeconomic’,	  as	  in	  Marx’s	  work	  it	  is	  nonsense	  to	  divorce	  economy	  from	  society.	  The	  economic	   infrastructure	  produces	  a	  distinctive	  social	  structure	   that	   determines	   the	   relations	   between	   people.	   Social	   class,	   in	   Marx,	   is	   not	   an	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constrictions	   that	   would	   orient	   individual	   practices.	   We	   argue	   that	   Pierre	  Bourdieu,	  with	  a	  body	  of	  work	  produced	  mainly	  during	  the	  1970s,	  has	  developed	  this	   argument	   by	   Marx	   outside	   of	   the	   Hegelian	   conception	   of	   identity	   and	   self-­‐identity	  that	  we	  can	  find	  behind	  Marx’s	  early	  theorizing	  on	  alienation.	  Thus,	  before	  entering	  Bourdieu’s	  model,	  we	  will	  expose	  what	  we	  consider	  as	  the	  main	  limitation	  behind	  Marx’s	  theory	  of	  alienation.	  	  
Marx	   was	   basically	   a	   Hegelian	   who	   put	   dialectics	   down	   to	   earth.	   His	   general	  approach	   to	   history	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   conflictive	   class	   relations	   as	  well	   as	   his	  understanding	  of	   identity	  and	  self-­‐image	  is	  essentially	  a	  materialist	  expression	  of	  the	  Hegelian	  idealist	  framework	  (Hegel,	  1998[1807]).	  Nancy	  Fraser,	  the	  celebrated	  American	   critical	   theorist,	   has	   developed	   a	   critique	   of	  Hegelian	   identity	   schema;	  for	   her,	   this	   Hegelian	   model	   is	   based	   on	   the	   dialogical	   construction	   of	   identity	  ‘through	   a	   process	   of	   mutual	   recognition’	   (Fraser,	   2000:	   109),	   giving	   way	   to	  analytical	   approaches	   that	   embrace	   the	   notion	   of	   self-­‐hatred	   (vid.	   e.g.	   Taylor,	  1992).	   Thus,	   the	   process	   of	   creation	   and	   solving	   of	   injustices	   on	   the	   sphere	   of	  recognition	   from	   the	   standpoing	   of	   the	   identity	   model	   can	   be	   summarized	   as	  follows	  –vid.	  (Fraser,	  1995;	  2000)–:	  	  
Generation	  of	  injustices	  within	  the	  sphere	  of	  recognition	  (Hegelian	  model):	  
1.	  One	  part	  of	  my	  identity	  is	  despised.	  
2.	  I	  am	  wrong.	  	  
3.	  I	  do	  not	  like	  myself.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  attribute	  of	  individuals,	  but	  a	  relation	  between	  structural	  groups	  that	  acts	  as	  a	  framework	  in	  which	  individuals	  take	  part	  and	  express	  their	  bounded	  praxis,	  or	  action.	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Generation	  of	  justice	  within	  the	  sphere	  of	  recognition	  (Hegelian	  model):	  
4.	  Symbolic	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  part	  of	  me	  which	  is	  despised.	  	  
5.	  I	  am	  not	  wrong.	  
6.	  I	  like	  myself.	  
According	   to	   Fraser,	   however,	   the	   application	   of	   the	   identity	   model	   to	   solve	  injustices	  within	   the	   sphere	   of	   recognition	   presents	   serious	   problems57.	   Namely	  regarding	   displacement	   and	   reification.	   By	   displacement,	   Fraser	   means	   that	   the	  fights	  for	  recognition	  can	  eclipse	  those	  for	  redistribution;	  by	  reification,	  she	  means	  that	   the	   fights	   for	   recognition	   can	   reify	   the	  defended	  group	   identities,	  what	  may	  derive	  in	  intolerance	  against	  the	   ‘others’,	   instead	  of	  respectful	   interaction	  (Fraser, 
2000: 108).	  Thus	  Fraser	  concludes	  that	  social	  movements	  should	  be	  changing	  their	  focus	   from	   an	   identity	  model	   to	   a	   status	   model	   (Fraser,	   2000:	   113).	   The	   status	  model	  does	  no	  longer	  include	  any	  notion	  on	  true/false	  identities	  and	  its	  correlate	  of	  self-­‐hatred;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  it	  interprets	  the	  absence	  of	  cultural	  recognition,	  not	  as	   the	   result	   of	   conflictive	   identities,	   but	   as	   a	   pattern	   of	   social	   subordination.	  Therefore,	  the	  reparation	  of	  this	  social	  subordination	  will	  come	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  measures	   oriented	   to	   load	   the	   despised	   diacritics	   with	   status.	   However,	   a	  more	  radical	   view,	   closer	   to	   Foucault’s	   four-­‐dimensional	   power,	   would	   propose	   the	  suppression	  of	   the	  difference;	  hence,	   for	   instance,	   regarding	  gender,	   the	   solution	  would	   not	   be	   given	   by	   the	   empowerment	   of	   women,	   but	   by	   the	   suppression	   of	  gender	  differences	  –vid.	  (Fraser,	  1997;	  Butler,	  1990)–.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  This	  identity	  model	  has	  been	  largely	  applied	  in	  several	  contexts,	  from	  gender	  politics	  –
vid.	  Fraser	  (1995)–	  to	  language	  policy	  –vid.	  Álvarez	  Cáccamo	  (2003)	  and	  De	  Nieves	  (2011) for	  analysis	  of	  the	  Galician	  case–.	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It	  was	   Pierre	  Bourdieu	  who	  most	   notably	   took	   over	   the	   task	   initiated	   by	  Marx’s	  theory	   of	   alienation,	   building	   it	   up	   outside	   the	   initial	   tradition	   based	   on	   the	  Hegelian	   identity	   model.	   Furthermore,	   Bourdieu’s	   endeavors	   achieved	   a	   more	  fundamental	   task	   by	   de-­‐economizing	   Marx’s	   framework	   of	   exploitation.	   As	  Habermas	   explained,	  Marx’s	  whole	   approach	  was	   built	   upon	   the	   idea	   that	  work	  was	  the	  fundamental	  human	  feature;	   it	   is	  well	  know	  that	  Habermas	  carried	  out	  a	  re-­‐elaboration	   of	   the	  Marxist	   approach	   upon	   the	   idea	   that	   language	  was	   instead	  the	  fundamental	  human	  feature	  (Habermas,	  2010	  [1981]).	  It	  may	  be	  said,	  however,	  that	  Bourdieu’s	  approach	  integrates	  both	  linguistic	  and	  working	  human	  capacities	  into	  an	  integrated	  framework	  for	  analysis	  thanks	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  capital.	  Capital,	   in	  Bourdieu’s	  work,	  does	  no	  longer	  belong	  solely	  to	  the	  economic	  realm.	  Thus,	  Bourdieu’s	  definition	  of	  capital	  broadens	  the	  initial	  Marxist	  economic	  approach,	  but	  is	  certainly	  rooted	  on	  it:	  
‘Capital	  is	  accumulated	  labor	  (in	  its	  materialized	  form	  or	  its	  ‘incorporated’,	  embodied	  form)	  which,	  when	  appropriated	  on	  a	  private,	  i.e.,	  exclusive,	  basis	  by	  agents	  or	  groups	  of	  agents,	  enables	  them	  to	  appropriate	  social	  energy	  in	  the	  form	  of	  reified	  or	  living	  labor.	  It	  is	  a	  vis	  insita,	  a	  force	  inscribed	  in	  objective	  or	  subjective	  structures,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  lex	  insita,	  the	  principle	  underlying	  the	  immanent	  regularities	  of	  the	  social	  world.’	  (Bourdieu,	  1986:	  241).	  
Hence,	  for	  Bourdieu	  there	  is	  no	  intrinsic	  limitation	  of	  capital	  to	  its	  monetary	  form.	  This	  would	   be	   a	   particular	   form	  among	  many.	  Which	   are	   these	   forms?	  Although	  Bourdieu	  himself	  have	  sometimes	  talked	  about	  ‘linguistic	  capital’	  (Bourdieu,	  2002:	  146),	  this	  is	  nothing	  but	  a	  form	  of	  the	  broad	  cultural	  capital.	  Thereby,	  for	  Bourdieu	  all	   forms	   of	   capital	   can	   be	   classified	   in	   three	   general	   types:	   economic	   capital,	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cultural	  capital	  and	  social	  capital.	  Bourdieu	  usually	  adds	  symbolic	  capital	  as	  well,	  but	  only	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  power	  or	  energy	  implicit	  to	  the	  three	  main	  types	  of	  capital,	  power	  as	  potentia.	  Thus,	  for	  instance:	  ‘(…)	  to	  function	  as	  symbolic	  capital,	  i.e.,	   to	   be	   unrecognized	   as	   capital	   and	   recognized	   as	   legitimate	   competence’	  (Bourdieu,	  1986:	  246).	  Therefore,	  symbolic	  capital	  is	  a	  form	  of	  capital	  perceived	  as	  legitimate	   and	   objective	   competence	   through	   which	   symbolic	   violence	   is	  implemented.	  Thus,	  for	  instance,	  an	  aristocratic	  child	  from	  18th	  century	  Paris	  could	  have	   shown	   his/her	   artistic	   expertise	   on	   neoclassicism	   to	   a	   peasant	   with	   no	  cultural	   capital	   inherited;	   the	   result	   would	   be	   the	   re-­‐construction	   of	   the	   class	  domination	   of	   the	   latter	   by	   the	   former	   under	   the	   disguised,	   pernicious	   form	   of	  legitimate	   knowledge,	  when	   in	   reality	  what	  was	   at	   stake	   is	   nothing	  more	   than	   a	  difference	  on	   the	   level	   of	   capital	   accumulation	  between	   the	   two	   social	   classes	  of	  which	  the	  cited	  individuals	  are	  members.	  To	  continue	  with	  the	  example,	  the	  result	  would	  have	  been	  an	  extraction	  of	  surplus	  value	  in	  terms	  of	  cultural	  capital	  of	  the	  latter	   by	   the	   former,	   in	   the	   case	   that	   the	   latter	   would	   have	   considered	  neoclassicism	  as	  a	   form	  of	  high	  human	  artistic	  expression.	  That	   is,	   if	   the	  peasant	  recognizes	   the	   legitimation	   of	   the	   cultural	   field	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   laws	  imposed	   by	   the	   logic	   of	   capital	   accumulation	   fixed	   by	   the	   aristocracy,	   then	   the	  apparent	   higher	   knowledge	   of	   the	   aristocrat	  would	   have	   functioned	   as	   symbolic	  violence,	  ended	  up	  with	  the	  symbolic	  extraction	  of	  symbolic	  capital	  in	  its	  cultural	  form.	  The	  dominant	  classes	  have	  the	  power	  to	  set	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  market	  and,	  once	  the	  rules	  are	  fixed,	  they	  also	  have	  a	  privileged	  access	  to	  the	  social	  objects	  that	  are	  capitalized	  by	  the	  market	  they	  have	  made.	  For	  Bourdieu,	  society	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  poker	  game	  in	  which	  some	  of	  the	  players	  team	  up	  each	  other	  to	  cheat	  on	  the	  rest	  of	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the	  participants	  to	  get	  their	  money;	  furthermore,	  as	  the	  cheated	  players	  do	  not	  see	  the	  trick,	  think	  that	  winners	  actually	  deserve	  to	  win.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  clarify	  Bourdieu’s	  standpoint	  we	  will	  first	  define	  the	  main	  notions	  of	  it,	  and	   after	   that	   we	   will	   exemplify	   the	   theory	   with	   the	   particular	   example	   of	   the	  linguistic	   market.	   Bourdieu’s	   general	   framework	   was	   defined	   by	   himself	   as	  
constructivist	   structuralism	   or	   structuralist	   constructivism,	   pointing	   to	   the	  transgression	   of	   the	   boundary	   between	   structure	   and	   agency	   underlying	   his	  thought	   (Bourdieu,	   1989:	   14).	   Bourdieu’s	   schema	   is	   based	   on	   classical	   social	  theory,	   not	   only	   from	   Marx,	   but	   also	   from	   Weber,	   due	   to	   the	   relevance	   that	  symbolism,	   particularly	   the	   notion	   of	   status,	   has	   acquired	   in	   his	   work;	   we	   find	  strong	  reminiscences	  of	  Veblen’s	  theory	  of	  the	  leisure	  class	  (Veblen,	  1994[1899]),	  and	  particularly	  in	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  conspicuous	  consumption	  with	  which	  the	  leisure	  class	  wanted	  to	  differentiate	  themselves	  from	  the	  industrial	  class	  (Veblen,	  1994[1899]:	   41-­‐59)	   –vid.	   Alvarez	   Sousa	   (1996:	   169)	   for	   its	   association	   with	  Bourdieu’s	  framework–.	  However,	  as	  Alvarez	  Sousa	  has	  pointed	  out:	  	  
‘Regarding	  the	  theory	  of	  social	  classes	  by	  P.	  Bourdieu,	  it	  departs	  from	  the	  Classics,	  although	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  them	  strictly,	  redirecting	  them	  to	  a	  new	  theory	  through	  a	  set	  of	  different	  ruptures.	  We	  want	  to	  make	  clear	  that	  these	  ruptures	  are	  not	  necessarily	  denials,	  but	  rather	  reformulations	  made	  by	  taking	  the	  positive	  aspects	  from	  each	  author,	  instead	  of	  the	  negative	  ones.’	  (Alvarez	  Sousa,	  1996:	  167).	  
Bourdieu’s	   structuralism	   is	   not	   identified	   with	   its	   typical	   definitions	   by	   Lévi-­‐Strauss	   in	   anthropology	   (Lévi-­‐Strauss,	   1958),	   or	   by	   Saussure	   in	   linguistics	  (Saussure,	  1974[1916]).	  In	  his	  own	  words:	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‘By	  structuralism	  or	  structuralist,	  I	  mean	  that	  there	  exist,	  within	  the	  social	  world	  itself	  and	  not	  only	  within	  symbolic	  systems	  (language,	  myths,	  etc.),	  objective	  structures	  independent	  of	  the	  consciousness	  and	  will	  of	  agents,	  which	  are	  capable	  of	  guiding	  and	  constraining	  their	  practices	  or	  their	  representations’	  (Bourdieu,	  1989:	  14).	  
Regarding	   constructivism,	   Bourdieu’s	   approach	   is	   not	   related	   to	   its	   influential	  Actor-­‐Network	  Theory	  version,	  as	  in	  the	  work	  by	  Latour	  (2005).	  In	  his	  own	  words:	  
‘By	  constructivism,	  I	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  a	  twofold	  social	  genesis,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  of	  the	  schemes	  of	  perception,	  thought,	  and	  action	  which	  are	  constitutive	  of	  what	  I	  call	  habitus,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  of	  social	  structures,	  and	  particularly	  of	  what	  I	  call	  fields	  and	  of	  groups,	  notably	  those	  we	  ordinarily	  call	  social	  classes’	  (Bourdieu,	  1989:	  14).	  
As	   Bourdieu	   explains,	   there	   are	   two	   main	   traditions	   in	   the	   social	   sciences;	   the	  objectivist	  one,	  epitomized	  by	  Durkheim’s	  famous	  quotation	  ‘consider	  social	  facts	  as	   things’	   (Durkheim,	  1982[1895]:	  60),	  and	  the	  subjectivist	  one,	  which	  according	  to	  Bourdieu	  ‘can	  reduce	  the	  social	  world	  to	  the	  representations	  that	  agents	  have	  of	  it,	   the	   task	   of	   social	   science	   consisting	   then	   in	   producing	   an	   “account	   of	   the	  accounts”	   produced	   by	   social	   subjects’	   (Bourdieu	   1989:	   15).	   This	   involves	   two	  different	   conceptions	   of	   the	   social	   scientist,	   either	   as	   a	   demiurge	   or	   as	   a	   mere	  interpreter.	   The	   first	   conception	   is	   usually	   associated	   to	   positivism,	   while	   the	  latter,	  boosted	  by	  post-­‐structuralism	  is	  shared	  nowadays	  by	  many	  scholars,	  and	  it	  is	   very	   well	   summarized	   in	   this	   fragment	   by	  Monica	   Heller,	   reporting	   a	   case	   in	  which	  the	  police	  asked	  for	  help	  to	  a	  linguist	  lecturing	  at	  the	  university:	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‘The	  place	  to	  find	  a	  language	  expert,	  of	  course	  (of	  course?),	  is	  a	  university.	  Hence	  my	  friend’s	  call	  to	  me:	  she	  knew	  she	  was	  being	  constructed	  as	  a	  holder	  of	  objective	  truths,	  while	  she	  understands	  herself	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  situated	  knowledge–an	  interpreter,	  not	  a	  transmitter.’	  (Heller,	  2011:	  4).	  
There	   is	   an	   utter	   opposition	   between	   objectivism	   and	   subjectivism.	   The	   first	  current	   sees	   human	   behavior	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   forces	  which	   are	   unknown	   to	  agents,	   who	   rationalize	   their	   behavior	   by	   building	   what	   Durkheim	   called	  ‘prenotions’	  and	  Marx	  ‘ideologies’;	  the	  role	  of	  the	  social	  scientist,	  thus,	  is	  to	  unveil	  the	   real	   hidden	   forces	  which	   are	   really	   determining	   human	   behavior	   (Bourdieu,	  1989:	  15).	   	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  subjectivism	  states	   that	  human	  behavior	  obeys	   to	  subjective	   symbolic	   representation;	   social	   agents	   build	   up	   their	   own	   social	  constructs,	   representations	   of	   their	  world,	   and	   act	   accordingly.	   Thus,	   the	   role	   of	  the	  social	  scientist	  would	  be	  to	  fully	  understand	  these	  social	  constructs	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  and	  explain	  people’s	  behavior.	  This	  way	  of	  theorizing	  is	  epitomized	  by	  Schutz’s	   work,	   who	   understood	   that	   the	   role	   of	   social	   scientists	   is	   making	  ‘constructs	  of	  the	  second	  degree,	  that	  is,	  constructs	  of	  the	  constructs	  made	  by	  the	  actors	   in	   the	   social	   scene’	   (Schutz,	   1962:	  59,	   cited	   in	  Bourdieu,	  1989:	  15).	  While	  objectivism	   sees	   people	   as	   puppets,	   subjectivism	   sees	   them	   as	   generators	   of	  symbolic	  worlds	  that	  guide	  their	  behavior.	  This	  has	  implications	  for	  every	  kind	  of	  human	   behavior	   or	   conduct.	   For	   instance,	   regarding	   electoral	   behavior,	   an	  objectivist	   would	   claim	   that	   people’s	   vote	   is	   an	   expression	   of	   an	   unconscious	  underlying	  force	  driving	  people	  to	  choose	  one	  particular	  party	  or	  electoral	  option,	  while	   people,	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   their	   behavior,	   elaborate	   some	   pseudo-­‐rational	  discourse	   explaining	   this	   action.	   For	   a	   subjectivist,	   people’s	   electoral	   behavior	   is	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nothing	  but	   the	   expression	  of	   people’s	   images	   and	   constructions	   of	   the	  different	  parties	  and	  political	  options	  at	  their	  disposal.	  	  
The	  work	   by	   Pierre	   Bourdieu	   is	   important	   for	   different	   things,	   but	   probably	   its	  greatest	   merit	   was	   to	   overcome	   the	   cleavage	   between	   objectivism	   and	  subjectivism.	  As	  Bourdieu	  explains:	  ‘If	  I	  have	  somewhat	  belabored	  this	  opposition	  –one	  of	  the	  most	  harmful	  of	  these	  “paired	  concepts”	  which,	  as	  Reinhard	  Bendix	  and	  Bennett	  Berger	  (1959)	  have	  shown,	  pervade	  the	  social	  sciences–	  it	  is	  because	  the	  most	   steadfast	   (and,	   in	  my	  eyes,	   the	  most	   important)	   intention	  guiding	  my	  work	  has	  been	  to	  overcome	  it’	  (Bourdieu,	  1989:	  15).	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  human	  action	  understands	   it	   as	   a	   vector	  with	   two	   components,	   a	   structural	   component,	  which	  we	   may	   call	  𝑥,	   and	   a	   subjective	   component,	   which	   we	   may	   call	  𝑦.	   Therefore,	   if	  human	  action	  is	  a	  vector	  with	  two	  components,	  it	  can	  only	  be	  partially	  understood	  or	   predicted	   by	   knowing	   only	   the	   value	   of	   either	  𝑥	  or	  𝑦.	   According	   to	   Bourdieu,	  thus,	  human	  action	  can	  be	  formalized	  like	  this:	  
𝑟 = 𝑥! + 𝑦! 	  
Consequently,	  structuralism	  introduces	  the	  predictive	  flaws	  summarized	  in	  figure	  27;	  if	  we	  only	  have	  the	  value	  for	  one	  of	  the	  components,	  𝑥,	  in	  this	  case,	  then	  we	  will	  only	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  human	  action	  as	  a	  vector	  ranging	  from	  the	  minimum	  to	  the	  maximum	  possible	   value	   that	   subjective	   view	   can	   take.	   Imagine	   that	   each	   value,	  from	  0	  to	  10,	  on	  the	  𝑥	  axis	  of	  figure	  27	  corresponds	  to	  a	  definite	  structural	  position	  –for	   instance,	   to	   class	   positions	   in	   the	   Goldthorpe	   schema–.	   If	  we	   only	   have	   the	  information	   for	   this	   axis	   without	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   values	   of	   the	   other	  component,	  i.e.,	  of	  subjective	  view,	  our	  prediction	  of	  behavior	  will	  range	  from	  0	  to	  10	   on	   the	  𝑦	  axis	   for	   each	   of	   the	   social	   classes.	   For	   instance,	   Marx’s	   structuralist	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prediction	   of	   revolution	   ignored	   the	   values	   of	   the	  𝑦	  axis;	   revolution	   is	   a	   possible	  vector	  (𝑟)	  only	  achievable	  for	  some	  of	  the	  structural	  locations	  (𝑥!),	  but	  if	  we	  do	  not	  take	   into	   account	   subjective	   view	   (𝑦!),	   then	  we	   cannot	   be	   able	   to	   predict	  when,	  under	  which	  circumstances	   that	  vector	   is	  going	   to	  happen,	  as	  we	   lack	  one	  of	   the	  components	  of	  the	  vector	  that	  represents	  human	  praxis.	  Marx	  was	  right	  in	  pointing	  that	  revolution	  is	  a	  vector	  only	  possible	  by	  individuals	  located	  on	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  structural	   positions,	   but	   unless	   we	   know	   the	   way	   in	   which	   subjective	   view	   is	  related	   to	   structure,	  we	   cannot	  be	  able	   to	  predict	   revolution,	   or	   any	  other	   social	  praxis.	  	  
	  

















Figure	  27.	  IlustraLon	  of	  the	  structuralist	  
predicLon	  ﬂaw	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class,	  represented	  by	  value	  ‘1’.	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  vector	  r	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  social	  agents	  present	   ‘1’	  values	   for	  both	  axes.	   In	  other	  words,	   it	   is	  necessary	  that	   the	   agents	  belong	   to	   a	   structural	   location	  defined	   as	  working	   class	  and	  that	  they	  hold	   a	   subjective	  worldview	  of	   dissent.	  Both	   subjective	   view	  and	   structural	  location	  must	  be	  combined	  in	  this	  unique	  way	  to	  produce	  revolution,	  so	  𝑟 = 𝑥! +𝑦!.	  Marx’s	   structuralism	   interpreted	   that	   the	  values	  on	   the	  y	   axis	   are	   completely	  determined	  by	  the	  values	  on	  the	  x	  axis,	  meaning	  that	  members	  of	  the	  working	  class	  would	   tend	   to	   develop	   a	   subjective	   view	   based	   on	   dissent.	   Bourdieu’s	   habitus	  clarified	   this	   point,	   as	   there	   is	   no	   determination	   of	   y	  by	   x,	   but	   an	   interrelation	  between	  the	  two,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  structural	  location	  influence	  the	  subjective	  view	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  subjective	  view	  reinforce	  structural	  location.	  This	  interplay	  between	  structure	  and	  agency	   is	  summed	  up	  in	  the	   idea	  of	  habitus;	   the	  habitus	   is	   a	   social	   mechanism	   within	   the	   minds	   of	   individuals	   constantly	  encouraging	   them	   to	   act	   within	   a	   limited	   range	   of	   options.	   	   It	   is	   the	   subjective	  expression	  of	  the	  structural	  location	  of	  individuals,	  acting	  like	  a	  force	  that	  orients	  practice	  within	  a	  range	  of	  options.	  If	  Marx	  would	  have	  thought	  in	  terms	  of	  habitus,	  then	   it	  will	   compel	   agents	   in	   each	   structural	   location	   to	   act	   in	   a	  unique	  manner,	  instead	   of	   orienting	   practice	   within	   a	   range	   of	   options.	   As	   expressed	   by	   Loïc	  Wacquant:	  
‘Habitus	  is	  an	  old	  philosophical	  notion	  originating	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  Aristotle	  and	  of	  the	  medieval	  Scholastic	  that	  was	  retrieved	  and	  reworked	  after	  the	  1960s	  by	  sociologist	  Pierre	  Bourdieu	  to	  forge	  a	  dispositional	  theory	  of	  action	  suited	  to	  reintroducing	  the	  inventive	  capacity	  of	  agents	  within	  structuralist	  anthropology,	  without	  that	  falling	  back	  into	  the	  Cartesian	  intellectualism	  that	  skews	  subjectivist	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approaches	  to	  social	  conduct	  from	  behaviorism	  to	  symbolic	  interactionism	  to	  rational	  choice	  theory’	  (Wacquant,	  2006:	  317).	  
	  
We	   will	   afford	   the	   reader	   the	   graphical	   representation	   of	   human	   behavior	  according	   to	   subjectivism,	   as	   it	   resembles	   the	   structuralist	   one	   but	   with	  predictions	   ranging	   from	   the	   minimum	   to	   the	   maximum	   structural	   value.	  According	  to	  Bourdieu,	  both	  deviations	  lack	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  the	  vector	  that	  human	  action	  is.	  
Therefore,	   if	  human	  action	  is	  a	  vector	  with	  two	  components	  (𝑥! ,𝑦!),	  every	  theory	  only	   taking	   into	   account	   one	   of	   these	   two	   components	   is	   incomplete.	   However,	  both	   objectivism	   and	   subjectivism	   made	   relevant	   contributions	   to	   sociology,	   as	  they	  provided	  an	  understanding	  on	  the	  generation	  and	  functioning	  of	  each	  of	  the	  two	   components.	   Bourdieu’s	   work	   was	   focused	   on	   the	   link	   between	   these	   two	  realities,	   which	   is	   the	   habitus.	   Thus	   the	   habitus	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   logically	  designed	  mechanism	  by	  which	  the	  structural	  and	  the	  subjectivist	  components	  are	  linked.	  
0	  
1	  










Fig.	  28.	  Vectorial	  representaLon	  of	  
revoluLon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  r	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Habitus	   refers	   to	   people’s	   internal	   set	   of	   predispositions	   for	   action,	   structurally	  determined.	   In	   his	   own	  words,	   habitus	   refers	   to	   ‘the	  mental	   structures	   through	  which	  they	  (agents)	  apprehend	  the	  social	  world,	  are	  essentially	  the	  product	  of	  the	  internalization	  of	   the	  structures	  of	   that	  world.	  As	  perceptive	  dispositions	   tend	  to	  be	  adjusted	  to	  position,	  agents,	  even	  the	  most	  disadvantaged	  ones,	  tend	  to	  perceive	  the	  world	  as	  natural	  and	  to	  accept	   it	  much	  more	  readily	   than	  one	  might	   imagine	  especially	  when	  you	  look	  at	  the	  situations	  of	  the	  dominated	  through	  the	  social	  eyes	  of	  a	  dominant’	   (Bourdieu,	  1989:	  18).	  Thus,	   the	  habitus	   is	   the	   lens	   through	  which	  the	  agents	  carry	  out	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  that	  constitute	  human	  action.	  This	  process	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  its	  basic	  binary	  expression	  and	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  explain	   in	   detail	   through	   neuroscience	   –vid.,	   e.g.,	   (Sollberger,	   Rankin	   and	  Miller,	  2010)–.	  As	  we	  have	  discussed	  earlier,	  neuroscience	  is	  gaining	  prominence	  within	  the	   social	   sciences	   and	   it	   is	   our	   belief	   that	   it	   will	   define	   one	   of	   the	   two	   main	  branches	   of	   sociology	   in	   the	   near	   future.	   The	   other	   branch,	   related	   to	   the	  structuralist	  component	  of	  human	  action,	  is	  the	  one	  that	  we	  want	  to	  expand	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  
We	   can	   briefly	   summarize	   Bourdieu’s	   argument	   by	   stating	   that	   structure	  determines	   habitus,	   i.e.,	   forces,	   and	   habitus	   urges	   agents	   to	   act	   within	   a	   set	   of	  possible	   practices.	   Each	   structural	   location	   is	   associated	   to	   a	   particular	   range	   of	  practices	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  deterministic,	  being	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  link	  directly	  proportional	  to	  the	  approximation	  of	  structural	  locations	  to	  ideal	  types.	  According	  to	   Bourdieu,	   human	   action	   is	   like	   rowing	   a	   boat	   in	   the	   night	  with	   the	   help	   of	   a	  lighthouse	  that	  is	  different	  for	  each	  structural	  position.	  When	  an	  individual	  is	  not	  clearly	   located	   in	   a	   precise	   structural	   location,	   then	   he/she	  will	   have	  more	   than	  one	  lighthouse,	  leading	  to	  confusion	  and	  suffering.	  As	  Bourdieu	  put	  it:	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‘Contradictory	  positions,	  suitable	  to	  exert	  on	  its	  occupants	  structural	  ‘double	  coercions’,	  are	  often	  torn	  habitus,	  leading	  to	  contradiction	  and	  division	  against	  themselves,	  generating	  suffering’	  (Bourdieu,	  2000:	  210)	  
But	  habitus	   is	  not	  a	   construction	   that	  operates	   in	  an	  empty	  space	  –in	   fact	   this	   is	  particularly	  what	   defines	   the	   subjectivist	   deviation–.	  Habitus	   is	   socially	   situated,	  and	   intrinsically	   related	   to	   social	   space.	   It	   underlies	   every	   social	   interaction	   and	  individual	   decision,	   being	   its	   direct	   link	   to	   social	   structure.	   Symmetrically,	   social	  structure	   manifests	   itself	   in	   social	   interaction	   through	   habitus,	   in	   Bourdieu’s	  words:	  ‘The	  dispositions	  acquired	  in	  the	  position	  occupied	  imply	  an	  adjustment	  to	  this	   position’	   (Bourdieu,	   1989:	   17).	   This	   (subjectively)	   embodied	   (structural)	  social	  distances	  ‘are	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  cooptation,	  friendships,	  love	  affairs,	  marriages,	   associations,	   and	   so	   on’	   (idem.).	   Here	   we	   see	   the	   linkage	   between	  subjectivism	  and	  structuralism,	  which	  are	  just	  two	  components	  of	  the	  vector	  that	  social	  action	  is.	  We	  may	  exemplify	  this	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘young	  rebel’	  attitude,	  as	  this	   is	   a	   human	   praxis	   to	   be	   found	   within	   the	   range	   of	   desirable	   practices	  determined	   by	   habitus	   to	   only	   those	   young	   people	   located	   in	   a	   similar	   semi-­‐advantaged	   structural	   location;	   on	   that	   very	   range,	   however,	   we	   may	   find	   the	  possibility	   to	  develop	  a	   conformist	  praxis,	   although	   the	   force	   to	  adopt	   this	   latter	  conduct	   will	   be	   stronger	   for	   agents	   occupying	   a	   less	   advantaged	   structural	  location58.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  This	   apparent	   contradiction	   is	   explained	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   agents	   who	   are	   advantaged	  enough	  have	  what	  may	  be	  described	  as	  carte	  blanche	  to	  denounce	  injustices	  they	  do	  not	  need	   to	   solve	   to	  be	  advantaged.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  disadvantaged	  groups	   tend	   to	   reject	  combative	   attitudes	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   show	   that	   they	  do	  not	  need	   the	   redistribution	  of	   the	  social	   field	   that	   in	   fact	   provokes	   their	   disadvantage	   position.	   The	   attitude	   benefits	   the	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Thus,	  the	  objective	  social	  space	  in	  which	  the	  habitus	  is	  developed	  is	  the	  field,	  which	  Bourdieu	   defined	   as	   a	   ‘battlefield’	   (Bourdieu	   &	   Wacquant,	   1992:	   101)	   where	  resources	  are	  disputed	  and	  distributed.	  Unlike	  economistic	  accounts	  of	  resources,	  of	  which	  Marxism	  is	  a	  perfect	  example,	  Bourdieu	  opened	  it	  up	  to	  other	  real	  forms	  of	  resources	  that	  are	  actually	  disputed	  in	  social	   fields.	  All	  the	  different	  resources,	  material	  and	  symbolic,	  that	  are	  present	  in	  society	  can	  be	  classified	  into	  three	  broad	  categories:	   cultural,	   social	   and	   economic.	   Bourdieu	   calls	   ‘symbolic’	   the	   force	   or	  strength	   that	   these	   resources	   get	   when	   deployed	   in	   the	   social	   field.	   Álvarez	  Cáccamo	  has	  rightly	  pointed	  out	   that	   this	  classification	  refers	   to	   the	  value	  or	  use	  related	   to	   social	   objects,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   only	  within	   a	   capitalist	   system	   that	   these	  value	  turns	  into	  actual	  forms	  of	  capital:	  
‘The	  immaterial	  dimension	  of	  language	  is	  subsumed	  by	  the	  same	  principles	  that	  determine	  the	  commodification	  of	  any	  resource	  and	  transform	  what	  initially	  is	  a	  social	  free	  good	  (Marx,	  1996[1867])	  into	  product	  and	  commodity	  with	  exchangeable	  value,	  which	  sets	  the	  value	  of	  the	  individuals	  themselves’	  (Álvarez	  Cáccamo,	  2011:	  11-­‐12).	  
However,	  as	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  is	  based	  upon	  capitalist	  societies	  and	  our	  analytical	  efforts	  also	  refer	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  societies,	  we	  will	  consider	  them	  as	  forms	  of	  capital.	  Thus:	   economic	   capital,	   social	   capital,	   cultural	   capital,	   and	   symbolic	   capital.	   As	  Bourdieu	  puts	  it:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  former,	   by	   restating	   their	   advantaged	   social	   position,	   reinforced	   by	   an	   image	   of	  ‘compromise’	   and	   ‘disinterestedness’,	   whereas	   benefits	   as	  well	   the	   latter	  who,	   although	  reproducing	  their	  disadvantaged	  social	  position,	  display	  an	  image	  of	  ‘dignity’	  that	  situates	  them	  as	  fully	  integrated	  within	  the	  dominant	  field,	   instead	  of	  despise	  to	  one	  of	  the	  many	  undervalued	  social	  sub-­‐fields,	  what	  would	  reduce	  their	  chances	  of	  upward	  social	  mobility.	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‘These	  objective	  relations	  are	  the	  relations	  between	  positions	  occupied	  within	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  resources	  which	  are	  or	  may	  become	  active,	  effective,	  like	  aces	  in	  a	  game	  of	  cards,	  in	  the	  competition	  for	  the	  appropriation	  of	  scarce	  goods	  of	  which	  this	  social	  universe	  is	  the	  site.	  According	  to	  my	  empirical	  investigations,	  these	  fundamental	  powers	  are	  economic	  capital	  (in	  its	  different	  forms),	  cultural	  capital,	  social	  capital,	  and	  symbolic	  capital,	  which	  is	  the	  form	  that	  the	  various	  species	  of	  capital	  assume	  when	  they	  are	  perceived	  and	  recognized	  as	  legitimate	  (Bourdieu	  1986).	  Thus	  agents	  are	  distributed	  in	  the	  overall	  social	  space,	  in	  the	  first	  dimension,	  according	  to	  the	  overall	  volume	  of	  capital	  they	  possess	  and,	  in	  the	  second	  dimension,	  according	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  their	  capital,	  that	  is,	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  the	  different	  species	  of	  capital,	  economic	  and	  cultural,	  in	  the	  total	  volume	  of	  their	  assets.’	  (Bourdieu,	  1989:	  17).	  
The	  notion	  of	  social	  field	  relates	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  social	  interaction	  is	  structured	  in	  fields	  with	  differential	  distributions	  of	  capital:	  
‘The	  structure	  of	  the	  field,	  i.e.,	  the	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  capital,	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  specific	  effects	  of	  capital,	  i.e.,	  the	  appropriation	  of	  profits	  and	  the	  power	  to	  impose	  the	  laws	  of	  functioning	  of	  the	  field	  most	  favorable	  to	  capital	  and	  its	  reproduction.’	  (Bourdieu,	  1986:	  246)	  
Thus,	   each	   form	   of	   capital,	   i.e.,	   of	   accumulated	   labor,	   can	   be	   transformed	   into	  another	  form	  of	  capital	  by	  paying	  a	  conversion	  tax	  that	  varies	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  field.	  In	  the	  academic	  field,	  for	  instance,	  cultural	  capital	  in	  the	  form	   of	   published	   papers	   on	   prestigious	   journals	   –i.e.	   in	   journals	   with	   a	   high	  volume	  of	  cultural	  capital	  associated–	  can	  be	  exchange	  for	  economic	  capital,	  as	   it	  enables	  the	  access	  to	  scarce	  tenured	  positions	  at	  universities,	  and	  for	  social	  capital	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–as	  it	  increases	  the	  chances	  of	  the	  researcher	  to	  get	  invited	  to	  talk	  as	  a	  key	  speaker	  in	  prestigious	  seminars	  or	  congresses,	  where	  he/she	  will	  connect	  him/herself	  with	  other	  prestigious	  researchers–.	  The	  rate	  of	  conversion	  depends	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  capitals	   in	  a	  particular	   field	  on	  a	  particular	   time;	   similarly,	   in	  a	   typical	   industrial	  economy	  the	  field	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  get	  profit	  from	  industrial	  activities,	  whereas	  in	  a	  financial	  economy	  profit	  will	  be	  easier	  to	  get	  through	  speculative	  activities	  on	  the	  stock	  market.	  Thus,	  there	  are	  fields	  where	  cultural	  capital	  holds	  the	  highest	  rate	  of	  conversion,	  meaning	  that	  agents	  are	  able	  to	  access	  the	  resources	  distributed	  in	  the	  field	  mainly	   through	  cultural	  capital,	   like	  academic	  credentials.	  However,	  even	   in	  these	   fields	  with	  primacy	  of	   cultural	   capital,	   the	  other	   forms	  will	   help	   to	   get	   the	  resources	   at	   stake	   –for	   instance,	   in	   the	   academic	   field,	   dominated	   by	   cultural	  capital,	   economic	   and	   social	   capitals	   can	  help	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   titles	  with	   a	  high	  volume	  of	  cultural	  capital	  associated–.	  However,	   the	  higher	  returns	  to	  capital	  are	  obtained	  by	  deploying	  the	  type	  of	  capital	  that	  dominates	  a	  particular	  field.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  an	  agent	  wants	  to	  optimize	  his/her	  capital	  resources,	  then	  he/she	  should	  use	   them	   accordingly;	   if	   she/he	   has	   a	   high	   volume	   of	   cultural/social/economic	  capital,	   then	   she/he	   should	   compete	   for	   resources	   on	   the	   fields	   that	   benefit	  cultural/social/economic	  capital.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  structural	  location	  of	  agents	  have	  two	  components:	  the	  total	  volume	  of	  capital	  that	  they	  have	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  volume,	  i.e.,	   the	  proportion	  of	  cultural,	  social	  or	  economic	  capital	   in	  which	  his/her	   total	   volume	   of	   capital	   is	   divided	   –vid.	   (Weininger,	   2005)–.	   Thereby,	   the	  extraction	   of	   capital	   gains	   cannot	   be	   only	   reduced	   to	   its	   economic	   form,	  exemplified	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  surplus	  value	  in	  Marx.	  We	  will	  exemplify	  this	  for	  the	  case	  of	  language.	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4.2.1.1	  Putting	  Bourdieu’s	  schema	  to	  work:	  The	  case	  of	  language	  Within	  the	  classic	  tradition	  of	  structuralist	   linguistics,	   the	  main	  role	  attributed	  to	  language	   is	   the	   communicative	   one	   (Saussure,	   1974[1916]).	   However,	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  Pierre	  Bourdieu,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  social	  realm	  where	  language	  articulates	  its	   classificatory	   function	   (Bourdieu,	   1982).	   It	   is	   in	   the	   linguistic	   market,	   that	  constitutes	   the	   field	   where	   language	   is	   implemented,	   that	   a	   given	   degree	   of	  linguistic	   competence	   gets	   its	   differential	   value.	   Linguistic	   competence	   relates	   to	  the	  higher	  or	  lower	  expertise	  of	  individuals	  in	  a	  given	  language.	  Notwithstanding,	  due	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   linguistic	   gains	   within	   the	   linguistic	   market,	   Bourdieu	  considers	   more	   appropriate	   to	   refer	   to	   this	   linguistic	   competence	   as	   linguistic	  
capital,	  which	  is	  a	  subtype	  of	  cultural	  capital.	  The	  higher	  this	  capital,	  the	  higher	  the	  authority	  associated	  to	  the	  speech	  act,	  and	  the	  higher	  the	  authority,	  the	  lower	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  uttered	  message	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  attention	  paid	  by	  the	   receivers.	  The	  paradigmatic	   case	  of	   the	  highest	   linguistic	   authority	   is	   a	  mass	  where,	  independently	  of	  the	  message	  conveyed,	  the	  assistants	  will	  hear	  the	  priest	  in	   the	   same	  way	   (Bourdieu,	  2002:	  146).	  Bourdieu	  defines	   this	  kind	  of	   situations,	  where	  speech	  is	  delivered	  without	  communicating	  a	  thing,	  as	  linguistic	  rapport	  de	  
forces	  (balance	  of	  power).	  These	  situations	  are	  not	  only	  related	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  speaker,	  but	  also	  the	   fact	  of	   ‘having	  so	  clearly	  on	   its	  side	  the	   institutions,	   the	  laws	  of	  the	  market	  and	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  social	  space,	  that	  it	   is	  possible	  to	  speak	  without	  saying	  anything,	  just	  speak’	  (Bourdieu,	  2002:	  146).	  
To	  define	  the	  concept	  of	   linguistic	  market,	  Bourdieu	  starts	  from	  another	  concept,	  the	   ‘kairos’,	   which	   was	   used	   in	   the	   lessons	   of	   rhetoric	   by	   Classical	   Sophists	  referring	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  hitting	  the	  mark.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  related	  to	  choose	  those	  words	   which	   are	   grammatically	   correct	   for	   discourse,	   but	   these	   must	   also	   be	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acceptable	   from	  a	   social	   point	   of	   view.	  Therefore,	   the	   idea	  of	   ‘kairos’	   relates	  not	  only	   to	   formal	   correction,	   but	   also	   to	   what	   is	   socially	   appropriate.	   Thus,	   for	  instance,	   if	   someone	   is	   uttering	   a	   very	   formal	   discourse	   when	   informality	   is	  required,	   then	   this	   speaker	   is	   certainly	   delivering	   an	   inappropriate,	   bothering,	  speech.	   Hence,	   to	   speak	   appropriately,	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘kairos’,	   is	   the	   basic	  mechanism	  thanks	  to	  which	  the	  linguistic	  market	  evaluates	  linguistic	  expressions.	  In	  social	  fields	   ‘there	  is	  a	  struggle	  of	  agents	  and	  institutions,	  with	  different	  forces	  and	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  different	  constitutive	  rules	  of	  this	  field,	  to	  get	  the	  specific	  gains	  at	  stake’	   (Bourdieu,	  2002:	  157).	  Thus,	   the	  State,	   the	  church	  or	  any	  political	  party	  are	  examples	  of	  fields	  in	  constant	  struggle	  for	  the	  benefits	  at	  stake.	  The	  role	  of	   the	  capital	   relates	   to	   the	  power	  exercised	  over	   the	   field,	  so	   that	   the	   field	   itself	  will	  favor	  those	  competitors	  with	  the	  highest	  volumes	  of	  capital	  –in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  linguistic	   market,	   the	   field	   benefits	   the	   participants	   with	   the	   highest	   volume	   of	  linguistic	  capital–	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  access	  to	  the	  surplus	  value	  derived	  from	  each	   interaction.	   To	   continue	   with	   the	   example	   of	   the	   linguistic	   field,	   Bourdieu	  explains	  that	  ‘to	  talk	  about	  linguistic	  capital	  means	  that	  there	  are	  linguistic	  gains:	  whenever	   someone	  who	  was	  born	   in	   the	   seventh	  district	   –this	   is	   the	   case	  of	   the	  current	   French	   political	   appointees–	   opens	   the	  mouth,	   receives	   a	   linguistic	   gain,	  which	   is	  by	  no	  means	   fictitious	  or	   illusory	  (…)	  The	  very	  nature	  of	   their	   language	  (that	  can	  be	  analyzed	  phonetically,	  and	  so	  on)	  indicates	  that	  he/she	  is	  authorized	  to	   speak,	  no	  matter	  what	  he/she	   says’	   (Bourdieu	  2002:	  146).	  Finally	   the	  habitus	  refers	  to	  ‘social	  structures	  “interiorized”	  and	  “incarnated”’	  (Bourdieu,	  1984:	  468),	  meaning	  that	  agents	  acquire	  their	  habitus	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  location	  within	  social	  structure	  and,	  particularly,	   in	  relation	   to	   their	  social	   class.	  The	   linguistic	  habitus,	  therefore,	  is	  related	  to	  the	  different	  ways	  of	  speaking	  that	  have	  the	  members	  of	  a	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speech	   community	   depending	   on	   the	   location	   in	   social	   structure	   of	   that	  community.	  Everyone	  of	  the	  habitus	  present	  in	  the	  linguistic	  market	  are	  linked	  to	  a	  specific	  volume	  of	  linguistic	  capital	  which,	  in	  turn,	  will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  field	  in	  order	  to	   obtain	   the	   surplus	   value	   produced	   by	   the	   interactions	   within	   the	   field.	  Consequently,	   the	  expression	  of	   the	   linguistic	  habitus	   in	   the	   linguistic	  market,	  or	  field,	   will	   result	   in	   the	   linguistic	   practice,	   or	   discourse.	   This	   materialist	   view	   of	  discourse	   understands	   that	   the	   value	   (prestige,	   authority)	   of	   the	   products	   (the	  different	  forms	  of	  linguistic	  expression	  of	  the	  agents)	  is	  negotiated	  in	  the	  linguistic	  market.	  The	  linguistic	  market	  is,	  as	  the	  economic	  market,	  affected	  by	  monopolies,	  holdings	   and	   the	   whole	   set	   of	   known	   strategies	   enabling	   capital	   accumulation,	  avoiding	  an	  equal	  negotiation	  of	  the	  price	  for	  a	  new	  product	  that	  could	  enter	  the	  market.	   Those	   participants	   in	   the	   interactions	  who	   have	   the	   highest	   volumes	   of	  linguistic	   capital	  will	   be	   advantaged	   in	   the	   interactions	   in	   terms	   of	   prestige	   and	  authority,	   facilitating	   the	   acquisition	   of	   the	   surplus	   values	   derived	   from	   the	  transaction.	  Thus,	  there	  are	  forces	  at	  stake	  that	  modify	  the	  value	  that	  the	  market	  gives	   to	   every	   product,	   in	   terms	   of	   associated	   capital	   to	   each	   of	   the	   forms	   of	  speaking	  of	  every	  participant	  of	  the	  interaction.	  The	  linguistic	  capital	  is	  distributed	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  products	  –the	  speech	  acts–	  approximate	  the	  pre-­‐established	   criteria	   by	   the	   underlying	   forces	   of	   the	  market,	  which	   provide	   a	  frame	  for	   the	   interaction.	  Finally,	   it	   is	  necessary	   for	   the	  market	   forces	   to	  operate	  that	  the	  market	  is	  unified,	  meaning	  that	  ‘the	  majority	  of	  the	  speakers	  are	  subject	  to	  the	   same	   rule	   determining	   the	   prices	   of	   the	   linguistic	   productions’	   (Bourdieu,	  2002:	   149).	   Using	   the	   example	   of	   the	   Bearn	   language,	   in	   Southeast	   France,	   this	  means	  that	  ‘the	  last	  of	  the	  Bearn	  peasant	  (…)	  is	  objectively	  measured	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  the	   standard	   Paris	   French’	   (Bourdieu,	   2002:	   149-­‐150).	   Bourdieu	   identifies	   the	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unification	   of	   the	   linguistic	   market	   with	   the	   linguistic	   relations	   of	   domination.	  	  These	   relations	   of	   domination	   do	   not	   respond	   strictly	   to	   the	   logic	   of	   economic	  domination,	  but	  to	  a	  specific	   logic	  that	  derives	  from	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  field,	  both	  in	  the	  way	  that	  these	  are	  applied,	  and	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  surplus	  value	  gained.	  This	  is	  how	  ‘cultural	  domination’	  (Bourdieu,	  2002:	  150)	  is	  constituted.	  	  
4.2.2	  Expanding	  Bourdieu:	  towards	  a	  law	  of	  capital	  attraction	  We	  have	  seen	  so	   far	   that	   the	  theory	  of	  practice	  by	  Pierre	  Bourdieu	  combines	  the	  objectivist	   and	   subjectivist	   view	   of	   human	   action	   into	   a	   single	   theoretical	  framework.	   This	   framework	   has	   two	   cornerstones:	   field	   and	   habitus.	   Habitus	  functions	  as	  an	   internal	  mechanism	  of	  agents	   for	   the	  orientation	  of	  practice.	   It	   is	  our	   view	   that	   this	   relates	   to	   Darwin’s	   theory	   of	   natural	   selection	   (Darwin,	  1964[1859]).	  According	  to	  several	  authors,	  the	  success	  in	  evolution	  of	  the	  human	  race	  relates	  to	   ‘its	  superior	  capacity	  to	  process	  symbols’	  (Castells,	  1996:	  92);	  this	  capacity	   enabled	   humans	   to	   constitute	   groups	   by	   the	   usage	   of	   highly	   complex	  symbolic	   references,	   giving	   them	   an	   extraordinary	   capacity	   to	   adapt	   to	   different	  geographical	  contexts,	  climates	  and	  circumstances.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  evolutionary	  that	   the	   individuals	   constituting	   human	   groups	   internalize	   a	   common	  understanding	   of	   the	   world,	   making	   decision-­‐making	   easier,	   faster	   and	   more	  efficient	   than	   it	   would	   be	   if	   every	   individual	   constantly	   calculate	   his/her	   utility	  maximization	   for	   every	   single	   action	   to	   be	   taken,	   as	   RAT	   postulates.	   Bourdieu	  called	   habitus	   this	   common	   lens	   or	   framework	   for	   understanding	   the	   world,	  involving	   that	   the	   application	   of	   habitus	   on	   the	   social	   situations	   that	   it	  contemplates	  produces	  human	  practice.	  Of	   course	   the	  habitus	   is	   constituted	   in	   a	  particular	  set	  of	  social	  interactions,	  and	  it	  provides	  a	  correct	  orientation	  to	  practice	  only	  within	  these	  situations;	  when	  humans	  are	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  contexts	  where	  the	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habitus	  is	  operative,	  they	  use	  analogy	  to	  orient	  their	  behavior.	  Thus,	  every	  peasant	  who	  is	  a	  new	  immigrant	  in	  a	  big	  city	  finds	  him/herself	  ‘lost’	  and	  therefore	  tend	  to	  make	  up	  communities	  with	   their	   fellow	  countrymen,	   trying	   to	  establish	  a	  similar	  partial	  social	  context	  where	  their	  habitus	  are	  fully	  operational	  in	  order	  to	  mitigate	  the	  distress	  caused	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  being	  out-­‐of-­‐context.	  Bourdieu	  called	  this	  effect	  
hysteresis	  or	  Don	  Quixote	  effect	  (Bourdieu,	  1979:	  122),	  which	  is	  certainly	  related	  to	  Durkheim’s	   anomy,	   as	   this	   describes	   the	   same	   situation	   of	   dissolution	   of	   social	  norms;	   however,	   Durkheim,	   as	   a	   good	   structuralist,	   misinterpreted	   the	   pattern,	  understanding	  it	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  society	  over	  individuals,	  lacking	  the	  subjective	  part	  of	   the	   equation	   present	   in	   Bourdieu’s	   hysteresis	   (Durkheim,	   1996[1893];	  2012[1897]).	  	  Capitalist	  societies	  are	  defined	  by	  an	  unequal	  access	  to	  resources.	  Individuals	  have	  differentiated	   access	   to	   economic,	   cultural	   and	   social	   resources.	   The	   theory	   of	  social	   classes	   by	   Bourdieu	   deducts	   that	   each	   social	   class	   is	   defined	   by	   its	  differential	  access	  to	  resources,	  classified	  in	  these	  three	  main	  groups.	  The	  logic	  of	  exploitation	   that	   we	   find	   in	  Marxist	   class	   analysis	   is	   also	   present	   in	   Bourdieu’s,	  who	  expanded	  it	  beyond	  the	  economic	  exploitation.	  Thus,	  if	  capital	  is	  accumulated	  labor,	   this	  also	  applies	   to	  cultural	  capital,	  which	   is	  accumulated	   labor	  since	  early	  childhood,	  where	  children	  from	  the	  upper	  classes	  are	  instructed	  in	  what	  is	  called	  high-­‐culture	   –visiting	   museums,	   theatres	   and	   other	   cultural	   institutions,	  inculcation	  of	  literary	  habits,	  etc.–,	  building	  up	  their	  taste	  from	  their	  social	  class.	  Of	  course	  when	   this	   children	   enter	   the	   education	   system,	  which	  will	   evaluate	   their	  expertise	   on	   the	   same	   culture	   they	   have	   been	   working	   at	   home,	   they	   have	   an	  advantage	  over	   their	  working-­‐class	  classmates,	  who	  were	   instructed	  not	   in	  high-­‐culture,	  but	   in	  popular	  culture,	   that	   is	  absent	  of	  curricula.	  The	  accumulated	  work	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that	   defined	   an	   investment	   in	   cultural	   capital	   pays	   off	   not	   only	   in	   the	   education	  system,	  but	  also	  in	  everyday	  interaction	  through	  body	  language,	  acts	  of	  speech,	  etc.	  And,	   as	   in	   the	   case	  of	   economic	  exploitation,	   the	   surplus	  value	   is	   taken	   from	   the	  working-­‐class,	  because	  no	  one	  can	  speak	  correctly	  without	  someone	  who	  speaks	  incorrectly.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  social	  capital,	   in	  the	  form	  of	  relations	  since	  early	  childhood,	  which	  are	  dependent	  on	   the	  social	  clubs	  and	  places	   that	  parents	  visit,	  enabling	   the	   establishments	   of	   life-­‐long	   friendships	   which	   are	   nothing	   but	   the	  expression	  of	  accumulated	  work	  in	  social	  capital,	  hiding	  capital	  behind	  an	  image	  of	  innocent	   friendship.	   This	   disguising	   mechanism	   applies	   to	   all	   forms	   of	   capital:	  cultural	  capital	  is	  hidden	  behind	  ‘intelligence’,	  social	  capital	  behind	  ‘niceness’	  and	  economic	  capital	  behind	  ‘effort’.	  
Figure	  29.	  Bourdieu’s	  Class	  Structure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  𝑋!:	  Composition	  of	  capital	  
+	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
(Economic	  preponderance)	  	  	  	  	  
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Cultural	  preponderance)	  	  	  	  	  	  _	  
Source: Elaborated by the author from information in Weininger (2005: 130). 
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There	   is	   a	   correspondence	   between	   every	   point	   in	   this	   three-­‐dimensional	   space	  (𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!)	  and	   a	   particular	   habitus.	   In	   this	   sense,	   habitus	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  adaptive	   mechanism	   to	   one’s	   structural	   location	   within	   a	   social	   space	   where	  resources	  are	  unequally	  distributed.	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  life	  with	  access	  to	  
X	   resources,	   it	   is	   better	   for	   individuals	   to	   understand	   the	   world	   through	   a	   lens	  made	  up	  from	  a	  structural	  position	  that	  enables	  access	  to	  this	  same	  X	  resources.	  It	  follows	   that	   in	   a	   society	   where	   resources	   are	   equally	   distributed	   the	   different	  habitus,	   then,	  would	  tend	  to	  converge,	  and	  that	   individuals	   in	  contradictory	  class	  locations	   or	   in	   the	   process	   of	   upward	   or	   downward	   social	  mobility,	   i.e.,	  with	   no	  clear	  class	   location,	  will	  hold	  different	  habitus;	   if	  habitus	   is	   like	  a	   lighthouse	  and	  practice	  is	  a	  sailor	  rowing	  in	  the	  night,	  then	  individuals	  in	  these	  kind	  of	  situations	  will	  have	  several	  lighthouses	  to	  follow,	  introducing	  confusion	  and	  distress.	  	  We	   see	   that	   Bourdieu’s	   theory	   of	   practice	   has	   two	   interrelated	   components:	  subjective	  (habitus)	  and	  objective	  (fields).	  Thereby	  we	  think	  that	  this	  point	  opens	  up	  two	  different	  lines	  of	  research,	  one	  for	  the	  objective	  component	  and	  the	  other	  one	   for	   the	   subjective	   component.	   The	   subjective	   component	   is	   identified	   with	  group	   habitus	   integrated	   in	   the	   mind	   of	   individuals.	   Therefore	   we	   can	   develop	  research	   regarding	   the	   neurological	   process	   by	   which	   this	   process	   of	   habitus	  integration	  is	  made.	  The	  rapid	  advance	  of	  neuroscience	  currently	  enables	  this	  line	  of	  research;	  we	  have	  already	  commented	  some	  research	  projects	  on	  neuropolitics	  measuring	  the	  segregation	  of	  hormones	  in	  agents’	  brains	  when	  talking	  about	  their	  identity	   feelings	   or	   their	   political	   values	   (Olivieri,	   2013).	   The	   research	   question	  regarding	  the	  subjective	  component	  of	  human	  practice	  would	  be	  ‘how	  habitus	  are	  integrated	   in	  people’s	  minds?’	  The	  other	   line	  of	   research	   relates	   to	   the	  objective	  part	   of	   the	   equation,	   and	   will	   eventually	   provide	   an	   answer	   to	   the	   relations	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between	  fields	  and	  between	  fields	  and	  habitus.	  Bourdieu	  himself	  has	  outlined	  this	  by	   stating	   that	   human	   practice	   (synthesis)	   is	   always	   the	   result	   of	   the	   dialectic	  between	  habitus	  (thesis)	  and	  field	  (antithesis).	  In	  the	  following	  pages	  we	  will	  try	  to	  expand	  and	  formalize	  this	  hint	  a	  little	  further.	  	  
4.2.2.1	  Far	  Beyond	  Bourdieu:	  Formalization	  and	  Expansion	  of	  the	  Theory	  of	  Practice	  Bourdieu	  wrote:	  
‘The	  major	  contribution	  of	  what	  must	  rightly	  be	  called	  the	  structuralist	  revolution	  consists	  in	  having	  applied	  to	  the	  social	  world	  the	  relational	  mode	  of	  thinking	  which	  is	  that	  of	  modern	  mathematics	  and	  physics,	  and	  which	  identifies	  the	  real	  no	  with	  substances	  but	  with	  relations	  (Bourdieu,	  1968).	  The	  “social	  reality”	  which	  Durkheim	  spoke	  of	  is	  an	  ensemble	  of	  invisible	  relations,	  those	  very	  relations	  which	  constitute	  a	  space	  of	  positions	  external	  to	  each	  other	  and	  defined	  by	  their	  proximity	  to,	  neighborhood	  with,	  or	  distance	  from	  each	  other,	  and	  also	  by	  their	  relative	  position,	  above	  or	  below	  or	  yet	  in	  between,	  in	  the	  middle.	  Sociology,	  in	  its	  objectivist	  moment,	  is	  a	  social	  topology,	  an	  analysis	  situs	  as	  they	  called	  this	  new	  branch	  of	  mathematics	  in	  Leibniz’s	  time,	  an	  analysis	  of	  relative	  positions	  and	  of	  the	  objective	  relations	  between	  these	  positions’	  (Bourdieu,	  1989:	  15-­‐16).	  
If	  we	  want	   to	  understand,	  or	   to	  open	  the	  black	  box,	   using	  RAT	   jargon,	  we	   should	  first	   formalize	   the	   relations	   between	   objective	   structures	   that,	   together	   with	   its	  subjective	   integration	   and	   reinterpretation,	   constitute	   human	   practice.	   We	   will	  start	   formalizing	   the	   model	   of	   human	   practice	   by	   Bourdieu,	   in	   its	   objective	  component,	  eventually	  leading	  us	  to	  its	  expansion.	  
Let	   us	   depart	   from	   the	   simplest	   notion	   of	   the	   human	   world,	   i.e.,	   the	   world	   as	  humans	  see	  it.	  We	  have	  already	  stated	  that	  Darwin’s	  evolution	  points	  out	  towards	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the	  fact	  that	  the	  human	  differential	  adaptation,	  as	  a	  species,	  is	  culture	  (Tomasello,	  1999).	   The	   superior	   capacity	   to	   process	   symbols	   (Castells,	   1996)	   of	   the	   Homo	  sapiens	   sapiens	   gave	   humans	   the	   capacity	   to	   build	   up	   complex	   social	   relations	  through	  the	  usage	  of	  symbols,	  enabling	  infinite59	  variations	  in	  the	  cultural	  patterns	  and	   thus	   increasing	   the	   adaptive	   capacity	   of	   humans	   to	   the	   most	   different	  environments.	   Habitus,	   thus,	   is	   the	   expression	   of	   this	   adaptive	   capacity,	  concretized	   in	   particular	   social	   environments;	   the	   habitus	   are	   developed	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  differential	  capacity	  by	  social	  groups	  to	  get	  resources	  that	  are,	  of	   course,	   symbolic.	   To	   say	   that	   resources	   are	   symbolic	   does	   not	   oppose	   the	  material	  nature	  of	  some	  resources,	  such	  as	  money,	  but	  it	  states,	  quite	  redundantly,	  that	  everything	  in	  the	  human	  world	   is	  taken	  into	  account	  symbolically.	  This	   is	  so	  because	   humans	   are	   symbolic	   animals	   attributing	   symbolic	   values	   to	   everything	  within	   their	  world;	   this,	   in	   turn,	  makes	   classification	   easier,	   and	   classification	   is	  another	   defining	   human	   feature,	   as	   it	   introduces	   an	   order	   into	   what	   would	   be	  otherwise	  a	  symbolic	  nebula	  –vid.	  Barth	  (1969)–.	  As	  capitalism	  is	  a	  socioeconomic	  system	  based	  on	   the	  premise	   that	   the	  resources	  available	   to	   individuals	  depends	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  too	  risky	  to	  state	  that	  there	  are	  infinite	  possibilities	  for	  cultural	  variation.	  Following	  Chomsky’s	  Universal	  Grammar	  (UG)	  –the	  theory	  stating	  that	  the	  human	  brain,	  as	  a	  product	  of	  evolution,	  presents	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  rules	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  languages,	  meaning	   that	   UG	   underlies	   every	   possible	   languages	   and,	   therefore,	   that	   there	   are	  
impossible	   languages,	   i.e.,	   those	   languages	  outside	   the	   rules	   of	  UG	   (Chomsky,	   2006)–	  we	  can	   think	   that	   there	   is	   an	   underlying	   common	   brain	   structure	   from	  which	   cultures	   are	  designed,	   and	   that	   therefore	   there	   are	   impossible	   cultures.	   This	   is	   the	   hypothesis	   of	  psychological	  nativism	  –vid.,	  e.g.,	  Pinker	  (2002)–	  arguing	  that	  evolution	  has	  shaped	  human	  brain	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  cultures	  are	  not	  developed	  from	  tabula	  rasa,	  but	  from	  underlying	  structures.	  In	  any	  case,	  accepting	  the	  nativist	  argument,	  we	  can	  still	  think	  that	  the	  number	  of	  cultural	  variations	  enabled	  by	  the	  human	  brain	  is	  high	  enough	  to	  guarantee	  successful	  adaptation	  to	  virtually	  every	  kind	  of	  natural	  and	  social	  environment	  on	  the	  planet.	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  60	  Note	   that	   we	   say	   ‘within	   capitalism’;	   there	   are	   still	   non-­‐capitalist	   societies	   within	  Western	   democracies,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   pre-­‐capitalist	   peasant	   communities	   or	   of	   post-­‐capitalist	  ‘integral	  cooperatives’	  –vid.	  Evans	  (2015)–.	  In	  this	  non-­‐capitalist	  societies	  –in	  the	  hypothetic	  case	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  any	  connection	  with	  capitalism–	  the	  classificatory	  symbolism	  of	  objects	  and	  subjects	  would	  not	  be	  developed	  in	  terms	  of	  capital,	  but	  instead	  in	   terms	   of	   ‘value’	   (Álvarez	   Cáccamo,	   2011a).	   This	   trend	   of	   capital	   ‘colonization’	   of	   the	  human	   world	   was	   famously	   pinpointed	   by	   Marx	   as	   the	   commodity	   fetishism,	  
Warenfetischismus:	  ‘As	   against	   this,	   the	   commodity-­‐form,	   and	   the	   value-­‐relation	   of	   the	   products	   of	   labour	  within	  which	   it	   appears,	   have	   absolutely	   no	   connection	  with	   the	   physical	   nature	   of	   the	  commodity	   and	   the	   material	   relations	   arising	   out	   of	   this.	   It	   is	   nothing	   but	   the	   definite	  social	  relation	  between	  men	  themselves	  which	  assumes	  here,	  for	  them,	  the	  fantastic	  form	  of	  a	  relation	  between	  things’	  (Marx,	  1990[1867]:	  165).	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Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author61.	  
As	   we	   have	   already	   discussed	   symbolic	   capital	   here	   refers	   to	   the	   amount	   or	  volume	  of	  each	  one	  of	  the	  three	  types	  of	  capital	  that	  is	  recognized	  in	  a	  given	  field.	  This	  relates	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  unified	  market,	  also	  discussed	  above,	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  common	  exchange	  rate	  of	  each	  three	  capitals	  and	  to	  the	  differential	  attribution	  of	  capital	   to	   social	   objects	   in	   a	   given	   field.	   Thus,	   for	   instance,	   in	   the	   academic	   field	  cultural	  capital	  holds	  the	  lowest	  exchange	  rate,	  dominating	  the	  other	  two	  types.	  In	  a	  political	  party,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   it	  usually	   is	  social	  capital	   that	  dominates	   the	  other	   two,	   with	   specific	   requirements	   in	   terms	   of	   social	   capital	   to	   become	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  The	  idea	  of	  representing	  Bourdieu’s	  general	  schema	  on	  capital	  in	  a	  pyramidal	  structure	  was	   taken	   from	   Álvarez	   Cáccamo	   (2015a),	   although	   this	   author	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘value’	  instead	  of	  ‘capital’	  –vid.	  Álvarez	  Cáccamo	  (2011b;	  2015b)–.	  
Economic	  capital	  
Cultural	  capital	   Social	  capital	  
Symbolic	  capital	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member,	  for	  instance.	  Finally,	  economic	  capital	  is	  dominant	  on	  the	  stock	  exchange	  market.	  For	  each	  one	  of	  all	  these	  three	  examples	  the	  other	  two	  forms	  of	  capital	  are	  also	  relevant,	  but	  their	  exchange	  rate	  is	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  the	  dominant	  one,	  i.e.,	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  invest	  a	  relatively	  high	  volume	  of	  non-­‐dominant	  capital	  to	  get	  a	  relatively	  small	  volume	  of	  the	  dominant	  capital.	  For	  instance,	  when	  a	  field	  is	  clearly	  dominated	  by	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  capital,	  like	  the	  academic	  field,	  in	  which	  tenured	   positions	   –charged	   with	   economic	   and	   social	   capital,	   but	   mainly	   with	  cultural	  capital–	  are	  given	  in	  exchange	  of	  cultural	  capital,	  it	  is	  formally	  not	  allowed	  the	  investment	  of	  the	  other	  two	  forms	  of	  capital	  –and	  if	  this	  happens,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  punishable	  by	  law,	  which	  is	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  capital	  exchange	  rates62–.	  Of	  course	   social	   democratic	   policies	   alters	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   market,	   obscuring	   the	  actual	   exchange	   rate	   for	   every	   type	   of	   capital	   in	   each	   field;	   for	   instance,	   public	  education	  affords	  a	  high	  volume	  of	  economic	  capital	  that	  in	  free	  market	  should	  be	  invested	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  cultural	  capital	  in	  the	  form	  of	  academic	  credentials.	  We	  can	  easily	  see	  this	  effect	  in	  those	  private	  academic	  institutions	  issuing	  credentials	  with	   very	   high	   quantity	   of	   cultural	   capital	   associated,	   which	   will	   eventually	   be	  exchanged	  for	  social	  and	  economic	  capitals,	  and	  that	  require	  exorbitant	  amounts	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  capitals63	  -­‐vid.	  Karabel	  (2005)	  and	  Brint	  and	  Karabel	  (1991)-­‐.	  	  
A	  given	  habitus,	  then,	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  association	  between	  social	  objects	  in	  order	  to	  better	  perform	  in	  a	  given	  field.	  The	  habitus	  of	  each	  social	  class	  is	  designed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Someone	  could	  argue	   that	   illegal	   capital	   conversion	   is	   still	  happening,	  but	  note	   that,	   if	  this	  were	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  invest	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  economic	  capital	  or	  of	  social	  capital.	  Thereby,	  the	  law	  on	  the	  conversion	  of	  capital	  in	  accordance	  to	  each	  field	  is	  not	  altered.	  This	  law	  was	  fully	  explained	  by	  Bourdieu	  (1986).	  63	  As	  Khan	  puts	  it:	  ‘Harvard’s	  “middle	  income”	  is	  the	  richest	  5	  percent	  of	  our	  nation’	  (Khan,	  2011:	  6).	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to	   optimize	   the	   fit	   between	   a	   set	   of	   social	   objects	   –agents–	   with	   access	   to	  differential	   set	   of	   social	   objects	   –money,	   arts,	   furniture,	   sports…–.	   Class	  domination	  is	  an	  on-­‐going	  process	  by	  which	  the	  upper	  classes	  capitalize	  a	  given	  set	  of	   social	   objects	   that	   are	   later	   inaccessible	   for	   the	   lower	   classes;	   an	   obvious	  example	  of	   this	   is	  money.	  Money	  value	  does	  no	   longer	   rely	  on	   the	  material	  with	  which	   it	   is	   made,	   but	   only	   in	   its	   symbolic	   value;	   the	   dominant	   classes	   charge	  money	  with	  a	  precise	  volume	  economic	  capital	  and	  then	  restrict	  the	  access	  of	  the	  lower	   classes	   to	   this	   resource.	   The	   lower	   classes	   can	   either	   participate	   in	   this	  hegemonic	  market	  –as	  almost	  every	  social	  field	  rely	  on	  money	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  economic	   capital–	  with	   the	   condition	   that	   they	   are	   going	   to	   have	   low	   volume	   of	  economic	   capital	   or,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   go	   out	   of	   this	   hegemonic	   field	   and	   start	  exchanging	   alternative	   currencies.	   The	   risk,	   of	   course,	   is	   that	   the	   symbolic	  attribution	  of	  economic	  value	  to	  this	  currency	  only	  applies	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  sub-­‐market	  in	  which	  the	  alternative	  currency	  operates.	  In	  other	  words,	  alternative	  currencies	   are	   symbolically	   deprived	   of	   economic	   capital	   within	   the	   hegemonic	  system,	   as	   defined	   by	   the	   dominant	   classes.	   Another	   example	   relates	   to	   sports	  (Bourdieu,	  1978).	  Sports	  are	  social	  objects,	  like	  money,	  loaded	  with	  value	  or,	  in	  the	  case	   of	   sports	   within	   capitalist	   societies,	   loaded	   with	   capital.	   The	   logic	   of	   class	  domination	  typical	  of	  capitalist	  societies	   is	  similar	   than	  for	   the	  case	  of	  money	  or,	  indeed,	   for	   any	   other	   social	   object.	   Let	   us	   take	   football	   as	   an	   example.	   There	   is	  evidence	   that	   there	   were	   ancient	   practices	   similar	   to	   modern	   football,	   where	   a	  bunch	  of	  people	  played	  with	  something	  similar	  to	  a	  ball	  divided	  into	  two	  teams	  to	  score	   points	   to	   the	   other	   team.	   These	   peasant	   varieties	   of	   playing	   football	   are	  usually	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘mob	   football’	   (Marples,	   1954).	   It	   was	   not	   until	   the	   19th	  century	  when	  codes	  of	  football	  were	  developed,	  in	  English	  elite	  schools.	  Different	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rival	  private	  schools	  formalized	  football	  in	  different	  ways,	  eventually	  giving	  way	  to	  modern	   official	   varieties	   –the	   Cambridge	   Rules	   gave	   way	   to	   modern	   European	  football,	  whereas	  Rules	   by	   other	   schools	   initiated	   rugby	   (Marples,	   1954)–.	  What	  does	   the	   history	   of	   football	   tell	   us	   about	   how	   society	   works?	   First	   of	   all	   it	   is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  different	  norms,	   initially	  elaborated	  by	  rival	  elite	  schools,	  prevail;	   the	   rivalry	   of	   elite	   schools	   is	   a	   way	   for	   summarizing	   the	   competition	  between	   different	   institutions	   for	   the	   same	   economic,	   cultural	   and	   social	  resources.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   different	   laws	   prevailed	   indicates	   that	   every	   of	   this	  elite	   schools	  dominated	  markets	  with	   a	   similar	   volume	  of	   capital;	   this	   control	   of	  similar	  resources	  enabled	  that	  the	  differential	  capitalization	  of	  practices.	  Secondly,	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  these	  rules	  formalized	  previous	  ‘mob’	  football.	  This	  opposition	  between	   form	   and	   substance	   is	   a	   constant	   in	   the	  processes	   of	   capitalization.	   The	  dominant	   classes	   elaborate	   norms	   based	   on	   shaping	   what	   was	   previously	  unshaped.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Cambridge	  Rules,	  they	  state	  that	  it	  is	  forbidden	  to	   touch	   the	   ball	  with	   the	   hands,	   thereby	   creating	   a	   standard	   to	  which	   compare	  every	  act	  of	  playing	  football.	  If	  somebody	  touches	  the	  ball	  with	  his/her	  hands,	  then	  he/she	  is	  playing	  wrong.	  The	  norm	  is	  capitalized	  because	  it	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  an	  social	  object	  –elite	  school–	  with	  high	  volume	  of	  capital.	  Therefore,	  to	  play	  football	  in	  accordance	  with	   the	  capitalized	  rules	   introduces	   the	  player	   into	   the	  market	  of	  the	  ruler	  –the	  institution–	  giving	  him/her	  the	  opportunity	  to	  acquire	  social	  capital	  that	   then	   could	   be	   exchange	   for	   economic	   or	   cultural	   capital.	   This	   capital	   is	  extracted	   from	   the	   popular	   classes,	  who	   by	   playing	  mob	   football	   are	   completely	  out	  of	   the	  hegemonic	  standard	   in	   the	  market.	  This	   is	  of	   course	   the	  same	  process	  defining	   linguistic	   standardization,	   or	   any	   other	   social	   practice	   –eating,	   riding,	  partying,	  working,	  etc.–.	  The	  dominant	  classes	  established	  a	  new	  standard	  through	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the	   formalization	   of	   previously	   unshaped	   practices;	   this	   new	   standard	   is	   loaded	  with	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  class	  that	  created	  it.	  Therefore,	  the	  dominated	  classes,	  who	  need	   to	   succeed	   in	   capitalist	   societies64,	   try	   to	   assume	   the	   forms	  enacted	   by	   the	  dominant	  classes,	  which	  are	  capitalized	  and	  therefore	  give	  access	  to	  the	  hegemonic	  market	  where	  these	  practices	  has	  some	  capital.	  The	  problem	  of	  course	  is	  that	  the	  formalization	  of	  practices	   is	  dynamic,	   ensuring	   that	   the	  dominated	   classes	  never	  achieve	   the	   degree	   of	   proficiency	   in	   these	   formalized	   practices	   shaped	   by	   the	  dominant	   classes;	   this	   explains	   successfully	   linguistic	   substitution,	   among	   other	  major	  social	  changes.	  
Finally	  we	  will	   add	   the	   concept	  of	   sub-­‐field	  or	   sub-­‐market	   to	  Bourdieu’s	   general	  schema,	   for	   we	   think	   it	   increases	   the	   explanatory	   power.	   As	   far	   as	   we	   know,	  Bourdieu	  did	  not	  mentioned	  the	  idea	  of	  sub-­‐fields	  in	  the	  way	  that	  we	  want	  to	  point	  out,	  but	  only	  while	  referring	  to	  different	  relations	  between	  hegemonic	   fields	  –for	  instance,	   the	   different	   semi-­‐autonomous	   sub-­‐fields	   of	   cultural	   production,	   as	  opposed	   to	   the	   single	   field	   of	   the	   Kabyle–.	   But	   now	   we	   want	   to	   pinpoint	   the	  following	  idea:	  whenever	  the	  dominated	  classes	  have	  very	  low	  amounts	  of	  capital	  within	   the	   hegemonic	   markets,	   they	   create	   alternative	   markets	   with	   their	   own	  distributions	   of	   capital	   among	   social	   objects	   and	   practices.	   Every	   agent	   could	  operate	  simultaneously	  in	  different	  fields,	  and	  accumulate	  high	  amounts	  of	  capital	  within	  one	   field	  or	   sub-­‐field	  while	   ate	   the	   same	   time	  very	   low	  volume	  of	   capital	  within	   another	   field	   or	   sub-­‐field.	   This	   process	   explains	   the	   existence	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   dominated	   classes	   freely	   choose	   to	   participate	   within	  capitalistic	  markets.	  It	  can	  be	  counter-­‐argued	  that	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  option,	  as	  capitalism	  is	  the	  dominant	  system,	  after	  it	  has	  accumulated	  most	  part	  of	  the	  accessible	  resources	  –vid.	  Beiras	  (2008a;	  2008b)–.	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maintenance	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   sub-­‐cultures,	   usually	   understood	   from	   the	   lens	   of	  socialization.	  But	  the	  theory	  of	  social	  practices	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  given	  habitus	  within	  a	  given	  field	  proportionate	  a	  structural	   location	  to	  subjective	  processes	  at	  the	  core	  of	  socialization	  theories.	  This	  solves	  the	  explanatory	  flaw	  of	  socialization	  theories,	   which	   never	   explained	  why	   similar	   personal	   experiences	   indeed	  many	  times	  produced	  such	  differences	  in	  social	  practices.	  This	  idea	  drove	  us	  to	  propose	  a	  theory	  of	  capital	  attraction	  in	  order	  to	  formalize	  the	  theory	  of	  social	  practices.	  At	  the	  core	  of	   this	   idea	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  social	  objects	  –including	  agents–	  attract	  each	  other	   in	  direct	  proportion	   to	   their	   volume/composition	  of	   capital	   and	   in	   inverse	  proportion	   to	   their	   social	   distance.	   In	   other	  words,	  when	   two	   social	   objects,	   for	  instance	  an	  agent	  and	  a	  social	  practice,	  present	   the	  same	  position	   in	  social	  space	  (vid.	   figure	  30)	  and	  are	  accessible	   to	  each	  other	  –they	  operate	   in	   the	  same	  field–	  then	   they	   will	   attract	   each	   other.	   The	   force	   of	   this	   attraction	   is	   directly	  proportional	   to	   the	   volume	   of	   capital	   and	   inversely	   proportional	   to	   the	   distance	  between	   them.	   For	   instance,	   different	   cultures	   –i.e.	   different	   fields–	   can	   charge	  with	   the	   same	   volume	   of	   capital	   some	   ways	   of	   eating	   –body	   disposition,	   etc.–	  attracting	  agents	  with	  an	  equal	  volume	  of	   capital;	  however,	   it	   is	   the	  case	   that	  an	  18th	  century	  French	  agent	  will	  never	  develop	  the	  practice	  of	  eating	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	   contemporary	   Chinese	   aristocrats.	   This	   effect	   played	   by	   social	   distance	   has	  been	   mitigated	   by	   globalization,	   which	   introduced	   a	   tendency	   towards	   the	  unification	  of	  fields	  and	  markets65.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Again,	   we	   see	   the	   fruitful	   expansion	   towards	   other	   forms	   of	   capital,	   apart	   from	   the	  economic	   one,	   of	  Bourdieu’s	   schema.	   Classical	  Marxists	   had	   theorized	   this	   unification	  of	  the	  fields	  only	  in	  its	  economic	  form	  (Chattopadhyay,	  2002;	  Lenin,	  2010[1916]).	  
	   251	  
Therefore	   we	   argue	   that	   this	   underlying	   logic	   of	   human	   practice	   can	   be	  mathematically	   formalized.	   This	   will	   clarify	   it,	   as	   well	   as	   it	   will	   enable	   its	  operationalization.	  
4.2.2.1.2	  Gauss’	  Theorem	  Mathematical	   representations	   of	   phenomena	   are	   not	   the	   reality	   behind	   these	  phenomena,	   but	   a	   symbolic	   representation	   of	   it.	   The	   advantage	   over	   any	   other	  good	  metaphor	  is	  that	  mathematical	  representations	  are	  the	  most	  accurate	  way	  to	  describe	  phenomena.	  The	  use	  of	  mathematics	   forces	   the	  analyst	   to	  provide	  exact	  descriptions	  and	   interpretations	  of	  phenomena,	  preventing	  the	   inclusion	  of	  black	  boxes	  within	  theories.	  Black	  boxes	  are	  part	  of	  the	  arguments	  that	  make	  up	  theories	  that	  are	  not	  clearly	  defined	  or	  explained.	  For	  instance	  theories	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	   socialization	   usually	   receive	   the	   accusation	   of	   relying	   on	   a	   black	   box	  when	   it	  comes	   to	   explain	   the	   process	   that	   causes	   the	   internalization	   of	   attitudes	   by	  individuals.	  	  
Mathematics	   allows	  us	   to	   formalize	   a	   theoretical	  model	  with	   the	  highest	   level	   of	  accuracy,	   enabling	   its	   testing	  and	  comparison	  with	  other	   rival	  models.	   So	   far	  we	  have	  developed	  an	  extension	  of	  Pierre	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  practice,	  postulating	  a	  gravitational	  theory	  of	  capital,	  or	  a	  law	  of	  capital	  attraction.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  are	  stating	   that	   there	   is	   a	   law,	   whose	   rationale	   we	   have	   already	   discussed	   in	   the	  previous	   pages,	   which	   provokes	   an	   attraction	   among	   social	   bodies,	   causing	   the	  alignment	   between	   subjects	   and	   practices,	   between	   practices,	   between	   practices	  and	  objects	  and	  between	  objects	  and	  subjects.	  In	  order	  to	  simplify	  and	  clarify	  this	  analysis,	  we	  have	  defined	  all	   these	  objects	  as	   simply	   social	  bodies	  with	  a	  definite	  position	  in	  social	  space.	  This	  position	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  an	  Euclidean	  vector	  with	  three	  components	  (x,	  y,	  z),	  each	  of	  them	  accounting,	  respectively,	  for	  the	  volume	  of	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economic,	   cultural,	   and	  social	   capital	   associated	   to	  each	   social	  body.	   Thus,	   social	  bodies	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  geometric	  objects	  with	  magnitude	  and	  direction;	  their	  capital	  volume	  defines	  its	  magnitude,	  and	  their	  direction	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  line	  between	  the	  origin	  O,	  in	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  space	  and	  the	  position	  (x,	  y,	  z)	  that	  they	  occupy	  in	  such	  a	  space.	  Symbolic	  capital	  is	  not	  a	  component	  of	  the	  vector,	  as	  this	  regards	  only	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  recognized	  capital	  within	  a	  given	  field.	  Thus,	  any	  social	  body	  –an	  agent,	   a	   practice,	   an	  object,	   etc.	   that	   is	   recognized	   in	   a	   given	   social	   field–	   can	  be	  expressed	  as:	  
𝐵 ≡ (𝐵! ,𝐵! ,𝐵!)	  
Being	  𝐵! ,𝐵! ,𝐵! 	  the	   components	   of	   the	   vector	  𝐵 ,	   referring	   respectively	   to	   the	  amount	  of	  economic,	  cultural	  and	  social	  capital	  with	  which	  the	  body	  is	  charged	  in	  a	  given	  social	  field.	  We	  can	  standardize	  the	  volume	  of	  capital	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  10.	  In	  order	  to	  exist	  socially	  within	  a	  given	  social	  field,	  capital	  must	  be	  symbolic	  capital,	  meaning	  that	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  measure	  the	  volume/composition	  of	  capital	  for	  every	  social	  body	  within	  that	  given	  field66.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Taking	  the	  example	  of	  an	  academic	  journal,	  the	  citation	  index	  would	  be	  an	  index	  of	  the	  volume	  of	  capital	  associated	  to	  the	  journal	  within	  the	  academic	  field.	  We	  could	  breakdown	  the	  composition	  of	   its	  capital	  using	  different	  methods.	  One	  could	  be	   to	  conduct	  a	  survey	  among	   capitalized	   agents	  within	   the	   field	   –professors	  with	   expertise	   on	   the	   area	   of	   the	  journal–	  asking	  them	  to	  answer	  questions	  that	  are	  proxies	  of	  the	  three	  types	  of	  capital.	  For	  instance:	  	  
• To	  what	  degree,	  in	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  10,	  do	  you	  think	  that	  having	  published	  in	  this	  journal	  improves	  your…	  
o Networking	  with	  other	  colleagues?	  (Proxy	  to	  social	  capital)	  
o Chances	  of	  salary	  increase?	  (Proxy	  to	  economic	  capital)	  
o Academic	  recognition	  by	  other	  colleagues?	  (Proxy	  to	  cultural	  capital)	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Figure	  31	  represents	  a	  social	  body	  as	  a	  vector	  in	  a	  given	  field.	  The	  social	  body	  is	  a	  vector	  in	  the	  social	  space	  OB	  	  -­‐from	  origin,	  O,	  to	  the	  point	  B-­‐	  with	  a	  magnitude	  and	  a	  direction;	   its	  magnitude	   refers	   to	   the	   total	   volume	  of	   capital	   (𝐵! ,𝐵! ,𝐵!)	  -­‐in	   the	  example	  (3,	  2,	  5)-­‐	  and	  the	  direction	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  line	  from	  origin,	  O,	  to	  point	  B.	  	  
We	   have	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   a	   force	   attracting	   social	   bodies	   that	   is	   greater	   the	  greater	   the	  similarity	  between	   the	  volume	  and	   the	  composition	  of	   their	   capital	  –their	  position	  in	  the	  three-­‐dimensional	  social	  space–	  and	  is	  weaker	  the	  greater	  the	  social	  distance	  between	  them.	  We	  postulate	  that	  this	  force	  between	  pairs	  of	  social	  bodies	  is	  equal	  and	  opposite	  to	  each	  other,	  independently	  of	  their	  individual	  social	  masses	  –i.e.	  their	  capital	  volume–	  directly	  proportional	  to	  their	  total	  capital	  volume/composition,	   and	   inversely	   proportional	   of	   the	   social	   distance	  between	   them.	   We	   do	   not	   need	   to	   develop	   ex	   novo	   the	   mathematics	  regarding	   the	   dynamics	   between	   attracting	   bodies	   as	   postulated	   by	   our	  
	  
	   254	  
theory,	   as	   these	   have	   been	   already	   modeled.	   The	   most	   fundamental	   of	   these	  models	  is	  the	  Gauss’	  theorem	  (Gauss,	  1813)67.	  
In	   the	   Gauss’	   theorem	   the	   symbol	  ∇ 	  represents	   a	   special	   vector	   where	   the	  components	  are	  derivatives	  with	  respect	  to	  x,	  to	  y,	  and	  to	  z.	  Thus:	  
∇≡ ( 𝜕𝜕𝑥 , 𝜕𝜕𝑦 , 𝜕𝜕𝑧)	  
Therefore,	   ∇   works	   as	   a	   differential	   operation	   of	   something,	   enabling	   the	  calculation	  of	  a	  vector	  from	  scalars	  –real	  numbers	  in	  linear	  algebra–.	  For	  example,	  ∇  can	  act	  on	  a	  scalar	  𝜑,	  which	  is	  a	  function	  of	  position,	  i.e.	  𝜑  (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧),	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  vector:	  
∇≡ (𝜕𝜑𝜕𝑥 , 𝜕𝜑𝜕𝑦 , 𝜕𝜑𝜕𝑧)	  
But	  ∇  can	  act	  on	  a	  vector	  field	  as	  well.	  This	  is	  possible	  by	  treating	  ∇	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  vector:	  
∇ ∙   𝑉 ≡ (𝜕𝑉𝑥𝜕𝑥 , 𝜕𝑉𝑦𝜕𝑦 , 𝜕𝑉𝑧𝜕𝑧 )	  
Every	   set	   of	   bodies	   represented	   on	   a	   virtual	   space,	   and	   thus	   holding	   a	   definite	  position,	   conforms	   a	   field.	   Therefore	   social	   fields	   can	   be	  modeled	  with	   the	   same	  mathematics	  used	  for	  general	  fields	  (magnetic,	  gravitational,	  etc.).	  A	  gravitational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  We	  will	  base	  this	  section	  on	  the	  explanations	  by	  Professor	  Leonard	  Susskind,	  physicist	  at	  Stanford	  University	  (Susskind,	  2009).	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field	   –and	   social	   fields	   are	   certainly	   gravitational	   fields–	   is	   defined	   by	   different	  masses	   in	   space.	   Figure	   32	   represents	   a	   force	   field,	   regardless	   the	   nature	   of	   its	  bodies	   –these	   may	   be	   particles,	   planets,	   objects,	   or	   social	   bodies–.	   In	   order	   to	  define	  the	  gravitational	  field	  we	  introduce	  a	  test	  mass;	  thus,	  moving	  the	  test	  mass	  through	  the	  gravitational	  field	  and	  liberating	  it	  in	  different	  points	  we	  will	  see	  how	  fast,	  and	   in	  what	  direction,	   the	   test	  mass	  moves.	  This	  operation	  gives	  us	   the	   two	  components	  of	  the	  acceleration	  vector	  –direction	  and	  magnitude–	  of	  the	  test	  mass	  (A).	  The	  acceleration	  vector	  can	  be	  defined	  as:	  
𝐴 ≡ (𝐴!𝐴!𝐴!)	  
Figure	  32.	  Representation	  of	  a	  field	  of	  acceleration	  (force	  field)	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acceleration,	   every	   mass	   (i,	   j…	   n)	   makes	   a	   contribution	   to	   the	   general	   force,	   as	  expressed	  in:	  
𝐴(𝑥) = 𝐺  𝑚!𝑅!!!   𝑅!	  
This	   is	   the	  equation	  of	   the	  gravitational	   field,	  where	  the	  acceleration	  depends	  on	  position,	   as	   indicated	   by	   (x).	   G	   is	   the	   gravitational	   constant,	   as	   calculated	   by	  Newton,	  and	  equals	  6.673x10!!!	  N∙ (𝑚 𝑘𝑔)!.	  Thus,	  the	  acceleration	  exerted	  by	  the	  
ith	  mass	  to	  the	  test	  mass	  is	  directly	  proportional	  to	  the	  mass	  of	  particle	  i	  multiplied	  by	   G,	   and	   is	   inversely	   proportional	   to	   the	   distance	   between	   the	   two	   masses.	  Moreover	  the	  direction	  of	   the	  acceleration	  of	   the	  test	  mass	  goes	  along	  the	  vector	  that	   links	   it	   to	   the	   ith	  mass,	   forcing	  us	  to	  add	  one	  more	  R	  to	  the	  denominator,	  as	  this	  is	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  two	  masses.	  Therefore	  the	  overall	  acceleration	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  the	  vectors	  linking	  the	  test	  particle	  to	  the	  total	  particles	  within	  the	  gravitational	  field.	  This	  gravitational	  field	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  the	  divergence	  of	  
A:	  
∇ ∙ 𝐴	  
Thus,	  if	  we	  only	  had	  a	  gravitational	  field	  made	  up	  of	  one	  single	  mass,	  then	  all	  the	  gravitational	   force	   of	   the	   field	   would	   be	   directed	   towards	   one	   single	   point.	   We	  refer	   to	   this	   effect	   as	   the	   divergence	   of	   the	   acceleration	   field.	   To	   build	   up	   the	  equation	   for	   this	  particular	   case,	   it	  was	  necessary	   to	   invent	   the	  concept	  of	   ‘mass	  density’,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  mass	  per	  unit	  volume,	  and	  is	  known	  as	  𝜌.	  It	  is	  therefore	  a	  field	  in	  itself,	  a	  density	  field,	  and	  can	  be	  expressed	  as:	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𝜌 = ∆𝑚∆𝑣 	  
The	  relation	  between	  the	  density	  field	  (𝜌)	  and	  the	  gravitational	  field,	  is	  expressed	  as	  a	  field	  equation:	  
∇ ∙ 𝐴 = −4𝜋𝜌𝐺 	  
Where	  the	  gravitational	  constant	  G	  is	  proportionate	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  mass	  (𝜌);	  the	  minus	   sign	   relates	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   a	   field	   with	   one	   single	   mass,	   the	   force	  converges	   into	   that	   point,	   and	   convergence	   is	   negative	   divergence	   (−∇).	   This	  equation	   is	   known	   as	   Gauss’	   law,	   and	   was	   formulated	   by	   Gauss	   in	   1835	   and	  accounts	  for	  the	  acceleration	  in	  a	  gravitational	  field	  that	  contains	  only	  one	  particle.	  
Gauss’	   theorem	  establishes	   that	   in	   a	   given	   field,	  which	  has	   a	   divergence,	  we	   can	  integrate	  the	  divergence	  over	  the	  volume	  inside	  the	  region.	  For	  instance	  if	  we	  had	  a	  spherical	  field,	  we	  can	  break	  up	  the	  space	  of	  it	  into	  three-­‐dimensional	  little	  cubes	  in	  order	  to	  integrate	  the	  divergence	  within	  each	  of	  the	  cubes	  while	  multiplying	  it	  by	  the	  volume	  of	  each	  cube;	   finally,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  add	  up	  all	   the	  divergences	  calculated	  for	  every	  cube	  making	  up	  the	  sphere	  so	  we	  have	  the	  overall	  divergence.	  Thus:	  
∇ ⋅ 𝐴 = ∇ ⋅ 𝐴!,!…!  ×  (𝑑! ,𝑑! ,𝑑!)!,!…! 	  
The	  field	  A	  of	  each	  of	  the	  cubes	  has	  a	  component	  perpendicular	  to	  its	  surface	  (𝐴!)	  and	  Gauss’s	  theorem	  states	  that	  the	  integral	  of	  the	  whole	  divergence	  of	  A	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  integral	  over	  the	  boundary	  (𝜎);	  therefore:	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∇ ⋅ 𝐴   𝑑𝑥,𝑑𝑦,𝑑𝑧 = 𝑑𝜎𝐴! 	  
Accordingly,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   know	   the	   gravitational	   field	   of	   a	   sphere	   by	  surrounding	  it	  with	  another	  sphere.	  As	  Gauss’	   law	  states	  that	  the	  divergence	  of	  a	  field	  A	  equals	  −4𝜋𝜌𝐺,	  then:	  
∇ ⋅ 𝐴   𝑑𝑥,𝑑𝑦,𝑑𝑧 = −4π𝐺 𝜌𝑑!𝑥	  
As	  −4𝜋𝐺	  is	  just	  a	  constant	  we	  can	  put	  it	  outside	  the	  integral,	  which	  still	  contains	  the	   volume;	   therefore,	   by	   integrating	   the	   volume,	   we	   will	   have	   the	   mass	   of	   the	  field.	  Thus:	  	   ∇ ⋅ 𝐴   𝑑𝑥,𝑑𝑦,𝑑𝑧 = −4π𝐺𝑀.	  
Therefore	  −4𝜋𝐺𝑀	  must	  equal	   the	  perpendicular	  component	  of	   the	  gravitational	  field.	  Given	  that	  the	  mass	  distribution	  of	  a	  sphere	  is	  isotropic,	  its	  gravitational	  field	  must	   be	   isotropic	   as	  well,	   i.e.,	   the	   gravitational	   component	   of	   the	   spherical	   field	  will	   be	   the	   same	   at	   every	   point	   of	   the	   surface	   of	   the	   sphere,	   simplifying	   the	  calculation	  as:	  𝐴! 𝑑𝜎.	  As	  the	  integral	  of	  𝑑𝜎	  is	  the	  area	  of	  the	  sphere,	  then:	  −4𝜋𝐺𝑀 = 𝐴!4𝜋𝑅!,	  or:	  −𝐺𝑀 = 𝐴!𝑅!	  
Consequently,	  the	  gravitational	  field	  of	  a	  mass	  (𝐴!)	  can	  be	  defined	  as:	  𝐴! = −𝑀𝐺 𝑅!	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Thus,	   Gauss’	   calculation	   matches	   exactly	   Newton’s	   universal	   gravitation.	  Therefore,	   what	   we	   really	   have	   here	   is	   a	   mathematical	   expression	   of	   a	   field	   of	  attraction	  between	  bodies	   that	  can	  be	  applied	  as	  well	   to	   fields	  made	  up	  of	  social	  bodies.	  	  	  
4.2.3	  Why	  people	  vote	  the	  way	  we	  do?	  After	   this	   long	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	   trip	   we	   have	   finally	   arrived	   to	   a	  point	   from	   which	   we	   are	   able	   to	   provide	   an	   adequate	   answer	   to	   our	   research	  question.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  existing	  theories	  on	  electoral	  behavior	  do	  not	  match	  the	  data,	  we	  have	  elaborated	  a	  new	   theoretical	   framework	   from	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	   theory	   of	   practice,	   initially	   developed	   notably	   by	   Bourdieu	   (1987).	  We	   have	  further	   developed	   Bourdieu’s	   approach,	   given	   it	   mathematical	   formalization	   as	  well	   as	   expanding	   it	   through	   the	   notion	   of	   sub-­‐fields.	   Regarding	   the	   former,	   we	  have	  developed	  a	  mathematical	  formalization	  for	  Bourdieu’s	  general	  theory;	  thus,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  it	  under	  the	  lens	  of	  attraction	  between	  social	  bodies	  in	  a	  vector	  space	   defined	   by	   the	   quantities	   of	   economic,	   cultural	   and	   social	   capital	   that	   are	  attached	   to	   them	   in	   a	   given	   social	   field.	   In	   this	   sense,	   social	   fields	   are	  understandable	   under	   the	   logic	   of	   general	   field	   theories,	   such	   as	   Newton’s	  gravitation	   field	   or	   Gauss’	   theorem.	   These	   two	   theories	   provided	   mathematical	  expressions	   of	   attraction	   between	   bodies,	   called	   gravitation	   by	   Newton	   and	  negative	   divergence	   by	   Gauss.	   We	   have	   seen	   that	   this	   general	   law	   of	   attraction	  between	  bodies	  in	  a	  given	  field	  suits	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  practice	  and	  help	  to	  its	  operationalization	   and	   formalization.	   Thus,	   every	   social	   body	   in	   a	   given	   social	  space	   holds	   a	   specific,	   measurable,	   quantity	   of	   economic,	   cultural	   and	   social	  capital;	   the	   attraction	   between	   social	   bodies	   is	   in	   direct	   proportion	   to	   the	   total	  volume	  of	  aggregated	  capital	  –called	  by	  Bourdieu	  ‘symbolic’	  capital,	  i.e.,	  the	  volume	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of	  capital	  effectively	  recognized	  in	  a	  given	  field–	  and	  inversely	  proportional	  to	  the	  distance	   between	   bodies.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   general	   law	   explains	   practice,	   for	  example	   linguistic	   practices;	   thus,	   in	   a	   multilingual	   field	   where	   one	   language	  accumulates	   more	   economic,	   cultural	   and	   social	   capital,	   a	   process	   of	   linguistic	  substitution	   is	   foreseeable	   as	   part	   of	   a	   general	   strategy	   towards	   upward	   social	  mobility,	  although	  some	  sort	  of	  difference	  between	  linguistic	  varieties	  will	  always	  remain	   as	   long	   as	   there	   are	   class	   differences,	   since	   ‘there	   is	   a	   clear	   relation	  between	   the	   accessibility	   to	   codes	   by	   the	   community,	   its	   knowledge,	   proficiency	  and	   use,	   and	   the	   forms	   of	   social	   stratification’	   (Álvarez-­‐Cáccamo,	   1987:	   132).	   In	  fact,	  the	  case	  of	  Galician	  linguistic	  change	  matches	  perfectly	  the	  theory	  of	  practice,	  since	   Galicians	   massively	   adopted	   the	   Spanish	   language	   only	   after	   internal	  immigration	  from	  rural	  areas	  and	  into	  the	  Galician	  cities,	  where	  the	  distribution	  of	  
capital	   among	   languages	   –Spanish	  held	   the	  highest	   volume	  of	   economic,	   cultural	  and	  social	  capital–	  was	  different	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  value	  in	  the	  rural	  villages	  –where	  Galician	  enabled	  social	  cohesion,	  through	  its	  associated	  social,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  use-­‐value–68.	  Ethnographers	  have	  noted	  that	  until	  the	  1980s	  there	  was	  a	  social	  taboo	  in	  rural	  Galicia	  avoiding	  parents	  to	  speak	  Spanish	  to	  their	  children,	  as	  it	   was	   seen	   as	   presumptuous;	   however,	   coinciding	   in	   time	   with	   the	   massive	  introduction	  of	  TV	  and	  of	  the	  Spanish	  education	  system,	  this	  taboo	  came	  to	  an	  end,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Of	  course,	  we	  follow	  here	  Marx’s	  classical	  distinction	  between	  use-­‐value	  and	  exchange-­‐value:	  “The	  commodity	  itself	  appears	  as	  unity	  of	  two	  aspects.	  It	  is	  use	  value,	  i.e.	  object	  of	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  any	  system	  whatever	  of	  human	  needs.	  This	  is	  its	  material	  side,	  which	  the	  most	  disparate	  epochs	  of	  production	  may	  have	  in	  common,	  and	  whose	  examination	  therefore	  lies	  beyond	  political	  economy.	  Use	  value	  falls	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  political	  economy	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  becomes	  modified	  by	  the	  modern	  relations	  of	  production,	  or	  as	  it,	  in	  
turn,	  intervenes	  to	  modify	  them.”	  (Marx,	  1993[1858]:	  851,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	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accelerating	   linguistic	   substitution.	   The	   introduction	   of	   these	   two	   socialization	  agents	  in	  the	  social	  field	  of	  rural	  Galicia	  had	  altered	  the	  location	  of	  the	  social	  object	  ‘Spanish	  language’	  in	  the	  social	  space,	  as	  well	  as	  it	  altered,	  or	  even	  introduced,	  the	  object	  ‘Galician	  language’	  (Álvarez-­‐Cáccamo,	  1991).	  But	  the	  very	  field	  was	  altered	  itself,	  since	  these	  two	  agents	  also	  introduced	  a	  new	  structure	  of	  social	  space	  with	  new	   forms	   of	   upward	   and	   downward	   social	   mobility,	   which	   progressively	  substituted	   the	   different	   forms	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   traditional	   society	   –vid.,	   e.g.,	  Fernández	  de	  Rota	  (1987)	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  social	  mobility	  in	  terms	  of	  weak	  and	  strong	  houses,	   typical	  of	   that	  society–.	  Rural	  Galicia	  became	  then	  part	  of	  Spanish	  capitalism,	  where	  social	  mobility	  was	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  traditional	  system	  and	  it	  went	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   the	   acquisition	   of	   capital,	   in	   its	   cultural,	   social	   and	  economic	   forms;	   in	   parallel,	   Spanish	   was	   culturally	   capitalized	   through	   the	  education	   system.	   In	   this	   sense,	   national	   languages	   are	   no	  more	   than	   particular	  linguistic	   varieties	   capitalized	   by	   the	   States	   to,	   circularly,	   increase	   the	   symbolic	  capital	  of	  the	  State	  that	  initially	  capitalized	  them	  –vid.,	  e.g.,	  Billig	  (1995)–.	  Thus,	  a	  typical	  pattern	  from	  the	  1950s	  onwards	  was	  that	  rural	  marriages	  immigrated	  into	  the	   city	   looking	   for	   upward	  mobility;	   in	   order	   to	   accomplish	   this	   objective,	   they	  transformed	  the	  use-­‐value	  of	  their	  lands	  into	  economic	  capital	  –they	  sold	  them	  in	  exchange	   of	   money–,	   transformed	   the	   use-­‐value	   of	   their	   language	   into	   cultural	  capital	  –they	  abandoned	  Galician	  in	  exchange	  of	  the	  cultural	  capital	  associated	  to	  Spanish–,	  and	  transform	  the	  use-­‐value	  of	  their	  social	  relations	  into	  social	  capital	  –as	   soon	   as	   they	   arrived	   to	   the	   city	   they	   transform	  economic	   and	   cultural	   capital	  into	   social	   capital,	   becoming	  members	  of	   one	  of	   the	  different	  urban	   social	   clubs;	  the	  more	  aggregated	  economic	  and	  cultural	  capital	  they	  had,	  the	  higher	  the	  social	  club	   they	   became	  members	   of.	   This	   of	   course,	   involved	   an	   abandonment	   of	   the	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network	  of	  social	  relations	  they	  previously	  had	  in	  the	  rural,	  defined	  as	  a	  complex	  combination	  of	  individualism	  and	  solidarity	  (Gondar,	  1993)–.	  
We	  have	   conducted	   six	   interviews	   to	   inhabitants	  of	   the	  Galician	   city	  of	  Corunna.	  Two	   of	   them	  had	   immigrated	   to	   the	   city	   during	   the	   past	   ten	   years,	   another	   two	  were	  sons	  of	  parents	  who	  arrived	  the	  city	  during	  the	  1970s,	  and	  another	  two	  were	  sons	   and	   grandsons	   of	   inhabitants	   of	   Corunna.	   One	   of	   the	   respondents	   of	   the	  second	  group	   is	   the	  son	  of	   immigrants	   from	  a	  rural	  area	  of	  Lugo,	  100	  kilometers	  away	  from	  Corunna.	  The	  man,	  already	  in	  his	  50s	  is	  not	  fluent	  in	  Galician,	  although	  his	   parents	   were	   both	   Galician-­‐speakers	   –although	   they	   tried	   to	   avoid	   speaking	  Galician	   in	   front	   of	   the	   respondent–	   explained	   how	   their	   parents	   oriented	  aggressively	  his	  social	  relations.	  His	  parents	  had	  good	  productive	  lands	  to	  sell	  back	  in	   the	   rural	  and	   thus	  could	   immigrate	   to	  Corunna	  with	  a	   relative	  high	  volume	  of	  economic	   capital;	   this	   volume	   enable	   them	   not	   to	   live	   in	   one	   of	   the	   peripheral	  neighborhoods,	  with	  lower	  house	  prices,	  where	  many	  rural	  immigrants	  lived.	  They	  wanted	  to	  live	  near	  the	  city	  center	  in	  order	  to	  enroll	  his	  son	  in	  one	  of	  the	  middle-­‐class	   schools	   of	   the	   city;	   he	   remembered	   how	   his	   parents	   went	   into	   economic	  difficulties,	  but	  never	  stopped	  being	  members	  of	  a	  famous	  middle-­‐class	  social	  club	  of	  the	  city,	  as	  well	  as	  he	  remembered	  his	  mother’s	  obsession	  with	  the	  quality	  of	  his	  child’s	  shoes.	  He	  finally	  got	  a	  middle-­‐class	  job	  and	  his	  current	  relationships,	  many	  of	  them	  were	  initiated	  when	  he	  was	  a	  child,	  are	  either	  second	  generation	  or	  third	  generation	  immigrants	  like	  him,	  and	  all	  of	  them	  share	  the	  same	  class	  location.	  He	  is	  still	   a	   member	   of	   his	   parents’	   social	   club	   and	   is	   a	   very	   good	   player	   at	   padel,	   a	  middle/upper	  class	  sport.	  He	  enrolled	  his	  children	  into	  an	  upper-­‐class	  social	  club	  of	  Corunna	  and	  one	  of	  them	  is	  a	  very	  good	  player	  of	  tennis,	  an	  upper-­‐classes	  sport	  (vid.	   Bourdieu	   2012[1979]).	   Neither	   his	   wife,	   nor	   his	   friends	   can	   speak	   fluent	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Galician,	  but	  his	  children	  can	  speak	  the	  standard	  variety	  of	  the	  language	  taught	  in	  the	  education	  system,	  although	  they	  have	  never	  really	  used	  it	  outside	  school.	  	  Paradoxically	   the	   respondents	   showing	   the	   highest	   sympathies	   for	   Galician	  language	  are	   those	  belonging	   to	   the	  group	  of	  Corunna-­‐born	  grandparents.	   In	   the	  context	  of	  political	  controversy	  on	  the	  law	  that	  regulates	  the	  teaching	  of	  Galician	  in	  the	   education	   system,	   these	   respondents	   were	   happy	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   having	  bilingual	   children.	   No	  members	   of	   their	   family	   ever	   spoke	   Galician,	   at	   least	   that	  they	  remember,	  and	  thus	  the	  fear	  of	  cultural	  de-­‐capitalization	  was	  not	  present.	  The	  Galician	   spoken	   by	   their	   children	   is	   of	   course	   the	   standard	   variety,	   which	  accumulates	  some	  sort	  of	  cultural	  capital	  in	  some	  particular	  fields,	  like	  the	  literary	  field.	  Thus,	  the	  social	  distance	  from	  the	  de-­‐capitalized	  forms	  of	  Galician	  and	  from	  the	  class	  who	  spoke	  it	  is	  so	  huge	  that	  they	  can	  allow	  themselves	  to	  appropriate	  the	  capital	   associated	   to	   its	   standard	   variety,	  while	   this	  was	   not	   possible	   to	   second-­‐generation	   immigrants.	   Moreover,	   the	   volume	   of	   social	   capital	   of	   this	   Corunna-­‐born	  grandparents	  group	  was	  notably	  higher,	  with	  friends	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  cultural	   world,	   like	   artist,	   art	   dealers,	   etc.	   a	   field	   where	   Galician	   language	   has	  associated	  capital,	  in	  its	  three	  forms	  –vid.,	  e.g.,	  Álvarez-­‐Cáccamo	  (1997;	  2003)	  and,	  particularly,	  Álvarez-­‐Cáccamo	  (2011c):	  ‘The	  overlaps	  between	  the	  networks	  of	  these	  fields	  are	  clear,	  even	  clearer	  in	  our	  society	  due	  to	  the	  anomalous	  character	  of	  language	  capitalization:	  sociolinguists	  who	  are	  writers	  and	  politicians,	  teachers	  who	  write,	  editors	  who	  are	  teachers	  and	  political	  figures,	  etc.	  etc.	  This	  cultural	  capital	  of	  Galician	  circulates	  around,	  but	  is	  sparsely	  convertible	  into	  the	  broader	  market	  circuit	  that	  determines	  social	  and	  economic	  locations	  and	  that	  “natural”	  “mobility”	  in	  class	  societies’–.	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Therefore	   the	   sympathy	   for	   Galician	   among	   urban	   upper	   classes	   is	   intimately	  related	  to	  their	  higher	  social	  capital,	  without	  which	  Galician	  cultural	  capital	  cannot	  be	   implemented,	   and	   thus	   never	   achieving	   the	   state	   of	   symbolic	   capital.	   On	   the	  other	   hand,	   the	   ghost	   of	   decapitalization	   is	   still	   very	   present	   among	   second-­‐generation	   immigrants,	   who	   present	   the	   fiercest	   attacks	   on	   Galician	   language.	  Consequently	   this	   constitutes	   a	   perfect	   example	   of	   the	   law	   of	   capital	   attraction:	  
directly	  proportional	  to	  its	  mass,	  inversely	  proportional	  to	  its	  distance.	  
Habitus,	   in	   this	   case	   linguistic	   habitus,	   can	   be	   seen	   clearly	   as	   a	   force	   causing	   an	  acceleration	  between	  social	  bodies	   that	   is	  equal	  and	  opposite	   to	  each	  other.	  This	  acceleration	   equals	   the	   product	   of	   the	  masses	   of	   the	   two	   bodies	   divided	   by	   the	  distance	   between	   these	   bodies.	   This	   general	   force	   does	   not	   determine	   human	  
practice,	   but	   rather	   orients	   it	   as	   an	   attraction	   between	   social	   objects;	   although	  unlikely,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   break	   this	   force,	   in	   the	   same	  way	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  swim	   against	   the	   flow	  when	   you	   can	  do	   it	   otherwise.	   Therefore,	   habitus	   bounds	  rational	   choice,	   by	   framing	   it.	   We	   argue,	   then,	   that	   rational	   choice	   equations	   of	  utility	  maximization	  should	  be	  widened	  in	  order	  to	  integrate	  the	  general	  attraction	  caused	   by	   habitus;	   the	   result	   of	   this	   integration	   would	   be	   the	   most	   accurate	  predictor	  of	  human	  practice.	  The	  bigger	  the	  masses	  of	  social	  bodies	  and	  the	  lower	  the	   distance	   between	   them,	   the	   smaller	   the	   weight	   of	   rational	   calculation,	   and	  viceversa.	  This	  explains	  why	  rational	  choice	  can	  effectively	  predict	  simple	  types	  of	  behavior,	   like	  in	  the	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  (Chess,	  1988)	  or	  even	  in	  football	  penalty	  kicking	   (Palacios-­‐Huerta,	   2003),	  while	   it	   presents	   important	   prediction	   flaws	   on	  complex	  ones,	  like	  voting	  behavior	  (Feddersen,	  2004).	  By	  formalizing	  the	  strength	  of	   the	  habitus	  we	  will	   then	  have	   an	   accurate	   approximation	   to	  human	  practices,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  contribution	  this	  work	  wants	  to	  make.	  This	  could	  be	  developed	  by	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formalizing	   the	  strength	  of	   the	  habitus	   from	   ‘1’	   (no	   force	  at	  all)	   to	   ‘0’	   (maximum	  strength);	  then	  we	  will	  simply	  need	  to	  multiply	  the	  appropriate	  equation	  of	  utility	  maximization	   times	   this	   coefficient.	   But	   first,	   we	   have	   to	   formalize	   the	   effect	   of	  habitus.	  
We	  have	  said	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  habitus	  is	  the	  social	  version	  of	  a	  force	  field.	  This	  enables	  us	  to	  draw	  the	  vector	  equation:	  
𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑆!𝑅!!!   𝑅!	  
Where:	  
𝑆! =∥ 𝑆 ∥= 𝑆!! + 𝑆!! + 𝑆!!	  
Meaning	  ∥ 𝑆 ∥	  the	  Euclidean	  length	  or	  magnitude	  of	  the	  vector	  𝑆,	  symbolic	  capital,	  which	   is	   composed	   by	   the	   economic	   capital	   component,	  𝑆!,	   the	   cultural	   capital	  component,	  𝑆!,	  and	  the	  social	  capital	  component,	  𝑆!.	  
And:	  
𝑅! = (𝑝! − 𝑞!)!!!!! 	  
Meaning	   the	   overall	   distance	  within	   the	   three-­‐dimensional	   Euclidean	   space	   that	  defines	  any	  social	  field.	  
Thus,	  the	  force	  of	  a	  given	  social	  field	  X	  can	  be	  equally	  expressed	  as:	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𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑆12 + 𝑆22 + 𝑆32(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖)2𝑛𝑖=1!   	  
We	   have	   stated	   that	   social	   objects	   are	   located	  within	   a	   vector	   space	  with	   three	  components,	   equal	   to	   the	   three-­‐dimensional	   representation	   of	   their	   symbolic	  capital	  derived	  from	  economic,	  cultural,	  and	  social	  forms.	  Thus,	  the	  force	  of	  vector	  𝐴	  between	   two	   or	   more	   social	   bodies	   in	   a	   particular	   social	   field	   X,	   equals	   the	  volume	  of	  the	  symbolic	  capital	  (S)	  –the	  sum	  of	  the	  economic	  (E),	  cultural	  (C),	  and	  social	  (s)	  capital	  effectively	  recognized	  in	  that	  given	  social	  field	  X–	  for	  each	  of	  the	  social	   bodies	   present	   in	   the	   field	   (i),	   divided	   by	   the	   Euclidean	   distance	   of	   the	  overall	   symbolic	   capital	   (S)	  present	   in	   that	   field	  X	   (𝑆!).	   In	   the	  vector	   form	  of	   the	  equation,	   the	   final	  𝑅! 	  indicates	   that	   the	   acceleration	   happens	   in	   the	   direction	  indicated	  by	  this	  vector	  (vid.	  fig.	  32).	  Therefore	  we	  have	  to	  divide	  the	  equation	  by	  this	   very	  distance,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   loss	   of	   equilibrium,	   and	   that	   is	  why	   the	  denominator	  is	  cubed	  and	  not	  just	  squared.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  we	  could	  express	  the	  same	  equation	  in	  its	  simpler,	  non-­‐vector,	  form	  in	  which	  the	  denominator	  would	  be	  just	  squared.	  	  
Consequently,	   the	   force	   of	   attraction	   between	   two	   social	   bodies	   is	   equal	   and	  opposite	  of	  each	  other,	  no	  matter	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  volume	  of	  capital	  between	  them.	   The	   bigger	   the	   capital	   volume	   of	   a	   social	   object,	   the	   bigger	   its	   force	   of	  attraction	   towards	  other	  social	  objects.	  This	   is	  why	  social	  distance	  plays	  such	  an	  important	   role	   to	   the	  maintenance	  of	   class	  divisions	   that	  Bourdieu	   called	   simply	  
distinction.	   Social	   distance	   plays	   here	   a	   determinant	   role	   by	   guaranteeing	   that	  social	   bodies	   do	   not	   converge	   around	   one	   single	   set	   of	   highly	   capitalized	   social	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objects.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  substitution	  of	  Galician	  by	  Spanish	  took	  so	  long	  since	  the	  first	  introduction	  of	  Spanish	  as	  an	  administrative	  language	  mainly	  during	  the	  17th	  century	  and	  cannot	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  dyad	  imperialism/resistance,	  as	  in	  Rodríguez	  (1976).	  The	  social	  fields	  present	  in	  rural	  Galicia	  were	  not	  integrated	  into	   the	   social	   fields	   where	   Spanish	   is	   at	   a	   reasonable	   social	   distance	   until	   the	  1970s,	  thanks	  to	  the	  massive	  introduction	  of	  Spanish	  TV	  and	  the	  education	  system.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  before	  that	  time	  some	  institutions	  used	  Spanish,	  notably	  the	  Church	  and	   the	   local	   political	   elites,	   but	   these	   were	   socially	   very	   distant.	   The	   1970s	  combined	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   universal	   education	   system,	   in	   Spanish,	   the	  introduction	  of	  TV,	   in	   Spanish,	   and	   the	  possibility	  of	   social	  mobility	   in	   the	   cities,	  also	   in	   Spanish.	   This	   enabled	   the	   transformation	   of	   use-­‐values	   into	   exchange-­‐values	   in	   order	   to	   access	   a	   capitalist	   market	   where	   an	   individual’s	   location	  depends	  on	  the	  volume	  of	  overall	  capital	  that	  he/she	  has,	  and	  where	  everything	  is	  commodified,	  including	  language,	  as	  Marx	  anticipated	  –commodity	  fetishism–	  and	  later	   ethnographic	   research	   confirmed	   (Heller,	   2011).	   The	  main	   factor	   breaking	  the	  taboo	  on	  the	  generational	  transmission	  of	  Spanish	  was,	  in	  fact,	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	   social	   distance	   with	   Spanish	   within	   the	   urban	   sub-­‐fields	   where	   the	   first-­‐generation	  immigrants	  went	  to	  live	  in69.	  Here	  we	  see	  the	  relevance	  of	  sub-­‐field,	  for	  as	  the	  overall	  urban	  inequality	  was	  in	  fact	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  rural	  one,	  it	  was	  not	   within	   sub-­‐fields.	   We	   argue	   that	   when	   inequality	   is	   too	   high,	   and	   thus	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  new	  urban	  sub-­‐fields	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  get	  a	  job	  as,	  for	  example,	  babysitter	   or	   bellhop,	   if	   individuals	   showed	   enough	   capital,	   also	   cultural	   capital	   in	   its	  linguistic	   variation.	   This	   social	   mobility	   from	   peasantry	   towards	   working-­‐class	  occupations	  was	  not	  present	   in	   the	  social	   fields	  present	   in	   ‘traditional’	   rural	  Galicia,	  and	  thus	   linguistic	   capitalization	  was	   seen	  as	  presumptuous.	   In	   the	  new	  context,	  however,	   it	  was	  not	  presumptuous,	  but	  necessary.	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Euclidean	  distance	  of	  overall	  symbolic	  capital	  is	  also	  high,	  the	  cultural	  adaption	  of	  humans	  drives	  them	  to	  operate	  within	  sub-­‐fields;	  if	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case,	  the	  lack	  of	  respect	  and	  status	  associated	  with	  decapitalization	  would	  be	  incompatible	  with	  happiness	   and	   human	   fulfillment.	   Therefore,	   sub-­‐fields	   are	   always	   dependent	   of	  the	   general	   dominant	   fields,	   but	   they	   are	   allowed	   to	   some	   degree	   of	   autonomy	  within	  them.	  The	  so-­‐called	  urban	  cultures	  are	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  sub-­‐fields,	  where	  the	   distribution	   of	   capital	   among	   social	   objects	   is	   altered	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  dominant	  fields,	  enabling	  the	  pseudo-­‐capitalization	  of	  its	  participants.	  This	  theory	  fully	   explains	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   sub-­‐cultures,	   even	   the	   violent	   ones,	   whereas	  rational	  choice	  theory	  does	  not.	  Socialization	  theories	  does	  not	  explain	  it	  neither,	  as	  it	  could	  never	  provide	  a	  convincing	  answer	  to	  the	  twins	  paradox	  –the	  empirical	  fact	  that	  two	  people	  with	  very	  similar	  process	  of	  socialization	  usually	  differ	  greatly	  in	   their	   practices.	   As	   Leong	   et	  al.	   put	   it:	   ‘(…)	   the	   twin	   paradox:	   the	   existence	   of	  pronounced	   differences	   in	   identical	   twins	   who	   have	   shared	   both	   heredity	   and	  environment’	  (Leong	  et	  al.,	  2012:	  118)–.	  More	  importantly	  the	  notion	  of	  sub-­‐fields	  solves	  the	  biggest	  problem	  of	  the	  Michigan	  approach	  on	  electoral	  behavior	  theory:	  explaining	  voting	  change.	  
It	  is	  usually	  state	  that	  the	  Columbia	  approach,	  focused	  on	  social	  cleavages,	  provide	  good	  explanation	  for	  vote	  stability,	  but	  not	  for	  change.	  If	  vote	  is	  the	  product	  of	  an	  alignment	  between	  structural	  positions	  and	  political	  parties,	  how	  is	  it	  that	  people	  change	  their	  vote	  without	  changing	  their	  structural	  position?	  But,	  moreover,	  how	  is	   it	   possible	   that	   individuals	   maintain	   their	   vote	   even	   when	   they	   change	   their	  structural	  position?	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  regarding	  the	  Michigan	  approach,	  focused	  on	  the	  socialization	  that	  builds	  up	  party	  identification,	  the	  theory	  says	  that	  voting	  is	   the	   product	   of	   an	   alignment	   between	   individual	   sympathies	   built	   during	   long	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periods	  of	  political	  socialization	  and	  the	  parties	  that	  attract	  these	  sympathies.	  How	  are,	   then,	  electoral	  changes	  possible	  during	  an	   individual’s	   live?	  These	  paradoxes	  are	   solved	   by	   the	   theory	   of	   practice	   that,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   breaks	   the	  objective/subjective	   cleavage.	   Thus,	   the	   practice	   of	   an	   individual	   is	   always	   the	  combination	  of	  his/her	  habitus	  and	  the	  field	  where	  he	  develops	  his/her	  life.	  As	  we	  have	  explained,	  individuals	  are	  social	  objects	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  symbolic	  capital	  attached,	  therefore	  occupying	  a	  position	  in	  the	  vector	  space	  that	  defines	  the	  social	  field.	   Political	   parties	   are	   too	   social	   objects	   equally	   defined	   in	   such	   space.	  Consequently,	  electoral	  preferences	  are	  the	  result	  of	  the	  association	  between	  these	  two	  social	  bodies,	  calculated	  in	  accordance	  with	  our	  general	  law.	  
Subfields	  are	  integrated	  within	  the	  general	  field,	  but	  maintain	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  autonomy,	  what	   facilitates	  a	  differential	  distribution	  of	  capital	  within	  the	  general	  framework.	  This	  explains,	  for	  instance,	  the	  appearance	  of	  urban	  dialects	  or	  jargon	  which,	  spoken	  by	  the	  working	  class,	  gives	  cultural	  capital	   in	   its	   linguistic	   form	  to	  those	  agents	  who	  show	  expertise	  in	  the	  jargon.	  This	  is	  possible	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  general	  rules	  of	  capital	  transmission	  are	  also	  respected	  within	  sub-­‐fields,	  since	  linguistic	  expertise	  in	  a	  given	  dialect	  has	  also	  attached	  a	  quantity	  of	  social	  capital	  –in	   the	   form	   of	   necessary	   contacts	   with	   other	   agents	   capitalized	   within	   the	   sub-­‐field–	  and	  of	  economic	  capital	  –increases	  the	  probabilities	  of	  having	  participated	  in	  the	  economic	  exchanges	  typical	  of	  the	  sub-­‐field–.	  However,	  all	  subfields	  are	  finally	  subject	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   dominant	   field,	   meaning	   that	   the	   capital	   attached	   to	  social	  objects	  within	  subfields	  is	  not	  symbolic	  capital	  within	  dominant	  fields;	  thus,	  capitalized	  social	  objects	  within	  subfields	  are	  punished	  in	  dominant	  fields,	  where	  they	  lose	  all	  its	  symbolic	  capital.	  This	  phenomenon	  underlies	  what	  has	  been	  called	  the	   demonization	   of	   the	   working	   class	   (Jones,	   2011),	   which	   is	   nothing	   but	   the	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decapitalization	  in	  the	  dominant	  field	  of	  the	  social	  objects	  capitalized	  within	  urban	  subfields.	   This	   symbolic	   dualism	   affects	   every	   social	   object	   included	   within	  economic,	   social,	   or	   cultural	   capital,	   like	   linguistic	   variation,	   clothing,	   body	  language,	  music,	   etc.	  Eduardo	  Galeano	  captured	   the	   logic	  of	   this	   social	   law	   in	  his	  poem	  Los	  nadies	  (The	  Nobodies),	  from	  his	  book	  El	  libro	  de	  los	  abrazos	  (The	  Book	  of	  Embraces):	  
‘Sueñan	  las	  pulgas	  con	  comprarse	  un	  perro	  y	  sueñan	  los	  nadies	  con	  salir	  de	  pobres,	  que	  algún	  mágico	  día	  llueva	  de	  pronto	  la	  buena	  suerte,	  que	  llueva	  a	  cántaros	  la	  buena	  suerte;	  pero	  la	  buena	  suerte	  no	  llueve	  ayer,	  ni	  hoy,	  ni	  mañana,	  ni	  nunca,	  ni	  en	  lloviznita	  cae	  del	  cielo	  la	  buena	  suerte,	  por	  mucho	  	  que	  los	  nadies	  la	  llamen	  y	  aunque	  les	  pique	  la	  mano	  izquierda,	  o	  se	  levanten	  con	  el	  pie	  derecho,	  o	  empiecen	  el	  año	  cambiando	  de	  escoba.	  
Los	  nadies:	  los	  hijos	  de	  nadie,	  los	  dueños	  de	  nada.	  Los	  nadies:	  los	  ningunos,	  los	  ninguneados,	  corriendo	  la	  liebre,	  muriendo	  la	  vida,	  jodidos,	  rejodidos:	  Que	  no	  son,	  aunque	  sean.	  Que	  no	  hablan	  idiomas,	  sino	  dialectos.	  Que	  no	  profesan	  religiones,	  sino	  supersticiones.	  Que	  no	  hacen	  arte,	  sino	  artesanía.	  Que	  no	  practican	  cultura,	  sino	  folklore.	  Que	  no	  son	  seres	  humanos,	  sino	  recursos	  humanos.	  Que	  no	  tienen	  cara,	  sino	  brazos.	  Que	  no	  tienen	  nombre,	  sino	  número.	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Que	  no	  figuran	  en	  la	  historia	  universal,	  sino	  en	  la	  crónica	  roja	  de	  la	  prensa	  local.	  
Los	  nadies,	  que	  cuestan	  menos	  que	  la	  bala	  que	  los	  mata.’	  (Galeano,	  2000:	  59)70.	  
The	   reason	   why	   dominant	   fields	   invest	   resources	   in	   the	   decapitalization	   of	  subfields	  is	  because	  these	  threaten	  to	  change	  their	  own	  distribution	  of	  capital,	  thus	  breaking	   the	   bonds	   between	   social	   objects	   that	   maintain	   the	   field	   together.	  Consequently,	   one	   given	   field	   can	   only	   be	   dismantled	   or	   dominated	   when	  confronting	  another	   field	  or	   combined	   fields	  with	  higher	  overall	   attraction	   force,	  competing	   for	   the	   different	   distribution	   of	   the	   same	   resources.	   Thus,	   as	   long	   as	  there	  is	  inequality,	  there	  will	  be	  dominant	  fields	  and	  subfields	  in	  conflict	  between	  each	   other.	   Marx	   identified	   such	   dynamic	   and	   theorized	   it	   by	   bringing	   back	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  ‘Fleas	  dream	  of	  buying	  themselves	  a	  dog,	  and	  nobodies	  dream	  of	  escaping	  poverty:	  that	  one	  magical	  day	  good	  luck	  will	  suddenly	  rain	  down	  on	  them–will	  rain	  down	  in	  buckets.	  But	  good	  luck	  doesn’t	  rain	  down	  yesterday,	  today,	  tomorrow,	  or	  ever.	  Good	  luck	  doesn’t	  even	  fall	  in	  a	  fine	  drizzle,	  no	  matter	  how	  hard	  the	  nobodies	  summon	  it,	  even	  if	  their	  left	  hand	  is	  tickling,	  or	  if	  they	  begin	  the	  new	  day	  with	  their	  right	  foot,	  or	  start	  the	  new	  year	  with	  a	  change	  of	  brooms.	  The	  nobodies:	  nobody’s	  children,	  owners	  of	  nothing.	  The	  nobodies:	  the	  no	  ones,	  the	  nobodied,	  running	  like	  rabbits,	  dying	  through	  life,	  screwed	  every	  which	  way.	  Who	  are	  not,	  but	  could	  be.	  Who	  don’t	  speak	  languages,	  but	  dialects.	  Who	  don’t	  have	  religions,	  but	  superstitions.	  Who	  don’t	  create	  art,	  but	  handicrafts.	  Who	  don’t	  have	  culture,	  but	  folklore.	  Who	  are	  not	  human	  beings,	  but	  human	  resources.	  Who	  do	  not	  have	  faces,	  but	  arms.	  Who	  do	  not	  have	  names,	  but	  numbers.	  Who	  do	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  world,	  but	  in	  the	  police	  blotter	  of	  the	  local	  paper.	  The	  nobodies,	  who	  are	  not	  worth	  the	  bullet	  that	  kills	  them.’.	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earth	  Hegel’s	  idealist	  dialectics,	  now	  filled	  up	  with	  social	  actors	  who	  he	  called	  the	  bourgeoisie	   –social	   agents	   taking	   the	   benefits	   in	   the	   dominant	   fields–	   and	   the	  proletariat	   –being	   exploited	   in	   the	   dominant	   fields,	   and	   eventually	   taking	   the	  benefits	   of	   newly	   constituted	   dominated	   subfields–;	   although	   this	   captures	   the	  intrinsic	   tension	   of	   capitalist	   inequality,	   revolution	   –i.e.,	   the	   overcome	   of	  outnumbered	   dominant	   fields	   by	   subfields–	   is	   not	   a	   necessary	   outcome	   of	   the	  process,	  because	   in	  order	  to	  occur	  two	  conditions	  must	  be	  met:	   In	   the	   first	  place	  the	  subfields	  need	  to	  be	  constituted	  –what	  Bourdieu	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  need	  of	  the	  working-­‐class	   to	   be	   constituted	   as	   such,	   as	   if	   it	   does	   not	   constitute	   a	   proper	  political	   subfield,	   it	   is	   no	   more	   than	   the	   exploited	   mass	   of	   agents	   within	   the	  dominant	  fields–.	  Secondly,	  working-­‐class	  subfields	  must	  coordinate	  among	  them	  in	   order	   to	   overcome	   outnumbered	   dominant	   fields	   –Lenin’s	   famous	   anti-­‐structuralist	   quote,	   ‘without	   revolutionary	   theory	   there	   can	   be	   no	   revolutionary	  movement’	  (Lenin,	  1973[1902]:	  11)–.	  
Accordingly,	  if	  social	  fields	  are	  force	  fields	  that	  hold	  together	  due	  to	  an	  attraction	  between	   social	   objects	   in	   accordance	   with	   a	   general	   law	   dictating	   that	   this	  attraction	   is	   directly	   proportionate	   to	   the	   volume	   of	   capital	   of	   the	   objects	   and	  inversely	   proportionate	   to	   the	   distance	   between	   them,	   then	   we	   can	   apply	   it	   to	  every	   social	   practice,	   including	   the	   social	   practice	   of	   voting.	   Thus,	   voting	   is	   a	  practice	   that	   expresses	   the	   linkage	   between	   social	   objects	  with	   a	   similar	   capital	  structure	   within	   a	   given	   social	   field.	   Consequently	   we	   must	   differentiate	   voting	  practices	  in	  the	  dominant	  fields	  and	  in	  the	  dominated	  subfields.	  Let	  us	  begin	  with	  the	  former.	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Dominant	   fields	  are	  characterized	  by	  having	   the	  highest	  attraction	   forces,	  due	   to	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   social	   objects	   that	   constitute	   them	  have	   the	   highest	   volumes	   of	  capital	  within	   society,	  which	  we	  understood	  as	   a	   complex	  of	   fields	   and	   subfields	  distributing	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   common	   resources.	   During	   this	   work	   we	   have	  described	   what	   we	   have	   called	   the	   law	   of	   capital	   attraction,	   but	   previously	  Bourdieu	   has	   described	   the	   law	   of	   capital	   conversion	   (Bourdieu,	   1986),	   that	  we	  have	  already	  considered.	  One	  of	   the	  side	  effects	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  capital	   forms	  are	  mutually	  convertible	  is	  that	  conversion	  rates	  vary	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  type	  of	  capital	  that	  dominates	  each	  field.	  This	  causes	  the	  division	  of	  the	  fields	  into	  three	  subfields,	  both	  dominant	  and	  dominated;	   in	  every	  society,	   i.e.,	   in	  every	  physical	  space	  where	  symbolic	  resources	  are	  structured	  within	  a	  global	  social	  field,	  this	  global	   field	   is	  divided	   into	  six.	  There	  are	   two	  main	  divisions,	  which	  are	   then	  breakup	   into	  three.	  There	   is	  one	  dominant	   field,	  constituted	  by	  the	  social	  objects	  with	   the	  highest	  volumes	  of	  attached	  capital,	  distributing	   the	  bulk	  of	   the	  existing	  symbolic	   resources.	   This	   dominant	   field	   is	   made	   up	   by	   social	   objects	   with	  differential	   volumes	   of	   economic,	   cultural	   and	   social	   capital,	   that	   summarize	   the	  different	  types	  that	  symbolic	  capital	  can	  adopt.	  Since	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  capital	  are	   mutually	   convertible,	   there	   must	   be	   a	   process	   of	   partial	   autonomization,	   in	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  exchange	  rates.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  dominant	  field	  is	  divided	  into	   three	   dominant	   fields:	   one	   characterized	   by	   the	   primacy	   of	   the	   economic	  capital,	   another	   one	   defined	   by	   the	   primacy	   of	   cultural	   capital,	   and	   a	   third	   one	  displaying	  the	  preeminence	  of	  social	  capital.	  Typical	  social	  objects	  included	  within	  each	  one	  of	  these	  dominant	  fields	  include:	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• Economic	  capital	  primacy:	  Money,	   successful	  businesses,	   large	  companies,	  industrialists,	   successful	   businessmen,	   expensive	   commodities	   (cars,	  houses,	  clothes…).	  
• Cultural	   capital	   primacy:	   Both	   objectivized	   and	   incorporated	   forms	   of	  cultural	   capital.	   Regarding	   the	   former:	   large	   private	   libraries,	   collector’s	  items,	   rarities,	   special	   editions,	   classical	   music…	   Regarding	   the	   latter:	  expertise	   on	   linguistic	   standards,	   table	   manners,	   scholarly	   knowledge,	  university	  professors…	  
• Social	  capital	  primacy:	  Memberships	  of	  elite	  social	  clubs,	  aristocratic	  titles,	  powerful	   families,	   exclusive	  parties,	   friendships	   in	   the	   government	   and	   in	  other	  institutional	  bodies…	  
Social	   agents	   embodied	   with	   enough	   volume	   of	   capital	   to	   access	   some	   of	   the	  resources	   distributed	   in	   one	   of	   these	   three	   dominant	   fields	   constitute	   the	  dominant	   classes.	  When	   any	   given	   social	   object	   has	   an	   irregular	   distribution	   of	  capital	   –meaning	   that	   it	   has	   attached	   significant	   greater	   amounts	   of	   one	   of	   the	  three	   types	   of	   capital–	   then	   it	   tends	   to	   revalue	   this	   particular	   form	  of	   capital,	   in	  order	   to	   prevent	   its	   exchange	   rate	   to	   depreciate.	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   typical	  discourses	   of	   agents	   within	   each	   one	   of	   the	   fields;	   for	   instance,	   successful	  businessmen	   tend	   to	   devalue	   scholar	   or	   erudite	   knowledge,	   arguing	   that	   it	   does	  not	  match	  the	  necessities	  of	  the	  market	  and	  that	  it	  is	  thereby	  useless.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  university	  professors	  tend	  to	  despise	  private	  entrepreneurship,	  arguing	  that	  the	  market	  does	  not	  necessarily	  address	  social	  necessities.	  Finally,	  aristocrats	  tend	  to	  despise	  both	  cultural	  and	  economic	  capitalized	  agents,	  typically	  contemptuously	  referred	  to	  as	  nouveau	  riche.	  Of	  course	  these	  critiques	  are	  never	  completely	  unfold	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neither	   externally	   nor	   internally,	   since	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   be	   a	   member	   of	   a	  dominant	   field	  without	   counting,	   to	   some	  degree,	  with	  all	   three	   forms	  of	   capital.	  Although	  we	  do	  not	  have	  data	  to	  contrast	  this	  empirical	  trend	  with	  the	  aristocracy,	  we	  can	  do	  it	  with	  the	  social	  agents	  integrated	  in	  the	  dominant	  fields	  with	  economic	  and	   cultural	   capital	   primacy.	   Table	   XVII	   illustrates	   the	   ideological	   self-­‐identification	  of	  managers	  and	  cultural	  professionals	  in	  three	  recent	  studies	  by	  the	  Spanish	   Center	   of	   Sociological	   Research,	   consistently	   matching	   the	   expected	  empirical	  trends	  predicted	  by	  the	  theory	  (two	  highest	  scores	  highlighted	  for	  each	  professional	  category)71.	  
Table	  XVII.	  Ideological	  Identification	  and	  Occupation	  in	  Spain	  	   January	  	  2015	   October	  	  2014	   July	  	  2014	  	   Directors	  and	  Managers	   Technical/Scientific	  Intellectual	  Professionals	   Directors	  and	  Managers	   Technical/Scientific	  Intellectual	  Professionals	   Directors	  and	  Managers	   Technical/Scientific	  Intellectual	  Professionals	  Conservative	   12.8	   10.4	   19.0	   10.4	   21.2	   10.1	  Christian	  Democrat	   8.3	   7.2	   4.8	   5.5	   9.1	   5.3	  Liberal	   15.6	   11.2	   14.3	   11.7	   13.6	   11.5	  Progressist	   11.0	   15.2	   10.7	   17.2	   9.1	   14.5	  Social	  Democrat	   7.3	   11.7	   10.7	   9.4	   10.6	   13.4	  Socialist	   7.3	   10.9	   10.7	   12.0	   4.5	   8.9	  Communist	   3.7	   3.7	   0.0	   3.2	   1.5	   1.7	  Nationalist	   9.2	   4.3	   4.8	   5.5	   1.5	   2.8	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  We	  have	   selected	   these	   three	   studies	   because	   the	  wording	   of	   the	   question	   asked	  was	  exactly	  the	  same	  in	  every	  of	  them:	  ‘How	  would	  you	  define	  yourself	  in	  politics,	  according	  to	  the	  following	  classification?’.	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Feminist	   0.9	   0.5	   1.2	   1.3	   1.5	   2.5	  Green	   4.6	   6.4	   1.2	   5.5	   3.0	   6.4	  Other	  answer	   2.8	   2.9	   0.0	   3.2	   4.5	   2.0	  Apolitical	   1.8	   2.4	   4.8	   3.6	   10.6	   4.5	  DN/DA	   14.7	   13.3	   17.9	   11.7	   9.1	   16.4	  Source:	  CIS	  studies	  no.	  3,050,	  3,041,	  and	  3,034.	  Agents	  are	  capitalized	  social	  bodies	  within	  the	  field	  attracting	  and	  being	  attracted	  by	  other	  similarly	  capitalized	  social	  bodies	  within	   that	   field.	  Let	  us	   illustrate	   this	  with	  an	  example;	   imagine	  an	  agent	  A,	  who	  is	  a	  senior	  manager	  of	  a	  multinational	  company,	  and	  presents	  the	  following	  capital	  structure:	  𝐸 𝐴 = 0.9	  
𝐶 𝐴 = 0.6	  
𝑠 𝐴 = 0.7	  
This	   capital	   structure	   is	   always	   relative	   to	   the	   general	   global	   field,	   which	  encompasses	  all	  three	  dominant	  fields,	  as	  well	  as	  all	  the	  dominated	  subfields.	  This	  means	  that	  within	  a	  given	  society	  there	  are	  limited	  economic,	  cultural,	  and	  social	  resources,	   and	   that	   our	   agent	   A,	   has	   access	   to	   almost	   every	   possible	   economic	  resource,	   to	   more	   than	   half	   of	   the	   cultural	   resources,	   and	   to	   70%	   of	   the	   social	  resources.	  This	  capital	  structure	  situates	  agent	  A	  within	  the	  dominant	  field,	  taking	  particular	  advantage	  on	  the	  dominant	  field	  with	  economic	  primacy.	  Formally,	  A	  is	  a	  social	  body	  occupying	  a	  particular	  position	  within	  a	  vector	  space:	  
𝐴 ≡ (0.9, 0.6, 0.7)	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This	  is	  a	  specific	  position	  within	  the	  global	  field	  that	  encompasses	  every	  field	  and	  subfield	  within	  a	  given	  society.	  This	  global	  field	  is	  defined	  by	  relations	  of	  attraction	  between	   the	   social	   objects	   within	   them,	   which,	   in	   turn,	   occupy	   other	   specific	  positions	  within	  the	  global	  field.	  The	  attraction	  between	  A	  and	  other	  social	  objects	  within	  the	  field	  is	   in	  direct	  proportion	  to	  their	  mass	  and	  in	  inverse	  proportion	  to	  their	  distance.	  Therefore,	  A	  will	  be	  mostly	  attracted	  by	  the	  social	  objects	  with	  the	  highest	   volume	   of	   capital	   within	   its	   particular	   dominant	   field	   with	   economic	  primacy.	   It	   will	   also	   be	   attracted	   by	   every	   social	   object	   within	   the	   global	   field,	  specially	  by	  the	  ones	  with	  more	  capital	  volume,	  but	  this	  attraction	  will	  be	  reduced	  if	  these	  are	  far	  from	  A’s	  position;	  for	  instance,	  A	  would	  be	  attracted	  by	  a	  rare	  17th	  century	   edition	   of	   Don	   Quixote,	   but	   not	   as	   attracted	   by	   a	   2013	   Lamborghini	  Gallardo.	   This	   differential	   attraction	   is	   the	   expression	   of	   the	   social	   law	   that	   we	  have	  outlined	  so	  far.	  We	  can	  estimate	  that	  the	  vector	  location	  of	  the	  Don	  Quixote	  edition	  would	  be:	  
𝑄 ≡ (0.4, 0.9, 0.6)	  
And	  that	  the	  vector	  location	  of	  the	  Lamborghini	  Gallardo	  would	  be:	  
𝐿 ≡ (0.9, 0.4, 0.8)	  
Of	  course,	  these	  are	  estimations,	  but	  the	  real	  position	  of	  these	  social	  objects	  could	  be	  measured	  through	  a	  survey	  with	  a	  representative	  sample	  of	  the	  agents	  who	  are	  members	   of	   the	   global	   field.	   The	   wording	   of	   the	   questions	   leading	   to	   this	  characterization	  would	  relate	  to	  the	  expected	  monetary	  value	  of	  both	  items,	  to	  the	  prestige	  of	  the	  brand	  for	  the	  case	  of	  the	  car	  and	  the	  perceived	  cultural	  heritage	  of	  the	  book,	  and	  to	  the	  expected	  kind	  and	  quantity	  of	  social	  relations	  granted	  to	  their	  
	   278	  
owners	  by	  both	  objects.	  Anyway,	  agreeing	  our	  estimated	  attributions,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  calculate	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  attraction	  between	  the	  three	  social	  bodies	  A,	  Q,	  and	  
L.	   In	  addition,	  we	  are	  able	   to	  calculate	   the	  overall	   strength	   that	  keeps	   together	  a	  fictional	  social	  field	  containing	  only	  these	  three	  items.	  Let	  us	  start	  with	  this	  latter	  calculation;	  our	  general	  formula,	  already	  commented,	  is:	  
𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑆12 + 𝑆22 + 𝑆32(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖)2𝑛𝑖=1! 	  
Thus:	  
𝐴(𝑥)
= [(0.9×0.4×0.9)2 + (0.6×0.9×0.4)2 + (0.7×0.6×0.8)2][(0.9 − 0.4)2 + (0.6 − 0.9)2 + (0.7 − 0.6)2] + [(0.9 − 0.9)2 + (0.6 − 0.4)2 + (0.7 − 0.8)2] + [ 0.4 − 0.9 2 + 0.9 − 0.4 2 + 0.6 − 0.8 2]	  
∴ 𝐴 𝑥 = 0.53	  
The	  overall	  force	  of	  this	  fictional	  field	  made	  up	  by	  the	  aforementioned	  three	  social	  bodies	  would	  equal	  0.53.	  This	   is	   the	  quantifiable	   force	   that	  bounds	   together	   this	  particular	   set	  of	   social	  objects.	  Accordingly,	  we	  can	  argue	   that	   the	   field	  will	  hold	  together	  until	   some	  other	   field	  with	  higher	  overall	   convergent	   force	  compete	   for	  the	   same	  resources.	  The	  capital	   attached	   to	  each	  of	   the	   social	  objects	  making	  up	  the	   field	   is	   always	   relative	   to	   the	  actual	   resources	   at	   stake;	   for	   instance,	   cultural	  capital	  will	  be	  boosted	  in	  those	  societies	  with	  higher	  education	  institutions,	  such	  as	  universities,	  which	  in	  turn	  keep	  associations	  with	  economic	  and	  social	  capital.	  The	  higher	  these	  ties	  between	  forms	  of	  capital,	  the	  stronger	  the	  field	  and	  the	  higher	  the	  capital.	   This	   is	   the	   reason	  why	   some	  universities	   has	  more	  prestige	   than	  others,	  being	  ‘prestige’	  an	  intuitive	  estimation	  of	  cultural	  capital	  which,	  in	  turn,	  defines	  –
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and	  is	  defined	  by–	  the	  other	  two	  forms	  of	  capital.	  For	  instance,	  to	  follow	  with	  the	  example	  of	  the	  university,	  its	  cultural	  capital	  will	  be	  higher	  if	  its	  alumni	  comprise	  presidents,	  millionaires,	  etc.	  and	  if	  its	  budget	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  average.	  
Let	   us	   calculate	   now	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   links	   between	   social	   bodies	   in	   our	  proposed	  example.	  Since	  this	  is	  a	  fictional	  field	  with	  just	  three	  social	  objects,	  three	  are	   the	   possible	   bonds:	   the	  manager	   (A)	  with	   the	   car	   (L),	   the	  manager	  with	   the	  book	  (Q),	  and	  the	  book	  with	  the	  car.	  Since	  we	  have	  defined	  this	  force	  as	  equal	  and	  opposite,	  vice	  versa	  is	  always	  included.	  Let	  us	  start	  with	  the	  attraction	  between	  the	  manager	  and	  the	  car:	  
𝐴(𝐴𝐿) = 𝑆12 + 𝑆22 + 𝑆32(𝐴𝐿)! 	  
𝐴(𝐴𝐿) = (0.9×0.9)2 + (0.6×0.4)2 + (0.7×0.8)2(0.9 − 0.9)! + (0.6 − 0.4)! + (0.7 − 0.8)!	  
∴ 𝐴 𝐴𝐿 = 1.0270.224 = 4.59	  
We	   see	   that	   this	   is	   much	   higher	   than	   the	   overall	   attraction	   of	   the	   field,	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  capitals	  –if	  this	  were	  not	  the	  case,	  the	  overall	  attraction	   should	   be	   higher,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   high	   volume	   of	   capital	  involved–.	   The	   attraction	   between	   the	   manager	   and	   the	   book	   is	   –we	   afford	   the	  detail	  of	  the	  calculations,	  now	  that	  these	  have	  been	  explained–:	  
𝐴 𝐴𝑄 = 0.7730.592 = 1.31	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As	  we	   see	   this	   is	  much	   lower	   than	   the	  AL	   attraction.	   Let	   us	   finish	   now	  with	   the	  calculation	  of	   the	  attraction	  between	  the	  car	  and	  the	  book.	  Again,	  we	  will	  excuse	  the	  detail	  of	  the	  calculations:	  
	  
𝐴 𝑄𝐿 = 0.7000.735 = 0.952	  
We	  see	  that	  the	  attraction	  between	  the	  book	  and	  the	  car	   is	  the	   lowest	  within	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  field,	  illustrating	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  different	  types	  of	  capital	  –it	  has	  the	  highest	  Euclidean	  distance–.	  
So	  this	  is	  our	  general	  model	  of	  social	  practice.	  It	  is	  a	  theory	  that	  provides	  accurate	  testable	   hypothesis	   on	   human	   practice,	   seen	   as	   an	   association	   between	   social	  objects	  within	  social	   fields	  of	  attraction.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  work	  we	  argued	  that	  Spain	  is	  a	  good	  case	  study	  because	  its	  two	  main	  social	  cleavages	  –the	  national	  and	  the	  class	  one–	  are	  deep	  enough	  to	  test	  its	  effect	  on	  electoral	  behavior.	  But	  now	  we	  are	  able	  to	  declare	  that	  we	  have	  developed	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  human	  practice,	  which	  enables	  the	  analytical	  integration	  of	  every	  social	  cleavage,	  not	  just	  of	  these	  two.	   Thus,	   according	   to	   our	   general	   framework,	   the	   diacritics	   at	   the	   core	   of	  nationalist	   discourses	   (Barth,	   1969)	   are	   nothing	   but	   social	   objects	   within	  autonomous	  or	  semi-­‐autonomous	   fields.	  Languages,	   for	   instance,	  can	  be	  modeled	  as	   objects	   in	   the	   vector	   space	   just	   like	   the	   three	   social	   objects	   of	   our	   previous	  example;	  this	   is	  so	  because	  they	  too	  have	  a	  particular	  volume	  of	  symbolic	  capital	  attached,	  which	  can	  be	  broke	  up	   into	  specific	  volumes	  of	  economic,	   cultural,	   and	  social	   forms	   of	   capital.	   In	   this	   sense,	   national	   projects,	   i.e.,	   nations	   are	   just	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dominant	   (or	   dominated)	   fields	   fighting	   to	   maintain	   (or	   to	   achieve)	   hegemony	  within	  a	  particular	  territory.	  As	  they	  traditionally	  had	  the	  power	  to	  impose	  duties	  over	  commodities,	   they	  still	  maintain	  the	  power	  to	   impose	  duties	  over	   languages	  and	   other	   diacritics,	   i.e.,	   capitalizing	   them.	   This	   capitalization	   of	   particular	  diacritics	   is	  of	  course	   linked	  to	  the	  conflict	  between	  fields,	  as	   it	  either	  maintain	  a	  capitalization	  of	   items	  that	  benefits	   the	  agents	  attached	  to	  them,	  or	   it	  defends	  an	  alternative	  capitalization	  that	  undermines	  the	  benefits,	  the	  symbolic	  and	  material	  surplus-­‐values,	   that	   agents	   within	   dominant	   fields	   obtain	   from	   the	   established	  distribution.	  This	  is	  why	  banal	  nationalism,	  i.e.,	  the	  one	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  established	  nations	   (Billig,	   1995)	   is	   always	   conservative	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   defined	   to	  safeguard	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   agents	   participating	  within	   the	   dominant	   fields	   –it	  could	   be	   progressive	   when	   it	   is	   opposed	   to	   the	   irruption	   of	   another	   dominant	  national	   fields	   that	   aim	   to	   occupy	   the	   space	   of	   the	   national	   dominant	   fields,	   for	  instance,	  through	  military	  invasion–.	  And	  this	  is	  why	  sub-­‐state	  ethnic	  nationalism	  can	  be	  progressive	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  aims	  to	  depose	  the	  dominant	  fields	  –which	  capitalize	  non-­‐majoritarian	  diacritics	  within	  the	  territories	  where	  national	  conflict	  does	   exist–	   and	   substitute	   them	  with	   another	   fields	   that	   indeed	   capitalize	   those	  diacritics	   that	   are	  majority	  within	   its	   territory;	   the	   paradox,	   however,	   is	   that	   as	  soon	  as	  this	  change	  takes	  place,	  ethnic	  nationalism	  starts	  to	  be	  conservative,	  in	  the	  sense	   that	   it	   becomes	   banal	   nationalism.	   In	   a	   deeper	   sense,	   the	   safeguard	   of	  dominant	   fields	   –or	   the	   fight	   for	   some	   subfields	   to	   become	   dominant–	   that	  characterizes	   nationalism	   is	   always	   inevitably	   conservative	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  question	   the	  existence	  of	   the	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  capital	  itself.	   At	   worst	   nationalism	   works	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	   such	   unequal	  distributions,	   while	   at	   best	   it	   works	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   more	   equal	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distribution.	  How	  can	  capital	  be	  equally	  distributed	  within	  societies,	  if	  this	  were	  to	  be	  possible,	  is	  a	  question	  that	  certainly	  exceeds	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  work72.	  
Now	  that	  we	  have	  traced	  our	  way	  down	  to	  this	  point	  we	  are	  finally	  able	  to	  answer	  the	   initial	   question	   of	   research.	   Voting	   is	   just	   one	   more	   social	   practice	   among	  many,	  and	  it	  can	  be	  formalized	  as	  an	  attraction	  between	  social	  agents	  and	  political	  parties,	   which	   are	   both	   social	   objects	   within	   a	   particular	   field	   or	   subfield.	  Therefore,	   in	   each	   social	   field,	   each	   electoral	   choice	   will	   have	   a	   particular	  volume/structure	  of	  symbolic	  capital	  attached.	  For	  example,	  among	  the	  dominant	  urban	   fields,	  one	   right-­‐wing	   liberal	  political	  party	  P	   could	  have	  a	  high	  volume	  of	  economic	  capital	   attached,	   say	  0.8	   in	  our	  0	   to	  1	  normalized	  scale,	   a	  medium-­‐low	  volume	   of	   cultural	   capital	   attached,	   say	   0.4,	   and	   a	   medium-­‐high	   volume	   social	  capital,	  say	  0.6.	  Thus:	  
𝑃 ≡ (0.8, 0.4, 0.6)	  
Maybe	  another	  conservative	  right-­‐wing	  party,	  C,	  would	  be	  something	  like	  this,	  with	  a	  remarkable	  higher	  volume	  of	  social	  capital:	  
𝐶 ≡ (0.7, 0.6, 0.9)	  
And	  a	  far-­‐left	  communist	  party,	  R,	  would	  be	  formalized	  as	  a	  vector	  where	  cultural	  capital	  has	  particular	  prominence:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  This	  is	  perhaps	  the	  question	  that	  defines	  critical	  theory	  since	  its	  very	  beginnings.	  It	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Plato’s	  Republic,	  and	  encompasses	  Marx’s	  critique	  of	  Political	  Economy	  and	  all	  the	  works	  that	  came	  after	  it;	  recent	  efforts	  on	  this	  matter	  can	  be	  seen	  on	  Wright	  (2010)	  or	  in	  Holloway	  (2002),	  while	  a	  good	  summary	  of	  it	  during	  the	  Modern	  period	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	   Löwy	   (1993).	   Perhaps	   symbolic	   capital	   cannot	   be	   equally	   distributed	   among	   all	  members	  of	  society	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  capital	  accumulation	  –vid.	  Zerzan	  (1994;	  2005)–.	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𝑅 ≡ (0.2, 0.9, 0.4)	  
Etc.	  Of	   course,	  another	  electoral	  options	  –abstention,	  null	  vote,	  etc.	  –	   can	  be	  also	  equally	  modeled,	  although	  one	  particular	  model	  should	  be	  given	   for	  each	   type	  of	  the	   existing	   abstentions	   within	   each	   field	   –anarchist	   abstention,	  ‘angry/destructive’	  abstention,	  etc.–.	  The	   logic	  of	  association	  between	  agents	  and	  electoral	  choices	  does	  not	  vary,	  therefore	  responding	  to	  the	  logics	  of	  social	  objects	  previously	   commented.	   For	   the	   case	   of	   very	   lowly	   capitalized	   social	   agents	   the	  association	  is	  between	  their	  very	  little	  actual	  capital,	  but	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  bond	  with	   highly	   capitalized	   social	   objects	   –including	   political	   parties–	   is	   equal	   and	  opposite,	   i.e.,	   these	  agents	  are	  as	  attracted	  by	  political	  parties	  as	  political	  parties	  are	  attracted	  to	  these	  agents.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  bonds	  could	  be	  very	  powerful,	  if	  the	  capital	  associated	  to	  the	  political	  parties	  is	  very	  high.	  Let	  us	  see	  this	  with	  an	  actual	  example:	  rural	  Galicia.	  In	  rural	  Galicia,	  the	  Popular	  Party	  (PP)	  has	  a	  consistent	  and	  clear	   majority	   across	   elections	   since	   democracy	   was	   restored	   in	   Spain,	   after	  Franco’s	   dictatorship.	   Our	   hypothesis	   goes	   as	   follows:	   Galician	   rural	   areas	   are	  among	   the	  most	   impoverished	  areas	  of	  Spain,	   and	   these	  are	  mainly	   inhabited	  by	  elderly	   people.	  We	   have	   already	   commented	   that	   there	  was	   a	   general	   transition	  from	   traditional	   ways	   of	   living	   to	   capitalism	   that	   caused	   massive	   internal	  immigration	   towards	  Galician	   cities,	  mainly	  Corunna	  and	  Vigo.	  There	  were	  more	  chances	  of	   success	   in	   this	   internal	   immigration	   if	   the	   initial	   invested	   capital	  was	  high,	  meaning	   that	   the	  wealthy	  peasants	  could	  sell	   their	   lands	   in	  order	   to	  obtain	  enough	   economic	   capital	   to	   initiate	   the	   urban	   capitalist	   life	   with	   confidence.	   Of	  course,	  many	  of	  the	  wealthiest	  of	  these	  peasants	  did	  not	  need	  to	  emigrate,	  as	  the	  rural	  social	   fields	  reported	  them	  enough	  capital	   to	  stay.	  The	  effect	  was	  that	  rural	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Galicia	  became	  more	  and	  more	  polarized	  during	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  with	  many	  of	   the	  wealthiest	   peasants	   becoming	   politicians.	   Poor	   peasants,	   on	   the	   contrary,	  did	   not	   have	   any	   substantial	   volume	   of	   capital.	   Hence,	   the	   question	   is:	   How	   can	  someone	   without	   capital	   manage	   to	   go	   through	   upward	   social	   mobility?	   The	  answer	  is,	  of	  course,	  that	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  field.	  It	  is	  the	  case	  that	  rural	  Galicia	  was	  far	  away	  from	  what	  we	  may	  call	  capitalization	  institutions,	  i.e.,	  places	  distributing	  capital;	  for	  instance,	  universities,	  which	  distribute	  cultural	  capital.	  But	  someone	  far	  away	  from	  universities	  need	  economic	  capital	  to	  send	  their	  children	  away	  –or	  to	  go	  away	  him/herself–	  meaning	  that	  capitalization	  was	  neglected	  via	  cultural	  capital.	  The	  only	   form	  remaining,	   thus,	  was	  social	   capital.	   It	  happens	   that	   the	  party	  with	  more	  members	  in	  Galicia	  –and	  in	  Spain–	  is	  by	  far	  the	  PP.	  Therefore	  the	  strong	  link	  between	   rural	   Galicia	   and	   the	   PP	   can	   be	   explained	   as	   the	   result	   of	   the	   trend	  towards	   capitalization	   of	   decapitalized	   social	   agents,	   who	   use	   the	   only	   form	   of	  capital	   at	   their	   disposal.	   This	   relation	   of	   exchange	   of	   votes	   for	   favors,	   i.e.,	  patronage,	   has	   been	   largely	   documented	   –vid.	   Jablonski	   (2009)–	   and	   has	   been	  detected	   by	   our	   own	   research.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   rural	   focus	   groups	   that	   we	   have	  developed,	  already	  discussed,	  this	  relation	  was	  constantly	  pointed	  out;	  in	  fact,	  one	  of	   the	  participants	   in	  the	  groups	  declared	  that	   in	  his	  region	  –South	  rural	  Galicia–	  there	  were	  intermediaries	  called	  ‘jornaleiros’,	  who	  continuously	  reported	  the	  local	  direction	  of	  the	  party	  on	  the	  political	   likes	  and	  attitudes	  of	  their	  neighbors.	  Thus,	  loyalty	  to	  the	  party	  and	  to	  the	  local	   leader,	  worked	  as	  a	  mechanism	  developed	  to	  obtain	   social	   capital	   by	   agents	  without	   any	   single	   form	  of	   capital.	   This	   loyalty	   is	  usually	   exchanged	   for	   favors	   –mainly	   little	   rural	   infrastructures–,	   needed	   when	  someone	   lacks	   economic	   capital,	   and,	   sometimes,	   for	   economic	   capital	   –via	  irregular	   job	   recruitment–.	   These	   practices	   are	   largely	   documented,	   not	   just	   by	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ethnographic	   research,	   but	   also	   by	   journalists,	   and	   has	   been	   recognized	   and	  condemned	  by	   justice	   (Ascón,	  2015).	  This	   logic	   also	   explains	   the	   similar	  process	  that	  takes	  place	  in	  Andalusia,	  being	  the	  Spanish	  Socialist	  Workers	  Party	  (PSOE)	  the	  beneficiary;	   this	   counter-­‐intuitive	   conclusion	   derives	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   social	  capital	   is	   the	   key	   variable	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   dynamic	   –vid.	   Ortega	   and	   Trujillo	  (2013)	  and	  Ortega	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  Andalusian	  case–.	  
In	  capitalized	  social	   fields,	   like	  cities,	   the	  association	  is	  simple	  and	  does	  not	  need	  any	   further	   theoretical	   clarification.	   In	   order	   to	   test	   our	   theory	   it	   would	   be	  necessary	   a	   state-­‐wide	   representative	   survey	   designed	   to	   provide	   an	   exhaustive	  identification	   of	   (1)	   the	   different	   social	   fields	   and	   subfields	   present	   within	   the	  country,	   and	   (2)	   the	   capital	   volume/structure	   of	   each	   one	   of	   the	   social	   objects	  operating	   within	   each	   one	   of	   the	   fields	   or	   subfields.	   Since	   this	   would	   produce	  extremely	   long	   questionnaires	   and	   datasets,	   it	   would	   be	   necessary	   to	   conduct	  thematic	   research.	   For	   instance,	   in	   order	   to	   predict	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   given	  elections,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  register	   the	  volume/structure	  of	  capital	  associated	  to	  every	  electoral	  option,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  social	  agents	  with	  right	  to	  suffrage.	  Since	  the	  distribution	  of	  capital	  within	   fields	   is	  always	  relative	   to	   the	  social	  position	  of	  the	   objects	   that	   integrates	   them,	   no	   ‘objective’	   research	   on	   the	   number	   of	   party	  members,	   economic	  goods	  associated	   to	  each	  party,	   etc.	   It	  will	  be	  enough	  with	  a	  good	  questionnaire	   that	   captures	   the	   capital	   volume/structure	  of	   each	  object	   for	  each	   field	   and	   subfield.	   For	   instance,	   in	   working-­‐class	   urban	   young	   sub-­‐fields,	  voting	   could	  be	   completely	  decapitalized,	   as	   the	   social	   object	   ‘political	  parties’	   is	  too	   far,	   making	   the	   Euclidean	   distance	   too	   high	   to	   generate	   a	   sensitive	   link.	   In	  urban	  middle-­‐classes	  with	  mainly	   cultural	   capital,	   the	   link	  would	   be	  maintained	  with	  those	  political	  options	  with	  higher	  attributed	  charges	  of	  cultural	  capital,	  etc.	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Each	  person,	  however,	  has	  a	  particular	  capital	  volume/structure,	  and	  each	  political	  option	  has	   a	  particular	   capital	   volume/structure	   in	   each	   field/subfield.	   	  An	   ideal	  survey	  would	  register	  both	  the	  volume/structure	  of	  capital	  of	  social	  agents	  and	  of	  political	   options	   according	   to	   each	   social	   agent;	   this	   would	   lead	   to	   the	  formalization	   of	   the	   fields,	   and	   to	   its	   break-­‐up	   in	   subfields.	   To	   design	   such	   a	  questionnaire	   is	   not	   easy	   task;	   a	   Bourdieu-­‐like	   questionnaire	   has	   been	   recently	  developed	  in	  the	  UK	  by	  Mike	  Savage	  et	  al.,	  provoking	  some	  harsh	  critiques	  by	  John	  Goldthorpe	  (2013).	  These	   flaws	  are,	  however,	   solvable.	  Further	  work	   to	   improve	  this	  methodology	   should	   be	   developed,	   as	   specific	  methodology	   is	   needed.	   Since	  the	  attribution	  of	  capital	  to	  social	   items	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  field	  structure,	  we	  need	  representative	   sampling	   of	   each	   field;	   this	   is	   clear,	   for	   instance,	   in	   relation	  with	  age,	  as	  Goldthorpe	  has	  pointed	  out	  (vid.	  supra).	  The	  volume	  of	  capital	  attached	  to	  higher	  education	  diplomas	  vary	  from	  generation	  to	  generation,	  depending	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  academic	  credentials.	  Thus,	  for	  instance,	  an	  architect	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  volume	  of	  cultural	  capital	  in	  1960s	  Spain	  than	  in	  2010s	  Spain.	  Since	  fields	  are	  constituted	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  type	  of	  market	  equilibrium	  we	  cannot,	  for	  instance,	   select	   the	   individuals	  with	   higher	   education	   credentials	   from	   a	   nation-­‐wide	   representative	   sample	   without	   falling	   into	   two	   possible	   errors:	   either	  increasing	   the	   sampling	   error	   substantially	   or	   misrepresenting	   the	   capital	  distribution	   of	   dominant	   social	   fields	   with	   cultural	   capital	   primacy.	   Specific	  surveys	   must	   be	   conducted	   within	   each	   social	   field	   that	   correctly	   measure	   the	  three	  general	  forms	  that	  capital	  can	  take.	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5.	  Hypothesis	  derived	  from	  the	  model	  and	  testing	  In	   this	   chapter	  we	  are	  going	   to	   test	   the	   theoretical	  model	  we	  have	  built	  up.	  This	  model	  was	  built	  upon	  two	  assumptions:	  the	  correct	  fit	  of	  the	  empirical	  regularities	  detected	   in	   our	   descriptive	   chapters	   and	   the	   improvement	   of	   the	   explanatory	  capacities	  of	  the	  currently	  dominant	  theories	  of	  electoral	  behavior.	  Thus,	  we	  have	  argued	   that	   the	   Columbia	   approach,	   based	   on	   alignments	   between	   people’s	  belonging	  to	  one	  side	  of	  existing	  social	  cleavages,	  appears	  to	  be	  too	  rigid	  to	  fit	  the	  variations	   in	   the	   electoral	   behavior	   within	   social	   classes.	   This	   prediction	   flaw,	  largely	  described	  by	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  Michigan	  approach,	  is	  also	  registered	  in	  our	  descriptive	  analysis,	  showing	  remarkable	  differences	  on	  the	  electoral	  behavior	  of	   agrarian	   classes,	   for	   instance.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   as	   we	   have	   indicated,	   the	  Michigan	   approach,	   based	   on	   socialization	   theories,	   is	   good	   to	   explain	   electoral	  change.	   For	   instance,	   it	   has	   produced	   fruitful	   lines	   of	   research	   focused	   on	   the	  relation	   between	   newspaper	   reading	   and	   changes	   in	   political	   preferences	   –we	  have	  already	  commented	  agenda-­‐setting	  theory	  (McCombs	  &	  Shaw,	  1972),	  which	  maintain	   its	  vigor	   today	  (Bouza,	  2004)–.	   	  The	   theory,	  however,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  provide	   an	   explanation	   of	   stable	   long-­‐term	   trends	   related	   to	   social	   cleavages	  (Evans	  &	  De	  Graaf,	  2013).	  Finally,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  commented,	  rational	  choice	  approaches	   struggle	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   not	   voting	   paradox;	   as	  Feddersen	  put	  it:	  
‘At	  least	  since	  Down’s	  (1957)	  seminal	  work	  An	  Economic	  Theory	  of	  Democracy,	  rational	  choice	  theorists	  have	  appreciated	  the	  “paradox	  of	  not	  voting”.	  In	  a	  large	  election,	  the	  probability	  that	  an	  individual	  vote	  might	  change	  the	  election	  outcome	  is	  vanishingly	  small.	  If	  each	  person	  only	  votes	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  influencing	  the	  election	  outcome,	  then	  even	  a	  small	  cost	  to	  vote	  –like	  a	  minor	  schedule	  conflict	  or	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mildly	  bad	  weather–	  should	  dissuade	  anyone	  from	  voting.	  Yet	  it	  seems	  that	  many	  people	  will	  put	  up	  with	  long	  lines,	  daunting	  registration	  requirements	  and	  even	  the	  threat	  of	  physical	  violence	  or	  arrest	  in	  order	  to	  vote.	  Given	  the	  central	  place	  of	  voting	  within	  political	  economy,	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  adequate	  rational	  choice	  model	  of	  large	  elections	  with	  costly	  voting	  presents	  an	  obvious	  problem’	  (Feddersen,	  2004:	  99).	  
A	  new	  model	  based	  on	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  of	  practice	  seemed	  appropriate	  to	  us	  in	  order	   to	   overcome	   these	   difficulties	   to	   fit	   the	   data.	   This	   is	   so	   because	   the	  underlying	   difference	   between	   Columbia	   and	   Michigan	   relates	   to	   the	   debate	  between	  objectivism	  and	  subjectivism,	  whose	  overcoming	  was	  the	  main	  declared	  purpose	  of	  Pierre	  Bourdieu,	  as	  he	  clearly	  states:	  
‘Speaking	  in	  the	  most	  general	  terms,	  social	  science,	  be	  it	  anthropology,	  sociology	  or	  history,	  oscillates	  between	  two	  seemingly	  incompatible	  points	  of	  view,	  two	  apparently	  irreconcilable	  perspectives:	  objectivism	  and	  subjectivism	  (…)	  If	  I	  have	  somewhat	  belabored	  this	  opposition	  –one	  of	  the	  most	  harmful	  of	  these	  “paired	  concepts”	  which,	  as	  Reinhard	  Bendix	  and	  Bennett	  Berger	  (1959)	  have	  shown,	  pervade	  the	  social	  sciences–	  it	  is	  because	  the	  most	  steadfast	  (and,	  in	  my	  eyes,	  the	  most	  important)	  intention	  guiding	  my	  work	  has	  been	  to	  overcome	  it’	  (Bourdieu,	  1989:	  14-­‐15).	  
Therefore	  we	  have	  elaborated	  a	  model	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  based	  on	  Bourdieu’s	  general	   theory.	   For	   this,	   we	   have	   formalized	   mathematically	   Bourdieu’s	   model,	  together	   with	   the	   formalization	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   sub-­‐fields.	   The	   result	   is	   an	  equation	   that	   accounts	   for	   the	   structural	   foundations	   upon	  which	   practice	   takes	  place.	   In	   other	   words,	   this	   is	   a	   model	   of	   electoral	   behavior	   based	   on	   situated	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practice	  theory	  of	  human	  action.	  The	  result,	   in	  each	  case,	  would	  be	  a	  measurable	  set	   of	   dispositions	   towards	   some	   of	   the	   different	   political	   options,	  meaning	   that	  each	  agent’s	  practice	  operates	  within	  the	  constraints	  set	  up	  by	  his/her	  structural	  position.	  The	  model,	  thus,	  combines	  both	  Columbia	  and	  Michigan	  approaches,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  postulates	  an	  integrative	  model	  with	  rational	  choice	  approaches	  described	  by	  the	  Rochester	  school.	  This	  would	  solve	  the	  paradox	  of	  not	  voting,	  by	  framing	   practice	   within	   each	   agent’s	   location	   in	   the	   different	   social	   fields	   that	  define	   society.	   The	   formalization	   of	   our	   model	   allows	   us	   to	   check	   its	   validity	  through	  a	  clear	  set	  of	  hypothesis	  testing.	  	  
5.1	  Description	  of	  the	  focus	  groups	  Our	  hypotheses	  are	  also	  tested	  with	  the	  data	  registered	  in	  the	  six	  focus	  groups	  that	  we	  have	  conducted.	  These	  focus	  groups	  were	  developed	  in	  the	  Galician	  peripheral	  municipality	   of	   Ponteareas	   and	   each	   of	   them	   counted	  with	   six	   participants.	   Our	  intention	   was	   to	   detect	   the	   different	   political	   discourses	   elaborated	   by	   agents	  within	   different	   structural	   locations.	   Thus,	  we	   have	   developed	   two	   focus	   groups	  for	  each	  one	  of	  the	  following	  profiles:	  
• Residents	  in	  the	  rural	  habitat	  of	  the	  municipality.	  
• Residents	  in	  the	  urban	  habitat	  of	  the	  municipality.	  
• Commuters	  living	  in	  Ponteareas	  but	  working	  in	  the	  nearby	  much	  bigger	  city	  of	  Vigo	  –while	  Ponteareas	  counted	  23,115	   inhabitants	  on	  1	   January	  2014,	  Vigo	  counted	  294,997	  in	  that	  date73–.	  
The	   logic	   underlying	   this	   selection	   was	   double.	   Firstly,	   we	   wanted	   to	   isolate	  different	  sub-­‐fields	  by	  collecting	  data	  from	  restricted	  habitats,	  where	  the	  amount	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  According	  to	  official	  data	  of	  the	  National	  Institute	  of	  Statistics	  of	  Spain	  (www.ine.es).	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of	   capital	   is	   limited	   enough	   to	   avoid	   the	   proliferation	   of	   dominant	   fields	   and	  subfields.	  	  	  
The	  development	  of	  qualitative	  research	   in	   this	  municipality	  seemed	  particularly	  good	   to	   us,	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   a	   Galician	   medium-­‐size	   municipality	   with	  enough	  internal	  habitat	  variability	  to	  test	  our	  hypothesis	  (vid.	  figure	  33).	  
Figure.	  33	  Distribution	  of	  the	  population	  in	  Ponteareas	  (2011)	  
Source:	  Nationa	  Statistics	  Institute	  (INE),	  2011	  Census.	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Furthermore,	  the	  population	  is	  distributed	  among	  the	  different	  habitats	  that	  make	  up	   the	   village.	   Figure	   34	   shows	   the	   distribution	   of	   the	   population	   among	   the	  administrative	  sections	  conforming	  the	  municipality.	  
	  
We	  have	  established	  habitat	  as	  the	  common	  variable	  for	  our	  focus	  groups	  because	  this	  way	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  register	  the	  different	  political	  discourses	  within	  every	  social	  field,	  enabling	  us	  to	  test	  the	  different	  hypothesis	  of	  our	  model.	  Since	  the	  idea	  is	   to	   capture	   these	   discourses,	   we	   have	   developed	   two	   groups	   for	   each	   habitat	  category,	   in	  accordance	  with	   ideology.	  Thus,	  we	  have	  a	  more	  rightist	  and	  a	  more	  leftist	  group	   for	  each	  habitat	  category.	   In	  all	   six	  groups	  we	  sought	  gender	  parity,	  and	  this	  was	  achieved	  for	  every	  one	  of	  them,	  that	  maintain	  a	  proportion	  within	  the	  range	   60/40	   per	   cent	   regarding	   gender.	   We	   did	   not	   control	   variables	   such	   as	  education	   or	   occupation,	   in	   order	   to	   introduce	   variability	   within	   these	   key	  












Figure	  34.	  Distribution	  of	  the	  population	  in	  the	  
different	  sections	  of	  Ponteareas	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variables,	  enabling	  us	  to	  test	  our	  hypothesis.	  The	  six	  focus	  groups	  were	  conducted	  between	  July	  and	  August	  2014.	  
5.2	  Analysis	  of	  the	  focus	  groups	  The	  main	  hypothesis	  derived	  by	  our	  model	  could	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  
There	   is	   no	   simple	   association	   between	   political	   cleavages	   and	   voting	  behavior.	  The	  association	  is	  rather	  between	  agents’	  structural	  location	  and	  political	   options	   that	   share	   a	   similar	   capital	   volume/structure.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   association	   is	   between	   social	   objects	   with	   similar	   amounts	   of	  capital	  (capital	  volume)	  and	  type	  of	  capital	  (capital	  structure).	  
This	   hypothesis	   fits	   the	   data	   shown	   in	   our	   descriptive	   chapter	   that	   features	   a	  spatial	  analysis	  of	  voting	  behavior	   in	   the	  general	  elections	  of	  Spain	  (1977-­‐2011).	  Thanks	   to	   these	  analyses	  we	  have	  demonstrated	   that	   similar	  structural	   locations	  are	  aligned	  with	  different,	  sometimes	  ideologically	  opposed,	  political	  options.	  This	  would	  explain,	   for	   instance,	   the	  sustained	  differential	  support	   to	  either	   the	  PP	  or	  the	  PSOE	  by	  deactivated	  rural	  municipalities	   in	  different	  ACs.	  This	  would	  explain	  as	   well	   internal	   variations	   within	   some	   ACs,	   usually	   considered	   as	   outliers.	   In	  accordance	  to	  our	  model	  these	  alignments	  depend	  on	  the	  capital	  structure	  within	  each	  social	   fields,	  and	  thereby	  it	  can	  solve	  the	  predictive	  flaws	  of	   the	  other	  three	  theories.	   Thus,	   according	   to	   the	   Columbia	   model,	   there	   should	   be	   alignments	  between	   social	   cleavages	   –namely	   classes	   and	   national	   identity–	   and	   particular	  political	  options;	  however	  this	  is	  not	  happening.	  The	  Michigan	  model,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   would	   propose	   alignments	   between	   variations	   in	   people’s	   primary	   and	  secondary	   processes	   of	   socialization	   and	   political	   options;	   this	   prediction,	  however,	  does	  not	   fit	   the	  registered	  trends	  of	  steady	  alignments	  between	  classes	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and	   political	   options	   –although	   the	   political	   options	   differ,	   questioning	   the	  Columbia	   approach–.	   The	  Rochester	   school	   provides	   a	  model	   that	   is	   different	   to	  each	  individual;	  the	  trends	  between	  cleavages	  and	  different	  political	  options	  could	  be	   seen	   as	   an	   illusion,	   result	   of	   the	   aggregation	  of	   individual	   equations	  of	   utility	  maximization.	  However,	   a	   rational	   choice	  model	  of	  voting	  behavior	  has	  not	  been	  theorized	  yet,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  previously.	  
The	  data	  of	  our	  focus	  groups	  fits	  the	  hypothesis.	  This	  is	  very	  clear	  on	  the	  two	  rural	  focus	  groups.	  Although	  the	  structural	  location	  of	  its	  participants	  is	  very	  similar	  and	  is	  defined	  by	  an	  overall	  absence	  of	  capital74,	  we	  have	  found	  the	  same	  discourses	  for	  justifying	  different	   voting	  behaviors,	   responding	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  different	  subfields	  where	  they	  live	  in.	  Thus,	  one	  of	  the	  participants	  commented	  on	  FG2	  while	  justifying	  her	  vote	  for	  the	  PSOE:	  
‘They	  are	  good	  people,	  good	  neighbors	  (…)	  You	  can	  always	  rely	  on	  them	  and	  ask	  for	  any	  help	  you	  may	  need	  and	  they	  listen.	  If	  they	  can	  help,	  they	  will…	  the	  thing	  is	  that	  you	  have	  to	  make	  yourself	  heard.	  Me,	  for	  instance,	  when	  they	  governed	  the	  Xunta	  [Note:	  Galician	  Autonomous	  Government]	  I	  went	  there	  and	  talk	  to	  X	  because	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  The	  average	  age	  is	  58	  years	  for	  the	  rightwing-­‐oriented	  rural	  group	  (FG1),	  while	  it	  is	  56	  years	  for	  the	  leftwing	  group	  (FG2).	  Regarding	  occupations,	  50%	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  rightwing	   group	   are	   retired,	   33.3%	   occupied,	   and	   16.7%	   unemployed	   with	   previous	  working	  experience.	  These	  proportions	  are,	   for	   the	   leftwing-­‐oriented	  rural	  group,	  33.3%	  retired,	   50%	   occupied,	   and	   16.7%	   unemployed.	   Regarding	   the	   type	   of	   occupations	  developed	  by	  the	  occupied	  members	  of	  each	  group	  and	  the	  past	  occupations	  of	  the	  retired	  workers,	   these	   are,	   for	   FG1,	   60%	   self-­‐employed	  with	   no	  workers	   hired	   (40%	   for	   FG2),	  20%	   employee	   with	   permanent	   contract	   in	   the	   public	   sector	   (20%	   for	   FG2)	   and	   20%	  employee	  with	  temporary	  contract	  (40%	  for	  FG2).	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it	  was	  a	  shame	  to	  see	  the	  school	  like	  that,	  he…	  he	  understood	  and	  at	  the	  end	  they	  fix	  the	  building	  (…)	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  it	  was	  thanks	  to	  me,	  but	  they	  did	  it’75	  
This	  participant	  is	  a	  woman,	  52	  years	  old,	  with	  primary	  studies	  and	  employee	  with	  temporary	  contract.	  Therefore	  her	  structural	  position	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  relative	  lack	  of	  economic	  and	  cultural	  capital	  –in	  average	  these	  are	  higher	  in	  the	  other	  groups–	  and	  thus	  her	  voting	  rationality	  is	  constraint	  by	  an	  attraction	  of	  her	  habitus	  towards	  the	  capital	  that	  she	  can	  mobilize	  best,	  i.e.	  social	  capital	  based	  on	  the	  knowledge	  of	  politicians	  who	  usually	  have	   family	  bonds	  with	  someone	   in	   the	   local	  community,	  well-­‐known	   to	   this	   participant	  due	   to	   the	  nature	  of	  multiplex	   social	   networks	   in	  rural	  habitats;	  as	  Coleman	  put	  it:	  
‘It	  is	  possible	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  closure	  and	  appropriable	  social	  organization	  provide	  social	  capital	  by	  use	  of	  a	  distinction	  made	  by	  Max	  Gluckman	  (1967)	  between	  simplex	  and	  multiplex	  relations.	  In	  the	  latter,	  persons	  are	  linked	  in	  more	  than	  one	  context	  (neighbor,	  fellow	  worker,	  fellow	  parent,	  coreligionist,	  etc.),	  while	  in	  the	  former,	  persons	  are	  linked	  through	  only	  one	  of	  these	  relations.	  The	  central	  property	  of	  a	  multiplex	  relation	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  the	  resources	  of	  one	  relationship	  to	  be	  appropriated	  for	  use	  in	  others.	  Sometimes,	  the	  resource	  is	  merely	  information,	  as	  when	  two	  parents	  who	  see	  each	  other	  as	  neighbors	  exchange	  information	  about	  their	  teenagers’	  activities;	  sometimes,	  it	  is	  the	  obligations	  that	  one	  person	  owes	  a	  second	  in	  relationship	  X,	  which	  the	  second	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Original:	  	  ‘Son	  boa	  xente,	  bons	  veciños	  (…)	  Siempre	  podes	  confiar	  neles	  e	  pedirlles	  calquera	  axuda	  que	  poidas	  necesitar	  e	  eles	  escoitan.	  Se	  poden	  axudarte,	  axudan…	  o	  que	  pasa	  é	  que	  ti	  teste	  que	  facer	  escoitar.	  Eu,	  por	  ejemplo,	  cando	  estaban	  na	  Xunta,	  eu	  	  falín	  con	  X	  porque	  era	  una	  verghüenza	  ver	  a	  escuela	  como	  a	  tiñan.	  E	  el…	  el	  entendeuno	  e	  ao	  final	  a	  que	  o	  arreghlaron?	  (…)	  Eu	  non	  digo	  que	  fose	  por	  min,	  eh,	  pero	  fixérono’.	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person	  can	  use	  to	  constrain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  first	  in	  relationship	  Y.	  Often,	  it	  is	  resources	  in	  the	  form	  of	  other	  persons	  who	  have	  obligations	  in	  one	  context	  that	  can	  be	  called	  on	  to	  aid	  when	  one	  has	  problems	  in	  another	  context’.	  (Coleman,	  1988:	  S109).	  
Significantly	   enough,	   the	   same	   voting	   rationale	   appears	   on	   FG1	   uttered	   by	   a	  participant	  who	  votes	  for	  the	  PP;	  he	  is	  a	  man,	  67	  years	  old,	  retired,	  who	  worked	  as	  self-­‐employed	   with	   no	   employees	   within	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   municipality,	   with	  primary	  studies:	  
‘(…)	  but	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  they	  respond.	  Every	  politician	  is	  there	  for	  self-­‐interest,	  you	  already	  know	  that…	  but	  every	  time	  the	  lights	  did	  not	  work,	  or	  the	  road	  was	  unpaved	  in	  X	  [name	  of	  the	  rural	  habitat	  where	  he	  lives],	  you	  can	  tell	  them	  and	  they	  send	  someone	  to	  fix	  it.	  And	  I	  know	  that	  in	  Y	  [another	  rural	  habitat	  nearby]	  it	  is	  not	  like	  that;	  they	  always	  have	  to	  wait	  until	  the	  elections	  (…)’76	  
Thus,	  we	   see	   clearly	   how	   there	   is	   a	   link	   between	   structural	   location	   and	   voting	  rationale,	  in	  this	  case	  between	  reduced	  capital	  structure/volume	  and	  the	  political	  parties	  with	  the	  highest	  charge	  of	  social	  capital	  within	  each	  field.	  The	  model	  also	  holds	  for	  other	  structural	  locations,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  with	  examples	  taken	  from	  FG3	  and	  FG4.	  The	  FG3	   group	   is	   the	   rightwing-­‐oriented	   focus	   group	  with	  participants	  from	  the	  urban	  habitat	  of	  the	  municipality,	  the	  city	  center.	  All	  of	  them	  lived	  there	  their	  whole	  lives,	  and	  the	  parents	  of	  four	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  also	  raised	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Original:	  	  ‘(...)	  pero	  tamén	  é	  certo	  que	  eles	  responden.	  Todos	  os	  políticos	  están	  aí	  por	  interés,	  xa	  o	  sabedes…	  pero	  cada	  vez	  que	  as	  luces	  non	  funcionaban,	  ou	  a	  carretera	  estaba	  sin	  asfaltar	  en	  
X,	  podes	  dicirllo	  que	  alguén	  mandan	  para	  arreghlalo.	  E	  eu	  sei	  que	  en	  Y	  eso	  non	  é	  así;	  siempre	  teñen	  que	  esperar	  que	  veñan	  as	  eleccións’.	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lived	  within	  the	  urban	  limits	  of	  the	  municipality.	  The	  capital	  volume/structure	  of	  the	   group	   clearly	   differs	   from	   the	   two	   rural	   ones.	   Thus,	   the	   average	   age	   of	   the	  groups	  are	  lower,	  52	  years	  old	  for	  the	  rightwing-­‐oriented	  urban	  group	  (FG3)	  and	  50	   years	   for	   the	   leftwing	   one	   (FG4).	   Regarding	   occupations,	   the	   percentage	   of	  retired	  participants	  is	  33.3%	  for	  both	  FG3	  and	  FG4	  –two	  of	  the	  six	  participants	  of	  each	   group–,	   50%	   are	   occupied	   in	   FG3	   (33.3%	   in	   FG4),	   and	   16.7%	   of	   the	   FG3	  participants	   are	   unemployed	   (same	  percentage	   for	   FG4).	   The	   occupations	   of	   the	  occupied	  and	  retired	  members	  of	  the	  groups	  present	  the	  following	  pattern:	  20%	  of	  participants	  in	  FG3	  are	  self-­‐employed	  with	  workers	  hired,	  40%	  are	  employee	  with	  permanent	  contracts	  and	  another	  40%	  employee	  with	  temporary	  contracts.	  25%	  of	  the	  participants	   in	  FG4	  are	  employee	  with	  permanent	  contracts,	  whereas	  75%	  are	  employee	  with	  temporary	  contracts.	  The	  overall	  economic	  capital	  of	  these	  two	  groups	  is	  the	  highest	  of	  the	  six	  focus	  groups.	  According	  to	  our	  hypothesis	  this	  fact	  should	   develop	   a	   voting	   rationality	   defined	   by	   an	   alignment	   with	   those	   parties	  judged	   as	   able	   to	   perform	   better	   economic	   policies.	   This	   rationality	   is	   clearly	  shown	  on	  FG3	  by	  a	  participant	  who	  is	  a	  woman,	  46	  years	  old,	  manager	  of	  a	   local	  store	  with	  two	  employees:	  
‘What	  I	  don’t	  like	  of	  Rajoy	  [President	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Government]	  is	  that	  he	  is	  raising	  too	  much	  taxes,	  and	  it…	  it	  is	  crazy	  what	  we	  are	  paying	  now.	  I	  didn’t	  vote	  for	  that,	  but	  I	  hope	  that	  the	  economy	  gets	  better…	  this	  unemployment	  is	  horrible.	  Besides,	  who	  is	  going	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  pensions?	  But	  I	  know	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  stop	  spending	  money	  like	  before.	  With	  Zapatero,	  for	  example,	  the	  PlanE	  [economic	  plan	  of	  the	  previous	  Spanish	  Government,	  of	  the	  PSOE,	  based	  on	  public	  works	  contracts]…	  It	  was	  wasted	  money.	  Besides,	  I	  couldn’t	  believe	  that,	  but	  you	  know	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that	  here	  all	  the	  workers	  were	  Portuguese…	  With	  the	  unemployment	  that	  we	  have!	  That	  is	  wasting	  money’77.	  
We	  see	  that	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  association	  between	  voting	  and	  economic	  performance,	  as	  the	  electoral	  discourse	  is	  clearly	  defined	  by	  economic	  policies.	  The	  same	  voting	  rationality,	  focused	  on	  the	  economy,	  is	  also	  found	  in	  the	  electoral	  discourse	  in	  FG4.	  In	   this	   group,	   a	   40	   year	   old	   man,	   employee	   with	   a	   permanent	   administrative	  contract	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  argues	  that	  his	  vote	  to	  the	  BNG	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that:	  
‘They	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  care	  about	  what	  is	  ours.	  Look	  the	  Basques	  or	  the	  Catalans…	  but	  we	  keep	  voting	  for	  the	  PP.	  Feijóo	  [President	  of	  the	  Galician	  Government,	  member	  of	  the	  PP]	  wants	  to	  go	  to	  Madrid,	  to	  the	  government…	  It	  is	  not	  to	  be	  selfish	  to	  care	  about	  what	  is	  ours…	  we	  are	  among	  the	  poorest	  in	  Spain’78.	  
Finally,	  we	  will	  comment	  the	  voting	  rationalities	  showed	  in	  groups	  FG5	  and	  FG6.	  These,	   as	  we	   explained,	   are	  made	  up	   of	   commuters	  who	  have	   their	   residence	   in	  Ponteareas,	   but	   need	   to	   go	   daily	   to	   Vigo,	  where	   they	  work,	   30	   kilometers	   away.	  The	   structural	   location	   of	   the	  member	   of	   these	   groups	   is	   defined	   by	   primacy	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Original:	  	  ‘Lo	  que	  a	  mí	  no	  me	  gusta	  de	  Rajoy	  es	  que	  está	  subiendo	  mucho	  los	  impuestos,	  y	  es…	  es	  una	  locura	  lo	  que	  estamos	  pagando	  ahora.	  Yo	  no	  voté	  para	  eso,	  pero	  espero	  que	  por	  lo	  menos	  la	  economía	  mejore…	  este	  paro	  es	  horrible.	  Además,	  ¿quién	  va	  a	  pagar	  las	  pensiones?	  Pero	  también	  creo	  que	  había	  que	  dejar	  de	  gastar	  el	  dinero	  como	  antes.	  Con	  Zapatero,	  por	  ejemplo,	  el	  PlanE…	  Eso	  fue	  tirar	  el	  dinero.	  Además,	  no	  me	  lo	  podía	  creer,	  pero	  ya	  sabéis	  que	  aquí	  todos	  los	  obreros	  eran	  portugueses…	  ¡Con	  el	  paro	  que	  tenemos!	  Eso	  es	  tirar	  el	  dinero’.	  78	  Original:	  ‘Son	  los	  únicos	  que	  se	  preocupan	  por	  lo	  nuestro.	  Mira	  los	  vascos	  o	  los	  catalanes…	  pero	  nosotros	  seguimos	  votando	  al	  PP.	  Feijóo	  quiere	  ir	  a	  Madrid,	  al	  gobierno…	  No	  es	  ser	  egoísta	  preocuparse	  por	  lo	  nuestro…	  somos	  de	  los	  más	  pobres	  de	  España’.	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cultural	   capital.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   groups	   the	  majority	   of	   participants	  have	  primary	   or	   secondary	   education,	   whereas	   in	   these	   groups	   of	   commuters,	   the	  proportion	   of	   participants	  with	   higher	   education	   credentials	   is	   higher	   (66.7%	   in	  both	  groups).	  The	  average	  age	  of	  groups	  FG5	  and	  FG6	  is	  the	  lowest,	  with	  38	  years	  for	   the	   former,	   and	   36	   for	   the	   latter.	   All	   the	   members	   of	   these	   two	   groups	   are	  currently	  occupied	  as	  employee	  with	  temporary	  contracts.	  	  
The	  cultural	   capital	  voting	  rationale	  predicted	  by	   the	   theory	   is	   clearly	   illustrated	  by	   the	   electoral	   discourse	   of	   this	   participant	   of	   FG5,	   voter	   of	   the	   PSOE.	   She	   is	   a	  woman,	  with	  a	  university	  degree	  in	  Biology,	  37	  years	  old,	  who	  works	  as	  a	  shopping	  assistant	  in	  a	  department	  store:	  
‘Here	  [in	  Ponteareas]	  what	  I	  see	  is	  that,	  many	  times,	  people	  is	  ignorant.	  I	  think	  that	  in	  order	  to	  vote	  you	  must	  inform	  yourself	  first…	  Look	  at	  X	  [nearby	  municipality],	  how	  they	  have	  an	  industrial	  estate	  and	  the	  social	  services	  are	  much	  better.	  But	  if	  people	  vote	  because	  they	  have	  a	  relative	  in	  the	  city	  council…	  then	  here	  we	  are…	  that	  it	  is	  shameful	  to	  see	  the	  streets	  like	  they	  are	  now.	  At	  least	  those	  of	  the	  PSOE,	  I	  don’t	  know,	  for	  what	  I	  read,	  I	  think	  they	  are	  prepared	  to	  implement	  a	  project.	  But	  the	  PP	  here…	  what	  ideas	  will	  they	  have?’79	  
This	   rationale	   is	   even	   clearer	   in	   group	   FG6,	   where	   a	   man,	   35	   years	   old,	   with	   a	  university	  degree	  and	  who	  works	  as	  commercial	  for	  a	  cable	  company,	  said:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Original:	  ‘Aquí	  lo	  que	  yo	  veo	  es	  que,	  muchas	  veces,	  la	  gente	  es	  ignorante.	  Creo	  que	  para	  poder	  votar	  primero	  tienes	  que	  informarte…	  Mira	  en	  X,	  cómo	  tienen	  un	  parque	  industrial	  y	  los	  servicios	  sociales	  son	  mucho	  mejores.	  Pero	  si	  la	  gente	  vota	  porque	  tienen	  a	  un	  familiar	  en	  el	  concello…	  pues	  así	  estamos…	  que	  es	  una	  vergüenza	  ver	  las	  calles	  como	  están	  ahora.	  Por	  lo	  menos	  los	  del	  PSOE,	  no	  sé,	  por	  lo	  que	  leo,	  yo	  creo	  que	  están	  preparados	  para	  llevar	  a	  cabo	  un	  proyecto.	  Pero	  el	  PP	  aquí…	  ¿qué	  ideas	  van	  a	  tener?’.	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‘Last	  time	  I	  voted,	  I	  vote	  for	  AGE	  [Galician	  leftwing	  nationalist	  political	  coalition]…	  and	  I	  voted	  them	  just	  because	  of	  Beiras.	  And	  that	  is	  the	  same	  reason	  why	  I	  always	  voted	  the	  BNG	  when	  they	  had	  Beiras	  as	  the	  candidate.	  I	  mean…	  he	  is	  Professor	  of	  Economics!	  You	  just	  had	  to	  hear	  him	  speaking	  in	  the	  Parliament…	  And	  then	  they	  put	  Quintana	  instead.	  I	  mean,	  who	  was	  that	  guy	  compared	  to	  Beiras?	  Beiras	  was	  an	  intellectual…	  and	  you	  see	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  BNG	  without	  him’80.	  
All	   these	   discourses	   are	   just	   examples	   of	   expressions	   of	   the	   political	   habitus,	   as	  alignments	   between	   agents’	   structural	   locations	   and	   the	   structural	   location	   of	  parties,	  being	  both	  always	  context-­‐dependent.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  social	  capital	  voting	  rationale	  registered	  on	  the	  rural	  groups	  is	  the	  same	  although	  the	  party	  benefited	  by	   it	   differs.	   In	   one	   of	   the	   rural	   areas,	   the	   PP	   has	   the	   greatest	   charges	   of	   social	  capital,	  whereas	  in	  the	  other,	  the	  party	  with	  the	  highest	  social	  capital	  is	  the	  PSOE.	  What	  these	  data	  show	  is	  that	  rationalities	  –which	  are	  expressions	  of	  the	  habitus–	  do	  not	  vary,	  although	  it	  may	  seem	  so	  if	  we	  only	  look	  at	  the	  results	  of	  the	  elections.	  This	   crucial	   appreciation	   can	   be	   seen	  more	   clearly	   in	   the	   following	   table	   (Table	  XVIII).	  To	  prepare	  this	  table	  we	  have	  identified	  all	  the	  expressions	  of	  the	  political	  habitus	  for	  each	  of	  the	  groups;	  then	  we	  classified	  each	  of	  these	  voting	  rationales	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  prevailing	  type	  of	  capital	  involved	  in	  each	  rational.	  Therefore	  we	  define	  voting	  rationales	  as	  conscious	  rationalizations	  of	  the	  unconscious	  attraction	  between	  forms	  of	  capital	  that	  is	  the	  habitus.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Original:	  ‘La	  última	  vez	  que	  voté,	  voté	  por	  AGE…	  y	  les	  voté	  sólo	  por	  Beiras.	  Y	  esa	  es	  la	  misma	  razón	  por	  la	  que	  siempre	  voté	  al	  BNG	  mientras	  tenían	  a	  Beiras	  de	  candidato.	  Quiero	  decir…	  es	  catedrático	  de	  economía!	  Sólo	  tenías	  que	  oírlo	  hablar	  en	  el	  Parlamento…	  Y	  luego	  van	  y	  ponen	  a	  Quintana.	  Quiero	  decir,	  quién	  era	  ese	  tío	  comparado	  con	  Beiras?	  Beiras	  era	  un	  intelectual…	  y	  ya	  ves	  lo	  que	  le	  pasó	  al	  Bloque	  sin	  él’.	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Table	  XVIII.	  Percentual	  presence	  of	  voting	  rationales	  for	  each	  focus	  group	  	   Total	  number	  of	  voting	  rationales	  registered	   Economic	  capital	   Cultural	  capital	   Social	  capital	  FG1	   7	   28.6%	   14.3%	   57.1%	  FG2	   6	   33.3%	   16.7%	   50%	  FG3	   10	   60%	   20%	   20%	  FG4	   11	   45.5%	   27.3%	   27.3%	  FG5	   9	   55.5%	   44.4%	   0.0%	  FG6	   12	   41.7%	   58.3%	   0.0%	  	  
Thus,	  Table	  XVIII	  shows	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  different	  voting	  rationales	  for	  each	  of	  the	  focus	  groups	  that	  we	  have	  developed.	  We	  see	  that	  the	  predictions	  of	  our	  theory	  meet	   the	   data	   registered	   very	  well.	   As	   FG1	   and	   FG2	   are	   the	   rural	   groups	  whose	  agents	   have	   primacy	   of	   social	   capital,	   FG3	   and	   FG4	   are	   the	   urban	   groups	  whose	  participants	  have	  primacy	  of	  economic	  capital	  and	  FG5	  and	  FG6	  are	  the	  groups	  of	  commuters	  with	  primacy	  of	   cultural	   capital.	  Of	   course,	   although	   the	  participants	  have	  primacy	  in	  one	  type	  of	  capital,	  they	  also	  have	  some	  volume	  of	  the	  other	  two	  broad	  types	  of	  capital,	  explaining	  the	  registered	  distributions.	  	  
This	  qualitative	  testing	  allowed	  us	  to	  make	  one	  fundamental	  scientific	  observation:	  the	  existence	  of	   voting	   rationalities.	  The	  existing	  of	   this	   rationalities,	   as	  we	  have	  said,	  are	  the	  conscious	  rationalizations	  of	  the	  unconscious	  strength	  of	  the	  habitus.	  We	   think	   that	   the	   relevance	   of	   this	   discovery	   is	   important	   because	   it	   improves	  previous	   measurements	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   class	   voting	   that,	   like	   the	   Alford	   Index,	  measure	  it	  as	  a	  linear	  relation	  between	  the	  working	  class	  and	  leftwing	  parties	  and	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the	   bourgeoisie	   and	   rightwing	   parties.	   Our	   theoretical	   model	   proposes	   a	   more	  complex	  relation	  between	  class	   location	  and	  electoral	  behavior,	  confirmed	  by	  the	  existence	   of	   voting	   rationalities,	   which	   are	   alignments	   not	   between	   classes	   and	  particular	   political	   parties,	   but	   between	   classes	   and	   political	   discourses.	   The	  specific	  alignment,	   thus,	  depends	  on	   the	  structure	  of	  each	   field	  where	   the	  agents	  are	  included,	  that	  defines	  the	  volume	  and	  type	  of	  capital	  associated	  to	  each	  of	  the	  political	   options	   –also	   to	   the	   abstention	   or	   to	   null	   vote–	   meaning	   that	   the	  alignment	  would	  be	  with	  the	  option	  that	  matches	  each	  voting	  rationality.	  	  
Another	  relevant	  conclusion	  of	  our	  analysis	  is	  that	  postulates	  that	  ideological	  self-­‐locations	   could	   be	   a	   post	   facto.	   If	   our	   theory	   is	   right,	   political	   alignments	   are	  expressions	   of	   the	   habitus,	   which,	   in	   turn,	   is	   an	   adaptive	   mechanism	   that	   a	  particular	   agent	  with	   a	   particular	   capital	   volume/structure	   develops	   in	   order	   to	  improve	  his/her	  performance	   in	  a	  particular	   field	  defined	  by	  a	  particular	   capital	  volume/structure.	   According	   to	   the	   theory,	   the	   habitus	   produces	   alignments	  between	  agents	  and	  political	  parties	   that	  may	  be	  well	   thenceforth	  rationalized	   in	  terms	  of	  ideological	  self-­‐identification.	  Simply	  put,	  an	  agent	  would	  first	  align	  with	  a	  political	   party	   situated	   by	   the	  media,	   the	   social	   environment	   and	   even	   by	   itself	  either	  on	  the	  left	  or	  on	  the	  right	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum;	  as	  time	  passes	  and	  the	  agent	  consistently	  votes	  for	  this	  party,	  he/she	  himself/herself	  may	  finally	  identify	  as	  either	  leftist	  or	  rightist.	  
Another	   hypothesis	   from	   our	   theoretical	   standpoint	   is	   that	   the	   reproduction	   of	  social	   structure	   is	   an	   everyday	   phenomenon	   that	   takes	   place	   on	   a	   daily	   basis	  through	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  mechanisms	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  through	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people’s	  discourses.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  electoral	  discourses	  this	  hypothesis	  can	  be	  operationalized	  as:	  
Social	  reproduction	  is	  also	  reconstructed	  through	  electoral	  discourses.	  This	  means	  that,	  regardless	  the	  structure	  of	  capital,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  the	  electoral	  discourses	  of	  agents	  with	  high	  amounts	  of	  capital	  and	  the	  electoral	  discourses	  of	  agents	  with	  low	  amounts	  of	  capital.	  
The	   corpus	   of	   all	   our	   six	   focus	   groups	   is	   clearly	   aligned	   with	   this	   hypothesis.	  According	  to	  Bourdieu81,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  opposition	  between	  the	  habitus	  of	  the	  dominant	  and	  the	  habitus	  of	  the	  dominated	  classes.	  This	  central	  opposition	  relates	  to	   that	   between	   form	   and	   function,	   and	   it	   is	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   formation	   of	   the	  judgment	  of	  taste,	  that	  constitutes	  Bourdieu’s	  most	  acclaimed	  research	  (Bourdieu,	  2012[1979]).	   This	   opposition	   translates	   symbolically	   the	   material	   reality	  constituted	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   working	   class	   needs	   to	   sell	   its	   human	   force	   or	  power	   and	   corporal	   abilities	   to	   earn	   a	   salary82,	   while	   the	   higher	   classes	   need	  precisely	   to	   show	   the	   absence	   of	   that	   need	   in	   order	   to	   socially	   construct	   their	  structural	   position.	   This	   produces	   differences	   regarding	   the	   appreciation	   of	  qualities	   such	   as,	   for	   instance,	   physical	   strength,	   substantial	   meals,	   or	   contact	  sports	   –on	   the	   side	   of	   the	   dominated	   classes–	   as	   opposed	   to	   physical	   charisma,	  haute	  cuisine,	  or	   refined	  sports	  –on	   the	  side	  of	   the	  dominant	  classes–83.	   In	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  This	   insight	   can	   be	   found	   throughout	   many	   of	   Bourdieu	   works.	   See,	   for	   instance,	  Bourdieu	  (2003).	  82	  This	   does	   not	   only	   refer	   to	   its	   physical	   power,	   as	   during	   the	   initial	   phases	   of	   capital	  accumulation	   (Arrighi,	   1994),	   but	   also	   to	   its	  mental	   power,	   as	   it	   is	   the	   case	   during	   the	  advanced	  stages	  of	  capital	  accumulation	  (Berardi,	  2004).	  83	  These	   differences,	   together	   with	   many	   other	   showing	   the	   same	   trend,	   have	   been	  empirically	  contrasted	  largely	  (Bourdieu,	  2012[1979]).	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words,	   when	   social	   objects,	   like	   in	   the	   examples	   related	   to	   sexual	   practices,	  culinary	  practices,	  or	  sports	  practices	  have	  significant	  amounts	  of	  capital	  attached,	  then	   they	   stop	   being	   just	   utilitarian	   to	   enter	   the	   reign	   of	   formality.	   This	   general	  difference	   sets	   up	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   social	   construction	   of	   distinction	   between	  classes	   and	   finds	   its	   way	   through	   every	   social	   practice;	   of	   course	   through	   the	  practice	  of	  electoral	  politics	  as	  well.	  Practically,	  this	  means	  that	  in	  every	  pair	  of	  our	  three	  sets	  of	  focus	  groups	  –one	  for	  each	  type	  of	  capital–	  we	  should	  find	  a	  difference	  between	  those	  agents	  with	  high	  volumes	  of	  capital	  and	  those	  other	  agents	  with	  low	  volumes.	  And	  this	  precisely	  was	  the	  case	  for	  the	  six	  focus	  groups.	  
Regarding	   the	   first	   pair	   of	   focus	   groups,	   integrated	   by	   agents	   with	   primacy	   of	  social	  capital,	  the	  difference	  can	  be	  seen	  clearly	  in	  the	  discourses	  of	  participant	  X	  and	   participant	  Y.	   Participant	  X	   is	   a	  woman,	   69	   years	   old,	   from	  one	   of	   the	   rural	  areas	  of	  Ponteareas,	  who	  is	  now	  retired	  after	  a	  life	  of	  temporary	  works	  related	  to	  domestic	  service.	  She	  stated:	  
‘And	  many	  times	  you	  went	  to	  the	  meals	  organized	  by	  them	  and	  there	  was	  P	  of	  course…	  and	  you	  had	  to	  go!	  (…)	  And	  then	  there	  maybe	  he	  came	  over	  the	  tables	  (…)	  To	  say	  hello!	  You	  could	  always	  tell	  him	  something	  (laughs)	  (…)	  Of	  course!	  So	  the	  ones	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  party	  commission	  talked	  about	  who	  was	  going	  to	  come,	  and	  you	  could	  tell	  him	  about	  any	  problem	  you	  had…’84	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Original:	  ‘E	  muitas	  veces	  ibas	  ás	  comidas	  que	  orghanizaban	  e	  claro	  que	  alí	  estaba	  P	  [major	  of	  the	  municipality]…	  e	  tiñas	  que	  ire!	  (…)	  E	  logho	  alí	  pois	  ao	  mellor	  viña	  polas	  mesas	  (…)	  A	  saludar!	  Siempre	  podías	  contarlle	  algho	  (risos)	  (…)	  Claro!	  Pois	  os	  da	  comisión	  de	  festas	  falaban	  de	  a	  quen	  iban	  traer,	  e	  tu	  tamén	  pois	  podías	  dicirlle	  algún	  problema	  que	  tiñas...’	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This	   is	   of	   course	   a	   justification	   of	   practices	   of	   clientelism,	   from	   the	   practical	  perspective	   of	   an	   agent	   with	   low	   volume	   of	   social	   capital	   attached.	   There	   is	   an	  implicit	  declaration	  of	  the	  need	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  social	  capital	  to	  improve	  her	  living	  conditions,	  in	  direct	  contrast	  with	  this	  other	  fragment	  uttered	  by	  Y.	  Y	  is	  a	  52	  years	  old	  man,	  owner	  of	  a	  small	  successful	  business	  of	  wood	  production.	  He	  stated:	  
‘At	  the	  end	  they	  are	  always	  the	  same,	  they	  are	  all	  for	  themselves.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  that	  they	  talk	  to	  the	  people.	  If	  they	  don’t,	  then	  it	  is	  when	  they	  get	  out	  of	  control.	  They	  must	  take	  into	  account	  what	  the	  neighbors	  tell	  them…	  If	  they	  don’t	  then	  it	  comes	  that	  they	  govern	  for	  themselves	  and	  then	  not	  even	  by	  chance’85	  
Although	   this	   is	   also	   a	   justification	   of	   political	   clientelism	   –a	   synonym	   of	   the	  electoral	   appreciation	   of	   social	   capital–	   the	   discourse	   differs	   clearly	   from	   the	  previous	   example.	   Notably,	   the	   utterance	   never	   refers	   to	   oneself,	   but	   to	   ‘the	  neighbors’,	   or	   to	   ‘the	   people’.	   The	   speaker	   explains	   how	   politicians	   should	  implement	  good	  government,	  not	  because	  the	  speaker	  needs	  it,	  but	  because	  that	  is	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  do.	  There	  is	  an	  implicit	  claim	  of	  expertise	  on	  how	  politics	  work,	  and	   a	   clear	   distance	   between	   public	   affairs	   and	   one’s	   personal	   affairs.	   As	   a	  consequence	   we	   have	   here	   registered	   the	   electoral	   expression	   of	   the	   general	  difference	   between	   form	   and	   function,	   between	   the	   abstract	   and	   the	   specific,	   or	  between	  the	  detached	  stylization	  of	  how	  things	  should	  be	  done	  and	  the	  raw	  claim	  of	  
how	  I	  need	  things	  to	  be	  done	  that	  justifies	  ideologically	  the	  practices	  of	  agents	  that	  constantly	   rebuild	   social	   structure.	   Underlying	   these	   similar	   pairs	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Original:	  	  ‘Ao	  final	  son	  todos	  iguales,	  todos	  están	  ao	  seu.	  Pero	  é	  importante	  que	  falen	  coa	  xente.	  Se	  non	  falan	  coa	  xente	  é	  cando	  se	  desmandan.	  Teñen	  que	  ter	  en	  conta	  o	  que	  dicen	  os	  veciños…	  se	  non	  é	  cuando	  gobernan	  para	  eles	  e	  xa	  entonces	  nin	  de	  casualidad’.	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metadiscourses	   there	   is	   the	   core	   difference	   between	   the	   lack	   of	   material	   and	  symbolic	   resources	   by	   the	   dominated	   classes	   and	   the	   need	   to	   express	   the	  abundance	  of	  resources	  of	   the	  higher	  classes	   in	  order	  to	  differentiate	  themselves	  from	  the	  lower	  classes	  and,	  thus,	  socially	  construct	  their	  dominant	  position86.	  
Examples	  of	   this	  differentiation	  were	  also	   found	   in	   the	  pair	  of	   focus	  groups	  with	  primacy	  of	  cultural	  capital	  (FG5	  and	  FG6)	  and	  of	  economic	  capital	  (FG3	  and	  FG4).	  One	  of	  the	  participants	  on	  FG3,	  51	  years	  old,	  owner	  of	  a	  local	  family	  business	  with	  employees,	  declared:	  
‘It	  is	  unacceptable	  that	  the	  government	  is	  raising	  taxes	  as	  it	  is	  currently	  doing.	  In	  order	  to	  create	  wealth,	  there	  must	  be	  investment	  first,	  and	  if	  you	  make	  the	  rich	  poorer	  that	  is	  bread	  for	  today	  and	  hunger	  for	  tomorrow’87.	  
Again	  we	   have	   registered	   the	   same	   impersonal	   style	   than	   before,	  with	   no	   direct	  reference	  to	  one’s	  own	  needs.	  This	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  implicit	  declaration	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  For	  an	  application	  of	   this	  difference	   to	  academic	  disciplines	  within	   the	  social	  sciences,	  where	   economics	   are	   linked	   to	   the	   higher	   classes	   whereas	   geography	   remains	  decapitalized,	   vid.	   Bourdieu	   (1980b).	   The	   argument	   follows	   the	   general	   ‘distinction’	  framework,	   by	  which	   economics	   are	   associated	  with	   the	   study	   of	   general	   laws,	   abstract	  reasoning,	   grand	   theory,	   etc.	   whereas	   geography	   is	   occupied	   with	   the	   study	   of	   the	  particularities	  of	  specific	  areas,	   limited	  theory,	  etc.	  Of	  course	  this	  particular	  classification	  is	   contextual,	   and	   relates	   to	   the	   location	   and	   trajectories	   within	   social	   structure	   of	   the	  members	  –students	  and	   faculty–	  of	   each	  discipline	   in	  a	  particular	  moment	  of	  history.	   In	  the	   end,	   it	   responds	   to	   the	   particular	   structure	   of	   the	   academic	   field	   in	   a	   particular	  moment,	  which	  is	  in	  turn	  defined	  by	  capital	  accumulation	  through	  history	  and,	  therefore,	  establishes	  continuities	  to	  some	  extent.	  87	  Original:	  ‘Lo	  que	  no	  puede	  ser	  es	  que	  el	  gobierno	  esté	  subiendo	  los	  impuestos	  como	  lo	  está	  haciendo.	  Para	  que	  haya	  riqueza	  tiene	  que	  haber	  inversión,	  y	  si	  haces	  a	  los	  ricos	  más	  pobres	  eso	  es	  pan	  para	  hoy	  y	  hambre	  para	  mañana’.	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the	  speaker	  to	  express	  that	  he	  does	  not	  need	  any	  help	  from	  the	  State,	  indeed	  any	  help	   at	   all,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   successful;	   in	   other	   words,	   he	   is	   declaring	   that	   he	   is	  already	  successful	  while	  giving	  the	  rest	  advice	  on	  which	  one	  is	  the	  better	  economic	  policy	   to	   be	   developed	   by	   the	   government	   and	   how	   everybody	   should	   use	   their	  right	   to	  vote	  accordingly.	   It	   is	   an	  expression	  of	   an	  agent	  who	   is	  benefited	  by	   the	  market.	  It	  clearly	  opposes	  the	  electoral	  habitus	  registered	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  this	  other	  participant,	  a	  woman,	  47	  years	  old	  with	  temporary	  contract:	  
‘It	  is	  not	  that	  I	  am	  happy	  if	  X	  wins,	  but	  I	  know	  that	  if	  Y	  wins	  I	  am	  going	  to	  have	  less	  days	  off’88	  
Although	   this	   discourse	   is	   also	   focus	   on	   an	   economic	   voting	   rationale,	   we	   see	  remarkable	  differences	  with	  the	  previous	  one.	  Again,	  we	  see	  that	  there	  is	  a	  usage	  of	   the	   first	  person	  singular,	  while	  at	   the	   same	   time	   there	   is	  a	  declaration	  of	   self-­‐interest	  behind	  electoral	  behavior.	  	  
Finally,	  we	  have	  detected	  the	  same	  opposition	  regarding	  cultural	  capital.	  Thus,	  one	  of	   the	  participants	  of	  FG5,	  a	  man,	  35	  years	  old,	  with	  post-­‐graduate	  studies,	  and	  a	  temporary	  job,	  declared:	  
‘What	  I	  see	  is	  that	  it	  is	  needed	  to	  get	  out	  from	  certain	  mentalities,	  maybe	  a	  little	  outdated.	  I	  liked	  very	  much	  the	  Jazz	  festival	  that	  took	  place	  some	  months	  ago	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  line	  should	  be	  followed.	  It	  is	  missed	  to	  value	  the	  heritage,	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Original:	  ‘Yo	  tampoco	  es	  que	  me	  alegre	  si	  gana	  X,	  pero	  sé	  que	  si	  gana	  Y	  me	  van	  a	  quitar	  días	  libres.’	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instance,	  without	  having	  to	  repeat	  always	  the	  same	  folklores.	  It	  is	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  this	  should	  be	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  city	  Council.’89	  
Once	   again,	   the	   same	   impersonal	   style	   is	   used	   to	   elaborate	   a	   discourse	   of	   ‘what	  should	   be	   done’	   instead	   of	   what	   I	   need	   to	   be	   done.	   This	   appearance	   of	  disinterestedness	  is	  a	  way,	  we	  argue	  to	  (re)construct	  class	  domination	  through	  the	  practice	  of	  voting.	  Again,	  this	  discourse	  is	   in	  clear	  divergence	  from	  this	  utterance	  by	  a	  participant	  of	  FG6,	  a	  man	  38	  years	  old,	  with	  a	  three-­‐years	  university	  degree	  in	  education:	  
‘I	  would	  like	  to	  have	  more	  cultural	  activities.	  I	  don’t	  know,	  guitar	  lessons,	  theater	  lessons…	  all	  these	  activities	  you	  cannot	  do	  here	  and	  that,	  to	  me,	  is	  a	  limitation’.90	  
We	   see	   how	   the	   schema	   is	   repeated	   for	   all	   the	   three	   types	   of	   capital	   and	  consistently	   in	   the	   six	   focus	   groups	   we	   have	   conducted.	   The	   implications	   of	   a	  bourdieusian	   analysis	   of	   electoral	   behavior	   are,	   therefore,	   twofold.	   On	   the	   one	  hand	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  why	  people	  vote	  the	  way	  we	   do,	   whereas,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   allows	   us	   to	   see	   electoral	   practices	   as	   yet	  another	   mechanism	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	   class	   differences	   within	   social	  structure.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Original:	  ‘Yo	  lo	  que	  veo	  es	  que	  aquí	  hacía	  falta	  salir	  un	  poco	  de	  ciertas	  mentalidades,	  a	  lo	  mejor	  un	  poco	  atrasadas.	  Me	  parece	  muy	  bien	  el	  festival	  de	  Jazz	  que	  se	  hizo	  hace	  unos	  meses	  y	  yo	  creo	  que	  habría	  que	  seguir	  en	  esa	  línea.	  Se	  echa	  de	  menos	  poner	  en	  valor	  el	  patrimonio,	  por	  ejemplo,	  sin	  tener	  que	  repetir	  siempre	  los	  mismos	  folklores.	  Está	  claro	  que	  para	  mí	  eso	  tendría	  que	  ser	  una	  prioridad	  para	  el	  Concello’.	  	  90	  Original:	  ‘A	  mí	  me	  gustaría	  que	  hubiese	  más	  actividades	  culturales.	  No	  sé,	  clases	  de	  guitarra,	  de	  teatro…	  todo	  eso	  aquí	  no	  lo	  puedes	  hacer	  y	  eso,	  para	  mí,	  es	  una	  limitación’.	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6. A	  brief	  conclusion	  The	  major	  debate	  within	  sociology	  is,	  perhaps,	  the	  one	  between	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  some	  kind	  of	  hidden	  processes	  to	  be	  discovered	  underlying	  human	  practice,	  and	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  no	  such	  processes	  at	  all,	  meaning	  that	  the	   empirical	   regularities	   in	   social	   data	   are	   nothing	   but	   the	   aggregation	   of	  individual	   choices.	   This	   opposition	   gave	   way	   to	   a	   major	   division	   within	   the	  discipline	   between	   objectivists	   and	   subjectivists,	   or	   between	   structuralists	   and	  phenomenologists.	   This	   core	   opposition	   produced	   a	   differentiation	   affecting	  methodology;	   while	   the	   former	   usually	   make	   extensive	   use	   of	   theoretical	  discussion	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  frameworks	  that	  explain	  human	  behavior,	  the	  latter	  usually	  explain	  that	  behavior	  by	  aggregating	  individual	  motivations.	  We	  could	  cite	  Habermas	  theory	  of	  communicative	  action	  (Habermas	  1984)	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  former	   and	   proponents	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   grounded	   theory	   (Glasser	   and	   Strauss	  1967)	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  latter.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  actions	  vary	   extremely;	   they	   are	   seen	   either	   as	   expressions	   of	   unconscious	  mechanisms	  that	  sociologists	  should	  uncover	  or,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  as	  expressions	  of	   freewill	  that	   sociologists	   should	   simply	   amalgamate	   and	   describe.	   However	   this	   whole	  opposition	  between	  objectivism	  and	   subjectivism	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	  has	  been	  denounced	   as	   a	   fallacy	   by	   many,	   and	   notably	   by	   French	   sociologist	   Pierre	  Bourdieu.	   Therefore	   we	   have	   departed	   from	   Bourdieu’s	   integrated	   theoretical	  approach	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   a	   new	   theory	   of	   electoral	   behavior	   that	   overcome	  some	   of	   the	   limitations	   presented	   by	   the	   currently	   dominant	   approaches,	  which	  remain	   fixed	  within	   the	  objectivist	  or	   subjectivist	  paradigms.	  The	  key	   concept	   in	  Bourdieu’s	   work	   that	   enables	   the	   surpassing	   of	   the	   objectivist/subjectivist	  cleavage	   is	   habitus.	   Simply	   put,	   habitus	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   internal	   adaptive	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mechanism	  within	  each	  individual	  that	  orients	  his/her	  practice.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  no	  structural	   determination	   of	   human	   behavior,	   nor	   is	   it	   seen	   as	   an	   expression	   of	  aggregated	  acts	  of	  freewill.	  Structure	  orients	  practice,	  without	  determining	  it.	  Our	  work	   expands	   Bourdieu’s	   general	   schema	   through	   the	   notion	   of	   subfields	   and	  formalizes	  it	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  its	  operationalization.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  description	  of	  electoral	   habitus	   that	  has	  been	   registered	   in	   the	  political	   discourses	  of	   the	   focus	  groups	  that	  we	  have	  developed.	  	  
The	   general	  methodology	   of	   our	   research	   departs	   from	   Goldthorpe	   critique	   and	  proposal	  of	  reintegration	  of	  research	  and	  theory	  in	  sociology.	  This	  critique	  argues	  that	   in	   order	   to	   produce	   scientific	   sociology	   we	   should	   always	   depart	   from	   the	  observation	   of	   empirical	   trends	   that	   constitute	   the	   basis	   of	   any	   explanatory	  endeavor	   through	   the	   construction	   of	   theory.	   Therefore,	   we	   have	   taken	   into	  account	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  general	  elections	  (1977-­‐2011)	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  a	  spatial	  analysis	  of	  the	  electoral	  results	  that	  showed	  remarkable	  regional	  variations	  within	  the	  same	  types	  of	  habitat.	  Afterwards	  we	  have	  presented	  a	  general	  review	  of	   the	   scientific	   literature	   on	   electoral	   behavior,	   to	   realize	   that	   this	   theoretical	  framework	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  variations	  showed	  by	  the	  analysis	  of	  our	  data.	  The	  Columbia	  approach,	  based	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  social	  cleavages	  on	  electoral	  behavior	  proved	   to	   be	   too	   rigid,	   while	   the	   Michigan	   approach,	   based	   on	   the	   varieties	   of	  socialization	  theory,	  too	  soft;	  the	  first	  theory	  predicted	  similar	  voting	  patterns	  for	  people	  within	  similar	  structural	  positions,	  and	  our	  research	  shows	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  since	  there	  are	  solid	  regional	  divergences	  between	  groups	  of	  people	  with	  similar	  positions.	  Even	  after	  careful	  analysis	  on	  what	  we	  have	  called	  pre-­‐capitalist	  effect	  on	  Galician	  class/nationalist	  voting	  behavior,	  the	  theory	  does	  not	  fit	  the	  data.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Michigan	   approach	   does	   not	   fit	   the	   data	   either,	   as	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socialization	   based	   theories	   postulate	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   kind	   of	   structural	  variations	   registered	   in	   our	   analysis.	   Finally,	   the	  Rochester	   approach	   focused	  on	  rational	   choice	   theory,	   present	   its	   main	   weak	   point	   precisely	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  analyze	   electoral	   behavior.	   Consequently,	   we	   have	   developed	   a	   new	   theory	  explaining	   electoral	   behavior.	   Since	   the	   Columbia/Michigan	   approaches	   are	  expressions	  of	  the	  structuralist/subjectivist	  debate,	  we	  have	  drawn	  our	  theory	  on	  the	  general	  framework	  by	  Pierre	  Bourdieu,	  which	  broke	  that	  division	  by	  producing	  an	   integrated	   approach.	   Furthermore	   we	   have	   expanded	   the	   original	   Bourdieu	  schema	   with	   the	   conceptualization	   of	   subfields,	   and	   we	   have	   provided	   a	  mathematical	   formalization	   of	   the	   whole	   new	  model.	   This	   new	   theory	   is	   a	   new	  theory	   of	   social	   practice	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	   explain	   and	   predict	   every	   human	  practice,	  not	   just	  electoral	  behavior.	  When	   it	  comes	   to	   the	  analysis	  of	  voting,	  our	  model	  does	  indeed	  fit	  the	  variations	  found	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  data.	  It	  opens	  the	  door	   to	   the	   future	   integration	   of	   our	   formalized	   model	   of	   practice	   with	  maximization	   of	   utility	   functions,	   typical	   of	   rational	   choice	   theory.	   As	   we	   have	  pointed	  out,	  the	  main	  achievement	  of	  our	  work	  is	  to	  present	  a	  formalization	  of	  the	  habitus	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  human	  practice.	  In	  other	  words	  this	  explains	  the	  effects	  of	  habitus	  on	  social	  agents.	  There	  is	  still	  one	  line	  of	  research	  to	  be	  developed	  in	  the	  future:	   the	   neurological	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   structural/subjective	   mechanism	  that	   is	   the	   habitus.	   Together	   with	   the	   formal	   integration	   with	   rational	   choice	  theory	   that	  would	   fill	   the	  gap	  between	   the	  range	  of	  possible	  practices	  offered	  by	  the	  habitus	  and	  actual	  practices,	  these	  would	  be	  the	  main	  future	  fields	  of	  research	  opened	  by	  our	  work.	  There	   is	  of	  course	  space	  for	  the	  future	  validation/testing	  of	  this	   new	   theory	   with	   appropriate	   data.	   We	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   correct	  measurement	  of	  it	  needs	  a	  new	  specific	  questionnaire	  and	  sampling,	  in	  accordance	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with	  its	  peculiarities;	  these	  three	  lines	  of	  research	  constitute	  the	  future	  ways	  that	  our	  work	  can	  take	  in	  the	  future.	  
As	   concluding	   remarks	   we	   will	   highlight	   what	   we	   think	   are	   key	   points	   for	   the	  validation	   of	   our	   theory.	  We	   think	   that	   this	   expanded	   theory	   of	   practice	   can	   be	  tested	  and	  validated	  through	  representative	  survey	  samples.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this	  we	  should	  proceed	  as	   follows.	   In	   the	   first	  place	  we	  would	  need	  to	  classify	  people	  by	  habitat,	   as	   habitats	   are	   divisions	   within	   unified	   fields.	   In	   parallel	   we	   need	   to	  classify	   people	   in	   accordance	   to	   these	   market	   unifiers.	   We	   have	   argued	   that	  nationalism	   plays	   a	   prominent	   role	   as	   market	   unifier;	   this	   is	   evident	   for	   the	  unification	   of	   economic	   markets,	   but	   has	   also	   pointed	   out	   that	   it	   affected	   the	  unification	  of	  cultural	  markets	  (Anderson,	  1991).	  The	  attractive	  force	  that	  defines	  fields	  are	  only	  effective	  if	  the	  market	  is	  unified;	  for	  instance,	  to	  say	  that	  a	  linguistic	  field	  is	  unified,	  Bourdieu	  means	  ‘that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  speakers	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  same	   law	   of	   linguistic	   production	   costs’	   (Bourdieu,	   2002:	   149).	  When	   Bourdieu	  applied	   this	   theory	   to	   the	   study	   of	   the	   Bearn,	   a	   region	   in	   Southern	   France,	   he	  clarified	  it	  by	  stating	  that	  ‘even	  the	  last	  one	  of	  the	  Bearn	  peasants	  (…)	  is	  objectively	  measured	   by	   the	   rule	   of	   standard	   Parisian	   French’	   (Bourdieu,	   2002:	   149-­‐150).	  Therefore	   nationalism	   works	   as	   a	   market	   unifier	   of	   all	   three	   kinds	   of	   capital,	  enabling	   the	   extraction	   of	   material	   and	   symbolic	   gains	   within	   the	   economic,	  cultural	  and	  social	  spheres.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  classify	  people	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  nationalist	   projects	   working	   within	   the	   fields	   they	   live	   in;	   of	   course	   there	   is	   a	  dominant	   major	   Spanish	   nationalist	   field,	   struggling	   for	   the	   unification	   of	   the	  Spanish	   territory	   in	  accordance	   to	   its	   rules;	  however,	   it	   is	  also	   true	   that	   in	   some	  parts	   of	   the	   territory,	   namely	   those	  with	   large	   ethnic	   diacritics	   decapitalized	   by	  Spanish	  nationalism,	  that	  have	  built	  their	  own	  national	  projects,	  i.e.,	  their	  own	  field	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unifiers.	  This	  situation	  guarantees	  national	  conflict	  in	  those	  areas	  where	  more	  than	  one	  national	  project	  is	  being	  developed,	  such	  as	  Catalonia,	  the	  Basque	  Country,	  or	  Galicia.	  It	  is	  important,	  thus,	  to	  classify	  people	  by	  their	  Autonomous	  Community,	  if	  we	   are	   to	   measure	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   habitus	   in	   Spain.	   The	   institutionalization	  approach	   have	   argued	   that	   even	   in	   those	   places	   with	   no	   sub-­‐state	   nationalist	  projects,	  such	  as	  Cantabria,	  or	  Madrid,	   the	  process	  of	  autonomic	  decentralization	  have	   contributed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   partial	   market	   unifiers.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	  useful	  to	  have	  a	  representative	  sample	  for	  each	  of	  the	  Autonomous	  Communities.	  The	  representation	  of	  the	  different	  habitats	  is	  also	  useful	  because	  the	  distribution	  of	   capital	   is	   relative	   to	   these	  habitats,	  meaning	   that	  a	  university	  credential	   could	  involve	  a	  high	  volume	  of	  cultural	  capital	  in	  some	  habitats,	  whereas	  it	  may	  involve	  a	  low	   volume	   in	   others.	   Once	  we	   have	   a	   representative	   sample	   of	   people	   for	   each	  habitat	  in	  every	  Autonomous	  Community,	  we	  can	  use	  a	  questionnaire	  that	  enables	  the	   classification	   of	   respondents	   in	   accordance	   with	   their	   volume/structure	   of	  capital.	   These	   can	   be	   done	   thanks	   to	   the	   inclusion	   of	   questions	   providing	  information	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  economic,	  cultural,	  and	  social	  capital	  each	  individual	  has.	   Additionally,	  we	   should	   use	   these	   respondents	   to	   classify	   each	   social	   object	  that	  we	  want	   to	   analyze,	   in	   this	   case	  political	  parties,	   in	   the	   same	  way;	   thus,	  we	  could	  ask	  respondents	  direct	  and	  indirect	  questions	  that	  give	  us	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  volume/structure	  of	  capital	  associated	  to	  each	  political	  party.	  Finally,	  if	  the	  sample	  is	   representative,	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	   represent	   the	   dominant	   fields	   and	   the	  subfields	   operating	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   the	   different	   market	   unifiers.	   Finally,	  then,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  calculate	  the	  convergence	  force	  of	  each	  field	  as	  well	  as	  the	  associations	  between	  agents	  and	  political	  options.	  Presumably,	  these	  associations	  will	   be	   sometimes	   strong,	   and	   sometimes	  weak.	  We	  have	   argued	   that	   a	   possible	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   Table	  IA.	  Gini	  index	  at	  disposable	  income,	  post	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  (1	  of	  2)	  	  	   1974	   1975	   1976	   1977	   1978	   1979	   1980	   1981	   1982	   1983	   1984	   1985	   1986	   1987	   1988	   1989	   1990	   1991	   1992	  
Australia	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Austria	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Belgium	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Canada	   	  	   	  	   0,304	   0,288	   0,293	   0,289	   0,289	   0,287	   0,292	   0,299	   0,296	   0,293	   0,292	   0,289	   0,284	   0,283	   0,287	   0,294	   0,292	  
Chile	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Czech	  	  
Republic	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,232	  
Denmark	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,221	   0,224	   0,225	   0,224	   0,22	   0,226	   0,222	   0,222	  
Estonia	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Finland	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,209	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
France	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Germany	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,251	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,256	   	  	   0,263	  
Greece	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,345	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Hungary	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,273	   0,282	  
Iceland	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Ireland	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Israel	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,326	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,329	   	  	   	  	  
Italy	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,287	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,275	   	  	  
Japan	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,304	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Korea	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Luxembourg	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,247	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Mexico	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,452	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Netherlands	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,272	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,292	   	  	   	  	  
New	  	  
Zealand	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,271	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,318	   	  	   	  	  
Norway	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,222	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Poland	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Portugal	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Slovak	  	  
Republic	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Slovenia	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Spain	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Sweden	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,198	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,209	   	  	  
Switzerland	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Turkey	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,434	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
United	  	  
Kingdom	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,309	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,355	   	  	   	  	  
United	  	  
States	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,336	   0,337	   0,34	   0,339	   0,34	   0,344	   0,348	   0,349	   0,346	   0,352	  
Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  from	  data	  of	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐Operation	  and	  Development	  (OECD,	  2014).	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   Table	  IA.	  Gini	  index	  at	  disposable	  income,	  post	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  (2	  of	  2)	  	  	   1993	   1994	   1995	   1996	   1997	   1998	   1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   MEAN	  
Australia	   	  	   	  	   0,309	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,317	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,315	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,336	   	  	   0,334	   	  	   0,322	  
Austria	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,268	   0,26	   0,266	   0,265	   0,261	   0,268	   0,267	   	  	   0,265	  
Belgium	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,27	   0,269	   0,264	   0,269	   0,259	   0,262	   0,262	   	  	   0,265	  
Canada	   0,286	   0,287	   0,289	   0,298	   0,302	   0,309	   0,309	   0,318	   0,317	   0,318	   0,316	   0,322	   0,317	   0,318	   0,319	   0,321	   0,32	   0,32	   	  	   0,301	  
Chile	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,509	   	  	   	  	   0,508	   	  	   0,501	   0,506	  
Czech	  	  
Republic	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   0,257	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,26	   	  	   0,267	   0,259	   0,259	   0,255	   0,256	   0,254	   0,256	   	  	   0,256	  
Denmark	   0,223	   0,216	   0,215	   0,216	   0,224	   0,224	   0,228	   0,227	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,232	   0,239	   0,246	   0,242	   0,238	   0,252	   	  	   0,228	  
Estonia	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,349	   0,337	   0,328	   0,313	   0,315	   0,314	   0,319	   	  	   0,325	  
Finland	   	  	   	  	   0,218	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,247	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,254	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,259	   0,255	   0,26	   	  	   0,243	  
France	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,277	   0,278	   0,276	   0,284	   0,287	   0,287	   0,284	   0,282	   0,283	   0,288	   0,293	   0,292	   0,293	   0,293	   0,303	   	  	   0,287	  
Germany	   0,262	   0,268	   0,266	   0,26	   0,259	   0,259	   0,259	   0,264	   0,27	   0,28	   0,282	   0,285	   0,297	   0,29	   0,295	   0,287	   0,288	   0,286	   	  	   0,273	  
Greece	   	  	   0,345	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,354	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,33	   0,34	   0,339	   0,33	   0,329	   0,331	   0,337	   	  	   0,338	  
Hungary	   0,299	   0,299	   0,294	   0,294	   0,281	   0,284	   0,294	   0,293	   	  	   	  	   0,303	   	  	   0,291	   	  	   0,272	   	  	   0,272	   	  	   	  	   0,288	  
Iceland	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,257	   0,269	   0,286	   0,279	   0,301	   0,266	   0,244	   	  	   0,272	  
Ireland	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,314	   0,315	   0,314	   0,299	   0,293	   0,331	   	  	   	  	   0,311	  
Israel	   	  	   	  	   0,338	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,347	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,378	   	  	   	  	   0,371	   0,373	   0,376	   	  	   0,355	  
Italy	   	  	   	  	   0,326	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,321	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,33	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,315	   0,312	   0,319	   	  	   0,311	  
Japan	   	  	   	  	   0,323	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,337	   	  	   	  	   0,321	   	  	   	  	   0,329	   	  	   	  	   0,336	   	  	   	  	   0,325	  
Korea	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,306	   0,312	   0,314	   0,314	   0,31	   0,311	   0,311	  
Luxembourg	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,259	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,261	   	  	   	  	   0,258	   0,277	   0,273	   0,273	   0,288	   0,276	   0,27	   	  	   0,268	  
Mexico	   	  	   0,519	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,507	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,474	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,475	   	  	   0,466	   	  	   0,482	  
Netherlands	   	  	   	  	   0,297	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,292	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,284	   0,28	   0,295	   0,286	   0,283	   0,288	   	  	   0,287	  
New	  	  
Zealand	  
	  	   	  	   0,335	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,339	   	  	   	  	   0,335	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,33	   0,317	   	  	   	  	   0,321	  
Norway	   	  	   	  	   0,243	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,261	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,276	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,25	   0,245	   0,249	   	  	   0,249	  
Poland	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,349	   0,326	   0,314	   0,314	   0,305	   0,304	   0,305	   	  	   0,317	  
Portugal	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,378	   0,373	   0,369	   0,361	   0,353	   0,339	   0,344	   	  	   0,360	  
Slovak	  	  
Republic	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,268	   0,275	   0,249	   0,246	   0,257	   0,261	   0,261	   	  	   0,260	  
Slovenia	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,246	   0,245	   0,241	   0,241	   0,236	   0,247	   0,246	   	  	   0,243	  
Spain	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,33	   0,324	   0,315	   0,309	   0,317	   0,333	   0,338	   	  	   0,324	  
Sweden	   	  	   	  	   0,211	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,243	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,234	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,259	   0,269	   0,269	   	  	   0,237	  
Switzerland	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,298	   	  	   	  	   0,298	  
Turkey	   	  	   0,49	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,43	   	  	   	  	   0,409	   	  	   0,411	   	  	   	  	   0,435	  
United	  	  
Kingdom	  
	  	   0,337	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0,34	   0,352	   0,34	   0,335	   0,335	   0,331	   0,335	   0,339	   0,341	   0,342	   0,345	   0,341	   	  	   0,338	  
United	  	  
States	  
0,369	   0,366	   0,361	   0,363	   0,364	   0,357	   0,354	   0,357	   0,36	   0,376	   0,374	   0,36	   0,38	   0,384	   0,376	   0,378	   	  	   0,38	   	  	   0,359	  
Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  from	  data	  of	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐Operation	  and	  Development	  (OECD,	  2014).	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Table	  IIA.	  Calculation	  of	   𝒏𝒊 𝒏𝒋 𝒂𝒃𝒔 𝒚𝒊 − 𝒚𝒋 	  for	  the	  fictional	  distribution	  of	  Lorenzland	  
	   i=	   	  
j=	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   Horizontal	  




1	   0	   3,000	   6,000	   8,000	   18,000	   28,000	   38,000	   78,000	   98,000	   118,000	   	  
2	   3,000	   0	   3,000	   5,000	   15,000	   25,000	   35,000	   75,000	   95,000	   115,000	   	  
3	   6,000	   3,000	   0	   2,000	   12,000	   22,000	   32,000	   72,000	   92,000	   112,000	   	  
4	   8,000	   5,000	   2,000	   0	   10,000	   20,000	   30,000	   70,000	   90,000	   110,000	   	  
5	   18,000	   15,000	   12,000	   10,000	   0	   10,000	   20,000	   60,000	   80,000	   100,000	   	  
6	   28,000	   25,000	   22,000	   20,000	   10,000	   0	   10,000	   50,000	   70,000	   90,000	   	  
7	   38,000	   35,000	   32,000	   30,000	   20,000	   10,000	   0	   40,000	   60,000	   80,000	   	  
8	   78,000	   75,000	   72,000	   70,000	   60,000	   50,000	   40,000	   0	   20,000	   40,000	   	  
9	   98,000	   95,000	   92,000	   90,000	   80,000	   70,000	   60,000	   20,000	   0	   20,000	   	  
10	   118,000	   115,000	   112,000	   110,000	   100,000	   90,000	   80,000	   40,000	   20,000	   0	   	  
Vertical	  sum	   395,000	   371,000	   353,000	   345,000	   325,000	   325,000	   345,000	   505,000	   625,000	   785,000	   4,374,000	  
	   377	  
Table	  IIIAa.	  Merging	  of	  municipalities	  to	  enable	  
comparison	  across	  elections.	  Origin	  correspond	  to	  the	  
local	  administration	  of	  1977;	  the	  merging	  ocurred	  
between	  1977	  and	  1979,	  unless	  indicated	  
ORIGIN	   DESTINY	  
Official	  codes	   Official	  names	   Official	  codes	   Official	  names	  
1012	  1029	   Barriobusto	  Labraza	   1043	   Oión	  1015	  1048	   Bergüenda	  Salcedo	   1902	   Lantarón	  (created	  in	  1978)	  1045	  	   Pipaón	   1030	   Lagrán	  4025	   Benínar	   4029	   Berja	  (since	  1984)	  4040	  4042	   Doña	  María	  Ocaña	  Escúñar	   4901	   Las	  Tres	  Villas	  5003	   El	  Ajo	   5073	   Flores	  de	  Ávila	  5028	   Bernuy	  Salinero	   5019	   Ávila	  
5223	  5248	  
Santa	  Lucía	  de	  la	  Sierra	  Tremedal	   5236	  
Solana	  de	  Béjar	  (until	  1979,	  when	  it	  became	  Solana	  de	  Ávila)	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5250	   Urraca	  Miguel	   5019	   Ávila	  5268	   La	  Zarzainto	   5236	   Solana	  de	  Ávila	  
8173	   Pruit	   8901	   Rupit	  I	  Pruit	  (merged	  in	  1977)	  9004	   Aforados	  de	  Moneo	   9209	   Medina	  de	  Pomar	  9008	   La	  Aguilera	   9018	   Aranda	  de	  Duero	  
9031	   Avellanosa	  del	  Páramo	   9902	   Valle	  de	  Santibáñez	  9049	   Bentretea	   9238	   Oña	  9053	   Boada	  de	  Roa	   9256	   Pedrosa	  de	  Duero	  9069	   Cañizar	  de	  Argaño	   9181	   Isar	  9081	   Castil	  de	  Lences	   9272	   Poza	  de	  la	  Sal	  
9092	   Castrovido	   9330	   Salas	  de	  los	  Infantes	  9116	   Cueva	  de	  Juarros	   9177	   Ibeas	  de	  Juarros	  9126	   Eterna	   9048	   Belorado	  Garganchón	   9145	   9274	   Pradoluengo	  Guadilla	  de	  Villamar	   9150	   9373	   Sotresgudo	  Guzmán	   9353	   9256	   Pedrosa	  de	  Duero	  Hinojar	  del	  Rey	   9158	   9174	   Huerta	  de	  Rey	  Hoyuelos	  de	  la	  Sierra	   9171	   9330	   Salas	  de	  los	  Infantes	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Junta	  de	  Oteo	   9186	   9209	   Medina	  de	  Pomar	  Junta	  de	  Río	  de	  Losa	   9187	   9908	   Valle	  de	  Losa	  Junta	  de	  San	  Martín	  de	  Losa	   9188	   9908	   Valle	  de	  Losa	  Lences	   9193	   9272	   Poza	  de	  la	  Sal	  Palacios	  de	  Benaver	   9245	   9181	   Isar	  
9260	   Peñalba	  de	  Castrointo	   9174	   Huerta	  de	  Rey	  9278	   Puras	  de	  Villafranca	   9048	   Belorado	  9284	   Quintanalara	   9314	   Revilla	  del	  Campo	  9285	   Quintanaloranco	   9048	   Belorado	  9286	   Quintanamanvirgo	   9256	   Pedrosa	  de	  Duero	  9290	   Quintanarraya	   9174	   Huerta	  de	  Rey	  
9296	   Quintanilla-­‐Pedro	  Abarca	   9172	   Huérmeces	  9333	   Salgüero	  de	  Juarros	   9177	   Ibeas	  de	  Juarros	  
9336	   Sandoval	  de	  la	  Reina	   9247	   Villadiego	  
9341	   San	  Pedro	  Samuel	   9259	   Pedrosa	  de	  Río	  Urbel	  
9344	   Santa	  Cruz	  de	  Juarros	   9177	   Ibeas	  de	  Juarros	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9364	   Sedano	   9905	   Valle	  de	  Sedano	  9367	   Solduengo	   9043	   Barrios	  de	  Bureba	  9402	   Valcavado	  de	  Roa	   9321	   Roa	  9420	   Las	  Vesgas	   9043	   Barrios	  de	  Bureba	  
9436	   Villahizán	  de	  Treviño	   9247	   Villadiego	  
9453	   Villanueva	  de	  Río	  Ubierna	   9906	   Merindad	  de	  Río	  Ubierna	  9474	   Villorejo	   9181	   Isar	  
9475	   Villorobe	   9463	   Villasur	  de	  Herreros	  
12019	   Ballestar	   12093	   Puebla	  de	  Benifasar	  
12030	   Bojar	   12093	   Puebla	  de	  Benifasar	  
12047	   Corachar	   12093	   Puebla	  de	  Benifasar	  
12062	   Fredes	   12093	   Puebla	  de	  Benifasar	  16076	   Colliga	   16078	   Cuenca	  16201	   Sotos	   16909	   Sotorribas	  
16252	   Villanueva	  de	  los	  Escuderos	   16078	   Cuenca	  16260	   Villar	  del	  Maestre	   16910	   Villar	  y	  Velasco	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17072	   Fonteta	   17902	   Forallac	  17131	   Peratallada	   17902	   Forallac	  17235	   Vulpellach	   17902	   Forallac	  18019	   Ambroz	   18911	   Vegas	  del	  Genil	  18026	   Belicena	   18911	   Vegas	  del	  Genil	  18156	   Pinos	  del	  Valle	   18159	   El	  Pinar	  18166	   Purchil	   18911	   Vegas	  del	  Genil	  19012	   Alcorlo	   19269	   La	  Toba	  19137	   Hinojosa	   19265	   Tartanedo	  19253	   Secarro	   19901	   Semillas	  
19276	   Torrecilla	  del	  Ducado	   19256	   Sienes	  19315	   Villacadima	   19065	   Cantalojas	  22038	   Aso	  de	  Sobremonte	   22059	   Biescas	  22138	   Lanuza	   22204	   Sallent	  de	  Gállego	  22219	   Serraduy	   22129	   Isábena	  24013	   Salas	  de	  los	  Barrios	   24115	   Ponferrada	  24048	   Castrofuerte	   24220	   Villaornate	  24072	   Fresnedo	   24064	   Cubillos	  de	  Sil	  
24075	   Galleguillos	  de	  Campo	   24139	   Sahagún	  24085	   Joara)	  into	  Sahagún	   24139	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24111	   Pedrosa	  del	  Rey	   24130	   Riaño	  
24128	   Renedo	  de	  Valdetujar	   24183	   Valderrueda	  24138	   Saelices	  del	  Río	   24051	   Cea	  24186	   Valdeteja	   24177	   Valdelugueros	  24195	   La	  Vega	  de	  Almanza	   24004	   Almanza	  24204	   Villacé	   24212	   Villamañán	  
24220	   Villaornate	   24902	   Villaornate	  y	  Castro	  26116	   Poyales	   26058	   Enciso	  26156	   Trevijano	   24146	   Soto	  en	  Cameros	  
27036	   Neira	  de	  Jusa	   27901	   Baralla	  (changed	  its	  name	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  70s)	  34065	   Cozuelos	  de	  Ojeda	   34004	   Aguilar	  de	  Campoo	  
34085	   Herreruela	  de	  Castillería	   34056	   Cervera	  de	  Pisuerga	  34111	   Nestar	   34004	   Aguilar	  de	  Campoo	  
34128	   Perazancas	   34056	   Cervera	  de	  Pisuerga	  
34226	   Villanueva	  de	  Henares	   34004	   Aguilar	  de	  Campoo	  
37084	   Carbajosa	  de	  Armuña	   37093	   Castellanos	  de	  Villiquera	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37093	   Castellanos	  de	  Villiquera	   37130	   Forfoleda	  
37220	   Navarredonda	  de	  Salvatierra	   37131	   Frades	  de	  la	  Sierra	  
40011	   Aldeanueva	  del	  Monte	   40170	   Riaza	  40027	   Becerril	   40170	   Riaza	  40096	   Grado	  del	  Pico	   40024	   Ayllón	  40116	   Madriguera	   40170	   Riaza	  40133	   Moraleja	  de	  Cuéllar	   40149	   Olombrada	  40137	   El	  Muyo	   40170	   Riaza	  40147	   El	  Negredo	   40170	   Riaza	  
40169	   Riahuelas	   40079	   Fresno	  de	  Cantespino	  40175	   Saldaña	  de	  Ayllón	   40024	   Ayllón	  
40187	   Santibáñez	  de	  Ayllón	   40024	   Ayllón	  40209	   Turrubuelo	   40032	   Boceguillas	  40217	   Valvieja	   40024	   Ayllón	  40226	   Villacorta	   40170	   Riaza	  42138	   Peñalcázar	   42148	   La	  Quiñonería	  44202	   Rudilla	   44125	   Huesa	  del	  Común	  47072	   Gomeznarro	   47085	   Medina	  del	  Campo	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47107	   Padilla	  de	  Duero	   47114	   Peñafiel	  47136	   Rodilana	   47085	   Medina	  del	  Campo	  47202	   Villaesper	   47197	   Villabrágima	  
49074	   Fornillos	  de	  Fermoselle	   49264	   Villar	  del	  Buey	  49217	   Tardobispo	   49151	   El	  Perdigón	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Table	  IIIAd.	  Merging	  of	  municipalities	  to	  enable	  
comparison	  across	  elections.	  Origin	  correspond	  to	  the	  
local	  administration	  of	  1982;	  the	  merging	  ocurred	  
between	  1982	  and	  1986,	  unless	  indicated	  
ORIGIN	   DESTINY	  
Official	  codes	   Official	  names	   Official	  codes	   Official	  names	  
1026	   Iruña-­‐Trespuentes	   1901	   Iruña	  Oka/Iruña	  de	  Oca	  4025	   Benínar	   4029	   Berja	  (since	  1984)	  5004	   Alamedilla	  del	  Berrocal	   5019	   Ávila	  5028	   Bernuy	  Salinero	   5019	   Ávila	  5050	   Carpio	  Medianero	   5903	   Diego	  del	  Carpio	  5146	   Narillos	  de	  San	  Leonardo	   5019	   Ávila	  5250	   Urraca	  Miguel	   5019	   Ávila	  5255	   Vicolozano	   5019	   Ávila	  9031	   Avellanosa	  del	  Páramo	   9902	   Valle	  de	  Santibáñez	  9158	   Hinojar	  del	  Rey	   9174	   Huerta	  de	  Rey	  9263	   Pesquera	  de	  Ebro	   9905	   Valle	  de	  Sedano	  9278	   Puras	  de	  Villafranca	   9048	   Belorado	  9364	   Sedano	   9905	   Valle	  de	  Sedano	  9475	   Villorobe	   9463	   Villasur	  de	  Herreros	  16260	   Villar	  del	  Maestre	   16910	   Villar	  y	  Velasco	  19012	   Alcorlo	   19269	   La	  Toba	  19276	   Torrecilla	  del	  Ducado	   19256	   Sienes	  22005	   Aínsa	   22907	   Aínsa-­‐Sobrarbe	  24072	   Fresnedo	   24064	   Cubillos	  de	  Sil	  24111	   Pedrosa	  del	  Rey	   24130	   Riaño	  27036	   Neira	  de	  Jusa	   27901	   Baralla	  (changed	  its	  name	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
	   386	  
the	  70s)	  37084	   Carbajosa	  de	  Armuña	   37093	   Castellanos	  de	  Villiquera	  37093	   Castellanos	  de	  Villiquera	   37130	   Forfoleda	  49074	   Fornillos	  de	  Fermoselle	   49264	   Villar	  del	  Buey	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Table	  IIIAe.	  Merging	  of	  municipalities	  to	  enable	  
comparison	  across	  elections.	  Origin	  correspond	  to	  the	  
local	  administration	  of	  1986;	  the	  merging	  ocurred	  
between	  1986	  and	  1989,	  unless	  indicated∗	  
ORIGIN	   DESTINY	  
Official	  codes	   Official	  names	   Official	  codes	   Official	  names	  
9080	   Castil	  de	  Carrias	   9048	   Belorado	  9475	   Villorobe	   9463	   Villasur	  de	  Herreros	  13099	   El	  Robledo	   13901	   El	  Robledo	  19012	   Alcorlo	   19269	   La	  Toba	  19276	   Torrecilla	  del	  Ducado	   19256	   Sienes	  24072	   Fresnedo	   24064	   Cubillos	  de	  Sil	  24111	   Pedrosa	  del	  Rey	   24130	   Riaño	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗	   In	   the	   file	   associated	   with	   the	   general	   elections	   of	   1989,	   only	   one	   merging	   was	  necessary.	   Thus,	   the	  municipality	   of	   Pedrosa	   del	   Rey	   (24111)	  was	  merged	   into	   the	  municipality	   of	   Riaño	   (24130).	   There	   is	   no	   need	   to	   merge	   municipalities	   in	   the	  elections	   thereafter,	   corresponding	   with	   years	   1993,	   1996,	   2000,	   2004,	   2008	   and	  2011.	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Table	  IVA.	  CIS’	  time	  series	  used	  to	  locate	  political	  parties	  and	  coalitions	  in	  the	  ideological	  space	  	  Code	   Title	   Sample	   Wording	  A402010610	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  PSOE	  (National)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/National	  (with	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla)	   And	  in	  which	  box	  of	  that	  same	  scale	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties?	  A402010620	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  AP	  (National)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/National	   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  when	  talking	  about	  politics	  we	  normally	  use	  the	  expressions	  left	  and	  right.	  On	  this	  card	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  boxes	  that	  go	  from	  left	  to	  right.	  In	  which	  box	  would	  you	  locate	  the	  following	  parties?	  A402010630	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  PP	  (National)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/National	  (with	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla)	   And	  in	  which	  box	  of	  that	  same	  scale	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties?	  A402010640	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  IU	  (National)	   Idem	   Idem	  	  A402010360	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  PNV	  (Basque	  Country)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/Basque	  Country	   Idem	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A402010680	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  ERC	  (Only	  to	  those	  who	  answer	  in	  Catalonia-­‐	  National)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/National	   And,	  using	  that	  same	  scale,	  please	  tell	  me	  where	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  one	  of	  the	  following	  parties	  or	  political	  formations?	  A402010850	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  CiU	  (Only	  to	  those	  who	  answer	  in	  Catalonia-­‐	  National)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/National	   Idem	  A402011910	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  Cs-­‐Ciutadans	  (Catalonia)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/Catalonia	   And	  in	  which	  box	  of	  that	  same	  scale	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties	  or	  coalitions?	  A402010420	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  BNG	  (Galicia)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/Galicia	   And	  in	  which	  box	  of	  that	  same	  scale	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties?	  A402010320	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  HB	  (Basque	  Country)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/Basque	  Country	   And	  using	  this	  same	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  10,	  could	  you	  tell	  me	  where	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  political	  parties	  that	  I	  am	  going	  to	  mention	  you?	  A402010310	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  EE	  (Basque	  Country)	   Idem	   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  when	  talking	  about	  politics	  we	  normally	  use	  the	  expressions	  left	  and	  right.	  On	  this	  card	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  boxes	  that	  go	  from	  left	  to	  right.	  In	  which	  box	  would	  you	  locate	  the	  following	  parties?	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A402010300	   Scale	  of	  ideological	  location	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  EA	  (Basque	  Country)	   Idem	   And	  in	  which	  box	  of	  that	  same	  scale	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties?	  A202030290	   Scale	  of	  nationalism	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  PP	  (Basque	  Country)	   Idem	   And	  using	  that	  same	  scale	  of	  Basque	  nationalism,	  where	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties?	  A202030380	   Scale	  of	  nationalism	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  PP	  (Galicia)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/Galicia	   And	  using	  that	  same	  scale	  of	  Galician	  nationalism,	  where	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties?	  A202030440	   Scale	  of	  nationalism	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  PP	  (Catalonia)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/Catalonia	   And	  using	  that	  same	  scale	  of	  Catalan	  nationalism,	  where	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties	  or	  coalitions?	  A2020303330	   Scale	  of	  nationalism	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  political	  parties:	  IU	  (Basque	  Country)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/Basque	  Country	   And	  using	  that	  same	  scale	  of	  Basque	  nationalism,	  where	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties?	  A202030550	   Scale	  of	  nationalism	  (1-­‐10)	  of	  Catalan	  political	  parties:	  ICV/ICV-­‐EUiA	  (Catalonia)	   Spanish	  population/both	  sexes/18	  years	  old	  and	  older/Catalonia	   And	  using	  that	  same	  scale	  of	  Catalan	  nationalism,	  where	  would	  you	  locate	  each	  of	  the	  following	  parties	  or	  coalitions?	  
	   391	  
Figure	  IA.	  LISA	  significance	  map	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘voting	  for	  left-­‐wing	  parties	  or	  
coalitions’	  (LV)	  
(Randomization:	  999	  permutations.	  Significance	  filter:	  p=0.01)	  
	  Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	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Figure	  IIA.	  LISA	  significance	  map	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘voting	  for	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  or	  
coalitions’	  (RV)	  (Randomization:	  999	  permutations.	  Significance	  filter:	  p=0.01)	  
	  Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	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Figure	  IIIA.	  LISA	  significance	  map	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘voting	  for	  peripheral	  nationalist	  
parties	  or	  coalitions’	  (NAC)	  (Randomization:	  999	  permutations.	  Significance	  filter:	  p=0.01)	  
	  	   Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	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Figure	  IVA.	  LISA	  significance	  map	  for	  the	  variable	  ‘abstention’	  (ABS)	  











	   Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  from	  the	  Spanish	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	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Table VA. Inclusion criteria in the different territorial habitats for the Spanish 
municipalities 
HÁBITAT	   INCLUSION	  CRITERIA	  
Cities	  
It	  is	  considered	  as	  city	  every	  municipality	  that	  meets	  the	  following	  criteria:	  -­‐ A	  total	  population	  of	  at	  least	  15000	  inhabitants	  in	  year	  1910.	  -­‐ A	  total	  population	  of	  at	  least	  30000	  inhabitants	  in	  year	  1930.	  -­‐ A	  total	  population	  of	  at	  least	  30000	  inhabitants	  in	  year	  1981.	  -­‐ A	  total	  population	  of	  at	  least	  35000	  inhabitants	  in	  year	  2001.	  In	   the	   same	  way,	   it	   will	   be	   considered	   as	   cities	   every	  municipality	   being	   Provincial	   capital,	   although	  these	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  aforementioned	  criteria.	  
Peripheries	  
It	  will	  be	  considered	  as	  peripheries	  those	  municipalities	  included	  as	  part	  of	  a	  Big	  Urban	  Area	  in	  the	  Spanish	  Housing	  Atlas	  (2007).	  In	  this	  case	  Big	  Urban	  Areas	  are	  characterized	  by	  having	  at	  least	  one	  municipality	  of	  50000	  or	  more	  inhabitants	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  municipalities	  having	  1000	  or	  more	  inhabitants.	  
Small	  
urban	  area	  
Small	  urban	  are	  classified	  by	  two	  criteria:	  1.	  If	  they	  have	  10,000	  or	  less	  inhabitants	  in	  year	  2001.	  2.	  If	  they	  are	  classified	  as	  Small	  Urban	  Area	  Municipalities	  in	  the	  Spanish	  Housing	  Atlas.	  	  
Rural	  
This	  category	  includes	  the	  rest	  of	  municipalities.	  It	   is	  divided	  into	  three	  groups:	  manualized	  rural,	  agrarian	  rural,	   and	   deactivated	   rural.	   The	   criteria	   for	   this	   sub-­‐classification	   depends	   upon	   their	   social	   and	   labour	  structures,	  in	  accordance	  with	  an	  automatic	  classification	  criteria	  initiated	  with	  the	  following	  rule:	  
          -Every municipality taken into account must meet the requisite of not belonging to any of the urban 
categories. 
        -Every data concerning their social and labour structure belongs to the Population Census 2001, carried out by 








Municipalities	  meeting	  any	  of	  the	  three	  following	  conditions: -­‐ At least 30% of the occupied population being in manual or administrative labor. -­‐ At least 50% of the population being occupied. 




-­‐ Municipalities with more than 14% of their population occupied in agriculture. 
Municipalities simultaneously classified in two categories including the Agrarian rural category 
will prevail in this latter one.	  
Deactivated	  
rural	  
Municipalities	  meeting	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  next	  conditions: -­‐ Municipalities having less than 400 inhabitants. -­‐ Percentage of population aged 65 or more years greater than 50%. -­‐ Percentage of population being occupied less than 30% 









-­‐ When one municipality is classified in two or more rural categories it is established the 
following prevalence order: -­‐ Agrarian municipalities will prevail in the first place, Manualizaed in the second and 
Deactivated in the last place. -­‐ In the case that a municipality is not assigned to any category, this will be classified 
attending to the proximity of the centroids using a discriminant analysis technique. 
A small number of municipalities, 11, remained outside the classificatory system (usually newly 
created municipalities that do not have enough information).	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Table VIA. Distribution of the main social structural variables among the different 
territorial habitats of Spain 	   Rural	   Small	  urban	   Periphery	   Cities	  Deactivated	   Agrarian	   Manualized	  Mass	   Population	  mean	   Year	  1900	   1,162	   1,062	   1,710	   7,715	   3,047	   56,712	  Year	  2010	   515	   676	   1,986	   18,394	   21,860	   25,7905	  Density	   Density	   13,7	   14,1	   73,0	   316,1	   1,301,8	   2,161,5	  Evolution	   Balance	  (all)	   Natural	  2001-­‐10	   -­‐157,809	   -­‐28,677	   -­‐54,424	   159,880	   707,856	   263,666	  Migration	  2001-­‐10	   15,222	   -­‐3632	   743,177	   934,373	   2,332,945	   751,982	  Growing	   2001-­‐10	   -­‐1.2	   -­‐1.2	   1.3	   2.1	   3.6	   1.0	  Composition	   Ages	  (average)	   %	  <16	   7.1	   7.5	   13.2	   16.4	   17.6	   15.5	  %	  >65	   37.4	   33.9	   22.2	   16.4	   13.8	   17.0	  Studies	  (average)	   No	  studies	   43.9	   37.1	   29.5	   30.5	   21.2	   19.5	  >Primary	   38.7	   40.8	   53.3	   55.7	   64.8	   67.2	  
Labour	  structure	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Table VIIA. Distribution of the Spanish 
municipalities into the different habitats 
TYPE	   Number	  of	  Municipalities	   %	   Population	   %	  Deactivated	  rural	   3.017	   37,2	   1.555.051	   3,31	  Agrarian	  rural	   935	   11,5	   632.912	   1,35	  Manualized	  rural	   3.034	   37,4	   6.025.681	   12,82	  Small	  Urban	   377	   4,6	   8.213.644	   14,75	  Periphery	   679	   8,4	   6.934.689	   31,57	  City	   66	   0,8	   14.843.093	   36,20	  Not	  applicable	   11	   0,1	   17.021.758	   0,02	  TOTAL	   8.119	   100	   47.021.031	   100	  Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Population	  and	  Housing	  Census,	  2011	  (Spanish	  Institute	  of	  Statistics)	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Figure	  VA.	  Spanish	  territory	  divided	  into	  the	  different	  territorial	  habitats	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Source:	  Elaborated	  by	  the	  author	  with	  data	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Population	  and	  Housing	  Census,	  2011	  (Spanish	  Institute	  of	  Statistics).	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